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SUMMARY
This thesis investigates how (1) outcome knowledge; (2) 
information order influence judgement under uncertainty.
Previous research has indicated that when we know the outcome 
of some event (hindsight) perceptions are biased so that we see the 
outcome as more likely than when we do not have such knowledge 
(foresight). The major line of empirical enquiry in this thesis is to 
discover the conditions under which hindsight bias of this kind does 
and does not occur. In particular, an attempt is made to discover how 
information order effects hindsight bias.
The thesis is divided into three parts. In PART 1 the first 
chapter shows how hindsight bias is not an isolated phenomena but one 
which fits into a coherent body of research in cognitive social 
psychology. The second and third chapters critically review previous 
research on hindsight bias and information order respectively. t
PART II details eight experiments carried out which investigate 
the effect of outcome knowledge and information order on different 
types of judgement under uncertainty. Experiments 1 - 3  investigated 
the effect of outcome knowledge and information order on subjective 
likelihoods. Experiment 4 examined information order with respect to 
juror judgements. Experiments 5 - 7  used material describing contenporary 
social/political events. Experiment 8 used factual material about 
sex roles.
These experiments are discussed in PART III of this thesis, which 
consists of two chapters. In the first chapter. Chapter 13, a general 
discussion is given to the findings of the eight experiments. The 
last chapter in this thesis considers cognitive processes that may be 
involved in hindsight judgements and concludes by considering the 
implications of this research for a model of man as an intuitive scientist.
i
(xvi)
Our hindsight drastically prunes the 
possible paths events could have taken: 
our foresight can never be so efficient. 
(McCorduck, 1979, p.18).
)
1.
CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1. PERSPECTIVE
"Perhaps the historian’s most difficult handicap 
lies in his inevitable hindsight. It is true 
enough that only knowledge of what comes after 
makes him an historian, but that with which he 
can least dispense also most subtlely corrupts 
him. Since we know how things worked out we 
are twice tempted to suppose that they were 
bound to work out in this way, and consider the 
known outcome to be in someway 'right'. The first 
frees the historian of his basic duty to explain: 
if what happened was inevitable no thought is 
required in understanding it. The second makes 
him into a tedious defender of accomplished fact 
and leads him to consider the past only in the 
light of the present, the notorious weakness 
already denounced." (Elton, 1969, p99).
The above quote introduces an important theme of the following 
two chapters and of the empirical work reported in PART II of this 
thesis. People in possession of historical or outcome knowledge 
(hindsight), whether historians or lay people, have a privileged 
view of events —  they know what happened. Traditionally and 
intuitively such knowledge is believed to confer us with a "wisdom 
of hindsight". It is further believed that this knowledge allows 
us to make a more complete and insightful analysis of what went on 
than would otherwise be possible.
2Recent research (Fischhoff, 1975a,b; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; 
Fischhoff, 1977; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977; Wood, 1978) has seriously 
challenged this view, indicating that precisely the opposite may 
be the case. They found that judges given outcome knowledge, and 
thus operating in hindsight, perceived the outcome they believed 
to have occurred as more inevitable than judges who are operating 
in foresight and do not know how events turned out. This phenomena 
has become known as "hindsight bias" or the "knew-it-all-along" 
effect. It appears to confirm Elton's (1969) suspicions quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter. Historians, of course, are not the 
only group of people to view events from such a position. In everyday 
life people often attempt to understand events which have happened to 
them. Fischhoff's research, by the same token, would indicate that 
they too fail to benefit from the "wisdom of hindsight".
The importance and significance of this area of enquiry can be 
seen by taking some examples from international politics, and will 
serve to demonstrate why we need to systematically investigate the 
process of second guessing; that is the tendency for people to 
overestimate what they would have predicted in the same circumstances 
(Walster, 1967).
{1} Wohlstetter's(1962,1965) analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
in the early sixties and the bombing of Pearl Harbour in 1941 shows
that before each crisis occurred there was a wealth of information to
3.
indicate that such outcomes would obtain. Why she asks:
"with all this data didn't we know that Japan 
would attack Pearl Harbour on December 7th.
Why, when it seems so clear in retrospect, 
didn't we anticipate that Khrushchev might put 
medium range missiles in Cuba? Why didn't we 
seize the first indications that such install­
ations were on the way?" (Wohlstetter,1965,p694).
Recriminations have echoed down the years concerning why appropriate
measures were not taken at the time to avoid the almost disastrous
consequences in one case and the destruction of the Pacific Fleet in
the other case. Were the decision-makers at the time to blame? If
it was so obvious in hindsight, why was it not so in foresight?
{2} Correlli Barnett (1963), in his study of supreme command
in the First World War, says that:
"The statesmen of Europe....made frantic and 
genuine efforts in July (1914) to draw away 
from the slide into general war. It was all 
an illusion: they had no free will. Once 
Austria declared war on Serbia, Europe moved 
helplessly according to a deterministic fate"
(p27) .
Just how inevitable was this slide into general war? Was it perceived 
in this way by those in command before the war had become a fact, i.e. 
in foresight? If frantic and genuine efforts were made then one might 
think this not to be the case. Hermann (1972)discusses other research 
in social psychology relevant to this.
{3} Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy to Hitler in the 
mid 1930's failed to curb Hitler's expansionism, and led to a German 
image of Britain as soft on the major issue of war. This led Hitler
4to seriously miscalculate Britain's reaction to the invasion of 
Poland in 1939. In hindsight, historians have said that the 
appeasement policy could never have been successful and should 
have been realised at the time (Noguferes, 1963). One effect 
of this was for future governments to regard appeasement policies 
with suspicion, with a tendency to regard them as inappropriate 
in any situation. Thus Anthony Eden's approach to the Suez Crisis 
of 1956 was one of aggression rather than appeasement. After the 
event historians have argued that appeasement would have been a 
much more appropriate and successful policy under the circumstances.
The first two examples highlight how after the fact analysis 
may lead to serious bias. For example, Fischhoff & Marom (1976) 
criticised Janis' (1972) analysis of Pearl Harbour on the grounds 
that he fails to acknowledge the limitations of retrospective analysis. 
Janis attributes the failure to predict the outcome as a product of 
faulty decision-making and information search resulting from a 
phenomena he calls "groupthink". Fischhoff & Marom point out that 
he may be subject to hindsight bias himself with the consequence that
other important factors are ignored. That factors other than "groupthink"
)
need to be taken into account is lucidly demonstrated by Wohlstetter 
(1962,1965). She argues that although America had an unprecedented 
intelligence picture of the enemy there was so much 'noise' in the 
system at the time that it was not feasible for such an eventuality to 
be seriously considered or predicted. Only in hindsight could the 
"true signals" be sorted out from the "noise".
5The third example highlights a consequence of hindsight bias: 
our ability to learn from the past is impaired because, says Fischhoff 
(1975a):
"When we attempt to understand past events, we 
implicitly test the hypotheses or rules we use 
both to interpret and anticipate the world around 
us. If, in hindsight, we systematically under­
estimate the surprises which the past held and 
holds for us, we are subjecting those hypotheses 
to inordinately weak tests and, presumably, finding 
little reason to change them. Thus, the outcome 
knowledge which gives us the feeling that we 
understand what the past was all about may prevent 
us from learning anything from it." (p298-299)
This is elaborated upon by May (1973) who shows that analogies from
the past applied to current problems or crises may be inappropriate
because they are oversimplified. Furthermore, in trying to formulate
a policy of how to deal with the crises the analogy seized upon may
be unduly influential. One consequence of this is that the outcome
which occurred in the past, if undesirable, may be perceived as the
inevitable result of an incorrect approach to the present problem. This
results in the policy adopted in the past being seen as inappropriate
to the current crisis only because it failed to bring about the desired
result then. Such misuse of history abounds according to May (1973).
Ideally, one important task of anyone who makes use of historical 
knowledge, professional or lay person, is to provide an accurate 
reconstruction of events. This entails ignoring outcome knowledge and 
depicting things as they were in foresight. Logically there is no 
reason why this should not be achieved. In some sense it is demanded 
if we are to learn anything from the past and not be surprised by the
6future. If, however, hindsight confers spurious wisdom upon us 
and encourages a knew-it-all-along attitude it is questionable 
just how useful such an analysis will be when we are trying to 
understand and predict events in the future.
In this thesis, I attempt to establish the degree to which 
outcome knowledge biases people's perceptions of social events.
In addition, I attempt to discover some of the conditions which may 
encourage bias of this kind and some of the conditions which may 
serve to reduce or eliminate it. I have assumed that it will be 
important to consider the amount of information, type of information, 
and the order in which it is obtained. Consider, say, the task of 
an historian. Typically he first knows how some event turned out.
In seeking to explain why this happened, or why some other outcome 
did not occur he will search for relevant information from what is 
available. The way this information is searched for and the order in 
which he reads it are likely to affect the explanation which he gives. 
Furthermore, outcome knowledge itself will partially determine what 
type of information is searched for, how it is assimilated, and the 
way in which it is judged relevant.
*
The order in which information describing some event appears may 
be an important variable and have a strong influence upon perceptions 
and judgments. This may be equally true of the professional historian 
and ‘lay historian' interested in understanding or second guessing 
some past event. Consequently, the order in which relevant information 
is brought to a person's attention may have predictable and systematic 
influences upon how it is viewed.
7In. summary, then, this thesis has two themes running through it, 
one primary and one secondary. The primary theme is concerned with a 
detailed empirical investigation of how outcome knowledge (hindsight) 
affects people's perceptions and subjective likelihood assessments.
In addition, some attempt is made to specify the conditions under 
which the bias will and will not occur. The secondary theme concerns 
order effects. This is empirically investigated both with respect 
to outcome knowledge and in juror decision-making.
1.2. ORGANISATION OF THIS THESIS.
Research into hindsight bias is one aspect of the more general 
study of the biases and inferential errors which people make. Much 
of this research treats man as an "intuitive scientist" and is central 
to the area known as cognitive social psychology.
Chapter 2 takes as its theme social psychology's view of rational 
man. The research reviewed in this chapter includes cognitive 
consistency; information search, assimilation and opinion revision; 
heuristics of. thinking: bias in attribution, and, bias in prediction. 
This chapter serves two functions: it (1) attempts to show how a 
new paradigm to a rational model of man, man the intuitive scientist, 
is beginning to emerge. The intuitive scientist is characterised 
as using informal rules of inference and subject to serious biases;
(2) demonstrates that the hindsight bias, briefly discussed in 
this chapter and treated at greater length in Chapters 2 and 3, 
is not an isolated phenomena. The chapter shows how this bias fits 
in and interrelates with other biases and inferential errors of the
intuitive scientist.
8Chapter 3 provides a detailed review of the empirical evidence 
investigating the effect of outcome knowledge and reporting hindsight 
bias. This chapter casts a critical eye over the six published studies 
and finds a number of serious methodological shortcomings.
Chapter 4 reviews representative research on order effects 
because four of the eight experiments reported in PART II of this 
thesis take information order as their main theme. Three of the 
experiments investigate information order with respect to hindsight 
judgments. The fourth investigates order of information and order 
of witnesses with respect to testimony in a rape trial..The effects 
upon j uror's perceptions of guilt and innocence are the focus of 
attention here.
This latter experiment, was run and included in this thesis 
for four main reasons. Firstly, it is a logical progression to go 
from looking at order effects within judgment under uncertainty to 
looking at them on their own. Secondly, most experiments which have 
investigated order effects in juror judgment have presented an 
inadequate characterisation of courtroom proceedings to mock jurors. 
This is discussed in detail in Section 3.3. of Chapter 4. Thirdly, 
if order of testimony or witness is found to affect judgments then 
such results might have important implications for the legal system. 
Fourthly, and lastly, if order effects cure detected- an explanation 
of the cognitive processes involved would draw on similar material 
as those invoked to explain hindsight bias.
9.
%Part II of this thesis reports eight experiments designed to 
investigate the effect of outcome knowledge and information order 
upon social judgment. The first experiment, reported in Chapter 5, 
looks at how hindsight and foresight judgments are affected by the 
method of information presentation and order. The second experiment, 
Chapter 6, not investigating hindsight bias directly, looks at the 
time of giving outcome knowledge and information order. Chapter 7 
reports the third experiment which looks formally at information 
order and hindsight judgments. Chapter 8, the fourth experiment, 
investigates order of testimony and witness in a rape trial with respect 
to juror judgment. The fifth experiment, Chapter 9, makes use of a 
contemporary social event to look at judgments in foresight and hind­
sight. The sixth and seventh experiments. Chapters lo and 11 respect­
ively look at judgments in foresight and hindsight when personal 
involvement is high. In the case of Experiment 6 concerning the out­
come of a pregnancy test; in Experiment 7 Labour and Conservative 
subjects assessed possible outcomes to the May 1979 General Election.
The eighth and last experiment. Chapter 12, used factual materials 
about sex role differences in occupations to investigate foresight/ 
hindsight judgments.
1
Part III, the third and final section of this thesis, consists of 
two chapters. The first. Chapter 13, provides a general discussion to 
the experiments, focusing on the effect of outcome knowledge and 
information order upon judgment under uncertainty. Chapter 14 considers 
the cognitive and inferential processes that may account for the empirical 
findings. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the general 
implications for the model of man as an intuitive scientist and suggestions
for future research.
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PART I
SOCIAL INFERENCE; RATIONAL MAN, HINDSIGHT 
AND INFORMATION ORDER
' CHAPTER 2.
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY'S VIEW OF RATIONAL MAN
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is two-fold, firstly, to review some 
representative research from cognitive social psychology and judgment 
under uncertainty which is providing an alternative paradigm to the 
rational model of man; secondly, to show how hindsight bias is not an 
isolated phenomena but one that fits into a fairly coherent body of 
research. The chapter begins with a general characterisation of a 
rational model of man, discusses ways in which it is inappropriate when 
compared with actual performance, and then provides a general character­
isation of man as an intuitive scientist. The major part of this 
chapter, section 2.2, reviews research, including hindsight bias, which 
has contributed to this view of man. Finally, the chapter considers the 
nature of bias and error in social inference.
Social psychological research into human judgment, decision-making 
and attribution is providing a strong challenge to the deep seated and 
traditionally held view that man operates rationally in a complex and 
uncertain environment. The following quote from Shakespeare provides a 
good characterisation of this traditional view:
"What a noble piece of work is man. How noble in 
reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving, 
how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, 
in apprehension how like a god, the beauty of the world, 
the paragon of animals." (Hamlet, Act II, Scene 2).
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The image of man as noble in reason and intuitive in faculties is developed 
and expanded upon by economic theory. Here "economic man" in the course
of being economic, is also rational. Simon (1955) outlines the essential 
features as follows:
"This man is assumed to have knowledge of the 
relevant aspects of the environment which, if 
not absolutely complete, is at least impressively 
clear and voluminous. He is assumed to have a 
well organised and stable system of preferences, 
and a skill in computation that enables him to 
calculate, for the alternative courses of action 
that are available to him, which of these will 
permit him to reach the highest attainable point 
on his preference scale" (p99) .
Steinbruner (1974), in equating rationality with an analytic paradigm
depicts rational man as follows:
"The quintessential analytic decision-maker is one 
who strains toward as complete an understanding as 
possible of the causal forces which determine outcomes.
He seeks to predict the flow of events and, where he 
has a leverage to manipulate them to his advantage" (p35).
and
"The major postulate of analytic theories of decision 
holds that decisions will be taken which maximise 
value (utility) given the constraints of the situation"
(p28) .
In brief, rational man is regarded as an unbiased processor of 
information, objectively assessing all possible alternatives and using 
rules of inference which enable him to be successful at these tasks. 
However, as Abelson (1974) points out, this view, as seen by social
psychologists, is too presumptive, prescriptive and preemptive. Abelson
!
raises these criticisms because recent research in human judgment and 
decision making demonstrates that people's logical and mathematical skills 
together with their ability to process information, falls short of the 
demands of a complex and uncertain environment (for reviews see Dawes,1976
Fischhoff, 1976; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1977; Simon, 1957)
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In stark contrast to the rational model, recent research depicts 
people as reality bound, often unable to process the important features 
of the environment, let alone consider an event in the context of all 
possible outcomes (Slovic, 1972). This inability to represent a complex 
environment in a satisfactory way has given rise to the terms "bounded 
rationality" (Simon, 1957) and "limited subjective rationality" (Abelson 
1974). A number of factors account for this; human attentional and 
processing capacities are limited (Miller, 1956); the misuse of various 
heuristics (i.e. informal rules) of thinking (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); 
biases and errors in information search and assimilation (Nisbett & Ross, 
1980); bias in attribution (Ross, 1977); and biases in prediction 
(Fischhoff, 1980).
Identifying the tasks of decision-making and social inference has 
shown that even in relatively simple situations people are called upon to 
perform many tasks. They must identify and classify quite large amounts 
of information, retrieve information from memory, provide weights to 
information according to its reliability and validity, evaluate altern­
atives in relation to several criteria at once, and finally to decide 
upon a certain course of action. Accordingly, then, they adopt heuristic 
strategies to ease the "cognitive strain". Such strategies are seen as 
being potentially sub-optimal because they fall short of the demands of 
the analytic paradigm.
The current view of man's ability to operate in a complex and highly 
uncertain environment differs from that of Simon (1957) . His view, based 
upon the idea of "bounded rationality", depicts man as constructing an 
over-simplified model of the world but acting rationally towards it.
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He says:
"The first consequence of the principle of bounded 
rationality is that the intended rationality of the 
actor requires him to construct a simplified model 
of the real situation in order to deal with it.
He behaves rationally with respect to this model 
and such behaviour is not even approximately optimal 
with respect to the real world". (pl98) .
More recent research, however, depicts man as operating with faulty
logic as well as over-simplified representations of the world (Slovic,
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1977). The present view, then, depicts
people as "lacking the correct programmes for many important judgmental
tasks" (Fischhoff, 1976,p424) as well as being subject to limitations
in their central information processor.
It must be stressed that error and bias is not always the product 
of such strategies, they often lead to successful judgments or decisions. 
What this body of research asserts is that they are often misused or 
relied upon too heavily, when this occurs systematic shortcomings in 
social inference arise (Nisbett & Boss, 1980).
The question arises, as to whether a coherent paradigm in the 
Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1962) exists of man as an intuitive scientist.
In recent years a number of books have appeared which indicate that a 
competitor to the rational or analytic paradigm (Steinbruner, 1974) is 
slowly emerging. Jervis, (1976); Steihbruner,(1974); Nisbett & Ross (1980); 
Axelrod,(1977); Janis & Mann, (1977); May, (1973) all provide excellent 
examples of this. For example, Jervis (1976) analyses causes of misper­
ception in international politics by drawing upon much of the psychological 
theory and research in social psychology which is contributing to this 
new model of man. Drawing upon cognitive consistency principles, bias in 
information assimilation, attributional biases he seeks to explain, for
15.
example, why "images" (.intentions of another nation) are maintained 
when rational theories would predict that it is irrational to do so.
Kinder & Weiss (1979) argue that the literature is too disparate 
and "in no way form a neat well-integrated system of thought about 
decision-making" (p717).. However, with the publication of Nisbett 
and Ross (1980) it is probably justifiable to argue that there is more 
coherence and integration in theory and research than Kinder & Weiss 
admit. Whilst one would not want to say that a full-blown paradigm 
of human judgment and decision-making exists, there are strong indications 
that such a paradigm is emerging. The following section provides a 
detailed review of research indicating this.
Within this emerging paradigm researchers can be seen as employing 
two strategies: (1) attempting to provide an accurate description of 
how people actually perform; and (2) constructing normative models which 
have not been stated formally and which suggest that the analytic paradigm 
is inappropriate (e.g. Tversky, 1972; Kahneman & Tversky, in Press.
Tversky (1972) outlines a model of choice based on elimination by aspects. 
In this model he views choice alternatives as being composed of a set of 
characteristics. This model depicts people making choice by first pro­
viding weights to each of the characteristics. Then the most heavily
Iweighted characteristic or aspect is considered first in relation to 
the choice alternatives. Those alternatives which do not have this 
characteristic are eliminated. The second most heavily weighted charact­
eristic is considered next in relation to the remaining alternatives.
Those alternatives which do not possess this aspect are eliminated. This 
process proceeds until only one alternative is left. This then becomes 
the alternative upon which the decision is based. Elimination by aspects
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is .not an analytic model of choice because the procedure does not 
ensure that the superior alternatives are retained and the inferior 
ones eliminated. Thus there is no guarantee that such a procedure 
will not lead to bias and error. The model is normative in the sense 
that it provides a model of how one ought to go about making decisions. 
It also specifies a procedure which allows people to rationalise or 
justify their decision and how they reached it. It is not analytic 
because the assigning of weights and the selection procedure may not be 
objectively verifiable.
2.2. MAN AS INTUITIVE SCIENTIST
This section provides a detailed review of some of the research 
which depicts man as an intuitive scientist. It also locates and 
relates the hindsight bias in relation to this body of research.
An intuitive scientist uses strategies of judgment and information 
processing which, although generally successful, often lead to serious 
bias and error. This is because such strategies have no counterpart 
in a rational or analytic model of scientific endeavour. In the main, 
simple intuitive strategies are relied upon too heavily, whilst more 
formal, appropriate rules are often ignored or underused.
I
Five areas of research are considered in respect to this:
(a) the power of cognitive consistency; (b) information search, assimil­
ation and the revision of opinions; (c) heuristics of thinking; (d) bias 
in attribution; (e) bias in prediction. These areas are not conceptually 
distinct —  they overlap considerably —  but provide a useful structure. 
The review in each of these areas is not exhaustive. This is for two 
reasons, firstly, it is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis to
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do so; the empirical work reported in PART II looks in detail at 
hindsight bias and order of information. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate that hindsight bias is not an isolated 
phenonenon but one that fits into a large body of research which 
shows that people cannot and do not live up to the strictures of 
rationality. Secondly, such an enterprise would be too large an 
undertaking in the context of this thesis.
2.2.1. The Power of Cognitive Consistency.
"By the verdict of innumerable social psychological 
experiments people prefer to keep their actions, 
beliefs, attitudes and assorted cognitions mutually 
consistent. This innocent fact has vast repercussions: 
it means that we tend to interpret new information 
to be consistent with previous information."
(Kinder & Weiss, 1978, p718).
The above quote introduces two important points which have emerged from 
research on cognitive consistency: (1) Balance Theory (Heider, 1958) , 
Congruity Theory (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) and Cognitive Dissonance 
Theory (Festinger, 1957) all maintain that man acts in order to keep 
inconsistencies among beliefs, attitudes or thoughts and behaviour at 
a minimum; (2) such consistency is often achieved through biased 
information processing and information search. This section considers 
these points in relation to a general principle of cognitive consistency 
and, more importantly, lays the foundations for the subsequent section 
on information search, assimilation and the revision of opinions.
Consistency among beliefs or between attitudes and behaviour is 
an important assumption that man holds about what it is to be rational. 
Reduction of inconsistei -y to achieve a more "balanced" or "congruous"
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state comes about by appropriate adjustment of these cognitions.
It is the ways in which this is attained that interest researchers
in judgment and decision-making. Rather than following the rules of
logic the reasoning processes used are characterised as following rules
of "psychologic" (Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958). Irrationality does not
follow as an inevitable consequence of these rules, they may often prove
reasonable procedures provided that adequate justification can be given
According to Jervis (1976):
"Balanced attitude structures do not reveal 
irrationality if the cognitive consistency 
can be explained by the actor's well-grounded 
beliefs about the consistencies existing in 
the environment he is perceiving." (pll9) .
However, because rules of "psycho-logic" provide no guarantee that such
perceived consistencies exist in the environment, bias and error often
occur. Thus, according to Zajonc (1960) :
"{w}hile the concept of consistency acknowledges 
man's rationality, observation of the means of 
its achievement simultaneously unveils his 
irrationality." (p281).
The theories of Balance, Congruity and Cognitive Dissonance are 
too well known to warrant any detailed description of them here. Of 
interest in the context of the present chapter, and especially the next 
section, is what they have to say about the way consistency is achieved. 
Consequently, we will only consider the research from this perspective.
Balance Theory (Heider, 1946,1948) suggests that people do not 
just simplify the environment at random. They make as few changes in 
their cognitions as possible according to a principle of "minimum effort" 
(Rosenberg & Abelson, 196); Rosenberg, et at, 1960). A similar principle 
is suggested by Congruity Theory. Osgood & Tannenbaum (1955) state that
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"changes in evaluation are always in the direction of increased 
congruity with the existing frame of reference" (p43). Whilst it 
may be difficult to determine what the existing frame of reference 
is, as Eiser (1980) points out, the basic idea that the simplest 
means of achieving consistency remains. Non-random simplification 
of the environment to achieve consistency in this manner is the reason 
why, for example. Kinder & Weiss (1976) discuss information interpret­
ation under the heading of cognitive consistency. This provides added 
support to the views of Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein (1977),and 
Fischhoff (1976) discussed earlier.
Congruity Theory provides a further suggestion as to how consistency 
is achieved through simplification. It is that assertions or information 
will be disbelieved and ignored when they conflict with strongly held, 
divergent attitudes or beliefs (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Jones and 
Kohler, 1958). This is the well-known "correction for incredulity" and 
is similar to Sherif & Hovland's (1961) concept of "latitude of rejection" 
which has implications for ego-involvement, social judgment and attitude 
change.
Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) indicates two things 
in the context of the discussion here; (1) post-decisional dissonance
Iis reduced by the seeking of and selective exposure to information which 
provides evidence for the superiority of the chosen alternative (Brehm, 
1956; Ehrlich, 1957); (2) goals are inferred after the action has taken 
place. This retrospective inference of meaning allows people,according 
to Schütz,(1967) to provide much better rationalisations for decisions 
than would be possible before they were made. This follows from 
the account of consistency being achieved through "maximal simplicity",
20
discussed earlier. Furthermore, as Pfeffer (1978) emphasises, it 
is similar to some aspects of what Kelley (1971) has to say about 
attribution theory, as attributions are made after the behaviour 
has occurred. Such retrospective rationalisation also bears a strong 
resemblance to Janis & Mann’s (1977) concept of "bolstering", in which 
they characterise decision-makers as engaging in to avoid pre-decisional 
dissonance. This is discussed in detail in the next section because 
cognitive dissonance theory only recognises post-decisional dissonance.
In order to discuss strategies of reducing pre-decisional dissonance we 
first need to establish it exists. It is more appropriate to do this later.
In summary, the family of consistency theories (Balance, Congruity 
and Dissonance) all indicate man to dislike, and seek to reduce, inconsist­
ency among cognitions. This is often achieved by biased information pro­
cessing and information search. The next section examines the "power 
of cognitive consistency" in relation to this.
2.2.2. Information Search, Assimilation and the Revision of Opinions.
The power of cognitive consistency to organise our cognitions implies 
that the way in which information is searched for, assimilated to pre­
existing "theories" and opinions revised will also come under its influence. 
This is so because people can be seen to adopt strategies which will enable 
them to avoid inconsistency in the first place. The model of man as an 
intuitive scientist implies that people hold "theories" about the social 
world. Such theories can be at a high level (constituting collections 
of beliefs and attitudes) or at a low level (constituting single beliefs 
or attitudes). In either case these preconceptions or theories will 
determine the way information is processed and assimilated. This section
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reviews some of the empirical evidence supporting these claims.
The concept of assimilation, used in the following discussions, 
bears a strong resemblance to Piaget's (1929) use of the term. For 
him new information is assimilated in such a way as to change the 
environment. Only when that information is "accommodated" does any 
change in the self or the person's "schemas" take place.
The claim that information is assimilated to fit with prescribing 
theories is not a new one, Bacon in 1620, for example, says the 
following:
"The human understanding when it has once 
adopted an opinion draws all things else 
to support it and agree with it. And 
although there be a greater number and 
weight of instances to be found on the 
other side, yet these it either neglects 
and despises, or else by some distinction 
sets aside and rejects, in order that by 
this great and pernicious predetermination 
the authority of its former conclusion may 
remain inviable."
That people hold on to opinions in the face of equally valid, conflicting 
evidence is demonstrated by the primacy effect in impression formation 
(Asch, 1946; Luchins, 1957; Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953). Professional 
scientists themselves are accused, by some philosophers of science, of 
holding on to theories in the face of overwhelming disconfirming evidence
I(Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975). If professional scientists 
exhibit such a bias then it is hardly surprising that research by social 
psychologists reports the same phemomena in the intuitive scientist.
Research into self-fulfilling prophecies (Jones,1977) demonstrates 
that expectations about ourselves and others influences both our own 
behaviour and that of others in such a way as to confirm these expectations 
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1979). Self-fulfilling prophecies operate in two
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ways: (1) where people see what they expect to. Chapman & Chapman 
(1969) show people perceive expected relationships in information 
when it is not there; (2) where an agent causes an actor to behave 
uncharacteristically but in a way expected by the agent (Snyder and 
Swann, 1978a,b; Snyder, in Press). Snyder & Swann (1978a), for 
example, show that a perceiver's falsely held beliefs about another 
person cause him to behave in a manner likely to confirm those 
beliefs. In testing out one’s beliefs, Snyder & Swann (1978a) argue 
"reality testing has become reality constructing" (pl59). According 
to Snyder (in Press):
"Confirmatory hypothesis-testing strategies 
may constrain targets to behave in ways that 
provide actual behavioural evidence that will 
appear to confirm the hypothesis under scrutiny"
(p25).
Labelling theory (Scheff, 1974) and the effects of stigmatisation 
(Goffman, 1963) provide good examples of this.
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that defective information 
search or biased exposure to consistency-maintaining types of 
information in order to bolster the chosen alternatives is the major 
way of reducing post-decisional dissonance (Festinger, 1964). What 
also appears to occur is that biased information processing takes
iplace before a decision is made. This happens because people 
experience pre-decisional dissonance as well. Empirical support for 
this comes from a number of studies, for example, Janis & Mann (1977); 
Fellner & Marshall (1970); Simmons et al (1973). Janis & Mann (1977) 
show,on the basis of numerous interviews with decision-makers, that 
people employ numerous "bolstering" tactics when appraising possible 
choice alternatives. One such tactic they discuss is that of
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"exaggerating favourable consequences" another is "minimising 
unfavourable alternatives" (p91). In the case of the former 
decision-makers are found to pay most attention to the favourable 
consequences of a choice alternative in order to justify the costs 
and risks involved. Such attention in itself may well make the 
favourable consequences seem more likely, as Carroll (1978) has 
shown. In the case of the latter tactic the decision-maker is found 
to characterise the undesirable outcomes to a preferred alternative 
as less bad than they really are, again allowing him to rationalise 
the costs and risks involved. To summarise, where people have 
preferences for certain alternatives it is often found that pre- 
decisional dissonance will arise as other alternatives may be 
objectively equally attractive. In order to reduce this dissonance 
"bolstering" strategies may be employed, this means that information 
search or assimilation may often be biased.
However, information assimilation to pre-existing opinions, beliefs 
or theories is not something that necessarily leads to bias. As Jervis 
(1976) points out "intelligent decision-making in any sphere is impossible 
unless significant amounts of information are assimilated to pre-existing 
beliefs" (pl45). However, circumstances arise in which people maintain
i
their theories or beliefs in the face of clearly discontinuing or contra­
dictory evidence (Schum, 1977; Engquist et al, 1976 ; Tucker & Rowe,1979; 
Erlhom & Hogarth, 1978; Wyer, 1977; Ross et al, 1975; Lord et al, 1979; 
Massad, Hubbard & Newson, 1979).
This position is summarised by Kinder & Weiss (1978), who say that 
"The pursuit of consistency becomes irrational as persistence and denial 
come to dominate openness and flexibility" (p7lO). Inappropriate 
perseverence of beliefs or theories is demonstrated in two studies by
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Ross, Lepper & Hubbard (1979) using a "total discrediting" or 
"debriefing" paradigm. Subjects were given the task of sorting 
suicide notes, distinguishing those which were authentic from those 
which were not. They were given one of three types of false feedback:
(a) success —  indicating that they had made much more accurate judgments 
than the average student; (b) failure —  indicating that they had made 
much worse judgments than the average student; or (c) average —  
indicating that they had been as successful in correct categorisation 
as the average student. Following this subjects were "debriefed" and 
told that the feedback they had received had been completely false. Ross, 
Lepper & Hubbard explained at length to the subjects that the feedback 
they had received had been pre-arranged and determined randomly. They 
even showed subjects the actual schedule which determined which of the 
above three conditions the subject had been assigned to and the pre­
determined feedback given. In short, subjects were told that the way 
they had classified the notes bore no relation to how the experimenter 
had informed them that they had classified the notes.
The results for both participants and observers revealed an 
extensive degree of post-debriefing perseverence. When asked how many 
answers (a) they thought they had got correct; (b) they would get correct 
on a second trial; (c) the average student would get correct; it was found 
that subjects in the success condition estimated a significantly greater 
number correct than subjects in the failure condition. Subjects in the 
average condition fell in between. Furthermore, subjects rated their 
own ability at such a task as greater when they experienced "success" 
rather than "failure". Observers, who watched actors perform the task
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also showed perseverence in a similar way. In a further attempt 
to reduce perseverence, the second experiment included a "process­
debriefing condition”. Here subjects received the same debriefing 
information as outlined above together with a description and 
explanation of perseverence itself. It was found that participants 
demonstrated little perseverence, but actors still showed the effect.
Further demonstration of perseverence is given by Ross & Anderson 
(1979). They and Ross, Lepper & Hubbard (1979) argue that perseverence 
reflects the operation of two processes in social-judgment. Firstly, 
that initial impressions, once formed, are difficult to change —  this 
relates to the primary effect in impression formation (see Chapter 4 for 
more detailed discussion). Secondly, and more importantly, they propose 
that "first impressions may not only be enhanced by subsequent biases in 
coding but may ultimately be sustained through such biases" (p889). In 
general then, once an initial scheme for assimilating and coding data is 
arrived at people are extremely reluctant to abandon it and formulate 
another.
The idea of a scheme is similar to Jervis' (1976) notion of an 
"image". He argues that one of the most important tasks for decision­
makers formulating foreign policy is to discover the intentions of the 
other nation. Jervis shows that 'images' of others' intentions determine 
how information is processed and that images are often retained, irration­
ally, in the face of overwhelming conflicting evidence.
Maintenance of beliefs or "theories" by biased assimilation of new 
information is demonstrated in a study by Lord, Ross & Lepper (1979).
They used the issue of capital punishment for murder and selected subjects 
who either strongly opposed or strongly favoured it. Both groups were 
shown two "real" studies, one supporting and one opposing its deterrent
effect, in a counterbalanced design. There were three main findings:
(1) the study which supported subjects' position was rated as more 
convincing and better conducted than the conflicting study; (2) if 
the first study subjects read supported their position it served to 
strengthen it; however, no change in opinions was found if the first 
study read opposed their position; (3) subjects were found to be more 
convinced of their view after reading both studies than before reading 
any of them.
The first two findings do not necessarily imply that irrational 
procedure for processing information is being employed. As Lord, Ross 
and Lepper (1979) point out: "our subjects' main inferential shortcoming 
...did not lie in their willingness to process evidence in a biased 
manner. Willingness to interpret new evidence in the light of past 
knowledge and experience is essential for any organism to make sense of 
and respond adaptively to, its environment" (p2107).
However, the third finding does constitute serious bias and a 
departure from rationality. To quote Lord, Ross & Lepper (1979), 
subjects' "sin lay in the readiness to use evidence processed in a 
biased manner to bolster the very theory or belief that "initially 
justified" the processing bias"(p2lo7). It is tempting to say that the 
subjects used a form of "grooved thinking", (Steinbruner 1974), and what 
Jervis (1976) calls "excessive and premature cognitive closure" (pl87).
Jervis argues in agreement with other research (for example, Bruner 
1957; Haber, 1966), that assimilation of information to pre-existing 
beliefs or theories is obviously necessary if decision-makers are to 
function at all in such a complex environment. However, it becomes 
irrational (i.e. excessive and premature cognitive closure occurs) when
such beliefs have become inappropriate. This occurs when relevant . 
information is ignored or discredited or when the rules for 
assimilating information exhibit bias. The two experiments outlined 
above demonstrate just such bias in assimilating and processing information.
In summary, Ross, Lepper & Hubbard (1975) and Lord, Ross & Lepper 
(1979) demonstrate that not only do beliefs, impressions, etc., persevere 
in the face of information which discredits the validity for holding them, 
but also that presentation of mixed evidence causes beliefs, impressions, 
etc., to be strengthened. Mahoney (1977) shows similar processes operating 
with professional scientists. He reports that journal article reveiwers 
are more critical of experiments which conflict with their own theoretical 
perspective than they are of experiments which confirm their own views.
In conclusion, the research reviewed in this section greatly extends 
and supplements the way in which the striving for cognitive consistency 
affects our judgments and decision-making processes. Perseverence and 
biased assimilation of information demonstrates that initially formed 
opinions and strongly held beliefs are maintained, often quite inappro­
priately, by the power of congitive consistency. In many cases our 
cognitive apparatus makes it easier for us to reduce complexity and
conflicting information by assimilating it to pre-existing beliefs, which
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we may have little or no grounds for holding. Such a strategy is often 
adaptive and correct, but at other times is the source of serious error 
and bias.
2.2.3. Heuristics of Thinking.
The ways in which we make judgments under uncertainty in a complex 
social environment does not appear to accord with rational models of man 
(Simon, 1957; Slovic, 1972; Abelson, 1974; Steinbruner, 1974; Nisbett 
and Ross, 1980). Rather than use formal rules of inference which, if
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correctly implemented, would guarantee success man is characterised 
as operating with a number of informal rules or heuristics of 
thinking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1971, 1973, 1974; Ajzen, 1977). These heuristics which are used to 
reduce potentially complex inferential tasks to more manageable, 
simpler judgmental operations, often lead to serious shortcomings and 
bias. Of course, they are often used with success. However, because 
they have no analogue in a formal model overuse and inappropriate use 
lead to undesirable consequences. This section describes some of these 
heuristics and indicates how they may lead to bias and error. Links 
with other biases and errors discusssed in other sections of this chapter 
are also indicated. The heuristics of thinking to be discussed provide 
explanations of the other shortcomings in social inference. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to provide any great detail to the 
latter consideration —  the interested reader is referred to Nisbett 
and Ross (1980); Tversky, Kahneman a Slovic, (1980) where greater 
discussion is given to this.
In making judgments, inferences and decisions, Tversky & Kahneman 
propose that people make use of simple intuitive heuristics rather than
using sophisticated, formal rules. Three heuristics —  availability,<
representativeness and anchoring and adjustment -- are examples of this. 
These are not explicit rules of thumb that people use but are "automatic 
and non-reflective and notably free of any conscious consideration of 
appropriateness (Nisbett a Ross, 1980, pl8) .
(a) The Availability Heuristic.
The availability heuristic is used by people when engaged in the 
task of estimating the frequency of some category or objects or the
probability of some event occurring. Simply stated, the frequency 
of a class or probability' of an event is judged by the ease with 
which relevant instances or occurrences can be brought to mind 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Availability is regarded as an "ecolo­
gically valid cue for the judgment of frequency because, in general, 
frequent events are easier to recall or imagine than infrequent 
ones" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973 p209). That is, experience
"has taught us that instances of large classes 
are recalled better and faster than instances of 
less frequent classes, that likely occurrences 
are easier to imagine than unlikely ones, and 
that associative connections are strengthened 
when two events frequently co-occur. Thus a 
person could estimate the numerosity of a class, 
the likelihood of an event, or the frequency of 
co-occurrances by assessing the ease with which 
the relevant mental operation of retrieval, 
construction or association can be carried out"
(Tversky & Kahneman, p208).
Bias and error occur with the use of the availability heuristic because 
factors other than frequency or probability (for example, the efficiency 
of memory search) affect the ease with which instances can be retrieved 
from memory.
Tversky & Kahneman (1973) report a number of studies which 
demonstrate how use of the availability heuristic may lead to bias.
In one study subjects were presented with the names of famous personalities 
of both sexes. Some of the names were better known than others. The 
task was to estimate whether the list contained more males or females 
and to recall the names on the list. It was found that subjects con­
sistently overestimated the frequency of the sex that had more famous 
names and recalled more very well known names than less well known ones.
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In another experiment subjects were asked to judge the relative 
frequency of two types of English words —  those beginning with 
the letter R or those where the third letter is R. Of 152 subjects 
105 judged words beginning with R to be more frequent. in fact words 
with R as the third letter are much more numerous. Bias due to 
availability occurs here because people find it easier to generate 
words beginning with the letter R than with R as the third letter.
The most available words are those which are generated easiest and 
hence frequency estimation is biased.
For similar reasons Coombs & Slovic (1978) show that newspaper 
reporting of more dramatic and exciting causes of death leads people 
to perceive those causes of death as more frequent than less dramatic, 
rarely reported ones. In fact, the latter causes are often more 
frequent than the former. Lichtenstein et al (1978) provide additional 
support for this.
Rothbart et al (1978) show that people with more extreme personality 
characteristics were judged (wrongly) to appear more frequently than those 
with "mild characteristics" in an impression formation task. They argue 
that extreme characteristics are more available from memory because of
their vividness. This is a similar explanation to that of Coombs and
l
Slovic (1978); Lichtenstein et al (1978).
Estimating the probability of occurrance of some social event or 
outcome can also be influenced by the availability heuristic. This 
may be due to the ease with which relevant stories, senarios or "scripts" 
(Schank & Abelson, 1977) can be brought to mind. How plausible such 
scenarios are, the number of relevant scripts that can be imagined, or 
the difficulty in producing scenarios may all affect likelihood assess­
ments through availability.
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This is demonstrated by Ross et al (1977). They found that 
subjects who were provided with a causal explanation as to why some 
event should occur from a specified set of antecedent events gave 
higher likelihood assessments to that outcome than those not provided 
with a causal explanation. Carroll (1978) has gone even further and 
shown that just asking subjects to imagine an event turning out in 
a certain way increases its perceived likelihood. Taylor & Fiske 
(1975, 1978) generalised this and showed that any strategy which 
focuses people's attention on potential causes affects their judgment.
Future expectations can also be biased by the availability of 
instances from past experience. Slovic, Kunreuther & White (1974) 
show that protection against natural hazard, such as flooding, is 
often inadequate because people are unable to imagine how future 
floods could be any different from ones they have experienced. Thus 
precautions are taken which would be successful with past floods but 
not necessarily able to cope with future ones. Slovic & Fischhoff 
(1979) make a similar point with respect to hazard management in 
nuclear energy.
In summary, availability appears to be a widely used inferential 
tool. Its misuse and inappropriate application leads to bias. In
i
general, the availability heuristic is most likely to be used when 
individual instances, scenarios, etc., are used to judge the frequency 
or probability of events. When generic features come to the fore the 
representative heuristic is most likely to be employed. It is to 
this that we now turn.
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(b) The Repreaentativaness Heuristic.
The representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972,1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) is used to judge the probability of an event 
or a sample "by the degree to which it is: (i) similar in essential 
properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient 
features of the process by which it is generated" (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1972,p431) . This heuristic permits people to simplify inferential 
judgments to ones of simple similarity. An event or instance will be 
assigned to one category rather than another depending upon the degree 
to which its salient features represent that category rather than 
another. In relying on this heuristic, people tend to pay greater 
attention to more salient, vivid and redundant features of an event 
rather than base their judgments on more diagnostic information such 
as base rates and the reliability and validity of the data.
Kahneman & Tversky (1972) report a number of studies demonstrating 
how the inappropriate use of representativeness leads to biased sub­
jective probability estimates. In one study, for example, subjects 
were shown the following sequences of coin tosses:
(i) H T T H T H (ii) H H H H T H and (iii) H H H T T T.
They were then asked to estimate the likelihood of each. The three 
sequences are equally likely, however, subjects chose the sequence which 
they thought best represented a random process of generation. In 
consequence, (i) was perceived as more likely than either (ii) or (iii). 
People appear to expect the essential characteristics of a process of 
chance to be represented in small samples. The "gamblers' fallacy" —  
where deviations occurring in one direction are expected to be balanced 
by deviations in the opposite direction —  is another example of the 
representativeness heuristic being misapplied. Deviations are not
corrected, but diluted. In another study, Kahneman & Tversky show 
how the use of representativeness leads people to ignore prior 
probability of occurrences or base-rate information when making 
judgments. Here subjects were provided with short personality 
descriptions of a number of people who, they were told, had been 
drawn at random from a group of lOO engineers and lawyers. In one 
condition subjects were told that the group consisted of 70 engineers 
and 30 lawyers. The subjects' task was to assess the probability 
that a personality description belonged to an engineer or a lawyer.
It was found that probability estimates reflected more their 
stereotypes of lawyers and engineers and how representative the 
description was of these rather than any attention being paid to 
base-rate information. Misuse of representativeness also accounts for 
poeple's misconception of regression (i.e. that output should be 
representative of input). Furthermore, Kahneman & Tversky (1973) have 
shown that people's confidence in predictions increases as redundancy 
increases. Redundant information is treated as diagnostic because it 
is perceived as representative.
In general, then, when people are engaged in predictive tasks 
requiring them to make subjective probability assessments the represent­
ativeness heuristic is greatly overused. More relevant and diagnostic 
base-rate information is often ignored. Recent research in attribution 
theory based on Kelley's (1967) covariation model has shown that people 
often ignore or underuse consensus information when making causal 
attributions (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida,Crandall & Reed, 
1976). Consensus information in attribution theory is equivalent to 
base-rate information in prediction and judgment tasks.
Base-rate or consensus information is not totally ignored 
however. Certain conditions have been found to encourage its use.
For example, when (a) it is given a causal interpretation (Ajzen,
1977; Wells & Harvey, 1977); (b) social desirability for the infor­
mation is high (Zuckerman, 1978); (c) the base-rate information is
about the self (Hansen & Donoghue, 1977); (d) making discrete pre­
dictions rather than subjective probability estimates (Manis et al, 
1980). Base-rate information is also found to be used by asking 
subjects to make repeated judgments (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 
1979), and by making information concrete rather than abstract 
(Carroll & Siegler, 1977).
In summary, representativeness is used by the intuitive scientist 
to assess the likelihood of some event given information of some other 
state of affairs. Judgments made in such a manner relate features of 
similarity between specific instances and generalisations. Perceptions 
of similarity often lead to bias because of the inappropriate use of 
representativeness. Discussion of the criteria by which people relate 
the representativeness of one event to another is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Tversky (1977), Bar-Hillel (in Press) provide some 
important insights into this.
I
(a) The Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic.
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
is where a decision to start with some "baseline" or natural starting 
point is made and explicitly revised in the light of new information. 
The original decision or "anchor" is one that the person may make 
himself or one that is suggested to him by somebody else. The revision 
or "adjustment" is often inadequate, as Tversky & Kahneman (1974) show,
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because'usually it does not take sufficient account of the new 
information. This results in people being biased towards their 
original decision or "anchor".
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) demonstrated this, by giving subjects 
an intuitive numerical estimation task, where, in 5 seconds, one 
group had to estimate the product of 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x l ,  
and another group was asked to estimate the product o f l x 2 x 3 x 4  
x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 .  The median estimate for the latter group was 512, 
for the former 2,250 (the correct answer is 40,320).
The phenomena of "conservatism", found within the Bayesian 
approach to opinion revision (see Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971 for a 
review) is a result of the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. 
Conservatism is where people, upon the receipt of new information, make 
smaller changes in estimates of probability than Bayes’ Theorem would 
prescribe, although the changes are in the right direction (Peterson 
and Beach, 1967; Phillips & Edwards, 1966). Subjects do not make as 
much use of this new information as this normative standard would 
prescribe. This is an example of anchoring and adjustment because we 
can regard the prior probability as the anchor and the revision brought 
about by the new information as the adjustment. Conservatism, then, 
results from insufficient adjustment.
In terms of social inference and judgment the anchoring and adjust­
ment heuristic may be generalised from numerical prediction partly to 
explain the primary effect in impression formation (Asch, 1946) and 
perseverence in attribution (Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, 1979). In both 
these cases the anchor is the initial impression or opinion formed,new 
information does not cause sufficient change as prescribed by strictly 
logical standards.
.> } 1 ^ o
Anchoring, in the sense discussed above, is an important 
psychological concept because it is strongly related to theory 
maintenance and the power of cognitive consistency, as discussed 
in section 2.2.2. and 2.2.1. respectively. For example, maintaining 
a theory in the face of overwhelming conflicting evidence may be 
little more than a strategy aimed at reducing cognitive strain.
An "anchor" or prior theory has this benefit because it provides 
some framework for processing and searching for new information.
In such cases the anchor may and probably did have had adequate 
justification at the time. Bias enters because new information may 
indicate this to be unjustified. It is cognitively less demanding 
to make minor modifications to the original view than to make a 
radical reappraisal and formulate an entirely different view.
Anchoring and adjustment, then, like the other two heuristics 
is a strategy people use for reducing cognitive strain in tasks which 
potentially demand complex information processing. As a result of 
this and because it is an informal rule of inference it often leads 
to bias and error on the part of the intuitive scientist.
(d) The Causal Heuristic.
I
Ajzen (1977) proposes that, in addition to the above heuristics 
of thinking people hold intuitive theories of events and that the 
judgmental strategy allowing people to introduce these theories to 
explain events is a causal heurisitc. This means that in making 
predictions people give primary consideration to those factors which 
they believe could cause the event or behaviour to occur. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1977) argue this also. It follows that information
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or data which has no obvious causal significance for people will 
tend to be ignored.
This, Ajzen (1977) argues, is precisely what happens in experi­
ments which report base-rate information to be ignored when making 
predictions or judgments. To demonstrate that people use a causal 
heuristic he conducted three experiments in which base-rate inform­
ation was given causal significance. In one of these experiments 
subjects had to estimate the probability that Gary W. had passed 
a certain examination. In addition to subjects receiving a personality 
description of Gary W. they also received either"causal" or "non- 
causal" base-rate information. The causal base-rate information 
informed subjects that about 75% of students who took the exam had 
passed (or failed). The non-causal information had no direct 
implications as to how easy (or hard) the exam was. Here subjects 
were informed that an educational psychologist had selected a 
sample from those who took the exam in which 75% passed (or failed). 
Ajzen found that the causal base-rate information had a stronger and 
more correct effect on prediction of success (or failure) than non- 
causal base-rate information.
jThe intuitive psychologist's assumption that all events, social 
or otherwise, can be given a causal explanation may lead to severe 
bias as it is inappropriate in some circumstances. Consider Tversky 
and Kahneman's (1971) finding that people have inaccurate perceptions 
of the laws of chance. They found people to believe that a small 
sample drawn randomly from a population should be representative of 
the population itself. Hence, failure to find some significant effect
r
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in a replication experiment using a sample size of only half that 
of the original study may be expected. However, as Tversky &
Kahneman (1971) point out, the believer in the "law of small numbers" 
rarely attributes a deviation from expectation to variability.
Rather, he finds a "causal explanation for any discrepancy" (pl09).
The causal heuristic, then, has such power that discrepancies which 
should be expected on statistical grounds are actually seized upon 
and give an inappropriate, erroneous causal explanation.
(e) Hypothesis Confirmation.
The heuristics of thinking discussed so far —  availability, 
representativeness, anchoring and adjustment, and causality are 
supplemented by other strategies the intuitive scientist uses when 
searching for and retrieving information. In addition.to the earlier 
discussion of this, in section 2.2.2., which derives from the power 
of cognitive consistency, people can also be seen to use an "hypothesis 
confirmation” strategy. This is in contrast to a disconfirmation 
approach to hypothesis testing (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1965; Snyder and 
Swann, 1978a,b; Snyder,in Press). In addition a bias towards memory 
for confirmatory evidence is demonstrated in a study by Snyder and
(
Uranowitz (1978).
Here, subjects first read a detailed case history of a woman and 
were subsequently told that she was either a lesbian or a heterosexual 
Probing of information memorised by subjects showed that those who were 
told she was a lesbian remembered those aspects of her behaviour that 
were consistent with such a life style. In a similar way, subjects who 
believed the woman to be heterosexual remembered information consistent 
with that life style. Furthermore, incorrectly remembered material was
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biased towards behaviour consistent with the life style subjects 
believed the woman to follow. Information search, as well as 
retrieval, has also been shown to be biased in a similar way.
Snyder & Cantor (1979) showed that information search proceeds by 
a strategy of hypothesis comfirmation rather than disconfirmation.
These studies supplement and extend the discussion of self-fulfilling 
prophecies given earlier.
The use of the heuristics of thinking together with a confirmation 
strategy in judging the probability or frequency of an event will mean 
that the most available information will not only be influenced by 
such things as perceptual salience, vividness, concreteness, but also 
that positive instances will be more available from memory. Both 
because they will be more numerous and regarded as more diagnostic. 
Further, in imagining an outcome people will tend to imagine how it 
could come about rather than how it could not. The confirmatory bias, 
by the same token, will influence the representativeness heuristic in 
a similar way.
je) Summary.
This section has discussed some of the informal rules of thinking 
that people use in decision-making and judgment under uncertainty. It 
was shown that although they often lead to successful ways of reducing 
complexity and organising the environment they often lead to serious 
bias. Often the heuristics are overused or misapplied mainly because 
they have no analogue in a formal mod61. These heuristics, chiefly 
availability, and representativeness, are used to explain how some of 
the other biases and inferential shortcomings discussed in this
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chapter came about. Indeed, Nisbett & Wilson (1977) go so far as 
to say that our own explanations of the way in which environmental 
stimuli affect us are inaccurate. They say that these explanations 
reflect culturally or experimentally derived rules rather than actual 
cause-effect explanations. They contend that such "explanations" 
depend, to a large extent, upon availability and representativeness.
2.2.4. BIAS IN ATTRIBUTION.
In general terms attribution theory takes as its central concern 
the attempt to characterise how man understands and gives causal 
explanation to his own and others' behaviour. It is a model of man 
as an intuitive scientist which seeks to characterise his intuitive 
perceptions of causality.
Heider (1958) provided the initial impetus, and Jones & Davis (1965); 
Kelley (1967, 1972) developed the ideas in more formal and greater detail. 
Kelley's model is perhaps the most general for studying attributional 
processes; that of Jones & Davis deals almost entirely with internal 
attributions, and focuses on determining the circumstances which promote 
internal (dispositional) , or external (situational) attributions.
The fundamental principle within Kelley's model is that of co­
variation. This states that the intuitive scientist examines the presence 
or absence of three different types of information to determine the type 
of attribution made. The three types of information are: (1) consistency 
—  does the actor behave in the same way at different times? (2) dist­
inctiveness —  does the actor behave in the same way in many different 
situations? (3) consensus —  do other actors perform the same behaviour 
in similar situations? How these factors co-vary, Kelley claims.
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determines whether internal or external attributions are made.
High consistency, low distinctiveness and consensus make it more 
likely that internal attributions will be made. McArthur (1972) 
has provided the most elaborate test of the model and largely 
confirms the hypotheses derived.
Fischhoff (1976),in an important paper, has argued that 
"{Attribution researchers find people to be effective processors 
of information, who organise their world in a systematic manner 
prone to relatively few biases" (p419). More recent research however 
(e.g. Ross, 1977;1978) has concentrated on describing the ways in 
which peoples' perceptions of causality are biased and depart from 
normative criteria. This section briefly reviews four of these 
attributional biases —  the fundamental attribution error; actor/ 
observer differences; false consensus and self-serving biases. 
Finally, some reasons for these two opposing images of man derived 
from attribution research are discussed.
(a) The Fundamental Attribution Error.
The intuitive scientist suffers from a pervasive shortcoming 
called the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). This is the 
"tendency to underestimate the importance of situational determinants 
and overestimate the degree to which actions and outcomes reflect the 
actor's dispositions" (pl93-194). An experimental demonstration of 
this is provided by Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz (1977). In this study 
subjects were either assigned the role of questioner or answerer.
The questioner was asked to make up a number of questions from his 
own general knowledge, he then gave them to the other subject to
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answer. ' This procedure obviously puts the latter at a strong 
situational disadvantage, as the questioner can draw upon his own 
idiosyncratic store of general knowledge. Questioners, contestants 
and subsequent observers of the ’quiz’ were asked to rate the general 
knowledge of the questioner and contestant. It was found that the 
contestants and observers all rated the questioner as having superior 
general knowledge to the contestants. This was also true for the 
questioners, but less marked. These results show that perceivers 
ignored the situational determinants which gave such power to the 
questioner and laid too much emphasis on dispositional aspects of 
the questioner when making ratings.
Further evidence of the fundamental attribution error is pro­
vided by Bierbrauer (1979). In this study observers watched a 
re-enactment of Milgram's (1963) famous experiment, and then filled 
in a questionnaire designed to assess the amount of situational and 
dispositional attributions observers gave to the subject in the 
experimental enactment. It was found that observers failed to perceive 
the strong situational factors involved. They gave reasons for the 
'teacher' administering high shock levels in dispositional terms, thus 
holding him personally responsible.
The fundamental attribution error is found in both the intuitive 
psychologist and his professional counterpart. For example, Mischel 
(1979) argues that the failure to find cross-situational consistency 
by personality theorists and the unwarranted adherence to the primacy 
of dispositions can be seen as due to the fundamental attribution 
error. Mischel (1968) argued along similar lines but without the
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benefit of this research. Jervis (1976) argues that in forming 
and maintaining images of' other nations the policy-maker is apt to 
consider less the situational forces at work in interpreting their 
behaviour and more likely to attribute the behaviour to dispositions.
An explanation of why the fundamental attribution error should 
occur can be traced to at least two sources. Firstly, the tendency 
to ignore base-rate or consensus information when making predictions 
or attributions. This is so because such information concerns 
environmental or situational factors. Secondly, misuse of represent­
ativeness and availability. For example, a single piece of behaviour 
is viewed as representative of the behaviour the person normally 
engages in, and hence results in dispositional attributions.
(b) Actor/Observer Differences and the Fundamental Attribution Error.
According to attribution researchers, people asked to explain their 
own behaviour often do so in situational terms. Conversely, when asked 
to explain the behaviour of another person there is a tendency to 
attribute stable dispositions (Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals & Ward,1968; 
Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Maracek, 1973). Jones 
and Nisbett (1971 characterise this actor/observer difference as 
follows: "there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their
actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute 
the same actions to stable personal dispositions" (p80). This divergence 
in the perceptions of actors and observers is a special case of the 
fundamental attribution error, with actors being less susceptible to it
than observers.
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Actor/observer differences may be due to (a) bias,
(b) observers having a less complete picture than the actor does,
(c) the failure to make a distinction between reasons and causes 
(Buss, 1978; Locke a Pennington, 1980). Bias may arise when 
information is made salient because it is vivid or more available 
from memory. On the other hand actors have "privileged access" 
to information which observers do not have at all. Hence it is 
not obvious that this divergence between actors and observers is 
a bias.
Jones (1976) in considering the above points in more detail, 
describes the underlying processes that may account for these 
divergent perceptions. For example, actors are more aware and in 
touch with the exact situational forces that are working upon them. 
Observers, on the other hand, regard the actors' behaviour against 
the environmental background. Thus "different aspects of the 
available information are salient for actors and observers and this 
differential salience affects the course and outcome of the attrib­
ution process" (Jones & Nisbett, 1971, p85). This relates back to 
the "vividness" criteria discussed earlier in this chapter. To the 
extent that there is a difference in the information processed by 
actor and observer and that this difference is due to salience and 
vividness.the divergent perceptions may indicate bias. However, 
the actor does have "privileged access" to information that the 
observer does not. For example, the actor may know that he behaved 
in a similar way in similar past situations; if the observer does 
not know the actor very well or has never encountered him in similar
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situatibns, then he has to make attributions without this knowledge. 
This may encourage the observer to make dispositional attributions.
(c) Self-Serving Biases.
Attributions made by actors following success or failure at some 
task has attracted attention from attribution researchers. Research 
here has been directed at attempting to discover if actors attribute 
success to personal characteristics and failure to situational forces. 
Following from this the question of whether motivational or ability 
variables should be held responsible if internal attributions are made 
is investigated.
Initial research seemed to show that attributions are made for 
self-serving purposes (Streufytt & Streuf^rt, 1969; Miller, 1976; 
Bradley, 1978; Miller 1976). In contrast, Ross et al,(1974) and Miller 
and Ross (1975) argue that there is little empirical support for self- 
serving biases. Miller & Ross concede that there is some evidence 
consistent with the self-enhancement proposition (subjects take the 
credit for success) but explain it in cognitive rather than motivational 
terms. In their view "self-enhancing" effects arise because people 
(a) tend to expect their own behaviour to produce success; (b) discern 
a closer covariation between behaviour and outcomes in the case of 
constant failure; (c) misconstrue the meaning of contingency (p213). 
However, others disagree (e.g. Weary, 1979) and the debate is still 
going on.
Amidst the confusion of this area of research in attribution two 
things emerge: firstly, empirical support for self-serving biases is 
not unequivocal; secondly, whilst motivational explanations may be 
possible, there are good reasons for regarding the bias, when it occurs,
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as a product of faulty information processing and oversimplification.
(d) The "False Consensus" Bias.
Earlier in this chapter it was shown that base-rate information 
or consensus information tends to be underused or ignored in certain 
kinds of social inference, unless, for example, it is made causally 
relevant. Ross (1977) has argued that, in other kinds of social 
inference, "laymen tend to perceive a "false consensus", that is, 
to see their own behavioural choices and judgments as relatively 
common and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing 
alternative responses as uncommon, deviant and inappropriate" (p352). 
Accordingly, "the intuitive psychologist judges those responses that 
differ from his own to be more revealing of the actors' stable dis­
positions than those responses which are similar to his own" {ibid. p352) .
Ross, Greene & House (1977) report a series of experiments which 
demonstrate "false consensus" or "egocentric bias". In one experiment 
subjects were presented with four hypothetical choices (for example, 
whether or not they would allow comments they had made about a super­
market to be used in a TV commercial). Each subject had to estimate
how many of their peers they thought would agree or disagree; indicate)
what they themselves would do; and rate the traits of a typical individual 
who they thought would adopt each of the two choices. In accordance 
with the false consensus hypothesis it was found that subjects who 
chose a particular alternative estimated that response as more likely 
among their peers than the alternative choice. Subjects gave less 
extreme ratings to the "typical" person who they thought would make
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the same choice as them. They made more extreme ratings to the 
"typical" person who would make the alternative choice.
In another experiment, subjects were confronted with a situation 
that entailed real consequences rather than hypothetical ones. In 
this case the wearing of a sandwich board advertising a restaurant 
and walking round campus for 30 minutes with it on. Similar questions 
were asked of subjects as in the previous experiment. It was again 
found that perceptions of consensus among peers was strongly deter­
mined by their own behavioural choice. Trait ratings followed a 
similar pattern also.
Goethals, Allison & Frost (1979); Goethals & Darley (1977) 
provide further empirical support for "false consensus". For example, 
Goethals, Allison & Frost (1979) report three studies which demonstrate 
that people holding certain opinions believe a larger and more diverse 
group shared the same opinion than held different opinions. In one 
experiment, subjects asked to rate President Carter's performance as 
good, fair or poor overestimated the proportion of others that agreed 
with them. Furthermore, subjects perceived people whose opinions were 
the same as their own to be more diverse than those whose opinions 
differed from their own.
This false consensus effect, as Ross has argued (Ross, 1977; Ross, 
Greene & House, 1977) provides a partial explanation of why actor/ 
observer differences should occur. If the observer sees the actor's 
response as different to that h£ would make, the actor's behaviour may 
be labelled as "deviant" and treated as more diagnostic of the actor's
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dispositions than behaviour similar to his own.
One of the reasons why the false consensus effect occurs is 
that "it results from non-random sampling and retrieval of evidence 
and from idiosyncratic interpretation of situation factors and 
forces" (Ross, Greene & House, 1977, p299). Here the authors are 
arguing that biased information search, assimilation and retrieval 
occurs because people selectively expose themselves to certain groups 
of people —  often those that behave similarly to us. In doing so 
the most available and representative information that comes to mind 
when making judgments about opinions and behaviour is biased. The 
available instances and representative behaviours are mostly in 
agreement and consistent with our own.
In summary, the false consensus bias is a powerful source of 
error in social judgment and inference. It results from inadequate 
information search proceeding along the lines outlined in section 
2.2.2. of this chapter.
(d) Summary.
Having looked at the biases that occur in attribution we now 
return to the question raised at the beginning of this section. It 
will be recalled that Fischhoff (1976) , when reviewing the research, 
summarised the findings to date as follows: "{Attribution researchers 
find people to be effective processors of information who organise their 
world in a syste matic manner prone to relatively few biases" (p419) . 
From our discussion of the fundamental attribution error, actor/observer 
differences, self-serving biases and the false consensus bias, this
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would appear not to be the case. In the light of this evidence we 
might want to say that people are inefficient gatherers and 
processors of information who organise their world in a systematic­
ally biased way. Why is there this discrepancy in research findings?
One answer is that there has been a shift away from the early 
normative approach of Kelley’s (1967) analysis of variance cube 
towards description of actual attributional processes (Nisbett and 
Ross r 1980). Another, perhaps more substantial, reason concerns 
man's ability to detect co-variation. The early research (e.g. 
McArthur, 1972) presented information to subjects which was relevant 
and unbiased, and with co-variations that were specified in advance.
Thus the task of estimating co-variation between possible causes and 
effects did not arise. Also the early research does not look at the 
way in which the intuitive scientist goes about collecting, assimilating 
and retrieving information from memory and is not called upon to 
specify the type of information relevant to the problem. Once these 
aspects become the focus of attention with respect to estimating 
co-variacion, then, as earlier sections of this chapter have shown, 
bias and systematic error occur at every stage.
The classic phenomena of "illusory correlation" (Chapman & Chapman 
1967, 1969) shows that when people assess co-variation —  here inferring 
psychopathological personalities —  they use pre-existing hypotheses and 
theories in making judgments. Furthermore, Smedslund (1963) shows that 
the concept of correlation in the intuitive scientist relies almost 
exclusively upon the detection of the frequency of present-present 
instancies in judging relationships (this is a similar strategy to
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ally biased way. Why is there this discrepancy in research findings?
One answer is that there has been a shift away from the early 
normative approach of Kelley's (1967) analysis of variance cube 
towards description of actual attributional processes (Nisbett and 
Ross t 1980). Another, perhaps more substantial, reason concerns 
man's ability to detect co-variation. The early research (e.g. 
McArthur, 1972) presented information to subjects which was relevant 
and unbiased, and with co-variations that were specified in advance.
Thus the task of estimating co-variation between possible causes and 
effects did not arise. Also the early research does not look at the 
way in which the intuitive scientist goes about collecting, assimilating 
and retrieving information from memory and is not called upon to 
specify the type of information relevant to the problem. Once these 
aspects become the focus of attention with respect to estimating 
co-variacion, then, as earlier sections of this chapter have shown, 
bias and systematic error occur at every stage.
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hypothesis confirmation discussed earlier in this chapter). Hence, 
when attribution researchers do not specify co-variation in advance 
it is hardly surprising to find them subject to certain biases.
In summary, recent research reports extensive and pervasive 
sources of bias in attribution processes. This contrast with early 
findings has come about because researchers are now focusing their 
attention on describing the way in which the intuitive scientist 
collects, assimilates and retrieves information when making estimates 
of co-variation. Such considerations as the power of cognitive 
consistency and the use of various heuristics of thinking also 
contribute to an explanation of various attributional biases, most 
notably the fundamental attribution error and the false consensus 
bias.
2.2.5. BIAS IN PREDICTION
Perhaps one of the most important tasks for the intuitive 
scientist operating in an uncertain environment is his ability to 
predict what is likely to happen in the future. As our environment 
becomes increasingly complex (Steinbruner, 1974) greater demands are 
going to be placed on our cognitive processes. We have already seen 
in previous sections of this chapter that the cognitive strategies 
employed by the intuitive scientist fail to take account of the degree 
of complexity existing in the world. It was found, for example, that 
predictions of social events often ignore base-rate information, con­
form to the "law of small numbers", misperceives causality (Chapman 
and Chapman, 1969), overuses or misapplies certain heuristics of
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thinking >(Kahneman & Tversky, -in Press). This section considers 
a number of other biases in prediction.
Before describing these other biases an important distinction 
between "process" and "effect" needs to be made. Cognitive processes, 
such as the heuristics of thinking, may have the result, through mis­
use of producing biases in prediction. Hindsight bias, which will 
be discussed in the next section, may itself be explained by 
"availability" and"representativeness!' However, the relationship 
between processes and effects is not unidirectional. For example, 
hindsight bias may play an important role in determining the availability 
of information on a future occasion. With the increasing amount of 
research into the model of man as an intuitive scientist this will 
become a focal point in the future. It is beyond the scope of the 
present chapter to give any more detailed discussion to this distinction. 
The final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 14) takes up this distinction.
(a) Hindsight Bias.
In predicting what we know or would have known we may cast our 
minds back to some past event and attempt to determine how accurately 
or likely we would have been able to foresee such an outcome obtaining. 
Our ability to do such a task and the confidence we feel about our 
accuracy, is important because it provides us with strong guidelines 
concerning what to expect in the future.
As discussed in Chapter 1, historians and those who make use of 
historical material view events from a privileged position —  they 
know how things have turned out (hindsight). We intuitively feel that
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hindsight confers us with some wisdom and, consequently, enables 
us to make a more accurate analysis of the event. This view has 
not been borne out by recent research. Fischhoff and his colleagues 
(Fischhoff, 1975a,b; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Fischhoff, 1977; Slovic 
and Fischhoff, 1977) and other researchers (Wood, 1978) have experi­
mentally investigated how possesion of outcome knowledge (hindsight) 
affects people's perceptions and subjective likelihood assessments 
of events. They report that being told how an event has turned out 
leads judges to perceive the outcome they believe has occurred as 
more likely than had they not known the outcome (foresight). This 
has been called hindsight bias or the "knew-it-all-along" effect.
This bias is reported to demonstrate that people are unable to 
ignore outcome knowledge when attempting to reconstruct a foresight 
state. Furthermore, this bias is regarded by Fischhoff (1975a) as 
seriously curtailing our ability to learn from the past, as indicated 
by the quote from Fischhoff (1975a) given in Chapter 1. In failing 
to realise how uncertain and surprising the past was, we may be less 
capable in assessing the likelihood of future events, and will, in 
turn, continue to be surprised by how they turn out.
Possession of outcome knowledge, and the increased subjective
)
likelihood assessments associated with it does not constitute bias 
per ae. An important conceptual distinction between "creeping 
determinism" and hindsight bias or the "knew-it-all-along" effect needs 
to be made. Fischhoff (1975a) hints at this distinction but fails to 
draw it out fully, and often confuses it in other papers (e.g. Fischhoff, 
1980). As will be shown, creeping determinism does not necessarily 
constitute bias, it may be entirely natural. However, the "knew-it- 
all-along" effect is a bias.
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Creeping determinism refers to the increased probability or 
likelihood that judges in hindsight assign to outcomes which they 
believe have occurred. It is a phenomena which occurs when judges 
are provided with outcome knowledge and only asked to assess the 
likelihood of that outcome (and others) in the light of the inform­
ation provided. Judges here are not requested to ignore outcome 
knowledge or to attempt to reconstruct a foresight state. Hindsight 
bias, on the other hand is where increased subjective probabilities 
are found for the outcome believed to have occurred (and decreased 
probabilities for those believed not to have occurred) when judges 
are instructed, in some form, to ignore the fact that they know 
what has happened. This applies whether judges are explicitly asked 
to ignore outcome knowledge when making subjective likelihood assess­
ments or asked to reconstruct a foresight state using less explicit 
instructions.
Contrasting the two, creeping determinism, may or may not be 
justified or rational, as we shall see. The "knew-it-all-along" effect, 
on the other hand, cannot be justified and is a true bias. Hindsight 
bias only exists if a person, in trying to reconstruct a foresight state, 
fails to adequately take account of the privileged view that outcome
Iknowledge provides.
Many events occur in which we are entirely justified in updating 
probability estimates in the light of outcome knowledge. For example, 
consider a research chemist who is trying to produce a new kind of 
chemical. Suppose that theory indicates that by combining two other 
chemicals in a certain way the desired chemical will be produced.
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Before the experiment is carried out the chemist may only feel 
65% certain that the reaction will go as predicted. The chemist 
carries out the experiment and obtains the desired chemical. As 
chemical reactions are subsumed under a determinist philosophy, 
the chemist would be justified, in hindsight, in saying that 
combination of the two chemicals in that way is virtually certain 
in the future to produce the desired chemical. If, on the other 
hand, we ask our chemist to cast his mind back to before the 
experiment was carried out and ask him to reassess the likelihood 
of the reaction going the way he predicted an estimate greater than 
65% would be evidence for hindsight bias. In short, when creeping 
determinism goes hand in hand with philosophical determinism the 
former may well be rational or justified.
In the case of social events or assessing one's own or others' 
factual knowledge, however, it is much more likely to be the case 
that creeping determinism is imposed upon rather than legitimately 
inferred from the available information. One reason for this concerns 
the unique nature of social events. No two events, however similar, 
can be said to be exactly the same. In summary, an important distinction
between creeping determinsim and hindsight bias needs to be made. TheI
latter is an inferential bias, the former may also be a bias but needs 
further considerations to demonstrate this is the case.
Having made this distinction we will now go on to examine some of 
the consequences and réunifications of hindsight bias. Fischhoff (1975) 
has shown that outcome knowledge exerts a strong influence over which 
antecedent items of information are perceived as relevemt to describing
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the event. This is an important finding, and one which requires 
further research, because information considered relevant in this 
way may be more easily assimilated. This would have the consequence 
of making it more readily available from memory on later occasions, 
so providing a complimentary explanation to the account given to 
biased information search and assimilation in section 2.2.2. of 
this chapter.
Two other consequences follow from the way in which hindsight 
biases perceptions of relevant information. First, in searching for 
information to explain why an event turned out as it did only inform­
ation confirming the outcome might be selected. Second, selective 
processing of relevant information might well serve to fuel the hind­
sight bias. If such information is more available from memory in the 
future causal explanations as to why it should have come about may 
be more easily constructed. The more plausible or greater number of 
causal explanations seem even more inevitable. Ross et al (1977); 
Carroll (1978), provide empirical support for this conclusion.
Hindsight bias can also be shown to influence the way in which 
future events are predicted. This can be seen most clearly by consider­
ing the two ways in which foreign policy-makers misuse history, 
according to May (1973). Firstly, in dealing with current events 
policy-makers are over-influenced by the way in which past events have 
turned out. Secondly, they oversimplify a current international crisis 
and relate it to the first past analogy that comes to mind without 
seriously considering the appropriateness of the analogy. For example,
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May argués that intervention in Korea in 1950 occurred because 
"the President and his advisers perceived a North Korean attack 
on South Korea as analogous to instances of Japanese, Italian 
and German aggression prior to World War II" (p52). Once an 
analogy has been made, May further argues, events and facts are 
seen as conforming to this image. We have already discussed 
earlier in this chapter sane of the cognitive processes that 
explain why this should happen. The point to be made here is that 
hindsight bias has a crucial role to play also.
In seizing upon an inappropriate or ill-considered analogy 
from the past policy-makers are too well aware of how it turned out.
If, in hindsight, the outcome is seen as more inevitable than it 
actually was in foresight, applying the analogy to current events 
will make a similar outcome, if the same measures are used, appear 
more likely than it actually is. Thus measures thought appropriate 
to avoid events turning out as they did in the past may be inappropriately 
applied to the current crisis. Consideration of policy making in inter­
national affairs provides dramatic illustration of the consequences 
of hindsight bias. However, there is no reason why the same or similar 
principles should not apply to domestic affairs and events in our own 
personal lives.
In summary, hindsight bias is a potentially serious inferential 
error on the part of the intuitive scientist. It may appear at all 
levels of social judgment, decision-making and prediction and lead to 
serious miscalculations, misperceptions and biased information 
processing. Chapter 1 of this thesis has demonstrated generally and
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by further illustrated example, the potential importance and
significance of this phenomena, little more will be said about 
it here. Chapter 3 provides a detailed review and critical 
evaluation of the experimental evidence for it. Further des­
cription of the methodology and findings is left until then.
A discussion and explanation of the cognitive processes involved 
is left to PART III of the thesis. Here it need only be mentioned 
that the heuristics of thinking of Tversky & Kahneman, information 
assimilation and retrieval, and attribution biases play a central 
role in this discussion.
(b) Other Biases in Prediction.
Further potential sources of bias in prediction stem from over- 
confidence in judgments (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1977) ; 
poor calibration (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977); value as a 
determiner of subjective probability (Slovic, 1966) and preference 
for concrete rather than abstract information when making pre­
dictions (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977).
Overconfidence in predictions is found when a person is not 
only requested to give some quantitative .estimate but also to indicate 
the degree of confidence he has in this estimate. Recent research 
has reported a consistent bias in confidence estimates. People have 
been found to be overconfident in evaluating how correct their own
Lichtenstein, 1977; Fischhoff & Slovic, 1976). For example, Fischhoff, 
Slovic & Lichtenstein (1977) asked subjects to estimate the likelihood 
that certain factual statements were true (for example, that absinthe
general knowledge is
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is a precious stone). They found that subjects who felt certain 
that a statement was true were often quite wrong.
The appropriateness of subjective probabilities is determined 
by their degree of calibration (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1976) . A well-calibrated judge 
is one who is correct, for example, on about half of the occasions 
that he assigns a subjective probability of 0.5 or odds of 1:1. 
Similarly, he is well calibrated if he is correct about three-quarters 
of the time he assigns a subjective probability of 0.75 or odds of 
3:1 and so on. Lichtenstein & Fischhoff (1977) report that judges 
seem to be quite well calibrated when odds are low (i.e. between 1:1 
and 3:1) but become less well-calibrated as the odds increase. For 
example, they find that subjects who gave odds of 1 x 106:1 or more 
were correct only 90% of the time. Thus instead of giving such high 
odds they should have been giving odds of around 9:1. Furthermore, 
Fischhoff & Slovic (1978) indicate that this over-confidence is 
difficult to counteract.
Over-confidence of this sort does have distinct psychological 
advantages —  it is one way in which we can organise and feel a 
certain amount of control over our environment. That it is often 
misplaced may lead to serious error because an outcome or consequence 
of a decision we think highly likely may form the basis of a decision 
or policy. That it is less likely and a greater degree of uncertainty 
exists means that it may too often go wrong.
One of the possible explanations for overconfidence may be that 
the value of an outcome or event may be important in determining our
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subjective probability of its occurrance. In general, bias in 
prediction may enter because certain states of affairs are desired. 
This idea has a long history, for example, McGregor (1938); Cantril 
(1938) both report that wishes and attitudes, among other things, 
are important determiners in the prediction of social events. More 
recent research has also found similar effects (Pruitt a Hoge, 1965; 
Slovic, 1963; Sevon, 1975; Milburn, 1978, Crozier, 1979). Milburn, 
(1978) for example, shows that in the prediction of future events 
positive, and hence highly valued, events were seen as more likely 
over time. Negative events were seen as less likely over time. For 
the four time periods 1980-1989; 1990-1999; 2000-2009; 2010-2019, 
subjects had to assess the likelihood of possible social events such 
as hunger and poverty no longer being a problem in the United States.
In addition to overconfidence and value the intuitive scientist 
has a preference for concrete rather than abstract information when 
attempting to make predictions (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Earlier in 
this chapter the research which demonstrated that people ignore 
base-rate information (even when it would provide more predictive 
power) was discussed. We now turn to consider how and why concrete 
or vivid information is preferred when making predictions. Nisbett 
and Ross (1980) argue that vivid information is more likely to be 
stored and recalled from memory than is more abstract, sta.tistical 
data. This may be so because such information has greater emotional 
interest, provides more detailed and specific knowledge and is more 
easily assimilated because it is perceived as having high causal 
relevance. Contributing to this is the Idea that actual experience 
of an event will have greater impact on prediction and judgment than
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will, say, second hand reports. This area has received little 
empirical enquiry from social psychologists to date, most of the 
evidence for this is anecdotal and derives from case histories 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). From what has been discussed earlier in 
this chapter it is easy to see why people pay more attention to 
vivid or concrete information. Such information is more readily 
available from memory, consequently those engaged in the task of 
prediction will be more influenced by it. This area should receive 
more attention from social psychologists in the future. The 
research will need to demonstrate, firstly, the extent of the 
preference for this type of information; and secondly, ways in 
which people can be encouraged to use more abstract data. Ajzen 
(1977), as previously discussed, has provided preliminary research 
into this. He demonstrated, it will be remembered, that giving 
base-rate information a causal interpretation results in it being 
used to a greater extent, and hence aids people to make more accurate 
predictions.
In summary, this section has indicated a number of serious 
shortcomings in the intuitive scientist when he is engaged in the task 
of prediction. Particularly important in its own right and from the 
point of view of this thesis is the reported bias of hindsight. Outcome 
knowledge, it was suggested,not only makes events seem more inevitable 
but provides a partial account for the biased search and assimilation 
of information discussed earlier in this chapter. Other biases in 
prediction discussed in this section may also have a direct bearing on 
hindsight bias. For example, the most available information in hind­
sight might well be that which is vivid rather than abstract. If the
abstract information indicates that another outcome might have 
occurred then it is even more .likely to be ignored when making 
retrospective analyses.
In general then, biases in prediction discussed in this 
section and referred to in other sections impose serious short­
comings on the intuitive scientist to operate effectively and 
efficiently in a highly complex and uncertain world.
2.3. BIAS AND ERROR
Throughout this chapter the idea of bias and error in the 
intuitive scientist has been a common theme. Little or no explicit 
consideration has been given to these terms; it is important to do 
so in order to establish more clearly what is meant by them and 
because it is going to become a major research area in the future 
(Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979).
Bias, as it has been used in this chapter and in the literature 
generally, does not refer to individual, idiosyncratic prejudices or 
oocur as a result of certain personality traits. It can be character­
ised as referring to systematic error which results from faulty or 
misused cognitive processes that people employ in social inference, 
judgment, prediction, etc. Systematic cognitive error of this kind 
may arise for two reasons: firstly, people may possess the correct 
programmes but cannot use them efficiently because their information 
processing capacity is severely restricted (Fischhoff, 1976).
Secondly, people do not possess the correct programmes to guarantee
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that systematic error will not occur. The research reviewed in 
this chapter is probably best described as resulting from the 
latter shortcoming. However, it is not merely that "people lack 
the correct programmes" (Fischhoff, 1976. p424), but that programmes 
have no analogue in any formal or rational model of inference or 
judgment. This additional qualification is needed because, as has 
been emphasised throughout the chapter, people are by and large quite 
successful. If they were just incorrect programmes they would have 
been abandoned long ago as they would not be adaptive and would lead 
to continual mis judgment. In the light of this Fj.schhoff's remark 
could, perhaps, be restated as follows: bias and error result from 
the same processes that are often successful, the programmes people 
use have no normative point of reference. Inappropriate use or mis­
use will often produce systematic error.
Bias is often detected because comparisons are made between 
a normative or rational model and the way in which people actually 
perform. Ignoring base-rate information, perseverence, hindsight 
bias, exemplify this. Such a comparison is the source of a potential 
problem though: in order to assert that systematic deviations occur 
it is necessary for the normative models to be correct themselves.
A recent controversy highlights this problem. It will be recalled 
that use of the representativeness heuristic often leads to bias as 
base-rate information may be ignored or paid insufficient attention 
to. Cohen (1979, 1980) argues that the normative model used to predict 
how people should make such statistical judgment is based on the well- 
developed Pascalian theory of probability. Essentially, he is 
concerned to demonstrate that if a Baconian theory of probability is
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people appear to perform in accordance with its principles, 
ot intended to discuss any of the details of this. For the 
suffice it to say that 'bias' in the intuitive scientist 
pendent upon which normative model one uses for conparison.
The discussion of bias as systematic error resulting from 
jpropriate use of non-normative 'programmes' and "systematic, 
sistent and predictable departure of person perception processes 
outcomes from processes or outcomes prescribed by a particular 
adel" (Schneider, Hastorf and Ellsworth, 1979, p.226), will receive 
iuch greater attention in the future. The above discussion has 
served to indicate what we mean when we say that the intuitive 
scientist exhibits bias. But it is not enough, we need to know, 
in much greater detail, precisely what is meant by such a claim.
2■4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
« ... *r .rovided a review of representative research
based upon a mode, jf man as an intuitive scientist. The emphasis 
has been on the ways in which the intuitive scientist exhibits bias 
and error in social judgment, inference and prediction. The picture 
that emerges is not a flattering one - at every stage of social 
inference serious shortcomings have emerged.
The issue raised at the beginning of this chapter can now be 
addressed: does the work reviewed here contribute an alternative . 
paradigm to the rational one? One line of evidence for accepting
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such a view comes from the change in emphasis in recent research 
in attribution. In 1976 Fischhoff characterised research on 
attribution and judgment under uncertainty as follows:
"Attribution researchers find people to be 
effective processors of information who 
organise their world in a systematic manner 
prone to relatively few biases. Judgment 
researchers reveal people to be quite inept 
at all but the simplest inferential tasks 
—  and sometimes even at them —  muddling 
through life by gratuitously allowing for 
a lot of error" (p419).
Recent research in attribution, especially that by Ross and his 
colleagues, has dramatically changed this picture. Attribution 
researchers now find people prone to quite a large number of 
serious biases. In this sense the two areas of research have now 
merged and present a similar image of man. The main reason for 
this development, as indicated earlier in the chapter, is that 
attribution researchers, like judgment researchers, are describing 
the way man actually performs.
A further indication of the coherence of the empirical work 
comes from its application. A number of people from different 
disciplines are finding this literature rich and fruitful in 
explaining issues in their own field. This is evidenced by 
political scientists (e.g. Jervis, 1976; Steinbruner, 1974; Axelrod, 
1976) and philosophers of science (e.g. Goldman, 1978) and social 
psychologists applying it to provide an understanding of negotiation
(Morley, 1980)
Finally, it may be the case that a strong competitor to 
the rational paradigm, outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
is not present at the moment. However, the signs are that over 
the next few years such an alternative will have emerged.
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
OF HINDSIGHT/FORESIGHT JUDGMENTS
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Fischhoff and his colleagues were the first to formally 
investigate the effect of outcome knowledge upon subjective likelihood 
assessments. They found, as indicated in the previous chapter, that 
judges who were given outcome knowledge, and thus operating in hindsight, 
perceived the reported outcomes as more likely than judges who did not 
know how events turned out, i.e. operating in foresight. Conversely, 
there was some indication that outcomes reported not to have happened 
were seen as less likely by hindsight than foresight judges. This 
latter finding is reported as being less consistent than the former 
one.
Fischhoff has labelled this perceived inevitability of events 
"hindsight bias". It will be recalled from the previous chapter that 
a distinction between hindsight bias and creeping determinism was 
made (see pp 52 ). Because of the importance of this distinction
for what follows it will be briefly described again here. Hindsight 
bias can only be said to occur when a judge is told the outcome and 
asked to ignore this fact or to reconstruct a foresight state when 
making subjective likelihood assessments. Creeping determinism occurs 
when a judge is told the outcome and merely asked to produce subjective 
likelihood assessments in the light of this and/or other relevant
67.
information. In both cases there is found to be greater 
probabilities assigned to relevant outcomes by hindsight judges 
than foresight judges.
This chapter presents a detailed review of six papers 
(Walster, 1967; Fischhoff, 1975a; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975;
Fischhoff, 1977; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977; Wood, 1978) which 
empirically investigate this. These papers are divided into three 
categories according to the kind of material judges are provided 
with. (1) Experiments which use "laboratory material". Here 
subjects are provided with descriptions of social events which are 
either concocted by the experimenter or are true but unfamiliar 
historical episodes. Three of the six papers fall into this 
category —  Fischhoff, 1975a; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977; Walster,1967. 
(2) Experiments making use of contemporary social or socio­
political events —  Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975. (3) Experiments where
material of a factual nature is presented to subjects. Here, for 
example, judges are presented with a word plus its definition or 
a factual statement and asked to assess the probability of its 
being true (or false). Two papers —  Fischhoff, 1977; Wood, 1978 
—  are of this type.
i
The above categorisation is adopted for two main reasons:
(1) it provides a useful way of conceptualising the experiments 
and allows useful and critical comparisons to be made. For example, 
it is found that the strongest evidence for hindsight bias comes 
from experiments using factual material. (2) The experiments 
described in PART II of this thesis also conform to this framework.
68.
The detailed review which follows adheres to a similar 
pattern for each of the papers considered. First, the experiment(s) 
reported in each is briefly described and the results summarised.
Second, a critical evaluation of the methodology and statistical analysis 
is given. Last, an overall evaluation of the paper is made. The 
chapter finally assesses the extent and magnitude of hindsight bias.
3.2. EXPERIMENTS USING LABORATORY MATERIAL 
3.2.1. Fischhoff (1975a)1
This paper reports three experiments which systematically 
investigate the effect of outcome knowledge upon judgments under 
uncertainty. The first is concerned with creeping determinism; the 
second and third with hindsight bias. Common to all three experiments 
are the event descriptions used (Mrs. Dewar in Therapy; The British- 
Gurkha Struggle; Near Riot in Atlanta; George in Therapy). Each was 
a passage of about 150 words with four possible outcomes specified.
In the hindsight conditions the "true" outcome was appended to the 
end of the event description. Subjects made likelihood assessments 
in terms of percentages and were instructed that the total for the
1 This study is reviewed first because it represents the first 
systematic attempt to look at judgmental differences in foresight 
and hindsight. Walster (1967), although chronologically earlier, 
does not have this as a central issue. Rather Walster's central 
concern is to investigate how knowledge of the consequences of 
another's decision affects anticipation of the outcome. Specifically, 
Walster tests the hypothesis that the more momentous the consequences 
of a decision the more subjects in hindsight would feel that they 
could have correctly anticipated it. She also investigates the idea 
that attribution of responsibility to the decision-maker will be 
greater when the consequences are more important. In short, her 
paper does not explicitly look at hindsight/foresight differences.
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Experiment 1 consisted of one foresight condition and four 
hindsight conditions (one for each outcome) for each event des­
cription. Table 3.1. presents the general design used in this 
experiment. Using an independent measures design, subjects in 
all conditions were asked to "evaluate the probability of occurrance
Table 3.1. General Design of Experiment 1 in Fischhoff (1975a).
four outcomes to any event description had to be lOO per cent.
Foresight Hindsight
1
Hindsight
2
Hindsight
3
Hindsight
4
OUTCOME
A
"True"
OUTCOME
B
"True"
OUTCOME
C
"True"
OUTCOME
D
"True"
Cells with "True" indicate this to be the outcome hindsight judges 
were told occurred.
of each of the four possible outcomes in the light of the information 
appearing in the passage" (p289). The important point to note here 
is that subjects in the hindsight conditions were not being asked to 
ignore the fact that they know what has happened or to attempt to 
reconstruct a foresight state. The experiment, then,focuses on the 
question of how knowing how an event has turned out influences people's 
assessments of both that outcome and the outcomes reported not to have 
happened. Fischhoff found that, in accord with creeping determinism, 
reporting an outcome increased its percieved inevitability.
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Experiment 2 investigated how aware people are of this 
tendency to see outcomes to events as more inevitable when 
knowing how they have turned out. Using the same event descriptions 
as in Experiment 1, but only running hindsight conditions (i.e.
1 - 4 in Table 3.1, not the Foresight condition) and getting one 
subject to assess outcomes for each of the four event descriptions, 
Fischhoff provided subjects with the instruction " to respond as 
they would have had they not known the outcome". That is, subjects 
are being asked to ignore outcome knowledge when assessing the 
likelihood of the outcomes to the event description. In analysing 
the results Fischhoff compared these assessments with those given 
in Foresight in Experiment 1. He found hindsight assessments to be 
consistently and significantly higher than corresponding foresight 
ones. This, he argues, indicates that once people know how an event 
turned out they are unable to accurately reconstruct a foresight state. 
In short, they are biased.
Experiment 3 extends this line of enquiry to see whether the 
hindsight bias is present when subjects are asked to respond as they 
thought other people would who were not in possession of outcome 
knowledge. Here subjects were asked to make assessments "as would, 
other students who did not know what happened". In this experiment 
there was one foresight condition and four hindsight conditions 
(one for each of the four possible outcomes to an event description).
As in Experiment 2, each subject made appropriate judgments for each 
of the four event descriptions. The results again showed hindsight
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estimates for the outcomes believed to have occurred to be con­
sistently higher. Fischhoff argues that this indicates that 
subjects respond as they believe they would have done and not 
as others would have had they not known the outcome.
In all three experiments subjects were also asked to make 
relevance judgments. They assessed, on appropriate seven point 
scales, "how relevant or important each datum appearing in the 
event description was in determining the event's outcome (p289). 
Generally, it was found that outcome knowledge influences perceived 
relevance. Items which had a direct bearing on a reported outcome 
were provided as much more relevant and diagnostic than items of 
information which did not have a direct bearing on the outcome(s) 
hindsight judges believed had occurred.
Two main criticisms to these experiments can be made, one 
concerns demand characteristics (Wood, 1978), the other concerns the 
experimental design and subsequent analysis of the second experiment 
described above.
(a) Demand Characteristics and Hindsight Bias.
Demand charcteristics2 (Orne, 1959; 1962; 1967) of the experi­
mental situation is concerned with the way in which subjects perceive
Psychological research into the role of the subject in psychological 
experimentation has been investigated from a number of perspectives.
As well as demand characteristics such things as bias in subject 
selection (Smart, 1966), the volunteer subject (Rosenthal, 1965), 
experimenter bias (Rosenthal, 1966,1967), and the problem of deceiving 
subjects (Kelman, 1967) have all been reported to have significant 
and largely undesirable influences on the performance and responses 
of subjects.
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the research and the way in which they focus on certain 
unintended cues when deciding how to respond. Orne contends 
that subjects are likely to "respond in a manner which is likely 
to support the hypothesis being tested" (Orne, 1972, p779).
A problem of demand characteristics is only appropriate to 
Experiments 2 and 3 described above. The main problem centres 
around the fact that subjects, in the hindsight condition, are 
given a piece of information (here outcome knowledge) and then 
asked to ignore it when making likelihood assessments and 
relevance judgments. The question that arises is what subjects 
make of this "ignore" instruction. The subject might quite 
justifiably ask himself —  why give this information to me in 
the first place if X am supposed to ignore it? It might then be 
realised or reasonably guessed that this is the focus of the ex­
perimental hypothesis. Given the propensity, as mentioned earlier, 
for subjects to want to please the experimenter and produce results 
in line with his hypothesis it may be the case that the subjects' 
likelihood assessments, particularly to the outcome believed to 
have occurred, are so influenced. This would mean that the hind­
sight bias reported in Experiments 2 and 3 may be interpreted as 
the result of the demand characteristics of the experiment. 
Experiment 1 does not suffer from this problem as subjects are only 
asked to assess the likelihood of a number of outcomes to a given 
event in the light of all the information given. Where "all" here 
includes outcome knowledge. It might be the case that undue 
emphasis is placed on this but as long as creeping determinism
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is beihg investigated and not hindsight bias it can hardly be 
raised as a criticism. Wood (1978) also has a demand character­
istic interpretation of hindsight bias uppermost in his mind. He 
attempts to give subjects instructions to rule this out, but as we 
shall argue, is not particularly successful.
In summary, a demand characteristic interpretation of hind­
sight bias is a possibility given the nature of the instructions 
subjects are provided with. If true it would cast doubt upon the 
validity and generalisability of the experimental results. One 
important task, then, is to attempt to provide subjects with 
instructions which will be less susceptibile to this criticism.
(b) Methodological Considerations.
The main criticism here concerns the design of the second 
experiment. In contrast to the first one each subject is provided 
with each of the four event descriptions and asked to assess the 
likelihood of the relevant outcomes. The second experiment only 
contains four hindsight conditions (one for each of an event 
description), no corresponding foresight condition is run here.
Two problems arise from this, firstly, the legitimacy of comparing 
hindsight conditions in Experiment 2 with foresight in Experiment 1. 
Foresight subjects in Experiment 1 assessed the possible outcomes to 
only one event description. In contrast, hindsight subjects in 
Experiment 2 made four sets of assessments, one for each event 
description. Such things as learning effects, repeated exposure to 
the same instructions to ignore outcome knowledge may serve to enhance 
the demand characteristic interpretation. Furthermore, there may have
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been differences in the population samples used, Fischhoff uses 
students from a number of different universities. For the sake 
of thoroughness in Experiment 2 it would only have required an 
extra 20 subjects or thereabouts to run a comparable foresight 
condition. Given the small number of subjects required in relation 
to the large number used overall it is difficult to understand 
why such a "control" group was not incorporated into the design.
The third experiment does have a foresight condition, of necessity 
as the instructions differ from Experiments 1 and 2, so the above 
criticisms do not apply here.
The statistical analysis Fischhoff gives to the data in the 
three experiments also presents problems. In the summary tables of 
likelihood assessments in the three experiments means are given.
This implies that Fischhoff regards the data as being interval or 
ratio. Given this it would be appropriate to use parametric statist­
ical tests. However, in testing for differences between hindsight 
and foresight judgments he uses the sign test and the Median test. 
These are both non-parametric tests which reduce the data consider­
ably and are less powerful than parametric tests. Given that his 
sample size is large (around 20 in each cell) he can hardly argue 
that non-parametric statistics are appropriate on the grounds that 
he does not have a large enough number of subjects in each cell.
The problem is compound by the way in which subjects' responses 
are categorised in order to make data appropriate for the sign test.
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Fischhoff counts the number of times hindsight assessments are 
greater than the respective foresight ones for a certain outcome 
to an event description. If the former is greater than the latter 
a + sign is allocated, which indicates support of the hypothesis.
A sign test is then carried out on the total number of comparisons. 
This may be warranted in providing an overall picture but it 
gives no indication of the size of the effect. In a more detailed 
analysis, which might give this information, Fischhoff uses the 
Median test. Given that means are presented the most appropriate 
statistics would be the t-test or ANOVA. The statistical analysis 
used to look at foresight/hindsight differences in relevance 
judgments is paradoxical in the light of the above discussion. 
Relevance judgments, it will be remembered, were made on 7-point 
scales. With this kind of rating scale it is never clear whether 
the data should be regarded as ordinal or interval. However, 
Fischhoff treats it as interval and uses parametric statistical 
tests.
Overall the statistical analysis has a paradoxical air about 
it. Where he reports means and regards the data as interval or 
ration he uses non-parametric statistical tests. Where there is ; 
an element of doubt over whether the data is interval or ordinal 
he uses parametric statistical tests. This is a disturbing analysis 
by Fischhoff and leads one to speculate why he might have adopted 
such an approach. For example, in giving means it is usual to 
give standard deviations also. Perhaps variance was so large that
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parametric tests failed to yield significant results? Whatever 
the reason consistency would require that medians and not means 
be presented if non-parametric tests were used.
In summary, this review of the three experiments reported 
in Fischhoff (1975) demonstrates a number of shortcomings in a 
systematic attempt to investigate differences in foresight/hindsight 
judgments. The problems of demand characteristics, experimental 
design and statistical analysis indicate that the reported hind­
sight bias should be treated with some caution. The first two 
criticisms only apply to Experiments 2 and 3, the third to all 
three. Evidence for creeping determinism seems fairly compelling 
and would be even stronger if we could have more confidence in the 
statistical analysis. Evidence for hindsight bias meets with 
greater reservations. In general, before accepting the wider 
implications of hindsight bias we need to establish that it is more 
than an artefact and subject the hypothesis to more rigorous and 
thorough empirical investigation.
3.2.2. Slovic & Fischhoff (1977)
This paper again reports three experiments, which the authors 
claim "examine the existence and workings of hindsight bias in lay 
assessments of scientific research" (p544). All three experiments 
present subjects with short summaries of research reports. Each 
experiment will be briefly outlined and then critically evaluated.
Experiment 1 used four short (about 150 words) summaries of 
experiments representative of research in biology, psychology and
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meteorology. Foresight subjects were asked to assess the likelihood 
of two possible outcomes, and explain why each might happen. They 
were then asked to assess the likelihood that each of the outcomes 
would be replicated in all, some or none of ten subsequent replic­
ation trials of each experiment. Subjects in hindsight were informed 
of the outcome of the first trial of each experiment and asked to 
assess the likelihood of replication of the original result in all, 
some or none of ten subsequent trials of each experiment. Results 
indicated that those who had been told how the experiment had turned 
out on one trial (hindsight) thought it more likely that it would 
turn out in that way on future trials than those who had not been 
told how one trial of the experiment had turned out (foresight).
For six of the eight comparisons there was a significant difference, 
the other two being in the predicted direction.
Experiment 2 was similar to the first except that foresight 
subjects assessed the likelihood of only one of the two possible 
outcomes to each experiment. This was done in order to make hind­
sight judgments more comparable with foresight ones. Foresight 
subjects assessed the likelihood of all, some or none of lO sub­
sequent trials turning out this way If the experiment had turned 
out in such a way on the first trial. Hindsight subjects followed 
a similar procedure as in Experiment 1 but were also asked to explain 
how the study might have worked out the other way. For example, if 
they had been told that, in the case of the "Gosling Imprinting"
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experiment, that the gosling approached the goose, they were 
asked to explain why it might approach the duck (other outcome) . 
This was asked of subjects in an attempt to reduce hindsight bias. 
Results obtained were similar to those of the first experiment 
with the latter instruction having very little effect.
Experiment 3 was designed to counter criticisms concerning 
the brevity of the reports, hence subjects received full length 
manuscripts. For the foresight condition the report consisted of 
introduction and method sections; the hindsight condition consisted 
of these same two sections together with the results. In both 
conditions subjects had to assess; (a) the surprisingness of 
results (in hindsight the assessment concerned the reported result, 
in foresight it concerned the two possible alternatives); (b) the 
stability of results (i.e. how likely to be replicated). As pre­
dicted it was found that in hindsight subjects found the reported 
outcomes to be less surprising than foresight subjects. Also, in 
hindsight the reported outcome was believed to be more replicable 
than in foresight.
Two problems arise concerning what these experiments cure 
claimed to be testing. Firstly, as quoted earlier, the authors 
claim to be "examining the existence and workings of hindsight bias" 
(p544) . This is not so, however, due to the central concern being 
with the extent of replicability of an experiment given that one 
trial has turned out in a certain way. The problem here is that
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hindsight is confounded with people's tendency to generalise or 
view a small sample as representative of what would be the case 
in a population or large number of occurrances. This consideration 
derives from Tversky & Kahneman's (1971) "law of small numbers".
Their research demonstrates that people are biased towards seeing 
a small sample from some population as similar to the population 
in all important characteristics.
The second consideration which questions the claim that these 
experiments are investigating hindsight bias centres around the 
distinction made between hindsight bias and creeping determinism. 
Hindsight bias only occurs when people are instructed to ignore 
outcome knowledge when making judgments but are unable to do so 
(see Chapter 2, pp 52 ). In the three experiments described here
this was not requested of subjects. They were not asked to ignore 
the result of the first trial when assessing replicability, surprising­
ness, etc. In view of this the experiments can only, at most, be 
regarded as examining the existence and workings of creeping determinism. 
This means, again, as discussed in Chapter 2, that the results found 
here are not evidence of bias per se , it might be the case that the 
increased probabilities in hindsight are justified. The research needs 
to establish that they are not for their claim to be investigating 
hindsight bias to make any sense.
In summary, these experiments do not, as the authors claim, 
investigate hindsight bias. At most they are looking at creeping 
determinism. However, it seems much more reasonable to argue that
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they are an investigation of Tversky & Kahneman's law of small 
numbers.
3.2.3. Walster (1967).
The third and final experiment to be reviewed in this section 
is Walster's (1967) "second guessing important events". The paper 
reports two experiments, both concerned with examining how confidence 
in predicting consequences of decisions is affected by the magnitude 
of the consequences involved. Experiment 1 is concerned with a 
decision to buy a house. Experiment 2 with taking a job. Walster's 
main hypothesis was that the more serious the consequences the more 
outcome knowledge induces the feeling that the consequences should 
have been anticipated first time around.
Walster described three levels of financial gain (high, medium 
and low) for both types of decision. Subjects were asked to assess 
how likely they thought they would have anticipated the consequence 
they believed had occurred. They were also asked to assess the degree 
of responsibility they attributed to the person for the consequences.
In Experiment 1 a "no information" or control condition was included 
in which subjects were not told about the financial gain or loss that 
had occurred as a result of the decision to buy a house. In Experiment 
2 two control conditions were included, one similar to that in Experi­
ment 1, and one where subjects were not told whether a decision had
been made.
The> control conditions in Experiments 1 & 2 can be regarded as 
foresight conditions; where subjects are informed of consequences 
is equivalent to a hindsight condition. Results from both experi­
ments demonstrated that the greater consequences (financial gain 
or financial loss) the more subjects felt they would have been able 
to anticipate such outcomes themselves. No systematic relationship 
between the degree of financial loss or gain and attribution of 
responsibility was found. For control conditions Walster only 
reports probabilities assigned to various consequences. No direct 
analysis of "foresight/hindsight" treatments is made.
A number of points can be made about this study in relation to 
later investigations into differences between foresight/hindsight 
judgments. First, it does not directly investigate either creeping 
determinism or hindsight bias. However, if we do look at the experi­
ments from such a perspective we find that the 'hindsight1 conditions 
are similar to those of Experiment 2 in Fischhoff (1975a). The 
instructions given to subjects by Walster were "suppose you had been 
told everything about Mrs.W's decision (except, of course, whether 
she won or lost money as a consequence of her decision) . Do you 
feel you would have been able to guess whether or not the purchase , 
would have had good or bad consequences, just from your knowledge of 
the situation?" (p241). In effect subjects are being asked to ignore 
the fact that they know the financial consequences when making con­
fidence assessments, etc. Therefore we can characterise the experiments 
as implicitly investigating hindsight bias.
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ReConceptualised in this way the results show that greater 
hindsight bias is exhibited when the consequences of a decision 
are more momentous. This is so because "hindsight" subjects told 
of a financial gain anticipated less of a loss (the greater the 
gain the less loss anticipated), and subjects told of a loss 
anticipated greater loss (the greater the loss the more it was 
anticipated) . This pattern of findings is exhibited in both experi­
ments. These results would seem to suggest, in the absence of proper 
statistical analysis, that knowing how an event turned out leads 
people to be biased in that they thought they would have anticipated 
it in foresight. Because the experiments did not ask subjects to 
assess the likelihood of each of the six possible consequences direct 
foresight/hindsight comparisons cannot be made. Accordingly, the 
results can only be taken as tentative indications of hindsight bias.
3.2.4. Summary.
These three papers (Fischhoff, 1975a; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977; 
Walster, 1965) do not lend strong support to there being a bias of 
hindsight. Fischhoff (1975a). whilst systematically investigating 
foresight/hindsight judgments, suffers from three major shortcomings: 
that of a demand characteristic interpretation, inadequate experimental 
design and statistical analysis. Slovic & Fischhoff (1977), although 
claiming to be investigating hindsight bias, are, as discussed, looking 
at creeping determinism at most, and probably the consequences of the 
"law of small numbers" of Tversky & Kahneman (1971). Walster (1967) 
obliquely investigates hindsight bias but provides no more than an
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indication as to its existence. In all, then, these three studies 
do not provide strong support for a bias of hindsight.
3.3. EXPERIMENTS USING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL EVENTS
"Laboratory material", such as has been used in the three 
papers just reviewed, has provided some indication of the effects 
of retrospective analysis. However, it is of obvious importance 
to ensure that these findings do not occur solely in the laboratory. 
To this end it is, therefore, necessary to demonstrate that hindsight 
bias occurs in everyday life. Fischhoff & Beyth (1975) report an 
experiment which made use of contemporary socio-political events.
3.3.1. Fischhoff & Beyth (1975).
The socio-political events used by Fischhoff & Beyth (1975) 
to investigate hindsight/foresight judgments were President Nixon's 
1972 visits to China and the U.S.S.R. In contrast to the three 
studies just reviewed this one used a repeated measures design. 
Fifteen possible outcomes were described for each of the visits 
and subjects assessed the liklihood of each outcome for either the. 
visit to China or the visit to the U.S.S.R. Sometime after the visits 
had occurred, subjects repeated their tasks,presumably knowing how 
Nixon's trips had turned out (hindsight). They were instructed to 
try and remember the probabilities they had given in foresight, or 
failing that to reconstruct a foresight state and give probabilities
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they thqught they would have given before the visit had taken 
place. Some subjects made foresight judgments shortly before 
the visit and hindsight judgments either shortly afterwards (two 
weeks) or long afterwards (four months). A further experimental 
condition was run in which only hindsight judgments were made.
This "after-only" group was instructed to "reconstruct probabilities, 
giving the probabilities which you would have given on the eve of 
the visit". For each of the fifteen outcomes to each trip subjects, 
in hindsight, also indicated whether they thought they had happened 
or not.
The overall picture that emerged from the results was that two 
thirds of the subjects produced hindsight judgments in the predicted 
direction. In more detail, three quarters gave higher assessments to 
outcomes they believed had occurred. A much weaker results was obtained 
for outcomes believed not to have occurred. Here only fifty seven per 
cent gave lower assessments in hindsight. It was also found that the 
bias was more pronounced when hindsight assessments were made long after the 
visits had taken place than shortly after. In the "after-only" condition 
hindsight bias was shown by two thirds of subjects for events believed 
to have occurred, and just over fifty per cent for outcomes believed not 
to have occurred.
This experiment is much less susceptible to a demand characteristic 
interpretation of hindsight bias than Fischhoff (1975). This is because 
asking subjects to cast their minds back to before the outcomes of 
contemporary events such as President Nixon's visit to China is some­
thing we often do in everyday life. The request is not an unusual one.
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However, telling people how an event turned out and then asking 
them to ingore it, as with Fischhoff (1975a)is unusual and 
unreliable. It is unrealistic in the sense that subjects have no 
foresight state which they have experienced to attempt to cast 
their minds back to. With contemporary and experienced events 
we often try to imagine back to before the result was known in 
attempting to understand how it came about. By the same token, 
likelihood assessments made in this way can also be seen as some­
thing we often do. In short, the use of contemporary socio-political 
events within this paradigm has strong attractions due to the con­
fidence we might have in the validity of the findings showing hind­
sight bias.
Unfortunately, the statistical analysis of the data may be 
criticised because Fischhoff & Beyth adopt rather loose criteria 
in determining whether subjects showed bias or not. The procedure 
used was as follows: each of the subject's responses to the fifteen 
outcomes was divided up into two categories (i) those subjects 
believed happened, and (ii) those subjects believed did not happen.
For each category foresight (f) and hindsight (h) assessments were 
compared. If f < h and f > h for (i) and (ii) above respectively 
a positive (+) sign was allocated, indicating it to be hypothesis 
supporting. If, on the other hand, f > h and f < h for (i) and (ii) 
respectively a minus (-) sign was allocated, indicating non-hypothesis 
supporting. If f=h for either category a (o) was allocated, and the 
data subsequently dropped from the analysis.
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The‘next step was to sum the number of (+) and (-) for each 
subject. If there were found to be more (+) than (-) the subject 
was deemed to be hypothesis supporting, if there were more (-) 
than (+) the subject was deemed to be non-hypothesis supporting.
If the number of (+) and (-) was equal the subject was dropped 
from the analysis. Finally, an overall index was computed combining 
these two categories.
Table 3.2., reprinted from F.ischhoff & Beyth, shows the number 
of hypothesis supporting and non-hypothesis supporting subjects for 
the two categories, together with the overall index, for each of 
the experimental groups. Also shown in Table 3.2 are Z-values and 
the percentage hypothesis supporting subjects for each category and 
experimental group.
The first problem concerns the allocation of a sign (+, -, or o) 
to each outcome. This method fails to take account of the extent to 
which hindsight and foresight judgments differ. It may well have 
been the case that hindsight estimates were only slightly different
o to foresight ones. If true this method of analysis would overemphasise 
the strength of hindsight bias.
t !
The second problem concerns the procedure by which subjects are 
characterised as hypothesis supporting or not. Again the size of the 
differences are ignored when only the number of (+) and (-) for each 
category and overall for each subject is computed. This again may 
tend to overemphasise the extent of the bias. It may have been the 
case that subjects had only one more (+) than (-).
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Table 3i2. Results printed from Fischhoff & Beyth (1975,p8)
showing the number of hypothesis-supporting (+) 
and non-hypothesis-supporting (-) subjects for 
each experimental group and response category.
DATA FROM FISCHHOFF & BEYTH (1975)
Group I (N = 29)
CHINA: Shortly before, shortly after.
Believed Believed did Overall
happened not happen
+ 17 15 17
- 7 8 11
% + 70.8 65.2 60.7
Group II (N = 41)
CHINA: Shortly before. long after.
+ 30 15 26
- 7 22 14
% 81.1 40.5 65.0
Group III (N = 26)
USSR: Shortly before. shortly after.
+ 14 13 15
- 8 8 8
% + 63.6 61.9 65.2
Group IV (N = 41)
USSR: Long before, shortly after.
+ 30 15 19
- 5 24 13
%+ 85.7 38.5 59.4
Group V (N = 23)
USSR: Long before, long after.
+ 7 15 18
- 3 6 4
%+ 85.0 71.4 81.8
Table 3-2. (continued)
DATA FROM FISCHHOFF & BEYTH (1975)
Groups I,II,III,V Combined (N = 119) .
Groups I,III,IV,V Combined (N = 119) (In parentheses)
Believed Believed did Overall
happened not happen
+ 78 (78) 58 (58) 76 (69)
- 25 (23) 44 (46) 37 (36)
%+ 75.7(77.2) 56.9(55.8) 67.2(65.7)
Group VI (N = 27)
USSR: No before, shortly after.
+ 20 io 16
- 4 14 8
% + 83.3 41.7 66.7
Group VII (N= 27)
CHINA: No before, long after.
+ 16 13 14
- 5 13 12
%+ 76.2 50.0 53.8
Group VIII (N = 37)
CHINA: No before, long after.
+ 18 22 24
- 13 12 13
%+ 58.1 64.7 64.9
Groups VI ,VIII Combined (N = 64)
Groups VII,VIII Combined (N = 64) (In parentheses)
+ 38(34) 32(35) 40(38)
- 17(18) 26(25) 21(25)
%+ 69.1(65.4) 55.2(58.3) 65.6(60.3)
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Table 3:3. Reanalysis of Fischhoff & Beyth's (1975) data
with "draws" included as instances of non­
hypothesis-supporting (-) subjects.
DATA REANALYSED TO INCLUDE •DRAWS*
Group I (N = 29) .
CHINA Shortly before. shortly after.
Believed Believed did Overall
happened not happen
+ 17 15 17
- 22 14 12
%+ 58 51.2 58.6
Group II
CHINA: Shortly before. long after.
+ 30 15 26
- 11 26 15
% 73.2 36.0 63.4
Group III (N = 26) .
USSR: Shortly before, shortly after.
+ 14 13 15
- 12 13 11
% + 53.8 50.0 57.7
Group IV (N = 41)
USSR: Long before, shortly after.
+ 30 15 19
- 11 26 » 22
%+ 73.0 36.0 46.3
Group V (N = 23)
USSR: Long before, long after.
+ 17 15 18
- 6 8 5
%+ 73.9 65.2 78.3
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Table 3,3. (continued)
DATA REANALYSED TO INCLUDE 'DRAWS’
Groups I,II,III,V Combined (N = 119)
Groups I,III,IV,V Combined (N = 119)(In parentheses)
Believed Believed did Overall
happened not happen
+ 78(78) 58 ( 58) 76(69)
- 41(41) 61(61) 43(50)
% + 65.5(65.5) 48.7(48.7) 63.9(58.0)
Group VI (N = 27)
USSR : No before, shortly after.
+ 20 IO 16
- 7 17 11
%+ 73.9 37.0 59.3
Group VII (N = 27)
CHINA: No before, long after.
+ 16 13 14
- 11 14 13
%+ 59.2 48.1 51.2
Group Vili (N = 37)
CHINA: No before, long after.
+ 18 22 24
- 21 15 13
%+ 48.6 59.4 64.9
Groups VI ,VIII Combined (N = 64)
Groups VII,VIII Combined (N = 64) (In parentheses)
+ 38(34) 32(35) 40(38)
- 26(30) 32(31) 24(26)
%+ 59.4(53.1) (50)(54.7) 62.5(59.4)
91.
The third, and most serious, problem stems from the 
previous two. It concerns the cases where foresight estimates 
equal hindsight ones and where subjects have equal numbers of 
(+) and (-). Fischhoff & Beyth, as outlined earlier, allocate 
both types of occurranees a (o) and then drop the data/subject 
in further analysis. This is unfortunate for the following 
reasons. Subjects, when making hindsight judgments, are explicitly 
instructed to give "the same probabilities you gave then (two 
weeks ago). If you cannot remember the probability you assigned 
then, give the probability that you would have given to each of 
the various outcomes on the eve of President Nixon's trip...."
(p5). Thus accurately remembered or reconstructed probabilities 
must be regarded as non-hypothesis supporting, and hence evidence 
against hindsight bias. Such instances should be assigned a (-) 
and included in the analysis. They should not be assigned a (o) 
and dropped from the analysis.
Strictly speaking, the hypothesis being tested by Fischhoff 
and Beyth is that "the remembered or reconstructed probability of 
an event will tend to be larger than the probability originally 
assigned to it if the event is believed to have occurred, and 
smaller if it is believed not to have occurred", (p3). Dropping 
cases if f = h and (+) = (-) gives a misleading picture as to the 
percentage of hypothesis supporting subjects.
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Table 3.3 shows the effects of reanalysing Fischhoff 
and Beyth's data with cases of foresight = hindsight counting 
against the hypothesis of hindsight bias, i.e. assigned a minus 
sign. The figures are obtained by taking an experimental group 
adding the number of (+) and (-) together and then subtracting 
this from the total number of subjects (N) in that group. This 
figure was then added to the non-hypothesis-supporting category.
The percentage of hypothesis-supporting (+) subjects was worked 
out by simply dividing the number in that category by the total N 
and multiplying by lOO.
The percentages shown in Table 3.3 are lower than those in 
Table 3.2. Whereas 3.2 shows that two-thirds of subjects exhibited 
hindsight bias Table 3.3 reveals a figure of less than 60 percent 
overall. For outcomes believed to have happened Fischhoff and 
Beyth (Table 3.2) report three-quarters of the subjects as giving 
higher assessments in hindsight. In contrast, Table 3.3 shows 
this figure to be less than two-thirds. For outcomes believed not 
to have happened Table 3.2 shows 57 per cent of subj ects giving 
lower assessments in hindsight; the re-analysed data (Table 3.3) 
shows this figure to be less than 50 per cent. Table 3.3 also shows
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only three of the eight experimental groups to have greater than 
60 per cent hypothesis-supporting subjects for outcomes believed 
to have occurred. The table also shows only one of the eight 
experimental groups to exceed this figure for outcomes believed not 
to have occurred. In contrast, Fischhoff & Beyth (Table 3.2) report 
seven and four out of eight for outcomes believed to have and not to
have occurred respectively. Re-analysing the data in this way 
shows the extent and strength of hindsight bias to be considerably 
less than Fischhoff & Beyth claim.
Unfortunately, inferential statistical analysis cannot be 
carried out on this re-analysed data in a similar way to Fischhoff 
and Beyth. The sign test is inappropriate and consequently a Z-score 
cannot be obtained.
The fourth and final criticism is a general one: although it 
is desirable to compute some overall index of foresight/hindsight 
differences it is also necessary to find out how many estimates for 
each question in the various groups are individually different. This 
could be achieved simply by comparing individual likelihood assess­
ments using, for example, the Wilcoxon T-test. Such an analysis 
would provide more detailed information concerning the magnitude of 
hindsight bias and provide what is lacking from Fischhoff & Beyth's 
analysis.
3.3.2. Summary.
The problems discussed concerning Fischhoff & Beyth’s procedure 
for analysing their data (a) use a method which provides a very weak 
criteria as to what is to be considered as a case of hindsight bias;
(b) incorrectly analyse the data using this procedure, they ignore 
what should be regarded as non-hypothesis-supporting instances;
(c) give no indication as to the strength or magnitude of the bias. 
Such shortcomings mean that one should be cautious about the strength 
of the bias. Re-analysis of the data (Table 3.3) shows the bias to
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be less extensive than claimed by Fischhoff a Beyth. In con­
clusion, stronger empirical support for hindsight bias is required 
before we can feel confident in its existence outside of the 
laboratory.
3.4. EXPERIMENTS USING FACTUAL MATERIAL
The two final experiments to be reviewed in this chapter 
both make use of factual material. As we shall see,Fischhoff (1977); 
Wood (1978), in contrast to the previous studies, provide the 
soundest evidence for the existence of hindsight bias, and give some 
indication to its extent.
3.4.1. Fischhoff (1977).
The two experiments reported in this paper firstly attempt to 
demonstrate hindsight bias, and secondly, try to discover if the bias 
can be reduced or eliminated. Both experiments make use of factual 
material, this was taken from a wide range of areas such as history, 
music, geography, literature. Subjects were presented with a word 
or statement and two definitions; they had to indicate which they 
thought correct. For example, Aladdin's nationality was (a) Persian 
or (b) Chinese. Subjects had to assign, to one of the alternatives, 
a subjective assessment of being correct.
Experiment 1 consisted of three treatments. For each treatment 
subjects in foresight answered seventy five factual questions of the 
form described above. An hour later subjects in treatment 1 
(reliability) were provided with twenty five of the original seventy
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five questions and asked to respond as they had done earlier. 
Subjects in treatment II (memory) were given the same instructions 
but were also told which was the correct answer to each question. 
Subjects in treatment III (hypothetical) were given twenty five 
new questions, told the correct answer, and asked to respond 
"as they would have had they not known what the answer was" (p350).
It was found that both hindsight treatments (II and III above) 
induced bias, over seventy per cent of the cases in which subjects 
did not remember their original response showed this. Subjects 
in the 'hypothetical' treatment (III) gave higher probabilities 
for correct answers. This was the case in twenty out of the 
twenty five test items when compared with foresight probabilities 
made by subjects in other treatments to the same question. For 
subjects in both treatments, hindsight bias was less pronounced 
for incorrect than correct answers. Subjects in the ^reliability' 
treatment remembered two-thirds of their original responses (com­
pared with only half of subjects in the 'memory' treatment), for 
those not remembered no systematic effects were found.
Experiment 2 attempted to eliminate or reduce this bias.
Using the same material as in Experiment 1, three 'hypothetical* 
(treatment II above) conditions were run. In the first the same 
procedure as Experiment 1 was used; in the second (hypothetical 
debiasing) subjects were told about hindsight bias and asked to 
do everything they could to avoid it. In the the third (hypothetical 
warning) subjects were requested to work as hard as possible at the
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task, this condition was included in order to counteract the 
tone of the instructions for the previous group.
Results showed that the new instructions had little effect 
on hindsight bias. No substantial differences in mean probabilities 
for the twenty five questions appear for any of the three treat­
ments in this experiment, or with the two hindsight treatments in 
Experiment 1. This experiment, Fischhoff claims, demonstrates the 
robustness of hindsight bias.
Two criticisms can be levelled at this study. The first 
concerns the problem of demand characteristics discussed earlier 
and applies mainly to the 'hypothetical' group in Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2. Here, subjects are being asked "to respond 
as they would have had they not been told what the answer was".
This "ignore" instruction is very similar to that in Fischhoff (1975) 
and the reader is referred back to the relevant discussion in 
Section 3.2. of this chapter. Problems of demand characteristics 
also arise with respect to the 'memory' group in Experiment 1.
The one hour time delay between foresight and hindsight judgments 
with subjects being told the correct answer and asked to remember 
the probabilities given an hour ago must strike subjects as part­
icularly odd.
In particular it is interesting to speculate what subjects 
might have thought the experiment was about. For example, being 
told the outcome and asked to ignore it might lead them to realise
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the true purpose of the experiment. Although
Fischhoff provides a cover story —  to the effect that it will 
aid experiments in evaluating the difficulty of the questions —  
it is hardly convincing. Subjects might, rightly, argue that 
such information could be obtained from the assessments given 
in foresight. In view of this and the discussion given earlier 
a demand characteristic interpretation of hindsight bias cannot 
be ruled out.
The second criticism concerns the design of Experiment 2, 
which did not include a foresight treatment of its own. Instead 
Fischhoff compared the hindsight ('hypothetical') treatments with 
the foresight treatment in Experiment 1. It is, however, important 
to note that both the 'hypothetical debiasing' and 'hypothetical 
warning' treatments included the following instructions: "Your 
responses are extremely important to us. The effort you invest 
in them will largely determine the value of our subsequent study. 
Please devote as much attention to this task as you can" (p354).
As the foresight treatment in Experiment 1 contained no such 
exhortation to work as hard as possible it is essential to have 
a foresight group with such an exhortation in Experiment 2. i
Overall, this study, especially the first experiment, provides 
the strongest evidence, from the experiments reviewed in this 
chapter, for hindsight bias. The second experiment, because of 
inadequate design, does not clearly demonstrate the robustness of
9 8.
bias as Fischhoff claims. Of course, the problem of a demand 
characteristic interpretation of the findings may temper the 
degree to which the results are accepted.
3.4.2. Wood (1978),
One of the central themes of this study is the problem of 
a demand characteristic interpretation of hindsight bias. Wood 
reports two experiments using similar factual material to that of 
Fischhoff (1977), in which subjects are provided with a cover story 
to explain why the experiments are as they are. Wood claims this 
cover story adequately disguises the true purpose of the experiments 
and consequently reduces the problem of demand characteristics.
The experiments also investigate how the bias is affected by amount of out­
come knowledge, type of question, and the effect of making foresight 
and hindsight judgments. In each experiment subjects were provided 
with a number of factual assertions, half being true and half false.
The task was to rate the plausibility of these assertions on a 
seven-point scale ranging from definitely false to definitely true. 
Subjects performed this task twice: once in foresight, and once 
in hindsight. In hindsight subjects were given the correct answers 
to all questions in one block. Hindsight subjects were given one 
of two sets of instructions, either 'memory' where they were told 
that "the primary interest was in their ability to give consistent 
ratings for those statements presented in Stage 1 and Stage 3”.
(i.e. foresight and hindsight)(p347). Or, 'peer* where people
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were asked to ignore the information (outcome knowledge) given 
in Stage 2 and rate the statements as they thought other college 
students would.
The results showed hindsight ratings to be higher for true 
statements and lower for false statements than foresight ones, in 
accordance with hindsight bias. No effect of different instructions 
(peer or memory) was found. Also, a larger bias was exhibited for 
true statements than false ones, in accordance with Fischhoff (1977).
Expeirment 2, using the same material and similar procedure, 
investigated the effect of pre-outcome judgments, instructions and 
the number of times subjects were exposed to the correct answers.
The 'memory' and 'peer' instructions were the same as in the first 
experiment. The main difference between this experiment and the 
last one concerned the number of exposures to outcome knowledge.
One group were shown the true answers and tested only once; another 
group were shown and tested three times. Additional instructions 
were also provided in an attempt to disguise the real purpose of 
the experiment. The instructions given stressed that Wood was 
interested "in assessing which statements were easy to learn and
|which were difficult as a way to study memory for the truth value 
of statements".
In general. Wood found that foresight/hindsight judgments were 
in the expected directions. Specifically, those exposed and tested 
on the correct answers three times showed a larger hindsight bias
ÎOO.
than tl\ose only shown and tested once. Also subjects who made 
both foresight and hindsight ratings to the same questions 
showed less bias than those who only made hindsight judgements. This 
was only true in the case of the ’memory' group, not the 'peer' 
group.
These results do appear to replicate and extend Fischhoff's 
(1977) findings. The study indicates that hindsight bias is 
stronger for true rather than false statements; not affected by 
instructions to remember original foresight ratings or answer as 
you think others would who did not know the answer. A repeated 
measures design finds less bias than an independent one. However, 
the main question of whether Wood provides adequate instructions 
to remove fears of a demand characteristic interpretation remains.
The 'peer' and 'memory' instructions in both experiments, plus 
the added 'plausible' instructions given in Experiment 2 are seen 
by Wood as increasing our confidence that "the effects are real 
and not an artefact of the experiment procedures used to demonstrate 
it" (p352).
The 'memory' instructions emphasised consistency, and appear 
not to ask subjects explicitly to ignore the fact that they know ' 
the correct answer. In view of the problems of Fischhoff (1975), 
discussed earlier, this memory manipulation by Wood would seem to 
succeed in reducing the likelihood of a demand characteristic 
interpretation. In contrast, the 'peer' instructions do not 
achieve this. Here, it will be recalled, subjects are asked to
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ignore outcome knowledge and rate as they thought other students 
would who did not know the correct answer. This represents no 
improvement over Fischhoff (1977). The additional cover story 
in Experiment 2, given at the time outcome knowledge is provided 
does offer some rationale to subjects concerned by why they should 
make three sets of responses. Once again, however, as with 
Experiment 1 only the results from the ’memory' group give us 
some reason to regard a demand characteristic interpretation as 
unlikely.
3 .4 .3 . Summary
Fischhoff (1977) and Wood (1978) provide the strongest support 
for the claim that outcome knowledge produces judgmental biases. 
With the proviso of a demand characteristic interpretation, which 
Wood goes some way to discounting (though not far enough), the 
use of factual material within this paradigm would seem to provide 
us with the best evidence for the existence of hindsight bias.
3.5. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE SIX STUDIES.
From the detailed, critical review presented in this chapter 
shortcomings in four areas indicate that the experiments do not 
demonstrate hindsight bias to be as reliable or as strong an effect 
as the researchers claim.
One problem encountered was with a demand characteristic 
interpretation. For Fischhoff (1975a) and Fischhoff (1977) this 
was shown to cast doubt on the confidence we could have in accepting
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their interpretation of the results. Experiments using con­
temporary socio-political events (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975) suffered 
less from this problem. The explicit attempt by Wood (1978) to 
provide a cover story to subjects succeeded in allaying our fears 
over this for his 'memory' groups but not for his 'peer' groups.
On the whole instructions given to subjects in hindsight to 
ignore outcome knowledge when making likelihood assessments are 
particularly open to demand characteristics. To overcome this 
it is necessary to provide equivalent instructions to the 'ignore' 
instructions which do not explicitly make this request. This may 
be a difficult thing to do and such a procedure might be open to 
criticism that one is merely investigating creeping determinism 
and not hindsight bias. However, such instructions can be formu­
lated, as will be shown in PART II of this thesis where two experi­
ments have this issue as one of their central concerns.
The second and third problems encountered with the six studies 
reviewed here were to do with shortcomings in experimental design 
and statistical analysis. Both Fischhoff (1975a) and Fischhoff (1977) 
omitted an important foresight condition in one of their experiments. 
The descriptive and inferential statistics in Fischhoff (1975a) and 
Fischhoff & Beyth (1975) was shown to make use of inappropriate tests, 
use weak criteria for establishing when subjects exhibited hindsight 
bias and provide little indication of the magnitude of the bias.
Fourthly, and finally, Slovic & Fischhoff (1977), it was argued
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At most it could be regarded as looking at creeping determinism.
It is more likely that the work is an extension of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1971). Walster (1967) provides some indications of
hindsight bias and its consequences, although her study was not 
designed with this in mind.
In conclusion, of the six studies here all but Walster (1967) 
have been shown to suffer from a number of serious shortcomings. 
Fischhoff (1977) and Wood (1978) provide the best evidence for 
hindsight bias. The three experiments which make use of "social 
scenarios", using laboratory or contemporary events, suffer from 
shortcomings which question the interpretation and the results 
themselves. In view of these problems it is of obvious importance 
to establish just how reliable and extensive the hindsight bias 
is. Furthermore, it is also important to establish the conditions 
which may encourage the bias and those which reduce or eliminate it. 
These considerations are of central importance to the experiments 
to be reported in PART II of this thesis.
is not ,to be considered as an examination of hindsight bias.
104.
CHAPTER 4.
REVIEW OF ORDER EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR HINDSIGHT FORESIGHT JUDGMENTS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the preceding chapter it was indicated that one 
of the objectives of the experiments to be reported in PART II of 
this thesis is to provide some indication of the conditions under 
which hindsight bias might be produced and conditions which might 
eliminate or reduce it. One important variable which might be 
expected to affect subjective likelihood assessments in both fore­
sight and hindsight is the order in which information describing a 
social event is presented.
Order of information presentation has been found to influence 
such things as impression formation (Asch, 1946; Luchins, 1962,1965;
Manis & Platt, 1979; Zadny & Gerard, 1974), ability attribution 
(Jones & Goethals, 1972; Jones et aZ, 1972), persuasive communication 
(Hovland, 1957), and judgments in Bayesian tasks (Peterson & Ducharme, 
1967; Shanteau, 1970). These findings may be important if psychology 
is to be applied to disciplines such as the law (Tapp, 1977) . Order 
of presentation of testimony (Lawson, 1967; Lawson, 1969; Stone, 1969; 
Costopolous, 1972), defence-prosecution order (Wallace & Wilson,1969), 
"climax" ordering of arguments (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) have all been 
reported to have systematic effects on judgments. Given that information 
order has reliable and predictable effects, as evidenced above, then
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by the same token it would seem reasonable to argue that hindsight 
/foresight judgments might be similarly influenced.
This chapter first reviews research that has investigated 
order effects in the above areas. No attempt is made to provide 
a complete treatment, but it is clear, nevertheless, that certain 
conditions are conducive to producing a "primacy effect", whilst 
other conditions tend to produce "recency effects". In the review 
of order effects in psvcho-legal studies emphasis is put on Thibaut 
and Walker's (1975) work in this area. This is for two reasons, 
firstly, it is widely regarded as an important and substantial 
contribution to this issue. Secondly, some of the material and 
procedures they use are drawn upon in the design of a number of the 
experiments to be reported in PART II of this thesis. The final 
section of this chapter discusses how the above findings may be 
applied to investigations into hindsight/foresight judgments. In 
particular, how order of information might be expected to influence 
creeping determinism, and, more importantly, hindsight bias.
4.2. GENERAL RESEARCH ON ORDER EFFECTS.
Four main areas will be reviewed here, these being impression 
formation, ability attribution, Bayesian judgments and persuasive 
communication. As we shall see from this review there is no simple 
rule or rules predicting the circumstances for obtaining primacy 
effects and those for obtaining recency effects. A number of factors 
have to be taken into consideration, for example, time delay between 
information presentation and judgments, familiarity with stimulus
material.
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Asch (1946) found evidence for a primacy effect in impression 
formation. Using a set of six adjectives to describe an imaginary 
person he presented one experimental group with them arranged from 
favourable to unfavourable (intelligent, industrious, impulsive, 
critical, stubborn, envious). A second experimental group received 
the same six adjectives but in reverse order. Substantially different 
impressions of the imaginary person were formed by the two groups.
More favourable impressions were formed when favourable adjectives 
appeared at the beginning of the list. In contrast, more unfavourable 
impressions were formed when unfavourable adjectives appeared at the 
beginning of the list. Similar findings have been reported using 
different sets of adjectives (for example, Anderson and Hubert, 1963; 
Anderson and Norman, 1962; Hendrick and Constantini, 1970). However, 
no primacy effect is found with shorter lists of adjectives (Anderson 
and Barrios, 1961) and is much less pronounced when subjects are 
repeatedly exposed to the list (Anderson and Hubert, 1963).
An experiment by Luchins (1957), where two one-paragraph 
descriptions of an imaginary person were used, also reported primacy 
effects. Here one of the paragraphs reported the imaginary person 
as friendly, outgoing and extrovert, the other as shy and introverted. 
Subjects who received the "friendly, extrovert" portrayal first 
perceived the person as more friendly than subjects who read the 
"shy, introvert" portrayal first. However, in another study 
(Luchins and Luchins, 1970) order of information was not found to have
4.2.1 'impression formation
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long-term effects. These studies indicate that first impressions 
are not long lasting and subject to change with the addition of 
new information.
We might conclude that it is only when judgments have to be 
made based purely on first impressions and where information is 
limited (but not too much so) that information occurring first is 
going to influence judgments. Under such conditions primacy effects 
may be explained by change of meaning (Asch, 1946), attention 
decrement (Anderson & Hubert, 1963) discounting (Anderson and 
Jacobson, 1965) , or due to different belief systems being formed 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
4.2.2. ABILITY ATTRIBUTION.
Attribution theory and attributional biases were discussed 
in some detail in Chapter 2 so little more will be said about the 
general area here. Ability attribution, or more specifically, the 
attribution of ability following success or failure is subject to 
a strong primacy effect. Jones et ail (1968) had subjects observing 
a stimulus person answering a series of intelligence test questions. 
Three conditions investigated order effects: where the stimulus 
person (a) began giving a large number of correct answers and then 
performance declined; (b) began giving a large number of incorrect 
answers and subsequently improved; (c) performed consistently through­
out. Subjects were asked to (i) rate the intelligence of the 
stimulus person; (ii) estimate how many correct answers the person 
would give on a subsequent trial; (iii) recall how many correct
answerstwere given in the original trial. For all three measures 
it was found that subjects attributed greater ability and intell­
igence to the person in condition (a) above, in condition (c) the 
person was rated least able.
These results demonstrate how early appearing information 
influences predictions of future performance and that it biases 
what is remembered of past performance. This strong and consistent 
primacy effect is explained by Jones & Goethals (1972) in terms of 
people perceiving early information as relatively stable. Sub­
sequent information is then assimilated to this image formed 
earlier on. Jones et al (1972) provide further support for this 
explanation. This explanation is similar to the general account of 
theory maintenance and change in Chapter 2.
The studies by Jones and his colleagues have strong implications 
for judgment under uncertainty generally and hindsight/foresight 
judgments in particular. This will be dealt with in greater detail 
later. Briefly, because, for example, Jones et al (1968) indicate 
that both predictions and postdictions are influenced by information 
appearing first we might expect hindsight judgments to be similarly 
influenced.
4.2.3. BAYESIAN JUDGMENT.
The Bayesian approach to the study of human judgment and decision­
making makes the basic assumption that "opinions should be expressed
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in terms of subjective or personal probabilities, and that 
the optimal revision of such opinions, in the light of relevant 
new information, should be accomplished via "Bayes’ Theorem"
(Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971, p30). Bayes' Theorem is, there­
fore, a normative model for investigating opinion revision and 
human judgment. A more detailed discussion of this approach was 
given in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2.): only a general outline will 
be given here.
Peterson & Beach (1967) indicated that people performed in 
reasonable accord with the Bayesian model. More recent research, 
reviewed in detail by Slovic a Lichtenstein (1971) presents a 
radically different picture. At best people are conservative 
processors of information, at worst people fail to adhere with 
Bayesian dictates, their deviations and discrepancies are seen as 
having no analogue in a normative or formal model.
The occurrence of order effects in tasks where people are 
required to update subjective probability estimates in the light 
of new information would be obvious transgressions of Bayes' Theorem. 
Both primacy and recency effects have been reported. Primacy effects 
have been found by Peterson a DuCharme, 1967; Roby, 1967; Dale, 1968; 
recency effects by Pitz a Reinhold, 1968; Shanteau, 1970.
Recency effects using poker chips (Pitz a Reinhold, 1968) and 
red and white lights (Shanteau, 1970) are found to occur when subjects
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are presented with a small number of samples from a population 
and asked to make subjects probability estimates after each sample. 
Pitz & Reinhold (1968), for example, had two bags, each containing 
lOO poker chips. In one bag the distribution was 60 red, 40 blue; 
in the other 60 blue and 40 red. Choosing one bag at random a 
trial consisted of 5 draws of one chip with replacement. Subjects 
who revised estimates after each one of the 5 draws exhibited recency. 
On the other hand, subjects who made probability estimates only after 
seeing the result of all 5 draws for any one trial showed no order 
effects. Using a descriptive, as opposed to normative, approach 
Shanteau (1970), in testing an additive model of decision-making 
also reports recency effects. Although it is difficult to compare 
the results from these two different approaches the similarity of 
task allows us to state that the conditions outlined earlier are 
conducive to recency effects.
The conditions under which a primacy effect is obtained within 
Bayesian and related areas of judgment, and those in which a recency 
effect is obtained are difficult to specify in a systematic way. 
Studies which demonstrate primacy all present subjects with long 
sequences of data (lOO in Peterson & DuCharme, 1967), which are 
structured to point towards a certain outcome. In contrast, studies 
reporting recency present subjects only with short sequences of data.
The finding that people are, on the whole, "conservative" when 
revising opinions (Peterson, Schneider & Miller, 1965; Phillips and
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Edwards,, 1966) is a kind of primacy effect, since subjects fail 
to update subjective probabilities sufficiently in the light of 
new information. This can be seen as subjects giving undue weight 
to information appearing early or to being "anchored" by it with
insufficient adjustment subsequently.
In general then, although both primacy and recency effects 
have been found to occur under most conditions in Bayesian judgment 
type tasks, one would expect primacy given that the central finding 
from such approach has been conservatism in judgment (Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971).
4.2.4. PERSUASIVE COMMUNCIATION.
Perhaps the most sustained research programme to investigate 
factors which influence peoples attitudes and beliefs and, hence, 
judgments, is that of Hovland and his colleagues (Hovland et ala 1953; 
Janis & Hovland, 1959). They conceptualise persuasive communication 
as being composed of three components —  the communicator, the 
communication, and the respondent. Within this framework they have 
sought to discover factors to account for successful and unsuccessful 
communicator or attitude change. j
The focus of this chapter on order effects automatically directs 
our attention to the communication or message component. Research on 
persuasive communication which has dealt with this has produced the 
most thorough and detailed analysis of order effects. Further, a 
systematic account of the conditions most likely to yield primacy
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and those most likely to yield recency has emerged. The empirical 
work is not solely attributable to Hovland's research programme; it 
was mentioned first for the framework it provides in understanding 
persuasive communication.
Lund (1925) appears to be the first social psychologist 
empirically to investigate order effects within this context. The 
question he investigated was: if both sides of a controversial 
issue are presented successively, which has the advantage —  the 
side presented first or last? Lund presented subjects with pros 
and cons of topical issues such as whether all men should have equal 
political rights; whether monogaraos marriage would continue to be 
the only socially accepted relation between the sexes. He found 
that the side presented first had a consistent advantage over the 
side presented second. He called this the "law of primacy" in 
persuasion. Later research showed this to be somewhat of an over­
statement. According to Hovland (1957): "when two sides of an 
issue are presented successively by different communicators the 
side presented first does not necessarily have the advantage".
Subsequent research has shown that a primacy effect may be 
expected with non-salient material (Rosnow & Goldstein, 1967); 
where the topic is highly controversial (Lana, 1963a); where 
subjects express or have a high interest in the topic (Lana,1963b). 
Recency effects have been found to occur for salient topics (Rosnow 
and Goldstein, 1967); uninteresting subject matter (Lana, 1963b); 
and moderately unfamiliar issues (Lana, 1961).
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Overriding any primacy or recency effect is strength of 
arguments for the other side, then the side with the strongest 
argument has the advantage, regardless of whether he goes first 
or last (Rosnow et ai3 1966).
Janis & Hovland (1959) indicate that the order of information 
or arguments is not the only, or perhaps most important, message 
factor. One-sided versus two-sided communications differ in their 
ability to persuade (Lumsdaine & Janis, 1953), as do low-and-high- 
fear appeals (Higbee, 1969). Furthermore, order of presentation 
of a communication can be divided into two questions. The first, 
for which experimental work has been reviewed in this section, is 
concerned with the most effective order of separate communications. 
The second concerns what the most effective ordering of the elements 
in a communication is, i.e. deals with a single source arguing for 
one side of an issue. The latter question has been less intensively 
investigated.
The types of issues examined here include such things as the 
effect of implicit versus explicit conclusions, presenting the con­
clusion first or last, climax or anticlimax order. Research has 
shown that drawing an explicit conclusion makes the message more 
effective (e.g. Hovland & Mandell, 1952; Maier & Maier, 1957). Little 
empirical work has addressed itself to the question of whether it 
is more effective to draw a conclusion at the beginning or end of a 
communication. McGuire (1969) gives a theoretical discussion to this,
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arguing that effectiveness depends on whether the information 
is agreeable or disagreeable to the audience. For the former, 
giving the conclusion first may be the most effective, for the 
latter, last may be more effective.
Climax versus anticlimax order arises as an issue when there 
are a series of arguments in a communication, some of these arguments 
being stronger than others. A climax order is where the strongest 
are given last, i.e. "built up to", anticlimax where the strongest 
are given first. Empirical investigation into this topic appears 
to be inconclusive, Sponberg (1946) found anticlimax more effective, 
however, Gulley & Berio (1956) found no difference between the two. 
Further consideration to this issue will be given when Thibaut and 
Walker's (1974) research is reviewed in Section 4.3.2. of this 
chapter.
In summary, order of presentation in persuasive communication 
has been investigated from two major perspectives. First, with 
respect to primacy-recency in which two sources are arguing for a 
different side on a given issue. Secondly, where the structure of 
communication of a single source arguing for a single issue is
iinvestigated. Primacy effects were reported in early studies but 
subsequent research showed that both primacy and recency occur 
depending upon the conditions. Order of a simple communication has 
been investigated with respect to climax versus anticlimax, explicit 
versus implicit conclusion. Less attention has been devoted to these 
issues and the empirical work that there is is not entirely consistent
in its findings.
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3.3. PSYCHO-LEGAL STUDIES
In the past ten years empirical work setting psychological 
studies in a legal context has grown dramatically (Tapp, 1976).
Much of this work has investigated psychological aspects of 
judicial processes. Whilst it is beyond the scope and relevance 
of the present chapter to review the research some indications of 
the kind of things investigated with respect to jury/juror judgments 
may be appropriate. With these studies it is important to note 
that most of the work has used mock juries or jurors and simulated 
trial proceedings. How much of this detracts from generalizing 
to real courtrooms is not an issue here —  Bermant et at, (1974); 
Foss (1975) consider this problem in detail and the interested 
reader is directed to these articles.
Investigations into influences upon juries/jurors have looked 
at such things as pretrial publicity (Hochberg & Stires, 1973); 
effect of inadmissable evidence (Wolf & Montgomery, 1977; Sue et att 
1973); speech style of defendants and witnesses (Erickson et a£,1978 
Conley et at3 1978); personality characteristics of the defendant 
(Nemeth & Sosis, 1973). On a more theoretical note models of jury 
decision-making have been tested by Davis, 1976; Nemeth, 1977; Kerr 
et aty 1976. Perrod & Hastie (1979) provide a review of these models
The order in which evidence or/and testimony is presented in 
court can and has been investigated in a number of ways. Perhaps 
the three most important manipulations concern prosecution/defence
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order; witness order in the case for prosecution and defence; 
finally, the internal order of testimony or evidence given by 
defence, prosecution or witnesses.
The order of proceedings in criminal trials in Britain and 
America is of the adversary type. This is structured as follows: 
prosecution's opening statement. Witnesses for prosecution followed 
by cross-examination of each in turn by the defence. Next, witnesses 
for the defence followed by cross-examination of each by prosecution. 
Finally,the summings up by prosecution, defence and judge.
Research into order effects in a psycho-legal context appear to 
produce inconsistent findings. Wallace & Wilson (1969) and Wilson 
(1971) report recency effects, whereas Stone (1969) reports primacy 
effects. One explanation for these differences might lie in the 
different experiment procedures. Stone (1969) gets subjects to make 
three judgments at different points in the "trial". In contrast, 
the studies reporting recency ask subjects to make judgments only 
after reading all the material. The effect of forcing mock jurors 
to make judgments early on in the proceedings may be the reason for 
obtaining such primacy effects. With the same material and design 
but only asking subjects to make-a final judgment a recency effect 
might be expected. Stone's procedure might also explain why he 
failed to find any overall order effects. The above argument is 
lent credence when one considers the task of jurors. They cure 
encouraged to pay equal attention to arguments appearing in all 
stages of a trial. This means they are asked, explicitly or implicitly
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to suspend judgment until all the evidence has been presented. 
Stone's (1969) procedure can be seen as dramatically changing 
this picture. In short, subjects/jurors are not suspending 
judgment. Given this the study had more value as one on commitment 
than saying anything substantial, about juror decision-making.
In summary, research into prosecution-defence order appears 
to indicate a tendency towards recency. This contrasts quite 
markedly with studies of order effect in impression formation, 
persuasive communciation, etc. There primary effects were most 
common. Because of the nature of the jurors task, outlined above, 
this might be expected. Research on impression formation, etc., 
does not induce or encourage people to wait until all the information 
has been presented. Indeed some of the explanations of primacy 
depend upon this assumption. In conclusion, the nature of the 
trial and the role of the juror explain and may lead us to expect 
recency effects to be in greater evidence than primary effects.
4.3.2. THIBAUT■& WALKER'S RESEARCH PROGRAMME
Thibaut & Walker’s (1974) book 'Procedural Justice' is an 
extended empirical investigation into the nature and impact of 
procedures in adversary and inquisitorial legal systems. The 
fundamental question addressed concerned the fairness or how just 
such procedures are. Using laboratory experiments which involve 
taking legal roles they report that "one of the clearest findings 
in our data is that the adversary procedure is judged by all of
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our subjects to be the most preferable and the fairest mode of 
dispute resolution" (pll3-115). They claim that their findings 
apply to conditions of actual litigation, and have no hesitation 
in making prescriptions for the wholesale adoption of the adversary 
procedure.
However, the generality of their findings must be treated with 
greater caution, as Bermant et aly (1976) point out. This is because 
the experiments were conducted with students role-playing and under 
conditions which do not bear sufficient similarity to actual litigation 
processes. In what follows their findings will be briefly summarised 
and a more detailed discussion of the above criticism and others provided.
Thibaut & Walker find the adversary system provides a more 
extensive search for information and factual material than an 
inquisitorial system. Here they found that unlawful facts caused 
decision-makers to give more extreme judgments in the inquisitorial 
system. With these general findings Thibaut & Walker go on to explore 
the adversary system in detail. They argue that one of the most 
important issues is to investigate order effects: "the two-sided 
character of the adversary system makes the effect of order a funda­
mental question" (p54). In the inquisitorial system this issue does 
not arise because the only participant is the decision-maker.
Thibaut & Walker conceptualise potential sources of bias or ■ 
differences due to order in two ways. Firstly, gross order differences, 
i.e. whether prosecution or defence go first or last. Secondly, what
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they Cc^ ll "internal order", by which they mean the actual 
presentation of evidence. This relates to a climax or anti­
climax order of arguments. This is characterised by Thibaut 
and Walker as follows: climax is where information and facts 
are presented in a weak to strong order; anticlimax where material 
is presented in a strong to weak order.
Chapter 5 of their book "Combating Internal Bias" reports 
an experimental investigation of this. Walker et alt (1972) also 
provides a report of this research. The study used an imaginary 
criminal case concerning Adams (the defendant) and Zemp. The case 
centred around the issue of how justified Adams was in responding 
violently to an assault by Zemp.
Manipulation of strong and weak material was achieved getting 
the evidence scaled, using Thurstone's (1959) method of equal­
appearing intervals as modified by Young & Cliff (1971). About fifty 
statements were first divided into lawful or unlawful categories by 
subjects and then given scale values on 1 - 9 scale. The lawful 
facts were assigned to the defence, the unlawful to the prosecution.
Three independent variables were manipulated: (i) gross order;
j
(ii) internal order; (iii) role player variation. Only the first 
two will be considered here as the latter does not have a direct 
bearing on order effects. Gross order was varied by having role- 
players read either the lawful followed by the unlawful facts, or 
unlawful facts followed by lawful ones. Internal order was mani­
pulated in four ways: (a) first attorney presentation sequence of
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weak to, strong facts, second attorney weak to strong facts 
(climax-climax); (b) first attorney strong to weak, second
attorney strong to weak (anticlimax-anticlimax); (c) climax- 
anticlimax; (d) anticlimax-climax. Subjects, individually, 
gave judgments of how lawful or unlawful they thought the 
defendant’s actions were (on a 9-point scale), together with 
an indication of their degree of certainty about the judgment.
The results showed that the attorney going second obtained 
more favourable judgments. When prosecution went second judgments 
were in their favour, when defence went second judgments were in 
their favour. Thus a recency effect for gross order was obtained. 
With respect to internal order results showed that for first 
presentations "climax" was more effective, but only for the 
prosecution. In the case of the second presentation climax ordering 
was found to be more effective for both prosecution and defence. 
Again a recency effect as strong evidence occurring at the end of 
a presentation i.e. climax, is more influential. As Thibaut and 
Walker say: "with second presentations, for both prosecution and 
defence, when strong evidence is presented late in the argument 
(as in the climax order) it carries greater weight than when it *
is presented early (as with anticlimax order) —  a recency effect 
for internal order" (p63) . In summary, recency effects are reported 
for both gross and internal order.
Four serious shortcomings of this study question the degree to
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which a realistic simulation of courtroom proceedings is made.
These criticisms indicate that one should feel much less confident 
than Thibaut & Walker in making prescriptions as to how criminal 
proceedings should be conducted.
The first shortcoming is that the study is unrealistic both 
with respect to gross and internal order manipulations. To be 
more realistic any manipulation of order should do more than 
merely vary the order in which defence and prosecution appear.
Such a design falls far short of the actual sequences of events 
in a courtroom. As described earlier, in any trial there are four 
distinct phases —  opening statements, case for the prosecution, case 
for the defence, summings up by prosecution, defence and judge.
Given this more complex procedure in the courtroom, compared to 
that of Thibaut & Walker, we would expect experiments to follow it, 
varying orders as appropriate, before any kinds of prescriptions 
could be made with confidence.
The second criticism is that an inadequate simulation is given 
because Thibaut & Walker do not allow defence/prosecution to come 
back to one another. There is no cross-examination by either side. 
Their procedure of assigning unlawful facts to the prosecution 
and lawful ones to the defence grossly oversimplifies and conflicts 1 
with the subtleties of criminal proceedings.
The third criticism concerns the case material itself. Making 
up and providing a very short summary of testimony, etc., that might 
be found in a real trial is quite inadequate. Thibaut & Walker 
present about 500 words of summary. The brevity in itself may be
"Unlawful" and "lawful" facts refer to statements indicating 
guilt or innocence of the defendant not statements permissable 
or impermissable in a criminal court of law.
*
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one of the reasons for finding order effects. Such a brief 
summary will have the effect of putting the facts, evidence,etc., 
into much clear perspective than when the information is divulged 
over a number of days. These three criticisms, it should be noted, 
are not specific to Thibaut & Walker, they apply to most of the 
studies in this area. They are given here because of the strong 
prescriptive advice made by Thibaut & Walker, and because this study 
is widely quoted as evidence for order effects in the courtroom.
The fourth, and final, shortcoming is to do with the responses 
made by subjects. In this study, subjects, it will be recalled, 
indicated their judgment of lawfulness on a 9-point scale (where 
1 was unlawful and 9 lawful) . Whilst it is important to discover 
how order affects judgments in this way it is of even greater imp­
ortance to find out if such variables affect verdicts (jurors and 
juries) . Thibaut & Walker provide no explicit answer to this issue. 
They tacitly assume that if judgments on rating scales are affected 
by gross or internal order than these would translate across to 
actual verdicts. The grounds for accepting this assumption are not 
particularly compelling. Significant differences found on rating 
scale judgments may not mean verdicts are affected. For example, , 
ratings under different orders may both be on the lawful side of 
the mid-point, here verdicts would also be "lawful" regardless of 
order. If verdicts are not affected by order there is little reasoning 
for supposing such a variable to be important in courtroom proceedings. 
Thibaut & Walker should also have asked subjects to make a verdict, 
this would have allowed greater generalisability.
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In' summary, the poor simulation of courtroom proceedings 
as evidenced by shortcomings in order manipulation, lack of 
cross-examination, impoverished trial material and inadequate 
measures means that this study can only be regarded as providing 
very tentative indications of sources of bias in an actual court­
room. The strong prescriptions Thibaut & Walker make are entirely 
unwarranted.
The above shortcomings do not mean that the recency effect 
reported here is uninteresting. The main issue centres around the 
question of whether the "legal atmosphere", however impoverished 
itself encourages recency rather than primacy? This relates to 
the discussion given in the previous section. There, it will be 
recalled, jurors or subjects in psycho-legal studies were charact­
erised as suspending judgment until all the information has been 
presented. This discourages primacy effects and recency effects 
may occur because information appearing later may be more vivid and 
available from memory when judgment is deliberated upon. A more 
detailed elaboration of this is provided in Chapter 2 so little 
more will be said here.
i
Primacy effects in impression formation, etc, in contrast, are 
explained as arising because information appearing early on is seen 
as being stable and later information assimilated to the image 
formed early on (Anderson & Jacobson, 1965; Anderson s Hubert,1963). 
However, when subjects know that additional information is going 
to be presented and are asked to suspend judgment until they have
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seen it> all the primacy effect disappears (Luchins, 1957), thus 
validating the characterisation of the task of subjects in psycho- 
legal experiments given above.
4.4. SUMMARY OF PRIMACY-RECENCY EFFECTS.
From the review of order effects in impression formation, 
ability attribution, Bayesian judgment, persuasive communication 
and psycho-legal studies it can be seen no really straightforward 
guidelines emerge as to when to expect primacy and when to expect 
recency. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the major studies reviewed 
here. Inspection of this table reveals that from a purely quanti­
tative perspective more empirical studies have reported primacy 
rather than recency effects. In impression formation the ordering 
of lists of six adjectives or more, and short, conflicting paragraphs 
describing a person produce primacy effects. On the other hand, 
repeated exposure and short adjective lists nullify order effects.
In ability attribution early success/failure influences judgments 
more than later performance. Large numbers of trials in Bayesian 
tasks encourage primacy, small numbers encourage recency. Recency 
in persuasive communication occurs when the material is salient or 
interesting or moderately unfamiliar. When these conditions are not 
present or the material is non-salient, or highly interesting or 
controversial or highly familiar primacy effects are found. In 
psycho-legal studies recency effects in defence/prosecution order 
and internal order are reported, primacy only seems to occur when 
mock jurors are forced to make an early commitment.
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Table 4.1. Summary of Main Findings for Order Effects
STUDY
Conditions in which 
Primacy obtained
Condition in which 
Recency obtained.
Condition in which 
No Order Effects 
obtained.
1. IMPRESSION FORMATION
ASCH, 1946
ANDERSON & HUBERT 1963 
KENDRICK & CONSTANTI
1970
LUCHINS, 1957 
ANDERSON & BARRIOS
1961
LUCHINS, 1970
List 6 adjectives 
List 6 adjectives
List 6 adjectives 
Short paragraphs
Repeated exposure
Short list 
adjectives 
Long time interval
2.ABILITY ATTRIBUTION
JONES et al, 1967 Early success/
failure
3. BA YES IAN JUDGMENT
PETERSON & DUCHARME
1967
ROBY, 1967
DALE, 1968
MILLER, 1968
PITZ & REINHOLD,1968
SHANTEAU, 1970
Large number trial:
Large number trials 
Large number trials 
Large number trials
Small number trials 
Small number trials
4.PERSUASIVE COMMUNIO-
ATION
LUND, 1925 
ROSNOW & GOLDSTEIN
1967
LANA, 1963a 
LANA, 1963b 
LANA, 1961
Short arguments 
Non-salient
material
High interest in 
topic
Highly contro­
versial
Highly familiar
Salient material
Uninteresting
topic
Moderately
unfamiliar
j
5.PSYCHOLEGAL STUDIES 
WALLACE & WILSON 1969
WILSON, 1971
STONE, 1969
THIBAUT & WALKER 1974
Early Commitment
Defense/Prosecutior
Order
Defense/Prosecutior
Order
Defense/Prosecutior
Order
Internal Order
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From this it can be seen that research into order effects 
has progressed from questions of primacy versus recency (as with 
Lund, 1925) to a detailed inquiry into the conditions under which 
one or the other effect may be found. However, there is no substantial 
theoretical model for which primacy or recency may be predicted 
in different or "real-life" circumstances. As Jones & Goethals(1972) 
argue "{pjrimacy versus recency is not a gripping critical issue 
in its own right. Information order, like time, age and number of 
siblings, is not a conceptually unitary variable" (p28). However, 
what has emerged from the research, in conjunction with current work 
on social cognition, is some indication of the underlying cognitive 
processes which might be involved. While it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to provide any detailed review of these it might prove 
useful to briefly consider them. This will prove useful for the 
following section.
Jones & Geothals (1972) describe three major processes that are 
involved in primacy effects and three in recency effects. These are 
summarised in Table 4.2. Primacy effects are seen to result from 
attention decrement, discounting and assimilation. Attention 
decrement is where distraction or fatigue causes people to give undue 
weight to information appearing early. Discounting is where early 
information is seen as stable and subsequent conflicting information 
that may appear later is ignored. Assimilation is where categories 
are formed early on and later information is assimilated or distorted 
bo fit these categories. These three explanations bear a strong 
resemblence to the considerations given to theory maintenance and 
change in Chapter 2, and could be reconceptualised within that frame­
work.
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' Table 4.2. Summary of Primacy and Recency Explanation 
ffrom JONES & GOETHALS, 1972).
ORDER EFFECT PROCESS DESCRIPTION
PRIMACY (i)Attention Decrement Distraction or Fatigue.
(ii)Discounting Early information stable.
(i i i)Ass imi1ation Categories formed early on.
RECENCY (i)Recall Readiness Immediate past better recalled.
(ii)Judgmental Contrast Short time spans.
(iii)Content - and context 
-related hypotheses.
Progressive changes known.
Recency effects are seen as resulting from the processes of recall 
readiness (the availability heuristic of Chapter 2?) , judgmental 
contrast and content-and-context-related hypotheses. Recall readiness 
is simply the fact that immediate past events are better remembered 
(and more vivid) than ones in the distant past. Judgmental contrast 
is where later appearing items of information are contrasted with 
earlier ones when short time spans are involved. Content-and-context- 
related hypotheses is where people know that progressive changes are 
likely to occur. This is similar to the suspension of judgment used 
to explain recency effects in psycho-legal studies discussed earlier.
Although research into order effects is of little theoretical 
interest in itself they are useful in more substantive areas. Some 
indication has already been made concerning how the explanations 
given above may be incorporated into the material discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Furthermore, order effects are regarded as
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providing insights into attributional processes (Jones & Goethals 
1972)i Anderson (1968) uses them to study different models of 
information processing. By the same token order effects and knowledge 
of the conditions under which they arise may lead to greater under­
standing of how outcome knowledge influences people's perceptions 
sind judgments of events. Also, specific information orders may 
work to reduce or eliminate creeping determinism or hindsight bias.
It is to these issues that we now turn.
4.5. ORDER EFFECTS AND HINDSIGHT/FORESIGHT JUDGMENTS.
In what follows the distinction between hindsight bias and 
creeping determinism, made in Chapter 2, will not be maintained. 
Hindsight judgments will refer to both, where appropriate. At present 
there is no reason for supposing information order to affect one 
without the other, although the results of the experiments reported 
in PART II of the thesis may cause us to revise this assumption.
In Chapter 3 it was shown that studies which had investigated 
hindsight judgments could be viewed as falling into three categories. 
These being experiments which used (a) laboratory material, (b) con­
temporary socio-political events, (c) factual material. The effect , 
of information order on hindsight judgments can only be asked of 
the first two categories, in the latter category it is difficult to 
see how considerations would apply within the format used.
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Before looking in more detail at information order and hind­
sight judgments it is important to show how order may be relevant 
generally. Here there are two main considerations, firstly, 
different ordering of information describing some social scenario 
may act to heighten or reduce hindsight bias or creeping determinism. 
The exact ways in which this might happen will be considered later.
The important point to make here is in the potential application 
of this to considerations of how historians, policy makers, etc., 
operate which was discussed in Chapter 1. Specifically, knowing 
how to reduce bias or the conditions likely to encourage it is pre- 
scriptively important. The second reason for looking at information 
order is a theoretical one. If order is found to have consistent 
effects on hindsight judgments it may help to resolve some of the 
theoretical disagreements over the cognitive processes involved.
The claim, made at the end of the previous section, that order effects 
are of little theoretical interest in themselves does not mean they 
are not of theoretical interest in other areas. As we shall see later 
in this thesis order of information does provide some important 
indications to the cognitive processes involved in producing hindsight 
bias.
4.5.1. INFORMATION ORDER AND HINDSIGHT JUDGMENTS.
Hindsight judgments using laboratory material or contemporary 
social events may be affected by information order in a number of ways. 
This section discusses some of these hypotheses. The experiments 
reported in PART II do not explore all of these hypotheses, only those 
which appeared, at the time, to be of the greatest significance.
Information bearing on the outcome reported to have happened 
may be ordered in one of two ways: (i) information which indicates 
that the outcome is likely to occur may appear first followed by 
information indicating the occurrence of other outcomes; (ii) inform­
ation indicating other outcomes may appear first followed by inform­
ation indicating the reported outcome as likely to occur. To assess 
how these different orders may affect hindsight judgments we also 
need to consider the time at which outcome knowledge is given. There 
are two natural places for providing this, before the event description 
and after the event description.
It is reasonable to assume that laboratory material does not 
initiate high interest for subjects and that the social scenario is 
a moderately unfamiliar one. In fact, the latter is a criterion for 
selection of social scenarios by Fischhoff (1975). In any case the 
material is unlikely to be highly controversial or highly familiar 
to subjects. From the review of order effects, especially in persuasive 
communication, these considerations might lead us to expect recency 
effects in foresight judgment.
For hindsight judgments the picture is more complex because of 
the time at which outcome knowledge is given. If outcome knowledge 
is given before the event description and the information is ordered 
as in (i) above, then a primacy effect might be expected, resulting 
in a strong hindsight bias. This may be the case because being told 
the outcome first and immediately reading information pointing towards 
that outcome are two conditions under which "assimilation" and "dis­
counting" would be operating. People should, then, regard early
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information as stable and hence more diagnostic, with subsequent 
conflicting information being discounted. Such a presentation 
should also encourage the early establishment of categories and 
expectancies into which later information is assimilated or 
distorted to fit such an outcome. Where outcome knowedge is given 
before the event description and information order is as in (ii) above 
less bias should be expected. Here early information will conflict 
with the outcome people believe has occurred. Hence other outcomes 
may be seen as more likely than in the previous condition with the 
result that judgments in hindsight may more closely resemble those 
in foresight.
Where outcome knowledge is given after the event descriptions 
and information ordered as in (i) above recency effects should occur. 
This is because of the reasons given earlier concerning the relationship 
between this material and that of persuasive communications. The 
recency effect should result, then, in a strong hindsight bias. This 
is so because if recency effects are operating anyway (foresight 
judgments in order (i) might be expected to be higher for the outcome 
believed to have occurred in hindsight than in order (ii)) then giving 
outcome knowledge at the end of the scenario should serve to increase 
the likelihood of the outcome pointed to at the end of the event 
description. In the case where outcome knowledge is given at the end 
of the scenario and information presented as in order (ii) above, we 
might expect negligible bias. This is because recency effects may be 
counteracted by outcome knowledge to produce judgments similar to 
foresight ones.
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Experiments making use of legal material, either real 
or simulated, demonstrated recency effects. This should apply 
to hindsight judgments using such material also (providing of 
course neither side has an overpowering case) . This discussion 
given above should equally apply here.
Experiments using contemporary social issues to investigate 
hindsight judgments are more difficult to predict order effects for.
One problem is that the experiment has no control over when the 
outcome (s) will occur and what it will be. It may be assumed that 
such socio-political events would command higher interest, be contro­
versial and be familiar to subjects. Such considerations may lead 
us to • predict primacy effects of varying information order in hind­
sight. How judgments may be affected in detail is more difficult to 
hypothesise about and will be left until the particular experiments 
are described in PART III. This is because the specific contemporary 
event has to be taken into consideration when making predictions of 
the effect of information order.
In summary, this section has indicated some ways in which differing 
orders of information may affect judgments in foresight and, more
iimportantly, in hindsight. Also been discussed is how hindsight bias 
might be affected (which should equally apply to creeping determinism). 
This was done in the light of the findings for order effects reviewed 
earlier in this chapter and the various explanations of primacy-
recency effects.
4.5.2. OVERVIEW OF ORDER MANIPULATIONS IN THE EXPERIMENTS IN PART II.
Four of the eight experiments to be described in PART II 
look at the effects of varying information order upon judgments.
Three of these investigate information order with respect to hind­
sight judgments, one investigates order effects in its own right.
Experiments 1 & 3 (Chapters 5 & 7 respectively), using 
laboratory material, look at information order and hindsight judgments 
with respect to unfamiliar social scenarios and 'legal' material.
The first experiment manipulated order by an intuitive selection of 
statements, partially derived from the scaling results of Thibaut and 
Walker (1974). Experiment 3, because of the findings of order effects 
in Experiment 1, used a much more rigorous and objective procedure 
of varying order. Here each statement of an event description was 
scaled by 20 subjects, scale values determined and information bearing 
on theoutcome presented either first or last in descending strength 
(similar to climax-anticlimax ordering procedure described earlier). 
Experiment 5, which used a contemporary social event (The Firemen's 
Strike of 1977/78), manipulated information order in terms of type 
of information rather than internal order.
»Experiment 4 (Chapter 8), a juror study, investigated order of 
testimony and witnesses in a long summary of a real courtroom trial. 
This experiment, which differs from the others because it does not 
investigate hindsight judgments, was carried out for two main reasons. 
Firstly, it was noted earlier, in the review of psycho-legal studies
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in this chapter, that there were a number of serious short­
comings in this work. The main ones being unrealistic manipu­
lation of order, too short a summary of a case, and little 
indication of how actual verdicts would be affected. Experiment 4 
tries to overcome these problems by manipulating order within the 
limits of standard courtroom proceedings, providing a more realistic 
trial summary and by asking mock jurors to give verdicts. Secondly, 
from looking at order effects within the hindsight/foresight 
paradigm it is a logical development to look at them on their own 
with a particularly applied emphasis. Further discussion is given 
to this aspect later in the thesis when the results of Experiment 4 
are discussed.
4.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed several lines of research dealing 
with order effects and attempted to summarise the conditions under 
which primacy or recency may be expected. Also considered was the 
explanation of the processes involved in producing these effects. 
The chapter then indicated ways in which order of information may 
affect hindsight judgments, and the hindsight bias. From this some 
hypotheses were derived as to which information orders might be 
expected to encourage the bias and which reduce it. Finally, the 
chapter briefly described the order manipulations in the experiments 
reported in PART II of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 5.
EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECTS OF "SURPRISE" INSTRUCTIONS, 
METHOD OF INFORMATION PRESENTATION AND ORDER ON 
JUDGMENTS IN HINDSIGHT.
5.1. INTRODUCTION
This experiment examined three issues with respect to hind­
sight judgments. Firstly, whether "surprise" instructions rather 
than "ignore", as in Fischhoff (1975a, 1977), would produce hind­
sight bias. Secondly, the effect of presenting event description 
information one item at a time rather than continuous prose as in
Fischhoff (1975a), and thirdly, the effects of different information 
orders.
Hindsight judges were given "surprise" instructions instead of 
"ignore" because of the problem of a demand characteristic inter­
pretation of hindsight bias discussed in Chapter 3. There, it will 
be recalled, it was argued that asking subjects to "respond as they 
would have had they not known the outcome" (Fischhoff, 1975a, p293) 
makes the bias particularly susceptible to such an interpretation. 
Briefly, the problem centres around giving subjects some piece of 
information and then asking them to ignore it when making likelihood 
assessments. They may argue that if the researcher wants them to 
ignore it why provide it in the first place unless it is what the 
experiment is about. In view of this, Experiment 1 provided hind­
sight subjects with "surprise" instructions in which, after being
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given outcome knowledge, they were asked to remember that surprising 
or unexpected events do happen when making likelihood assessments.
Such instructions indirectly ask subjects to ignore outcome knowledge 
because it should lead them to ask themselves how likely the outcome 
would have been had they not known what happened.
The second issue this experiment investigated, sequential 
presentation of the event description, was included for two reasons. 
Firstly, it provides a more realistic simulation of how people go 
about studying the past than presentation of a continuous prose 
passage, as in Fischhoff (1975a), does. Typically, people do not 
have all information to hand at once but sequentially up-date judgments 
as new information comes to light. Secondly, such a procedure allows 
a more detailed analysis of how outcome knowledge influences perceptions. 
If hindsight bias is found it will be possible to determine whether 
it occurs immediately upon reciept of outcome knowledge or develops 
as new information comes into view.
The third issue, less central than the previous two, concerns the 
effects on likelihood assessments of varying the order of information.
The experiment uses four scenarios, two taken from Fischhoff (1975a) 
and two derived from Thibaut & Walker (1975). The latter, which are 
short summaries of an imaginary criminal case, contain the same 
information but vary its order. In one (Jury Case A) mostly "unlawful" 
evidence appears first followed by "lawful" evidence. In the other  ^
(Jury Case B) mostly "lawful" followed by "unlawful" evidence is 
presented. It is hypothesised that hindsight bias will be more 
evident in Case A than in Case B.
For explanation of what is meant by "unlawful" and "lawful" 
here see footnote on page 121.
1
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This hypothesis is derived from the following considerations: 
firstly, although it was argued (Chapter 4) that recency effects 
are dominant where legal material is used. Stone (1969) found a 
primacy effect when early judgments were made. Secondly, the 
experiment to be reported here involved early commitment due to the 
sequential presentation procedure, again likely to produce primacy 
effects. Given this and that outcome knowledge is provided before 
the event description a "guilty" outcome with "unlawful" evidence 
appearing first should encourage hindsight bias. On the other 
hand the same outcome together with "lawful" evidence appearing 
first should reduce bias. The detailed reasons for this were dis­
cussed in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4 and will not be repeated here.
In summary, the experiment to be reported here attempts to 
(i) overcome the problem of a demand characteristic interpretation 
of hindsight bias; (ii) determine whether such bias is present 
immediately outcome knowledge is given or develops as new information 
appears; and (iii) investigate how information order influences 
hindsight judgments.
5.2. METHOD
1
SUBJECTS
80 subjects, 40 male and 40 female, attending an Open University 
Summer School took part in the experiment.
PROCEDURE
Subjects were randomly assigned to either a foresight or hindsight
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condition and read one of four event descriptions, also assigned 
at random (v/ith the constraint that equal numbers of men and 
women were assigned to each experimental treatment). Two of the 
four scenarios —  "Mrs. Dewar in Therapy" and "The British-Gurkha 
Struggle" were taken from Fischhoff (1975a), the other two —
"Jury Case A" and "Jury Case B" were constructed from ppl28-134 
of Thibaut & Walker (1975). In each case subjects were presented 
with information one item at a time and asked to estimate the 
likelihood (in percentage form) of each of the possible outcomes 
specified to a scenario. For Jury Case A and B subjects were 
asked to assess outcomes concerning the verdicts a hypothetical 
jury would come to. In all cases subjects were asked to ensure 
that the four percentages added up to one hundred. After each 
statement had been revealed it was left open to inspection. Thus 
the assessment given after statement N had been revealed was made 
in the context of the previous N-l items of information that subjects 
had already seen. After each item of information subjects were asked 
to assess the likelihood of each of the four possible outcomes. The 
assessments given to the last statement were taken as reflecting the 
subjects assessment of the likelihood of the four outcomes in the 
light of all the information concerning the scenario.
The forty subjects operating in foresight made likelihood 
assessments without knowing how many items of information they would 
receive, and without knowing how things turned out in the case given 
to them. After reading all the information describing the scenario
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they were told the outcome and asked, once again, to assess the 
likelihood of the outcomes presented to them. Before doing this 
they were reminded that "unexpected or surprising events do happen". 
This allowed a within-subjects comparison of foresight (F) and 
hindsight (HI) treatments
Forty subjects were allocated to a second hindsight treatment 
(H2) in which they were first told the outcome of the scenario 
randomly allocated to them: reminded that unexpected or surprising 
events do happen; and then followed the procedure outlined above.
This allowed a between-subjects comparison of foresight (F) and 
hindsight (H2) treatments.
In both conditions (F and H2) subjects spent, on average, between 
20 and 25 minutes doing the task. Each subject was run individually 
with the experimenter revealing the next item of information only 
after he/she had given likelihood assessments to the few outcomes 
in the light of the previous statement(s).
INSTRUCTIONS
In the foresight condition the cover sheet of each questionnaire 
contained the following instructions:
In this questionnaire we are interested in knowing 
how people judge the likelihood of possible outcomes of 
social events. A passage describing an unfamiliar social 
event will be shown to you. You will be shown statements 
about the event one at a time. After each statement we 
would like you to evaluate the probable occurrence of each 
of the four possible outcomes of the event. When you have
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doije this the next statement will be shown to you 
and we would like you to re-evaluate the possible 
occurrence of each outcome in the light of the new 
information. Would you please estimate the probab­
ilities in terms of percentages and bear in mind 
the following information:
(a) when all outcomes seem equally likely, each 
outcome should be assigned a score of 25%;
(b) after each statement you should write down 
four scores, which should add up to 100%.
After subjects had read all the information and made likelihood 
assessments to the four outcomes associated with the final state­
ment they received the following instructions:
%»
Here is one more item of information I would 
like you to consider: the actual outcome of this 
event was....1. Please remember that surprising 
or unexpected events do happen. In the light of 
this I would now like you to estimate the prob­
ability of each of the possible outcomes once 
more. Thank you.
This is the HI (Hindsight) treatment.
In the H2 condition the cover sheet of each questionnaire 
given to subjects was the same as that provided in foresight. 
Upon reading this subjects were presented with the following 
information and instructions :
J
The first item of information is that the outcome
of this event was.... 2 Please remember that unexpected
or surprising events do happen. Please estimate the 
probability of each of the possible outcomes given 
the information set out below.
depending on the scenario subjects were always given the same outcome. 
Both the number and actual wording of the outcome were provided. For 
example, for the scenario "Mrs. Dewar in Therapy" subjects were told 
that the actual outcome was No.4: continued therapy: improvement. 
2See footnote1.'
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Subjects were then shown the first statement of the scenario 
and made assessments to the outcomes provided. Subjects had 
completed their task as soon as the last statement of the 
scenario had been revealed and assessments made to the outcomes.
STIMULUS MATERIAL
The four event descriptions together with the four possible
outcomes specified with each were as follows:
1. MRS. DEWAR IN THERAPY
1. Mrs. Dewar, who was seen once a week, at first was quite 
resistant to psychotherapy and would evasively say that every­
thing was going along fine and that she had no difficulties.
2. At the fifth session she admitted that she kept having sex 
dreams about men other than her husband.
3. At the eighth session she confessed, with great self-recrim­
ination and anxiety, that she had had sex relations with one 
of her uncles when she was sixteen years old.
4. She was apologetic for not bringing out this information sooner.
5. She also said that she felt much better now that she had revealed 
this.
6. However, her frigidity and menstrual pains continued unabated.
7. At the fifteenth session she confessed that what really concerned 
her was that, at the age of 13, she had had sexual relations with 
several boys.
8. Her brother was one of these boys.
9. Each time she now had sex relations with her husband, the memory 
of what she had done in the past recurred to her.
10. She admitted that she "just didn't want to have anything to do 
with sex".
11. The therapist opted for a rationalistic approach, trying to convince 
her that there was no reason why she had to be guilty about her 
past incestuous relations.
12. The therapist argued that she had engaged in sex relations when 
she was very young and it is hardly unusual for girls of 13 to 
be as promiscuous as she was.
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OUTCOMES
(1) Terminated therapy; no improvement.
(2) Terminated therapy; improvement.
(3) Continued therapy; no improvement.
(4) Continued therapy; improvement.
2. BRITISH-GURKHA STRUGGLE
1. For some years after the arrival of Hastings as Governor-General 
of India, the consolidation of British power involved serious war.
2. The first of these wars took place on the Northern frontier of 
Bengal where the British were faced by the plundering raids of the 
Gurkhas of Nepal.
3. Attempts had been made to stop the raids by an exchange of lands, 
but the Gurkhas would not give up their claims to country under 
British control.
4. Hastings decided to deal with them once and for all.
5. The campaign began in November, 1814. It was not glorious.
6. The Gurkhas were only some 12,000 strong.
7. The Gurkhas were brave fighters, fighting in territory well suited 
to their raiding tactics.
8. The older British commanders were used to war in the plains where 
the enemy ran away from a resolute attack.
9. In the mountains of Nepal it was not easy even to find the Gurkhas.
10. The troops and transport animals suffered from the extremes of 
heat and cold.
11. The British officers learnt caution only after sharp reversals.
12. Major-General Sir D. Octerlony was the one commander to escape 
from these minor defeats.
iJ
OUTCOMES
(1) British victory.
(2) Gurkha victory.
(3) Military stalemate with no peace settlement.
(4) Military stalemate with peace settlement.
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3. JURY CASE A.
1. Adams (the defendant) and Zemp had been close friends for 
years. Recently they began to gamble heavily, and as matters 
became involved, met at a tavern to discuss their relationship.
2. At the start of the meeting Adams told Zemp they should end 
their relationship before serious trouble developed between 
them.
3. After a period of conversation Zerap knocked Adams to the floor 
and threw an object in his direction.
4. A waiter heard the defendant fall to the floor and scream 
"I ought to kill you for that".
5. Adams responded by stabbing Zemp in the stomach with a piece 
of glass.
6. The defendant ran out of the back door after the stabbing.
7. The law provides that it is unlawful to use more force in 
repelling an attack than a person believes necessary.
8. The defendant (Adams) is 6-feet tall and weights 15 stones;
Zemp is 5-feet 8-inches tall and weighs 12 stones.
9. Adams was not injured when he was knocked to the floor.
10. Zemp liked to drink heavily and often became violent when 
he was drunk.
11. Adams drank only one beer on the night of the stabbing.
12. Before he met Zemp at the tavern the defendant told a friend 
he hoped that he could settle his dispute with Zemp amiably.
13. One of the waiters told the police he wouldn't mind if Adams 
never came to tavern again because he sometimes bullied other 
customers.
14. Zemp told one of the waiters at the tavern he planned to settle 
his differences with the defendant once and for all.
iOUTCOMES OF JURY DELIBERATION
(1) Not guilty.
(2) Guilty of grievous bodily harm —  sentence 5-10 years.
(3) Guilty of using more force than necessary —  sentence 0-2 years
(4) Hung jury.
4. JURY CASE B
1. Adams (the defendant) and Zemp had been close friends for 
years. Recently, they began to gamble heavily, and as matters 
became involved, met at a tavern to discuss their relationship
2. Before he met Zemp at the tavern the defendant told a friend 
he hoped that he could settle his dispute with Zemp amiably.
3. Zemp told one of the waiters at the tavern he planned to settle 
his differences with the defendant once and for all.
4. Zemp liked to drink heavily and often became violent when he 
was drunk.
5. At the start of the meeting Adams told Zemp they should end 
their relationship before serious trouble developed between 
them.
6. After a period of conversation Zemp knocked Adams to the floor 
and threw an object in his direction.
7. A waiter heard the defendant fall to the floor and scream 
"I ought to kill you for that".
8. Adams responded by stabbing Zemp in the stomach with a piece 
of glass.
9. The defendant ran out of the back door after the stabbing.
10. The law provides that it is unlawful to use more force in 
repelling an attack than a person believes necessary.
11. The defendant (Adams) is 6-feet tall and weighs 15 stones;
Zemp is 5-feet 8-inches tall and weighs 12 stones.
12. Adams was not injured when he was knocked to the floor.
13. Adams drank only one beer on the night of the stabbing.
14. One of the waiters told the police he wouldn’t mind if Adams 
never came to the tavern again because he sometimes bullied 
other customers.
OUTCOMES OF JURY DELIBERATION
• ■ 1 1 ■■ ■ -— ■■■■- ■ ........ —  ii
(1) Not guilty.
(2) Guilty of grievous bodily harm —  sentence 5-10 years.
(3) Guilty of using more force than necessary —  sentence 0-2 years.
(4) Hung jury.
The. two scenarios taken from Fischhoff (1975a) were used 
because they were found to give the most consistent evidence of 
hindsight bias. The two scenarios derived from Thibaut & Walker 
(1975) , Jury Case A and Jury Case B, varied information order by 
first selecting a balanced number of "lawful" and "unlawful" state­
ments from the total number given in their Appendix. Thibaut and 
Walker obtained this classification for statements by getting judges 
to scale each according to Thurstone's (1959) method of equal-appearing 
intervals, hence a scale value was also found for each statement.
The statements used, together with their scale, values, are repro­
duced in Appendix 5a. In order to control for length of scenario 
the number of statements selected was approximately the same as those 
from Fischhoff (1975a). Order of statements in each of the "Jury 
Cases" was manipulated by either having the bulk of "lawful" state­
ments appearing first and "unlawful" appearing last or vice versa.
This was not done rigorously but in such a way as to preserve the 
readability of the scenario.
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5.3. RESULTS
To discover how outcome knowledge, sequential presentation and
i
information order (in the two "Jury Cases") influenced likelihood
3assessments, comparisons were made using non-parametric tests. The 
Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks Test was used for repeated 
measures comparisons, the Mann-Whitney U-test for independent measures 
(Siegel, 1956). One-tailed tests were used in foresight/hindsight
Of the seven experiments investigating foresight/hindsight judgments 
reported in this thesis all except Experiment 8 used non-parametric 
test. The reasons for using such tests is discussed in Appendix 12.
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and information order comparisons, two-tailed tests in information 
presentation comparisons.
(a) Hindsight/Foresiqht
-’ - r  *
To obtain an overall picture of how judgments made in hindsight 
differed from those made in foresight the analysis first pooled 
results within conditions across the four^scenarios. This was 
done for both outcomes reported to have occurred and not reported 
to have occurred. In both cases this was achieved by using a method 
similar to Fischhoff & Beyth (1975) and modified in light of the 
discussion given in Chapter 3.
For outcomes reported to have occurred the analysis proceded as 
follows: the median assessments for each of the four scenarios in
the foresight condition after all statements had been revealed was 
determined. For each scenario the median was compared with the response 
of each subject in the H2 condition. In order to decide whether a 
subject was hypothesis supporting (+) or non-hypothesis supporting (-) 
the following coding scheme was used:-
(+) assigned if the H2 raw score was greater than the 
foresight median for the particular scenario;
(-) assigned if the H2 raw score was less than or equal 
to the foresight median for the scenario.* .
Table 5.1 summarises the results of this analysis. The table shows
**Fischhoff & Beyth (1975a) were shown in Chapter 3 to use a procedure 
which omitted scores when foresight equalled hindsight.. The discussion 
there considered this invalid, hence "draws" are considered non-hypothesis 
supporting.
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Table 5.1 Number of hypothesis and non-hypothesis supporting 
. subjects in each scenario for the outcome reported 
to have occurred.
SCENARIO AND OUTCOME (+) (-)
Mrs. Dewar in therapy: continued 
therapy —  improvement (No.4) 3 7
British-Gurkha Struggle —  
British Victory (No.l)
7 3
Jury Case A —  Guilty of using 
more force than necessary (No.3) 7 3
Jury Case B —  Guilty of using 
more force than necessary (No.3) 8 2
Total 25 15
% 62.5 37.5
that across the four scenarios 62.5% of subjects were hypothesis 
supporting and 37.5% non-hypothesis supporting. This is not a 
significant difference however (Binomial test Z = 1.42, p < 0.078, 
one-tailed). Fischhoff & Beyth (1975), using their procedure, find 
over 69% to be hypothesis-supporting (this drops to around 61% if 
the above procedure is used —  see Table 3.1 for further details).,
A similar procedure for outcomes not reported to have occurred 
was used. The only difference was that the following coding scheme 
was used in place of the one described earlier
(+) assigned if H2 raw score was less than the
foresight median for that particular scenario.
(-) assigned if H2 raw score was greater than the 
foresight median for that particular scenario.
Table 5.2 summarises the results of this analysis, and shows that
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Table 5.-2 Number of hypothesis-supporting and non-supporting
subjects in each scenario for outcomes reported not 
to have occurred.
SCENARIO AND OUTCOME (+) (-)
Mrs. Dewar in therapy No.l 6 4
No. 2 5 5
No. 3 2 8
Total 13 17
British-Gurkha No. 2 6 4
No. 3 8 2
No. 4 8 2
Total 22 8
Jury Case A ' No.l __ IO
No.2 7 3
No. 4 - IO
Total 7 23
Jury Case B No.l _ IO
No. 2 IO -
No. 4 - IO
Total IO 20
Grand Total 52 68
% 43.3 56.6
across the four scenarios only 43.3% of estimates given in hindsight 
were hypothesis-supporting, whilst 56.6% were non-hypothesis 
supporting. Fischhoff & Beyth (1975) report over 55% to be hypothesis­
supporting (this drops to around 50% if "draws" are included —  
see Table 3.1 for more on this).
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To discover how outcome knowledge together with the "surprise" 
instructions influenced judgments in each of the four scenarios 
further foresight/hindsight comparisons were made. This was done 
using the Mann-Whitney U-test in F-H2 comparisons» and Wilcoxon
Table 5.3 Median probability estimates given to the reported 
outcome after all information presented.
CASE OUTCOME
C O N D I T I O N
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT(2) HINDSIGHT(1)
1.
Mrs. Dewar 
in therapy
Continued 
therapy —  
improvement
70.0 55.0
p<0.02
82.5
p<0.01
2.
British-
Gurkha
Struggle
British
victory.
17.5 55.0
p<0.05
57.5
p<0.05
3.
Jury Case A Guilty of using 
more force than 
necessary —  
sentenced 2yrs.
32.5 52.0
NS
75.0
p<0.05
4.
Jury Case B Guilty of using 
more force than 
necessary —  
sentenced 2 yrs.
3.5 55.0
p<0.025
1
30
p<0.025
in the F-Hl comparisons.
Table 5.3 summarises the median likelihood assessments given
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to the reported outcomes after all items of information had 
been presented in F, HI and H2 treatments replicated. Fischhoff's 
(1975a) results with respect to the "British-Gurkha Struggle"
(p<0.05, Mann-Whitney U=26) and showed that a similar bias was 
evident in "Jury Case B" (p<0.025, Mann-Whitney U=23). "Jury 
Case A" produced no statistically reliable difference between F and 
H2 treatments but the scenario "Mrs. Dewar in Therapy" produced 
data opposite to that in Fischhoff's research (p<0.02,Mann-Whitney 
U=18.5, two-tailed).
Table 5.3 also shows that data from F and HI treatments (repeated 
measures) led to higher assessments for reported outcomes in hind­
sight than foresight for each of the four scenarios ("Mrs. Dewar 
in Therapy", p<0.01, Wilcoxon T=l, N=8; "British-Gurkha Struggle", 
p<0.005, Wilcoxon T=0, N=8; "Jury Case A", p<0.05, Wilcoxon T=0,
N=5; "Jury Case B", p<0.025, Wilcoxon T=0, N=6).
A similar analysis is not given here for outcomes reported 
not to have occurred because little difference between foresight and 
hindsight (H2) was found in the pooled results, as indicated in 
Table 5.2. Appendix 5B summarises, for each scenario and each out­
come, all the median percentages derived after each item of inform­
ation was presented. From this it can be seen that many hindsight 
assessments are similar to foresight ones for outcomes reported not
to have occurred
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(b) Hindsight Bias and Sequential Presentation of Information.
The sequential method of information presentation allows us 
to determine whether hindsight bias, occurs immediately outcome 
knowledge is given or develops as new information comes into view. 
To investigate this two sets of analyses were conducted. First, 
between foresight and hindsight (H2) assessments given after the 
first statement has been presented.
Table 5,4 Median probability estimates given to the reported 
outcome after first item of information.
CASE
J
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT(2)
1.
Mrs. Dewar 
In therapy
Continued 
therapy —  
improvement
60.0 22.5 p<0.05
2.
'British-
Gurkha
struggle
British
victory 45.0 30.0 NS
3.
Jury Case A Guilty of using 
more force than 
necessary —  
sentenced 2 yrs.
25.0 25.0 NS
iJ
4.
Jury Case B Guilty of using 
more force than 
necessary —  
sentenced 2 yrs.
13.0 25.0 NS
Second, between assessments given to the first and last statement of 
information in F and H2 for each scenario.
(
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Tattle 5.4 summarises the median assessments given to the 
reported outcome after presentation of the first statement in 
treatments F and H2. From this it can be seen that for "Jury Case B" 
the effect of outcome knowledge was to raise the perceived prob­
ability, but not significantly so (p->0.05, Mann Whitney U=43) .
For "Jury Case A" there was no difference between F and H2.
In the other two scenarios the effect of outcome knowledge was to 
lower the perceived probability of the reported outcome. The 
difference was only significant for "Mrs. Dewar in Therapy"
(p<0.05, Mann Whitney U=22, two-tailed), not in the case of the 
"British-Gurkha Struggle" (p>0.05, Mann Whitney U=43.5). From 
this it appears that differences between F and H2 do not appear 
immediately outcome knowledge is given.
Table 5.5 Median probability estimates given to the reported 
outcome after first and last items of information.
CASE CONDITION
S T A T E M E N T
SIGNIFICANCE
FIRST LAST
1.
Mrs. Dewar
in Therapy
Foresight(F) 60.0 70.0 NS
Hindsight(H2) 22.5 50.0 p < 0.05
2.
British-
Gurkha
Struggle
Foresight(F) 45.0 17.5 p < 0.05 I
Hindsight(H2) 30.0 55.0 NS
3.
Jury Case A Foresight(F) 25.0 32.5 p < 0.05
Hindsight(H2) 25.0 52.0 NS
4.
Jury Case B Foresight(F) 13.0 3.5 NS
Hindsight(H2) 25.0 55.0 p < 0.01
V
Table 5.5 summarises the median assessments given to the 
reported outcomes after presentation of the first and last items 
of information in F and H2 respectively. From this it can be seen 
that in all four scenarios judges operating in hindsight perceived 
the reported outcome as more likely at the end than the beginning. 
Only two of these were significantly different though (“Mrs. Dewar 
in Therapy", p 0.05, Wilcoxon T=9.5, N=10,- Jury Case B, p 0.01, 
Wilcoxon. T-O, N=8). In contrast, judges operating in foresight
Table 5.6 Median Probability Estimates of the Four Outcomes in
Jury Cases A & B given in Foresight and Hindsight(H2).
OUTCOME CONDITION
' S C E N A R I O
SIGNIFICANCE
JURY CASE A JURY CASE B
1. Not
Guilty
Foresight(F) O O NS
Hindsight(H2) O O NS
2. Guilty of 
causing 
grievous 
bodily harm
Foresight(F) 37.5 87.5 p < 0.05
Hindsight(H2) 17.5 30.0 NS
3. Guilty of 
using more 
force than 
necessary
Foresight(F) 32.5 3.5 p < 0.025
Hindsight(H2) 52.0 55.0 NS
4. Hung 
Jury
Foresight(F) O O NS
Hindsight(H2) O 7.5 NS
j
revised their estimates downwards in some cases ("The British-Gurkha 
Struggle", p<0.05, Wilcoxon T=6, N=9; "Jury Case B", p>0.05, Wilcoxon 
T=10, N=6) and upwards in others ("Mrs. Dewar in Therapy", p>0.05, 
Wilcoxon T=9, N=9; "Jury Case A", p<0.05, Wilcoxon T=4, N=9) . In 
foresight, then, there is no consistent pattern, in hindsight there is.
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(c) Information Order in Jury Case A and B.
To discover how the two different information orders in 
Jury Case A and B affected judgments two sets of analyses were 
performed on estimates given after the last statement. Firstly, 
between judgments in Jury Case A and B for each outcome. Table 
5.6 summarises the medians and results of this analysis. Figures 
5.1 and 5.2 graphically depict the medians for outcomes 2 and 3 
respectively. From the table it can be seen that for outcome 2 
(guilty of causing grievous bodily^ harm) judges in Jury Case B 
found it to be much more likely than those in Jury Case A 
(p<0.05, Mann Whitney U=27). For outcome 3 (guilty of using more 
force than necessary) the opposite was found, i.e. subjects in "A" 
believed it much more likely than those in "B" (p<0.025, Mann- 
Whitney U=21), between hindsight assessments in the two cases 
produced no significant differences. The hypothesis that hind­
sight bias would be more evident in the Case A than Case B because 
of primacy effects, was not confirmed: the pattern of results 
indicate recency effects to be operating.
The second analysis was between foresight and hindsight assess­
ments in each case for each outcome. For the outcome reported to ! 
have occurred (guilty of using more force than necessary) previous 
analysis (see Table 5.3) has already shown hindsight assessments to 
be significantly greater only for Jury Case B. For outcomes not 
reported to have occurred only outcome 2 in Jury Case B was found 
to be significantly greater in foresight than hindsight (p<0.03,
Mann Whitney U=23.5)
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Figure 5'. 1 Median likelihood assessments in foresight and
hindsight (H2) for the outcome -'Guilty of grievous 
bodily harm.
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Figure 5.2 Median likelihood assessments in foresight and 
hindsight (H2) for the outcome "Guilty of using
90 -1 
80 -
70 -
more force than necessary" (this is the outcome
reported to have occurred).
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5.4. DISCUSSION
The first issue this experiment was designed to explore was 
whether outcome knowledge would lead subjects to exhibit hindsight 
bias when they were provided with "surprise" rather than "ignore" 
instructions. Strong support for hindsight bias was not found here. 
Reporting an outcome of a scenario produced a consistent increase 
in its likelihood whenever within subjects comparisons were made, 
thus replicating and extending the findings of Fischhoff & Beyth 
(1975a). However, between subjects comparisons produced much less 
consistent results. This was shown in two ways: firstly, an over­
all picture of how foresight and hindsight judgments differed, made 
by pooling across scenarios, found less support than that reported 
by Fischhoff & Beyth, (1975a) . The experiment reported in this 
Chapter found only 62.5% of subjects to be hypothesis-supporting 
for outcomes reported to have occurred, compared with 69% by Fischhoff 
& Beyth (1975a). Furthermore, only 43.3% of subjects were hypothesis­
supporting for outcomes reported not to have occurred, Fischhoff and 
Beyth's figure being over 55%. Secondly, turning to a consideration 
of F-H2 comparisons for each scenario, those taken from Fischhoff 
(1975a) replicated previous findings with respect to "The British- < 
Gurkha Struggle"^ but reversed previous findings for "Mrs. Dewar in 
Therapy", Considering the two scenarios derived from Thibaut and 
Walker (1975, ppl28-134)y F1H2 comparisons were in the direction 
predicted by Fischhoff's research, but only one (Jury Case B) was 
statistically significant. Taken together, these findings suggest 
hindsight bias not to be a particularly strong or reliable phenomenon.
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The' second issue concerned just how outcome knowledge 
influences perceptions and how hindsight bias occurs. The 
sequential presentation procedure allowed this to be investigated. 
For three scenarios it was found that F and H2 assessments were 
not significantly different after the first statement had been 
presented. For the scenario, "Mrs. Dewar in Therapy", however,
H2 assessments were significantly less than foresight ones.
Together these findings demonstrate that if hindsight bias is 
going to occur it will not do so immediately upon receipt of out­
come knowledge. Comparisons between assessments assigned to the 
first and last statements of event descriptions in foresight and 
hindsight (H2) indicated a consistent pattern of results in the 
latter treatment. For each scenario it was found that all assess­
ments given to the last statement were higher them those given to 
the first; indicating that if hindsight bias is going to occur it 
does so only as new information comes to light. However, because 
only weak support for hindsight bias was found as indicated earlier, 
it must be concluded that the above influence of outcome knowledge 
whilst consistent, may not be great enough to lead to reliable bias.
The third issue was how foresight/hindsight judgments would be; 
affected by different orders of information in "Jury Case A" and 
"Jury Case B". It was hypothesised that hindsight judges in Case A 
would exhibit greater bias than such judges in Case B. The opposite 
was found, indicating recency, not primacy, effects to be operating. 
This cam be seen from inspection of Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Both graphs 
show outcome knowledge to have greater influence over judgments in
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Jury Case B rather than Jury Case A. In Figure 5.1, which plots 
median assessments for Outcome 2, hindsight assessments are 
significantly less for Case B but not for Case A. This is in 
the expected direction if hindsight bias is operating (i.e. 
assessments less in hindsight for outcomes reported not to have 
occurred). Figure 5.2 which plots medians for the outcome reported 
to have occurred, demonstrates an equivalent pattern. Hindsight 
assessments are significantly greater than foresight ones in Jury 
Case B but not in Jury Case A. The greater influence of outcome 
knowledge in "B" can only l?e attributable to the different inform­
ation orders. In A the order was mostly "unlawful" followed by 
"lawful" statements, and the reverse of this in B. The above 
results indicate that information appearing last had greater 
influence over hindsight assessments. Explaining why bias was found 
in "B" for Outcomes 2 and 3 and not in "A" for the same outcomes. 
The implications of these results are that hindsight bias may be 
reduced if information bearing on other outcomes appears last.
Why should recency effects of the sort described above be in 
evidence rather than primacy ones as expected from the discussion 
given in the introduction to this experiment? No indication of this 
can be found in the results. Consideration of the material provides 
the only indication. In Chapter 4 it was shown, on the whole, that 
recency effects dominated where "legal" material was used. A main 
reason for this was a "suspension of judgment" hypothesis. Results
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from foresight comparisons indicate such a principle to be 
operating here. Also, in Chapter 4, it was indicated that early 
commitment encouraged primacy effects, this was demonstrated by 
Stone (1969). Commitment in the experiment reDorted here differed from Stone's 
in that subjects made verdicts in his study and likelihood assess­
ments in this. This difference may account for the recency effects 
found here as commitment is less strong.
Overall the findings discussed here lend only partial support 
for Fischhoff's claim that events seen in hindsight are perceived 
as more inevitable than when those same events are seen in foresight.
Apart from the above reasons for this three other considerations need 
to be discussed.
First, the "ignore" instructions of Fischhoff may indeed suffer 
from demand characteristic problems, the use of "surprise" instructions 
is less susceptible to this and so may provide a more accurate picture 
of how judgments made in hindsight differ from those in foresight.
However, it has to be acknowledged that such instructions may lead 
people to be too conservative when making judgments.
Second, due to the problem of the "law of small numbers" (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1971) discussed in Chapter 2, it is possible that less 
reliable or consistent results found in this experiment were due to 
sample size being approximately half that of Fischhoff, (1975a);
Fischhoff & Beyth, (1975a). This is dealt with in some detail in Appendix
13 as it is an issue relevant to other experiments reported in
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PART II of this thesis, rather than one specific to the experiment 
reported in this chapter.
Third, it may be the case that hindsight bias is mediated by
the position of outcome knowledge relative to other items of 
information in the scenario. HI subjects received outcome knowledge 
at the end of the event description, as in Fischhoff (1975a),,and 
saw the reported outcomes as more probable than in foresight. H2 
subjects were told what had happened before they received other 
information and produced the expected pattern of results in only 
two of the four cases.
A second experiment was designed, therefore, to investigate 
the effects of the position of outcome knowledge when subjects read 
continuous prose passages as in Fischhoff (1975a).
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CHAPTER 6.
EXPERIMENT 2: POSITION OF OUTCOME KNOWLEDGE AND HINDSIGHT 
JUDGEMENTS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The results of the previous experiment indicated that hindsight 
bias may not be a particularly strong or consistent phenomenon. One 
reason for this was that two variables were found to affect it, firstly, 
it may be mediated by the position of outcome knowledge in relation 
to the event description. Secondly, certain information orders may 
act to reduce or encourage it. In contrast to the previous experiment 
the one to be reported here investigated creeping determinism rathern 
than hindsight bias.
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the lack of strong 
support for hindsight bias makes it of interest to attempt to replicate 
Fischhoff's (1975a) results with respect to creeping determinism. 
Secondly, as Fischhoff (1975a) reports, creeping determinism to 
be a stronger phenomenon than hindsight bias we may be able to determine 
more precisely the effects of position of outcome knowledge and 
information order.
It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that a distinction was made 
between creeping determinism and hindsight bias. The latter was said 
to occur only when subjects were given instructions which, either 
explicitly or implicitly, asked them to ignore outcome knowledge
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(i.e. attempt to reconstruct a foresight state) when making judgements. 
Creeping determinism, on the other hand, was said to occur when 
subjects, provided with outcome knowledge and an event description, 
were asked to make judgements in the light of all the information they 
had been given. Fischhoff (1975a) finds creeping determinism to be 
a stronger phenomenon than hindsight bias. For example, pooling his 
results from Tables 1 and 3 (pp. 293 and 295 respectively) for the 
outcome reported to have occurred we find that the median foresight/ 
hindsight difference is 14.2% and 9.5% for creeping determinism and 
hindsight bias respectively.
The experiment to be reported here investigated three hypotheses: 
that creeping determinism would (1) be more in evidence when outcome 
knowledge was given after the event description than before; (2) 
that confidence in the judgements made by subjects would be greater 
in hindsight than foresight; (3) that information appearing last 
which indicates that the reported outcome will occur will have a 
stronger influence on judgements than information which appeared 
first.
The first hypothesis is an extension of the indications in the, 
previous experiment that outcome knowledge given at the end of an 
event description may induce greater hindsight bias than if it were 
given at the beginning. The hypothesis is lent further credence by 
the recency effects reported in the previous experiment. If subjects 
are instructed to make judgements in the light of all information, 
as in those for creeping determinism, the existence of recency 
effects would serve to make the reported outcome appear more inevitable
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when outcome knowledge is given last rather than first.
The second hypothesis also derives from Fischhoff's general 
finding that outcome knowledge leads people to perceive that outcome 
as more inevitable than if they did not know the outcome. This is
so because it follows from this that we would expect people to feel 
more confident in their judgements in hindsight. Indirect support 
for this hypothesis can be found in a number of historical writings.
For example, Wohlsletter (1962) comments:
" . . . it is much easier after the event to sort out the 
relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, 
of course, a signal is always crystal clear; we can now 
see what disaster it was signalling, since the disaster 
has occurred." (p. 387)
The third hypothesis is made as a result of the findings in the 
previous experiment, where, as discussed above, recency effects were 
found. There is no obvious reason why this should not apply when 
creeping determinism rather than hindsight bias is being investigated.
The experiment to be reported here loses the same scenarios and out-
Icomes as in the previous one. It differs in that subjects were pre­
sented with continuous prose passages rather than the sequential 
presentation of information method. This was done because of the 
focus upon replication and extension of Fischhoff (1975a). Consequently 
it was thought more appropriate to follow his design in this respect.
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6.2. METHOD
SUBJECTS
120 undergraduate students at the University of Warwick acted as
subjects in this experiment.
PROCEDURE
40 subjects were randomly assigned to a Foresight (F) condition:
40 to a hindsight condition (HB) in which they were told what happened 
before reading the event description (this is equivalent to the H2 
condition in Experiment 1); and 40 to a hindsight condition (HA) in which 
they were told the outcome after reading the details of the scenario.
In each condition subjects read one (and only one) of the four scenarios 
used in Experiment 1. Subjects in all conditions were asked to make 
two sets of judgements, first to assess the likelihood (in percentage 
form) of each of the possible outcomes specified to a scenario; 
secondly, to indicate how confident they felt about their assessments. 
They did this on a scale where O was "unsure" and 5 was "very 
confident". Likelihood assessments, as in Experiment 1, given to the 
four possible outcomes of a scenario had to add up to 100%.
INSTRUCTIONS
4
The instructions given to both foresight and hindsight subjects
that appeared on the coversheet of the questionnaire ran as follows:
In this questionnaire we are interested in knowing how people 
judge the likelihood of possible outcomes of social events. A 
passage describing an unfamiliar social event will be shown 
to you. We would like you to evaluate the probability of 
occurrence of each of the four possible outcomes of the event 
in the light of the information appearing in the passage.
Would you please estimate the probabilities in terms of per­
centages and ensure that the four scores add up to 100%
Please look at the questionnaire sheet (p.3), before you read
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the event description, so that you are acquainted with the 
outcomes.
These instructions are similar to those of Fischhoff (1975) in Experiment 
1 (p. 289), which are reproduced in Appendix 6A. After reading the 
event description as appropriate to the condition, subjects were 
given the following instructions to read before making judgements:
In the light of the information appearing in the passage what 
was the probability of occurrence of each of the four possible 
outcomes listed below. (The probabilities should sum to 100%).
After this subjects were asked to indicate their degree of confidence 
in their judgements on a scale labelled as indicated above.
STIMULUS MATERIAL
The four scenarios used in this experiment ("Mrs. Dewar in Therapy"; 
"The British-Gurkha Struggle"; "Jury Case A”; "Jury Case B") were the 
same as those used in Experiment 1. The only difference was that 
numbers to each sentence had been omitted and the sentences combined 
to form a single continuous prose passage. In the conditions where 
outcome knowledge was given it appeared separately either at the 
beginning or end of the paragraph. For example, in HA (hindsight, 
outcome knowledge after the event description) the "British-Gurkha 
Struggle" was presented to subjects as follows:
2 ■ BRITISH GUP.KHA STRUGGLE
For some years after the arrival of Hastings as Governor-
General of India, the consolidation of British power
involved serious war. The first of these wars took place 
on the Northern Frontier of Bengal where the British were 
faced by the plundering raids of the Gurkhas of Nepal. 
Attempts had been made to stop the raids by an exchange 
of lands, but the Gurkas would not give up their claims 
to country under British control, and Hastings decided to 
deal with them once and for all. The campaign began in 
November, 1814. It was not glorious. The Gurkhas were 
only some 12,000 strong; but they were brave fighters, 
fighting in territory well-suited to their raiding tactics. 
The older British commanders were used to war in the 
plains where the enemy ran away from a resolute attack.
In the mountains of Nepal it was not easy even to find the 
Gurkhas. The troops and transport animals suffered from the 
extremes of heat and cold, and the officers learnt caution 
only after sharp reversals. Major-General Sir D. Octerlony 
was the one commander to escape from this minor defeat.
The actual outcome of this event was a British Victory. 
(Outcome No. 1 on questionnaire sheet) .
6.3 RESULTS
(1) Position of Outcome Knowledge and Creeping Determinism
To discover the effect of (a) outcome knowledge and (b) position 
of that information relative to the event description, upon judgements 
two sets of analyses were performed. First, to achieve an overall 
picture the same pooling across studies procedure as described in 
Experiment 1 was used. Second, individual comparisons between foresight 
and hindsight judgements for each scenario was made using the Mann 
Whitney U test.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarise the results of the "pooled analysis" 
for outcomes reported and not reported to have occurred respectively. 
Table 6.1 shows that when outcome knowledge was given before the event 
description only 37.5% of subjects exhibited creeping determinism (i.e. 
were hypothesis supporting), the majority, 62.5%, being non-hypothesis
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supporting. The Table also shows that when outcome knowledge is 
provided after the event description 42.5% of subjects exhibited 
creeping determinism. These figures for creeping determinism are 
much lower than those reported by Fischhoff.
Table 6.2 shows that for outcomes reported not to have happened 
40% were hypothesis supporting when outcome knowledge was given before 
the event description and 49.2% of assessments when outcome knowledge 
was given at the end. These are higher than average percentages 
obtained for outcomes reported to have occurred, which is opposite to 
Fischhoff's findings. Looking at the individual scenarios. Table 
6.1 shows that outcome knowledge given after the event description 
is more likely to result in creeping determinism than if it is 
given before in the scenarios "The British-Gurkha Struggle" and 
"Jury Case A".
Turning now to individual comparisons. Table 6.3 summarises the 
median assessments made in the foresight and two hindsight conditions 
for each outcome in each scenario. The Table shows that, for the 
outcomes reported to have occurred, hindsight after (HA) judgements 
were in the predicted direction for the "British-Gurkha Struggle"
(P < 0.025, Mann Whitney U = 19.5) and "Jury Case B" (P < 0.1, Mann 
Whitney U = 29). Hindsight (after) assessments were in the opposite 
direction to that expected by the creeping determinism hypothesis, 
neither being significantly so however. For outcomes reported to 
have occurred in the hindsight before (HB) condition no assessments 
were significantly different from foresight ones. For outcomes which 
did not occur foresight/hindsight comparisons yielded two significant
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Table 6.1 Number of hypothesis supporting and non-supporting subjects 
in each scenario for outcomes reported to have occurred
CONDITION
SCENARIO AND OUTCOME HINDSIGHT BEFORE HINDSIGHT AFTER
(+) (-) (+) (-)
Mrs. Dewar in Therapy: continued 
Therapy - improvement (No.4) 2 8 3 7
British-Gurkha Struggle: British 
Victory (No.l) 6 4 8 2
Jury Case A: Guilty of using more 
force than necessary (No.3) 2 8 1 9
Jury Case B: Guilty of using more 
force than necessary (No.3) 5 5 5 5
Total 15 25 17 23
% 37.5 62.5 42.5 57.5
Table 6.2 Number of hypothesis-supporting and non-supporting assessments 
in each scenario for outcomers reported not to have occurred
SCENARIO OUTCOMENUMBER
CONDITION
HINDSIGHT BEFORE HINDSIGHT AFTER
(+) (-) {+) (-)
Mrs. Dewar in Therapy 1 6 4 5 5
2 3 7 3 7
3 2 8 5 5
TOTAL 11 19 13 17
The British-Gurkha 2 6 4 6 4
Struggle 3 4 6 9 1
4 4 6 4 6
TOTAL 14 14 19 11
Jury Case A 1 4 6 3 7
2 4 6 2 8
4 O io 3 7
TOTAL 8 22 8 22
Jury Case B 1 4 6 6 4
2 8 2 7 3
4 3 7 6 4
TOTAL 15 15 19 11
GRAND TOTAL 48 72 59 61
% 40.0 60.0 49.2 50.8
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Table 6.3 Summary of Median Assessments for each Scenario and each
Outcome given in Foresight and the tv/o hindsight conditions
SCENARIO AND OUTCOME
CONDITION
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT BEFORE HINDSIGHT AFTER
Mrs. Dewar in Therapy
1. Terminated Therapy - 
no improvement 20 IO 17.5
2. Terminate Therapy - 
improvement IO IO IO
3. Continued Therapy - 
no improvement 17.5 20 22.5
1. Continued Therapy - 
improvement 50 50 37.5
The British-Gurkha Struggle
L. British Victory 12.5 17.5 37.5**
2. Gurkha victory 50 35 37.5+
3. Military Stalemate wit! 
peace settlement 22.5 27.5 5.0
4. Military Stalement wit! 
no peace settlement IO IO IO
Jury Case A
1. Not Guilty 5.5 IO IO
2. Guilty of causing 
grievous bodily harm 20 30 32.5
3. Guilty of using more 
force than necessary 60 50 47.5
4. Hung Jury 10 11.25 IO
Jury Case B
1. Not Guilty 5 5 IO
2. Guilty of Causing 
grievous bodily harm 40 22.5* 27.5
3. Guilty of using more 
force than necessary 50 54 55+
4. Hung Jury 7.5 IO 5
This is the outcome reported to have occurred. Values with 
* or + denote that comparison with appropriate Foresight 
judgement is significantly different < 0.05; +P < 0.1.
à
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differences in the expected direction. These were "The British-Gurka 
Struggle", outcome 2, hindsight after (P < 0.1, Mann Whitney U = 27). 
Appendix 6B summarises all the values obtained from foresight comparisons 
with the two hindsight conditions (HB and HA) using the Mann Whitney
U test.
(2) Confidence Levels
Table 6.4 Median Confidence Levels given in Hindsight (HA and HB) and 
Foresight
SCENARIO
CONDITION
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT BEFORE HINDSIGHT AFTER
Mrs. Dewar in 3.5 3.0 4.0
Therapy N=8 N=9 N=9
The British-Gurka 3.5 3.0 2.0
Struggle N=9 N=9 N=9
Jury Case A 4.0 3.0 4.0
N=9 N=9 N=9
Jury Case B 4.0 4.0 4.0
N=6 N=8 N=9
Table 6.4 summarises the median confidence levels made in foresight 
and the two hindsight conditions. From this Table it can be seen that 
only one of the eight medians is greater in hindsight than foresight, 
but not significantly so. Four were less in hindsight and three the 
same as foresight. Again none of these were significantly different.
The table also shows that not everybody gave confidence estimates (for 
each cell N should equal 10). This was due to a fault in the layout 
of the questionnaire: the confidence scale appeared on its own on the 
back page and not everybody noticed it.
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Figure 6 ■ 1 Median likelihood assessments in foresight and
hindsight conditions for the outcome "Guilty of using
Figure 6.2 Median likelihood assessments in foresight and
hindsight conditions for the outcome "Guilty of causing 
grievous bodily harm".
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(3) Creeping Determinism and Information Order in Jury Cases A and B
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 graphically depict the medians for outcomes 
2 and 3 respectively in Jury Case A and B. The only difference between 
foresight and hindsight comparisons, as reported earlier, was a trend 
in Jury Case B for Outcome 3 between foresight and hindsight after 
(P < 0.1, Mann Whitney U = 29, one tailed). Comparisons between HA 
and HB for outcomes 2 and 3 ("guilty of causing grievous bodily harm" 
and "guilty of using more force than necessary" respectively) yielded 
no significance differences. The only difference between these two 
information orders was in foresight assessments for outcome 3. Here 
the assessments given in Jury Case B were significantly higher than 
those in Jury Case A (P < 0.05, Mann Whitney U = 23.5, two tailed) .
6.4 DISCUSSION
The first hypothesis this e x p e r im e n t w a s  designed to explore, that 
creeping determinism would be more in evidence when outcome knowledge 
was given after the event description rather than before, received 
only weak support. Where outcome knowledge was given before the event 
description no evidence of creeping determinism was found. However, 
two scenarios out of the four produced results consistent with the 
creeping determinism hypothesis in the condition where outcome knowledge 
was given at the end of the event description. The pooled results in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 tell a similar story. Overall, less than 50 per 
cent of subjects or assessments given in hindsight were consistent with 
creeping determinism. Again only one scenario ("The British-Gurkha 
Struggle") provided clear evidence for both the outcome reported to have
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occurred and the outcomes reported not to have occurred.
In summary, then, differences between foresight and hindsight 
(after) were much less consistent than those obtained by Fischhoff
(1975a). Limited support was obtained for the suggestion from Experi­
ment 1 that creeping determinism is mediated by the position of outcome 
knowledge. Reporting the outcome of an event produced a statistically 
significant increase in its perceived likelihood for only two of the 
four cases and then only when outcome knowledge was presented at the 
end of the scenario. At the moment the available data would seem to 
suggest that presenting outcome knowledge at the end of a scenario 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for hindsight-foresight 
differences to occur.
The second hypothesis, that subjects would exhibit greater con­
fidence in likelihood assessments made in hindsight than foresight, 
received no support. This might have been expected in view of the 
failure to detect consistent effects in hindsight. In the one case
k_ .
where creeping determinism was found ("The British-Gurkji Struggle", 
hindsight after) confidence levels were opposite to that predicted, 
but not significantly so. ;
The third hypothesis, concerning the effect of different information 
orders, manipulated (as indicated in Experiment 1) by ordering statements 
scaled by Thibaut and Walker, on hindsight judgements also received 
little support. The hypothesis, it will be recalled, was that hind­
sight judgements would exhibit stronger creeping determinism when 
information pointing at the reported outcome was presented last rather
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than first. Inspection of figures 6.1 and 6.2 reveals the medians 
associated with each scenario to be in the predicted direction. For 
the outcome which occurred (Number 3) assessments are higher, for both 
hindsight conditions, in Jury Case B. Further inspection of Figure 
6.2 reveals the opposite to be the case for the outcome reported not 
to have occurred (Number 2) . As none of these differences were 
significant, however, the results will not be discussed in any more 
detail.
However, the interesting question remains as to why quite strong 
evidence for recency effects in hindsight judgements was found in 
Experiment 1 but not here. This failure to replicate the results may 
stem from two considerations. First, it may be due to the procedural 
differences between the two experiments. In Experiment 1 an item-by­
item sequential presentation together with "surprise" instructions 
in hindsight was used. Experiment 2 presented subjects with a continuous 
prose passage and instructed subjects to make judgements in the light 
of all information presented. Both the sequential presentation and 
"surprise" instructions may account for the failure to replicate order 
effects here. For example, the sequential presentation procedure 
may cause people to attend to the information more especially that 
towards the end. In recalling it in order to formulate likelihood 
assessments the information which appeared last may be more available 
from memory and hence exert greater influence over assessments.
The second consideration stems from the way in which information 
order was manipulated in the two scenarios. In Experiment 1 it was 
reported as being achieved in a non-rigorous or objective way - the
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bulk of "lawful" or "unlawful" statements either appeared first or 
last, and were ordered in such a way as to make the scenario easy 
to comprehend.^- Such a procedure falls short of a rigorous order 
manipulation in a number of ways. First, rather than have the bulk 
of lawful or unlawful statements first or last it would be more 
appropriate a manipulation of order to have all of each sort appear 
in such a way. Second, the scale values and categorisation given 
to these statements by Thibaut and Walker's (1975) judges may differ 
on both counts to those given by British judges. Third, not all the 
statements taken from Thibaut and Walker were scaled by them, speci-r 
fically, those briefly outlining the incident. Finally, statements 
were scaled according to degrees of lawfulness or unlawfulness but 
not in relation to a specific charge.
In view of these shortcomings a further experiment was designed 
to investigate the effect of different information orders on hindsight 
judgements. The ordering of information was achieved using a more 
rigorous and objective procedure in line with the points discussed 
above.
An oversight and shortcoming with this, ar.d the previous experiment, 
was that subjects were not informed about a specific charge 
against Adams (the defendant).
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CHAPTER 7.
EXPERIMENT 3: THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ORDER UPON HINDSIGHT
JUDGEMENTS
7.1. I INTRODUCTION
Experiment 3 is the last one in this thesis to use "laboratory 
material" to investigate the effect of outcome knowledge upon judgements. 
The experiment to be reported here returns to an investigation of 
hindsight bias and how it might be influenced by the order in which 
information describing some social event appears.
Three hypotheses were investigated with respect to hindsight 
judgements. That those in possession of outcome knowledge would 
(1) see that outcome as more likely than subjects who did not know 
how events turned out; (2) be less surprised at its occurrance than 
subjects in foresight and, conversely, hindsight subjects would be 
more surprised if the outcomes reported not to have occurred had 
occurred than those in foresight; (3) show greater confidence in their 
judgements than those in foresight.
With respect to information order it was hypothesised that hind­
sight bias would be more in evidence when information pointing to 
the outcome believed to have occurred appeared at the end of the event 
description than at the beginning.
The experiment to be reported here returned to an investigation 
of hindsight bias (as in Experiment 1) rather than creeping determinism
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(as in Experiment 2) for two reasons. (1) as discussed in Chapter 2 it 
is the most interesting of the two phenomena because of its potentially 
serious consequences in terms of what one learns from the past. (2) 
Neither of the previous experiments provide strong support for hind­
sight bias or creeping determinism. In view of this there appears to 
be no particular advantage, as argued in the previous chapter, in 
investigating the latter rather than the former. In consequence the 
former reason becomes even more compelling.
The three hypotheses concerning the effect of outcome knowledge 
upon perceptions stem, as in the previous experiments, from Fischhoff 
(1975a) ,Fischhoff and Beyth (1975). Hypotheses (1) and (3) need no 
further introduction as their derivation is discussed in the intro­
ductions of Chapters 5 and S respectively. Hypothesis (2) derives 
from Fischhoff (1975) where he argues that people in hindsight will 
be less surprised at the occurrance of an outcome they believe has 
occurred than if they had not known how events turned out. In effect, 
then, hindsight bias should cause people to be less surprised at outcomes 
believed to have occurred. For outcomes believed not to have occurred 
people should show greater surprise, as a consequence of hindsight 
bias, than those in foresight. j
The order in which information appeared in the two scenarios used 
in this experiment ("Mrs. S" and "Adams and Zemp") was varied in two 
ways. In one order information indicating the outcome reported in 
hindsight appeared first followed by information indicating other 
outcomes. In the other this order was reversed. As the hypothesis 
indicates recency effects are assumed to be operating (if there are
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any order effects at all) . The reasons for this have been discussed 
in earlier chapters and will not be repeated here. However, as 
information order is manipulated in a different way to that in 
previous experiments a brief summary of the procedure might prove 
useful.
At the end of the last chapter it was indicated that the way in 
which information order had been manipulated in the jury cases was 
not entirely satisfactory or objective. The present study overcame 
these shortcomings by having subjects scale statements according to 
Thurstone and Chave's (1929) equal-appearing interval scale. Having 
obtained a scale value for each statement order of information was 
varied in one of two ways, as indicated earlier, by rank-ordering 
the statements according to their value.
In summary, the experiment reported here investigated how subjective 
likelihood assessments, surprise and confidence levels are affected by 
possession of outcome knowledge. Secondly, how Hindsight bias may 
be influenced by the order in which statements describing the event 
appeared.
7.2. METHOD
(
SUBJECTS
60 undergraduate students at the University of Warwick acted as 
subjects in this experiment.
DESIGN
The design of the experiment can best be understood by examining 
Figure 7.1. The study included a foresight and hindsight condition
180.
(where outcome knowledge was given before the event description) with
two treatments in each.
Figure 7.1 Design of Experiment J3
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT
ORDER 1 ORDER 2 ORDER 1 ORDER 2
Mrs. S Adams 
& Zemp
Mrs. S Adams 
& Zemp
Mrs. S Adams 
& Zemp
Mrs. S Adams 
& Zemp
N = 15 - N = 15 N = 15 N = 15
In the "order 1" treatment subjects read an event description where the 
order of information was such that paeCt indicating the reported out­
come appeared last and that indicating other outcomes appeared first.
In the "order 2" treatment the event description appeared in the 
reverse order to that above. Subjects in each treatment made two sets 
of judgements, in a counterbalanced design, one relating to the Mrs.
S. scenario and the other to the Adams and Zeinp scenario.
PROCEDURE
Thirty subjects were randomly allocated to a foresight condition
ti
and thirty to an hindsight condition. In both conditions 15 subjects 
were randomly allocated to an "order 1" treatment and 15 to an "order 
2" treatment.
In both conditions subjects had to make three sets of assessments.
c
They had to (1) assess the likelihood of occurrence of each of the
four possible outcomes to the scenario, ensuring that these four likelihoods
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totalled lOO per cent; (2) for each outcome indicate, on a seven-point 
scale ranging from surprised to not surprised, how surprised they 
would be (have been) had it occurred; (3) for each scenario indicate 
how confident they felt about the judgements they had just made. 
Appendix 7A and 7B provide examples of the questionnaire sheets for 
Mrs. S. in Foresight order 1 (FOI) and hindsight order 1 (HOI) respec­
tively. It should be noted that the questionnaire sheets for each 
order treatment in each condition were identical.
Subjects in both conditions spent, on average, between 20 and 
25 minutes completing the task. Subjects were run in small groups 
(of between 3 and 6) with the experimenter present to ensure no communi­
cation occurred between subjects.
INSTRUCTIONS
In the foresight condition the cover sheet of each questionnaire
ran as follows:
In this study we are interested in knowing how people judge 
the likelihood of possible outcomes of social events. The 
relevance of this can be seen by, for example, thinking of 
some past events that you know about —  how likely was the 
outcome that actually occurred? How likely did other out­
comes seem before the one that actually occurred? Was the 
outcome that did in fact happen surprising? These are the 
kind of issues looked at here.
In what follows you will find there are two event descrip­
tions —  one concerned with a woman who has made a number 
of suicide attempts in the past; the other concerns a 
summary of evidence heard in a criminal trial. Associated 
with each event is a short questionnaire.
Would you please proceed as follows:-
Read carefully through the first event description, then 
answer the questionnaire associated with it. Then go on 
to the second event description, read carefully through 
and answer the questionnaire for that one.
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Upon reading this and the event description subjects were provided 
with a questionnaire asking them to make likelihood assessments, 
estimates of surprise and indicate confidence levels. As an example, 
the questionnaire for "Mrs. S." is reprinted in Appendix 7A. Appendix 
7B is the hindsight questionnaire.
In the hindsight condition subjects received the same instructions
on the cover sheet of the questionnaire but with an additional para­
graph. This appeared after the second paragraph of the foresight
instructions and read as follows :
As the interest is with past events you will find that before 
the event description you are told what actually happened. 
This information is given to you as it provides a realistic 
simulation of how we view past events. For example, an 
historian trying to understand why the bombing of Pearl 
Harbour took America by surprise knows what happened and 
analyses events in the light of this. Of course, the fact 
that a certain outcome occurred does not mean it was 
inevitable, it may have been one that people thought 
exceedingly unlikely.
These are an elaboration of the "surprise" instructions used in 
Experiment 1. They implicitly ask subjects to attempt to reconstruct 
a foresight state of mind. Hence the experiment is investigating  ^
hindsight bias.
STIMULUS MATERIAL
Subjects in this experiment were asked to make judgements about 
two scenarios, one labelled "Mrs. S." and the other "Adams and Zemp". 
The latter contains exactly the same material as the jury cases in 
former experiments. The former is new, and was written by the author. 
It provides a short summary of the personal history of Mrs. S. together
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Appendix 7C reprints this scenario in the Order 1 treatment.
The use of these event descriptions was guided by a number of 
reasons. First, as the Adams and Zemp scenario had been used before 
to look at the effect of varying order of information it is of 
interest to see how previous results compare with those manipulating 
order in a more objective way. A new event description was used for 
three main reasons: (1) to ensure that previous findings were not 
specific to a scenario but would generalise across scenarios. (2)
This scenario would draw on less background knowledge, than, for 
example, the British-Gurkha Struggle. (3) It was felt that statements 
in this event description would be easier for subjects to scale.
For the Adams and Zemp scenario the possible outcomes listed 
were the same as in previous experiments, as was the outcome reported 
to subjects in hindsight (guilty of using more force than necessary). 
For the scenario about Mrs. S. the outcomes listed were as follows
1. Successful suicide attempt
2. Further suicide attempt which was regarded as being 
highly dangerous to life and of serious intent on 
her part.
3. Further suicide attempt which was regarded as not 
being dangerous to life or of serious intent on 
her part.
4. No further suicide attempt.
For this scenario subjects were asked to make judgements in respect 
of these outcomes in the 5 year period following Mrs. S's third
with details about a number of suicide attempts she has made.
suicide attempt.
184.
SCALING PROCEDURE AND ORDER MANIPULATION 
(a) Scaling
Twenty subjects scaled each statement appearing in both scenarios 
according to Thurstone and Chave's (1929) equal appearing interval 
scale. For the scenario "Mrs. S." judges were first asked to read 
through the event description and scale the statements in accordance 
with the following instructions:
Each sentence appears separately on a set of numbered 
cards. The numbering corresponds to the position of each 
sentence in the passage that you have just read.
I would like you to describe each of the given sentences 
using one of the following nine point scales:- One scale 
concerns sentences which you think indicate that Mrs. S. 
will not make a further suicide attempt within the five 
years following her third suicide attempt. The other 
scale concerns sentences which you think indicate that 
she will make a further suicide attempt within 5 years 
following her third suicide attempt.
For the scale concerned with sentences indicating that 
she will make a further suicide attempt within the 
next 5 years - on card 9 put those statements which you 
think strongly indicate no further attempt, on card 1 
put those statements which you think weakly indicate 
no further attempt. Arrange each of the sentences in 
accordance with the degree of strength or weakness that 
you think they imply between these two points.
Would you please start with sentence 1 and carry out 
the above procedure for each of the 16 sentences.
Thus judges had to make two decisions, (1) they had to choose whether 
the sentence indicated the possibility of a further suicide attempt
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or not. .(2) They had then to decide, on the appropriate nine-point 
scale labelled as described in the instructions, to what extent the 
sentence indicated one of these two things.
Judges scaling the statements of the Adams and Zemp scenario 
followed a similar procedure but with the following modifications:
(1) They had to decide whether the statement implied guilt or inno­
cence for the defendant (Adams) (2) To indicate the degree of guilt 
or innocence on the appropriate nine-point scale. The two sets 
of scales for each scenario are reproduced in Appendix 7P.
The scale value of each sentence was determined in accordance 
with Thurstone and Chave's procedure but with the following modifi­
cation. For each scenario the two scales (guilty/not guilty: suicide 
attempt/no suicide attempt) were treated as a continuum from -9 to 
+9. For Mrs. S. -9 most strongly indicated a further suicide attempt 
and +9 most strongly indicated no further suicide attempt. For the 
Adams and Zemp scenario -9 indicated the greatest degree of guilt and 
+9 the greatest degree of innocence.
The number of times each statement had been given a certain 
scale value was determined. A cumulative frequency distribution for 
each statement was computed, starting at the (+) or (-) end depending 
on which contained over 50% of the scores. A statement's scale 
value was found by plotting a graph of the cumulative frequency 
and reading off the 50 per cent level. Thus the scale value is such 
that half the judges classified a statement to the left of it and half 
to the right of it. Appendices 7E and 7F summarise the cumulative
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frequencies and scale value for each sentence. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 
show the sentence, its number, and scale value determined by the 
above procedure for the scenarios Mrs. S . and Adams and Zemp 
respectively.
(b) Order Manipulation
The event description information for each scenario was ordered 
in two ways. In the case of Mrs. S. this was achieved as follows: 
"Order 1" - the statement with the highest value on the "no further 
suicide" scale appeared first. This was followed by the statement 
with the next highest value on this scale, and so on. When all the 
statements on this scale had been ordered in this manner the statement 
with the lowest value on the "further suicide attempt" scale appeared 
next. This was followed by the next highest statement, and so on.
The event description ended with the one having the highest value.
In "Order 2" statements appeared in the reverse order.
Much the same procedure for the Adams and Zemp procedure was 
followed. Here the "Order 1" treatment had the statement with the 
highest value on the "not guilty" scale appear first, and the highest 
value on the "guilty" scale appear last. Statement in between were 
ordered as described above. "Order 2" statements appeared in the 
reverse to that of "Order 1".
7.3 RESULTS
(a) Hindsight Bias
Two sets of analyses were performed to determine the effect of
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Table 7.1 Sentence, Scale Value and Sentence Number for Mrs. S. 
scenario
MRS. S .
Key (-) refers to scale concerned with a further suicide attempt 
(+) refers to scale concerned with no further suicide attempt
SCALE
i/ALUE
SENTENCE
NUMBER SENTENCE
-7.7 7 At 27 Mrs. S. made a second suicide attempt by 
poisoning - this attempt was seen as dangerous to 
life and of serious intent on her part - she was 
admitted to a mental hospital for 2m.
-6.0 14 A year after her husband's death she made a third 
suicide attempt by taking a small overdose of 
aspirins - this was seen as relatively harmless to 
life and not of serious intent on her part.
-5.7 11 When she was 40 her husband died of a heart 
attack which made her depressed and discontented.
-5.0 5 After the first suicide attempt Mrs. S . was 
restless and discontented perhaps because she did 
not have a steady boyfriend.
-4.5 2 Mrs. S. was born in 1930 and came from a family in 
which her father had committed suicide and her 
mother often threatened it.
-4.2 4 At the age of twenty she made her first suicide 
attempt by trying to poison herself with her 
mother's sedatives - this was classified as a 
dangerous threat to life but not of serious intent 
on her part.
-3.2 io Mrs. S. was not altogether happy with her life as 
a housewife, it often made her tense and depressed
+1.3 16 Mrs. S. had no previous psychiatric history of 
mental illness apart from that associated with 
her second suicide attempt.
+2.5 12 Insurances had left her well provided for materi­
ally and financially after her husband's death.
+3.3 3 Mrs. S. had had a fairly happy childhood and did 
not want for any material things.
+4.3 9 In a period of seven years, from 30 to 37, Mrs. S. 
had three children, two girls and a boy.
+4.7 8 At 29 Mrs. S. was married, she gave up her 
secretarial work to have a family.
contd. . .
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Table 7.1 contd.
SCALE
VALUE
SENTENCE
NUMBER SENTENCE
+5.0 6 She left home at the age of 21 and took a job as 
a secretary at which she was quite competent and 
found enjoyable.
+5.0 1 Mrs. S. was a likeable person who always appeared 
to be cheerful and had a free and easy attitude 
to life.
+5.0 13 A short while after her husband's death Mrs. S. 
returned to work as a secretary and seemed to 
enjoy going back to work.
+7.4 15 Mrs. S. loved her three children and appeared to 
get a sense of fulfilment from them.
\
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Table 7.2 Sentence, Scale Value and Sentence Number for "Adams and 
Zemp" scenario
ADAMS AND ZEMP
Key (-) refers to scale concerned with guilt
(+) refers to scale concerned with not guilty
SCALE
VALUE
SENTENCE
NUMBER SENTENCE
-8.0 5 Adams responded by stabbing Zemp in the stomach with 
a piece of glass
-6.4 6 The defendant (Adams) ran out of the back door after 
the stabbing.
-5.4 io Adams was not injured when he was knocked to the 
floor.
-5.4 7 The law provides that it is unlawful to use more 
force than a person believes necessary in repelling 
an attack.
-5.3 8 The defendant (Adams) is 6ft. tall and weighs 16 
stones, Zemp is 5ft 8" tall and weighs 12 stones.
-4.4 13 One of the waiters told the police he wouldn't mind 
if Adams never came to the tavern again because he 
sometimes bullied other customers.
+2.0 2 Recently Adams and Zemp had begun to gamble heavily, 
and as matters became involved, met at a tavern to 
discuss their relationship.
+2.0 11 On the night of the stabbing Adams drank only one 
beer.
+4.3 3 At the start of the meeting Adams told Zemp that 
they should end their relationship before serious 
trouble developed between them.
+4.5 14 Zemp told one of the waiters at the tavern he plan­
ned to settle his differences with the defendant 
once and for all.
+5.0 9 Zemp liked to drink heavily and often became violent 
when he was drunk.
+5.7 4 After a period of conversation Zemp knocked Adams to 
the floor.
+6.0 1 Adams (the defendant) and Zemp had been close 
friends for years.
+7.4 12 Before he met Zemp at the tavern the defendant told 
a friend he hoped he could settle his dispute with 
Zemp amiably.
outcome knowledge upon likelihood assessments, estimates of surprise 
and confidence in those judgements. (1) Results were pooled, using 
the procedure outlined in Chapter 5, to get an overall picture.
(2) Individual comparisons between foresight and hindsight judgements 
were made using the Mann Whitney U test.
Table 7.3 summarises the overall percentages of hypothesis 
supporting and non-supporting judgements for the outcomes reported and 
not reported to have happened. As can be seen from this table the 
results, in general, provide little support for hindsight bias. Only 
one of the hypothesis-supporting percentages is greater than 50 per 
cent, this only just so.
Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 summarises the medians of the likelihood 
assessments, surprise estimates and confidence levels respectively 
for the scenarios Mrs. S. and Adams and Zemp, Table 7.4 reveals 
that of the four hindsight likelihood assessments given to the outcome 
reported to have occurred two were in the predicted direction and 
two opposite when compared with respective foresight assessments 
(FOl with HOI and F02 with H02). For the scenario Mrs. S. both 
assessments in the predicted direction were significant (FOl/HOl:
P < 0.01, Mann Whitney U = 53; F02/H02; P < 0.025, Mann Whitney U = 
56.5). No significant differences between foresight and hindsight 
assessments for the Adams and Zemp scenario were found. Table 7.4 
also shows that for outcomes reported not to have occurred five out 
of six hindsight assessments were in the predicted direction for 
the Mrs. S. scenario. Only one of these was significant however 
(further suicide attempt: not dangerous to life, FOl/HOl, P < 0.05,
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Table 7.3 Percentage of Hypothesis-Supporting and Non-Supporting 
Judgements for Outcomes Reported and not Reported to 
have Occurred
JUDGEMENTS % SUPPORT
(+) (-)
LIKELIHOOD ASSESSMENTS
1. Outcomes reported to have occurred 53.3 46.7
2. Outcomes reported not to have occurred 45.5 54.5
SURPRISE ESTIMATES
1. Outcomes reported to have occurred 46.7 53.3
2. Outcomes reported not to have occurred 48.3 51.7
CONFIDENCE LEVELS 41.7 58.3
Table 7.4 Median Likelihood assessments assigned to the outcomes of 
the scenarios Mrs. S . and Adams and Zemp
SCENARIO AND OUTCOME FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT
ORDER 1 ORDER 2 ORDER 1 ORDER 2
MRS. S.
|l. Successful Suicide Attempt io lo 40** 40* |
2. Further Suicide Attempt - 
Dangerous to Life
3. Further Suicide Attempt - 
not Dangerous to Life
4. No further Suicide Attempt
25
40
io
20
40
25
20
15***
5
20
29
5
ADAMS AND ZEMP
lo
20
5
30
io
20
5
40
1. Not Guilty
2. Guilty of Causing Grievous 
Bodily Harm
3. Guilty of using more force 
than necessary 50 50 40 40
4. Hung Jury lo io 15 10
This is the outcome reported to have occurred
Values with * denote that comparison with equivalent foresight 
condition is significantly different. * P < 0.025; P < 0.01;
P < 0.005.
192.
Table 7.5 Median surprise estimates given to the outcomes of the 
scenarios Mrs. S. and Adams and Zemp
SCENARIO AND OUTCOME FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT
ORDER 1 ORDER 2 ORDER 1 0RDER2
MRS . S.
|l- Successful Suicide Attempt 4.5 5.0 3 .O 4.0
2. Further Suicide Attempt - 
Dangerous to Life 4 .O 4.5 2.5 4.0
3. Further Suicide Attempt - 
Not Dangerous to Life 2.0 3.0 5 .O*** 3.0
4. No Further Suicide Attempt 5.5 5.5 6.5 6.0
ADAMS AND ZEMP
1. Not Guilty 6.0 6.5 6.0 6.0
2. Guilty of Causing Grievous 
Eodily Harm 4 .O 3.5 6.0 4.0
3. Guilty of using more force 
than necessary 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
4. Hung Jury 4 .O 6.0 5.0 5.0
J This is the outcome reported to have occurred
Values with * denote that comparison with equivalent
foresight condition is significantly different *** P < 0.001.
Table 7.6 Median Confidence Levels Given to Judgements made about the 
Two Scenarios in Foresight and Hindsight
SCENARIO
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT
ORDER 1 ORDER 2 ORDER 1 ORDER 2
MRS. S. 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
ADAMS AND ZEMP 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
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Mann Whitney U = 50) . For the Adams and Zemp scenario all six hind­
sights assessments were in the opposite direction to that predicted, 
but none significantly so.
Table 7.5, which summarises the median surprise estimates shows 
that for the outcomes which occurred two of the four hindsight 
estimates were in the predicted direction, but none significantly 
so. For outcomes not reported to have occurred half were in the 
predicted direction and half in the opposite direction. One of those 
in the predicted direction was significantly different (Mrs. S., 
further suicide attempt; not dangerous to life, F01/F02; P < 0.001, 
Mann Whitney U = 23).
Table 7.6, summarising the confidence levels, shows all the 
medians to be identical. Obviously, no significant differences were 
found here.
(b) Information Order
The lack of strong or reliable support for the notion that 
oucome knowledge leads to systematic bias means that our predictions 
concerning the effect of information order on hindsight judgements 
are unlikely to receive support either.
Inspecting the median likelihood assessments for outcomes 
reported to have occurred in Table 7.4 reveals that HOI and H02 
are the same for both scenarios. As expected from this no significant 
differences were found. For outcomes reported not to have occurred
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the table shows only two of the six comparisons to be in the 
predicted direction. One of these being significant (Mrs. S., 
further suicide attempt: not dangerous to life, H01/H02, P < 0.025, 
Mann Whitney U = 59.5). None of the four in the direction opposite
to that predicted were found to be significantly different.
The effect of information order upon surprise estimates can be 
seen from inspection of Table 7.5. For outcomes reported to have 
occurred it can be seen that Order 1 produces less surprise than 
Order 2 for the Mrs. S. scenario, however this was not found to be 
a reliable difference. Similarly, no significant differences were 
found between HOI and H02 for the Adams and Zerap scenario. For out­
comes reported not to have occurred only one of the six was in the 
predicted direction (Mrs. S., further suicide attempt; not dangerous 
to life), but not significantly so. The five in the opposite 
direction were not significant either.
7.4 DISCUSSION
The first hypothesis this experiment was designed to investigate, 
that hindsight bias would be shown in likelihood assessments, estimates 
of surprise and confidence levels, received only weak support. 
Likelihood assessments, the traditional way of detecting this bias, 
provided no support for Fischhoff's claim that possession of outcome 
knowledge leads people to perceive the outcome they believed has 
occurred as more likely (and less likely for outcomes believed not 
to have occurred) than when those same events are seen in foresight 
when the assessments were pooled together. Only 53.3% of assessments 
supported this for outcomes believed to have occurred and less than
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50% for those believed not to have occurred.
Individual comparisons of foresight and hindsight assessments 
for each scenario and outcome provided only weak support for hindsight 
bias. This coming almost entirely from the outcome reported in hind­
sight in the Mrs. S. scenario. Here hindsight assessments for both 
order treatments were significantly different from foresight ones.
The only other significant result, which was for an outcome believed 
not to have occurred for the Mrs. S. scenario, also provided evidence 
of hindsight bias. The failure to detect hindsight bias in the Adams 
and Zerap scenario is puzzling in view of results in previous experiments 
where the same scenario provided some support for this bias. Some 
possible reasons for this will be discussed later.
Comparison of foresight/hindsight estimates of surprise provided 
virtually no support for the hypothesis that those in possession of 
outcome knowledge would be less surprised for the outcome believed 
to have occurred and more surprised for those believed not to have 
occurred than those in foresight. The pooled results showed slightly 
more than 50% of estimates to be in the opposite direction.
f
Individual comparisons yielded only one significant difference which 
was in the predicted direction. Confidence judgements, however 
analysed, provided no support for the hypothesis.
In summary, foresight/hindsight judgements provided only very 
weak support for the existence of hindsight bias. This coming 
almost entirely from subjective likelihood assessments. On the 
whole, these findings do not provide a convincing pattern of results
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for one to claim that possession of outcome knowledge leads to system 
matic effects.
The second hypothesis concerning the effect of different informa 
tion orders upon hindsight judgements received little support either. 
This is partly due, as indicated in the previous section, to little 
evidence being found for hindsight bias in the first place. No 
significant differences due to information order were detected for 
the reported outcomes. For those not reported to have occurred one 
result was found to be consistent with the hypothesis. This was 
the only significant finding for all the H01-H02 comparisons and 
constitutes the only support for the second hypothesis.
The lack of a clear pattern of results with respect to both 
these hypotheses is something of a surprise in view of the findings 
from the previous two experiments. Although they do not provide 
convincing evidence for a general hindsight bias, creeping deter­
minism or the effect of different information orders upon hindsight 
judgements they do provide stronger support than that obtained in
this experiment. In view of this we may be justified in speculating
(upon possible reasons for this discrepancy.
Two considerations may be appropriate here, first, the position 
of outcome knowledge in relation to the event description; second, 
the "readability" of the event descriptions. Concerning the former, 
it will be recalled that outcome knowledge was given before the 
event description. The previous two experiments provided some 
evidence, not substantial though, that such position of outcome
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knowledge may result in hindsight bias (or creeping determinism) 
being less pronounced than if it were given after the event description. 
The design of the experiment reported in this chapter may be criti­
cised on these grounds as controlled variables were designed, or 
should have been, to encourage hindsight bias.
The second, and more important consideration, concerns the 
procedure used for manipulating information order. The problem 
arises from ordering sentences or statements in a scenario with respect 
to their scale value only. Such an approach ignores the "readability” 
and overall coherence of the passage. Indeed, many subjects spon­
taneously commented upon difficulties they encountered when trying 
to piece together. In the Mrs. S. scenario, subjects found it 
difficult to sort out the chronological sequence of events. The 
ordering procedure ignores this aspect, as a consequence the event 
description jumps from one time period to another. In the Adams 
and Semp scenario a similar problem was experienced - this concerned 
the sequence of events leading up to and following the stabbing.
The net effect of the "readability" problem was to cause subjects to 
read the event description more than once to achieve a clear under­
standing. This "repeated exposure" to the information, as will be 
recalled from Chapter 4, is likely to nullify order effects (Anderson 
and Hubert, 1963).
In summary, the above two considerations indicate that the weak 
support for the experimental hypotheses may be partially due to 
shortcomings in design. In particular, the "intuitive" manipulation 
of information order described in Experiment 1 may be less objective
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but does preserve coherence and make understanding relatively easy in 
a way the more objective procedure does not. Perhaps the lesson to 
be drawn from this is that some kind of satisfactory and specifiable 
trade off between these two criteria is required. An easily compre­
hensible passage is as important as an objective procedure for mani­
pulating orders. It is hard to see how the two could be made completely 
compatible but some attempt to take account of both factors is 
required.
The next chapter reports an experiment which continues the 
main theme of the one reported here. The experiment is concerned 
solely with the effect of different orders of information, this with 
respect to jurors' perceptions of guilt or innocence in a rape
trial.
CHAPTER 8.
EXPERIMENT 4: EFFECTS OF WITNESS AND TESTIMONY ORDER UPON
JUROR VERDICTS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The experiment to be reported in this chapter differs from the 
other empirical studies in this thesis as it does not investigate 
hindsight judgements. The experiment is solely concerned with order 
effects and investigates this with respect to jurors’ verdicts of 
guilt or innocence using a criminal trial. The reasons for this 
were summarised in Chapter 1 and discussed at greater length in 
Chapter 4 which reviewed order effects.
The experiment, whilst preserving the overall structure of 
adversary proceedings in this country, manipulated the order in which 
witnesses appeared and the order of testimony given by each witness. 
Recency effects, it will be recalled from Chapter 4, are the most 
common findings in psycholegal studies, with Thibaut and Walker (1975) 
providing the strongest evidence. On the basis of their research 
the experiment reported here was designed to test two predictions. 
That (1) there would be a greater number of guilty verdicts when 
witnesses and testimony indicating guilt appeared last, and, 
conversely, a greater number of not guilty verdicts when witnesses 
and testimony indicating innocence appeared last in both the case 
for defence and prosecution; (2) confidence levels in these judgements 
would be greater when guilty or not guilty verdicts were given by 
subjects where witnesses and testimony indicating guilt appeared last
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or indicating innocence appeared last respectively.
Thibaut and Walker (1975) make strong claims concerning the 
importance and relevance of their findings to the courtroom. In 
commenting upon their results they say: "These results clearly show 
that in the legal setting recency effects are pervasive" (p.61). To 
accept such implications of the results of experimental research 
we need to be confident that such research adequately characterises 
and simulates criminal courtroom proceedings. Thibaut and Walker's 
research on order effects, reviewed in some detail in Chapter 4, was 
found to suffer from a number of serious shortcomings in this respect. 
The detailed discussion given there will not be repeated here, only 
a summary of the criticisms will be given. It will be recalled that 
the most serious shortcomings were (a) poor simulation of criminal 
courtroom proceedings, (b) inadequate trial material and (c) failure 
to ask subjects for guilty or not guilty verdicts.
The experiment to be reported here attempts to overcome these 
problems by: (1) maintaining the traditional procedure in 
criminal trials (i.e. opening statements by prosecution and defence; 
the case for the prosecution and defence; closing arguments by 
prosecution and defence; summing-up by the judge); (2) using a 
shortened version of an actual (rather tfen fictional) criminal case 
- here a rape trial; (3) presenting a version of substantial length 
(over 3,000 words) rather than a short summary (less than 500 words);
(4) asking simulated jurors to give verdicts rather than indications 
of guilt or innocence on a nine-point scale.
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Attempting to provide greater "ecological validity" to the 
experiment imposes restrictions on the way in which order can be mani­
pulated. For example, one cannot, as most studies have (Wallace and 
Wilson, 1969; Wilson, 1969), vary the order in which prosecution and 
defence appear in the proceedings. In view of this, and to provide 
some similarity between Thibaut and Walkers' "gross" and "internal" 
order, the present study varied order in two ways (1) Witness order 
- here witnesses for the defence or prosecution were ordered in terms 
of degree of guilt or innocence the judges thought they indicated 
for the defendant. Witnesses called for the defence or prosecution 
remained in their respective part of the proceedings, only the order 
in which they appeared was varied. In one condition witnesses indica­
ting strongest degree of guilt appeared first followed by those 
judged to indicate innocence. The other condition reversed this 
order (2) Testimony order - here the order of statements made by 
each witness was varied (with the restriction that defence or 
prosecution's cross-examination, as appropriate, came last). There 
were two orders, either strong guilty followed by weak guilty, weak 
innocent, strong innocent statements; or the reverse of this.
In summary, the present study investigated order effects with 
respect to witnesses and their testimony. It was predicted that, 
on the basis of previous research, recency effects would be obtained. 
In seeking to make the findings applicable and relevant to actual 
criminal courtroom proceedings the experiment was designed so as 
to preserve traditional adversary protocol. Previous research has 
failed to do this, in consequence their findings must be regarded 
as having little relevance or application for the legal profession
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in particular, and the law in general.
8.2. METHOD
SUBJECTS
128 Open University students, 64 male and 64 female, attending 
a Summer School at Warwick University served as "jurors" in this 
experiment. People who would be exempt or ineligible to serve on a 
jury were excluded from the study (see Devlin, 1966, Ch.l. for a 
detailed list).
DESIGN
Figure 8.1 Design of Experiment 4
SEX WI WG
TG TI TG TI
MALE N = 16 N = 16 N = 16 N = 16
FEMALE N = 16 N = 16 N = 16 N = 16
Key: WI - "innocent" witness first 
WG - "guilty" witness first 
TG - "innocent" testimony first 
WG - "guilty" testimony first
The design of the experiment can best be understood by examining 
Figure 8.1. The study included two witness order conditions (WG and 
WI) and two testimony order conditions (TG and TI) In the witness 
order conditions subjects read a shortened version of a trial trans­
cript in which either "innocent" witnesses appeared first followed 
by "guilty" ones (labelled WI), or "guilty" appeared first and 1
1 In the witness order conditions the order in which witnesses for 
prosecution and defence appeared was varied; in the testimony 
order conditions the statements made by these witnesses was varied.
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"innocent" last (labelled WG). In the testimony order conditions 
either "guilty" statements followed by "innocent" ones (TG) or 
"innocent" followed by "guilty" (TI) was presented to simulated jurors. 
The two order manipulations, therefore, yielded four conditions:
WI - TG; WI - TI; WG - TG; WG - TI.
PROCEDURE
Thirty two subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four 
order conditions, with the restriction that 16 males and 16 females 
appeared in each.
Each subject received a twelve page booklet, containing instructions, 
the rape trial (order of witness and testimony according to condition), 
and a questionnaire. The two page questionnaire is reprinted in 
Appendix 8A. The instruction sheet, which was on the cover page of 
the booklet, read as follows:
Would you please read through the following passage which 
is a summary of an actual trial. After you have read this 
summary would you please answer the short questionaire 
which follows i t .
The next ten pages of the booklet were taken up with the rape trial 
structured, as indicated in the introduction, to conform to traditional 
British criminal courtroom proceedings. The final two pages of the 
booklet contained the questionnaire. "Jurors" were asked to make 
two kinds of judgements: (1) whether they thought each of the two 
defendants was guilty of rape, attempted rape or not guilty of either 
charge, (2) To indicate, on a seven-point scale ranging from "not
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Subjects spent, on average, 45 minutes reading the rape trial 
transcript and completing the questionnaire. After completing the 
task they were debriefed as to the aims of study and invited to make 
comments about the case, etc.
STIMULUS MATERIAL
confident at all" to "very confident”, how confident they were about
the verdicts they had given.
The rape trial proceedings were transcribed from an audio tape
used by Sealy (1973, 1975) in his experimental studies. The material
•%was derived from an actual trial transcript (Sealy-personal communication). 
The audio-tape obtained from Phil Sealy lasted for over 2.5 hours and 
when transcribed amounted to over 12,000 words. In order to reduce 
this between one third and one quarter two judges (the experimenter 
being one) were given the task of precising it without changing the 
structure. A third judge then compared the two versions for 
discrepancies and/or omissions. Where such problems arose the 
three judges discussed them and reached consensus over what to include
and omit. One of the two versions was selected for use in the
2
experiment.
SCALING AND ORDER MANIPULATIONS 
(a) Scaling
Twenty subjects scaled 63 statements of testimony according to
2 The two summaries made by the two judges together with the audio- 
tape transcription can be obtained on request.
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Thurstone and Chave's (1929) method of equal—appearing interval scale. 
A similar procedure to that outlined in the previous experiment (see 
Chapter 7, pp. 184 ) was followed. In view of this only the
differences will be described here.
Judges were asked to scale the statements in accordance with 
the following instructions:
The object of this exercise is to scale evidence from an 
actual rape trial transcript.
Would you please read through the prosecution • s opening 
statement, Mary Watkin's evidence and the judge's summing up.
There are two sets of cards with the following letters 
on them: A, B, C, D, E, F, I, J, K. Please arrange them 
before you in that order.
The evidence from the transcript is numbered, as you will 
see. For each numbered statement would you carry out the 
following procedure: for the set of cards relating to 
Harrison would you put those statements which you think 
imply the highest degree of guilt on card A. On card 
F put those which imply a neutral position with respect 
to Harrison. On card K put those statements which imply 
the highest degree of innocence for Harrison. On the 
rest of the cards arrange statements in accordance with 
the degree of guilt or innocence you believe they imply. 
Do not try to get the same number in each pile as they 
are not evenly distributed.
Would you repeat this procedure for the set of cards 
relating to Bryce.
From these instructions it can be seen that judges were first 
required to read through the trial transcript. The order of witness 
and testimony presented to them was that of the original audio 
tape transcription as summarized by the judges. Appendix 8B 
reproduces the trial case that the scaling judges read. As there 
were two defendants in this case, Harrison and Bryce, judges scaled 
each statement twice: once on an 11-point scale, ranging from highest 
degree of guilt to highest degree of innocence, with respect to
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Harrison; secondly, on a similar 11-point scale, but this time with 
respect to Bryce.
The method for determining the scale value of each statement 
was similar to that outlined in the previous chapter, again only the • 
differences will be described here. First, the scale value of each 
statement was determined with respect to Harrison. Previous research 
using this material has indicated that most people perceive Bryce to 
be innocent, whilst verdicts concerning Harrison tend to be more 
equivocal. Thus manipulating order with respect to Harrison should 
stand more chance of detecting order effects, if they exist. Secondly, 
each statement was classified as indicating "guilt" or "innocence" 
depending on which side of the mid-point of the scale it fell.
Thirdly, a "Q-value" for each statement was determined. This is a 
measure of ambiguity and is found by computing the scale-span of the 
two quartile points of the cumulative curve for a statement. Appendix 
8C summarises the category, scale and Q-value of each statement 
together with the cumulative frequencies. The sentence numbers given 
correspond with the sentence numbers in Appendix 8b .
f
(b) Order Manipulation
Witness order was varied by first determining the degree of 
guilt or innocence of each witness as indicated by the twenty judges. 
This was achieved by selecting the statement or sentence with the 
highest scale value for guilt or innocence for each witness. This 
determined the category and ranking of witness. All witnesses for 
the prosecution fell in the "guilty" category and witnesses for the
Witness order for the WG treatment was achieved simply by 
ordering the witnesses, for the prosecution's case, from most guilty 
to least guilty; and, for the defence's case, from least innocent to 
most innocent. Witness order for the WI treatment was achieved by 
ordering least guilty to most guilty and most innocent to least 
innocent for prosecution and defence respectively. This yielded 
the following witness orders:
defence in the "innocent" category.
Testimony order was manipulated by ordering the statements made 
by each witness in one of two ways: (1) TG - strongest guilty state­
ments, followed by weakest guilty, weakest innocent and strongest
i
innocent. (2) TI - strongest innocent statements, followed by weakest 
innocent, weakest guilty and strongest guilty.
These two order manipulations yielded four treatments: (1) WG-TG; 
(2) WG-TI; (3) WI-TG; (4) WI-TI. The testimony orderings are similar 
to those of "climax" (TI) and "anticlimax" (TG) characterised by 
Mckelog (1952) and investigated by Thibaut and Walker (1975) under 
the heading of "internal bias".
WG WI
Cross-Examination of Mary Watkings
Detective Constable Foster
Dr. Grovernor’s Report
Dorothy Watkins
Joyce Blunden
Mrs. Godfrey
George Smith
Harrison
Bryce
Cross-Examination of Mary Watkins
George Smith
Mrs. Godfrey
Joyce Blunden
Dorothy Watkins
Dr. Grovenor's report
Detective Constable Foster
Bryce
Harrison
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8.3. RESULTS
The results are reported in three sections: (1) those relating 
to verdicts given by individual "jurors" to Harrison and Bryce on 
the charges of rape and attempted rape (2) Confidence levels given 
by jurors to those verdicts (3) Sex differences in verdicts.
(1) Verdicts
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 summarise jurors verdicts on the charges of 
rape and attempted rape for Harrison and Bryce respectively. Table 
8.1 shows that, overall, the WG-TG condition produced the greatest 
number of guilty verdicts (16 out of 32) on the charge of rape for 
Harrison. The least number of guilty verdicts (6) being obtained in 
the WI-TG condition. Table 8.2, which summarises the verdicts for 
Bryce, shows that the number of guilty verdicts on the charges of 
rape and attempted rape does not differ greatly between conditions.
To discover whether order manipulations affected verdicts four
2X were performed, one for each defendant and each charge, for
guilty and not guilty verdicts. For Harrison on the charge of rape
2and attempted rape no differences due to order were found (X = 4.75,
2df = 3, P > 0.05; X = 1.4, df = 3, P > 0.05, respectively).
Similarly, no reliable differences due to order were found for Bryce
2on the charge of rape and attempted rape (x = 0.43, df = 3, P > 0.05;
2 2 X =1.48, df = 3, P > 0.05, respectively) . Performing a 2 x 2 X
on testimony and witness order again revealed no significant differences
2 2(x = 0.2, df = 1, P > 0.05; X = 0.61, df = 1, P > 0.05, respectively).
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(2) Confidence in Verdicts
Table 8.3 summarises the means and standard deviations for each 
of the order treatments for Harrison on the charges of rape and attempted 
rape. To discover if witness and testimony order affected confidence 
in verdicts by males and females a 3-way analysis of variance was 
performed. The factors order, verdict and sex were extracted giving 
a 4 x 2 x 2 analysis with independent measures (Winer, 1971, p.452) .
Table 8.4 summarises the results of this analysis.
Table 8.3 Summary of Means and Standard Deviations of Confidence 
Levels for Harrison on the charge of rape and attempted 
rape
HARRISON - CHARGE OF RAPE
SEX
WG - TG WG - TI WI - TG WI - TI
GUILTY NOTGUILTY GUILTY
NOT
GUILTY GUILTY
NOT
GUILTY GULITY
NOT
GUILTY
MALE X 5.08 4.69 6.13 3.83 5.38 4.42 4.00 4.73
SD 1.11 2.45 0.25 1.54 0.75 2.01 2.00 1.37
N 6 IO 4 12 4 12 5 11
FEMALE X 5.00 4.22 6.30 4.69 5.00 4.11 4.20 4.00
SD 0.82 1.64 1.15 1.30 1.41 1.62 1.48 1.79
N 7 9 3 13 2 14 5 11
HARRISON - CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED RAPE
MALE X 4.63 2.83 5.00 3.91 4.42 5.25 3.83 4.00
SD 1.89 2.48 0.71 1.50 1.63 1.25 1.91 1.87
N 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 5
FEMALE X 5.57 1.50 4.75 3.90 4.63 2.50 5.83 2.80
SD 0.98 0.71 1.56 1.35 1.43 0.71 0.75 1.92
N 7 2 8 5 12 2 6 5
i
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Table 8.4 Summary of Analysis of Variance on Confidence Levels of 
Juror verdicts with respect to Harrison
HARRISON ON THE CHARGE OF RAPE
SOURCE SS DF MS F SIGN
A(ORDER) 12.497 3 4.16 1.59 NS
B(SEX) 0.156 1 0.156 0.06 NS
C(VERDICT) 15.207 1 15.207 5.82 P < 0.025
A x B 2.789 3 0.93 0.36 NS
A x C 15.295 3 5.10 1.95 NS
B x C 0.112 1 0.11 0.04 NS
A x B x C 1.999 3 0.66 0.25 NS
ERROR 292.75 112 2.61
HARRISON ON THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED RAPE
A(ORDER) 5.49 3 1.83 0.77 NS
B(SEX) 1.70 1 1.70 0.72 NS
C(VERDICT) 42.44 1 42.44 17.94 P < 0.001
A x B 6.95 3 2 .32 0.98 NS
A x C 12.48 3 4.16 1.76 NS
B x C 19.99 1 19.99 8.45 P < 0.005
A x B x C 10.57 3 3.52 1.49 NS
ERROR 179.76 76 2.35
Data for Harrison
No significant differences in confidence levels due to order 
(F = 1.59; df = 3.112; P > 0.05) or sex of juror (F = 0.81; df = 1.112; 
P > 0.05 were found. However, a significant difference in confidence 
levels between verdicts was found (F = 5.82; df = 1.112; P < 0.025).I
Jurors expressed more confidence in guilty verdicts than not guilty 
ones. There were no significant interactions. For Harrison on the 
charge of attempted rape neither order (F = 0.77; df = 3.76; P > 0.05) 
or sex (F = 0.72; df = 1.76; P > 0.05) produced any reliable diffe­
rences in confidence levels. Once again, though, jurors expressed 
greater confidence in guilty verdicts than not guilty verdicts 
(F 17.94; df = 1.76; P < 0.001). A significant interaction between 
sex and verdict was found (F = 8.45; df = 1.76; P < 0.005). No other
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significant interactions were detected.
Data for Bryce
The confidence jurors expressed about their verdicts in the 
different order treatments by males and females for Bryce on the 
charge of rape and attempted rape are summarised in Table 8.5. A 
two-way analysis of variance was performed and is summarised in 
Table 8.6. Extracting order and sex yielded a 4 x 2 analysis with 
independent measures. The factor guilty/not guilty was not extracted 
because insufficient numbers of jurors gave guilty verdicts to enable 
an anlysis to be carried out (Table 8.5 shows this).
Table 8,5 Summary of Means and Standard Deviations of Confidence
Levels for Bryce on the Charge of Rape and Attempted Rape
BRYCE ON THE CHARGE OF RAPE
WG - TG WG - TX WI - TG WI - TI
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
X 4.97 4.06 5.25 5.06 5.03 4.66 4.59 3.88
SD 1.70 1.75 1.60 1.12 1.78 2.16 1.81 1.96
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
BRYCE ON THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED RAPE
X 4.70 3.93 5.17 4.70 4.80 4.28 4.53 3.80
SD 1.61 1.39 1.19 1.45 1.90 1.77 1.85 2.14
N 15 14 15 15 15 16 15 15
For Bryce on both the charges of rape and attempted rape no 
signficant differences due to order were found (F = 1.55; df = 3.120; 
P > 0.05; F = 1.08, df = 3.112, P > 0.05 respectively). The sex 
of juror produced a trend, showing females to be less confident about 
their verdicts than males for both charges (F = 2.89, df = 1.120,
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Table 8;6 Summary of Analysis of Variance on Confidence Levels of 
Jurors with respect to Bryce
BRYCE ON THE CHARGE OF RAPE
SOURCE SS DF MS F SIGN
A(ORDER) 15.3 3 5.1 1.55 NS
B(SEX) 9.5 1 9.5 2.89 P < 0.1
A X  B 1.84 3 0.61 0.19 NS
ERROR 395.7 120 3.30
BRYCE ON THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED RAPE
A(ORDER) 9.93 3 3.31 1.08 NS
B(SEX) 11.42 1 11.42 3.73 P < 0.1
A x B 0.62 3 0.21 0.07 NS
ERROR 342.53 112 3.06
P < 0.1; F = 3.73, df = 1.112, P < 0.1, respectively). No significant 
interactions were detected.
(c) Sex Differences
Apart from the above sex differences for confidence levels in 
juror's verdicts by Bryce, the verdicts themselves were analysed from 
this perspective. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 summarise verdicts produced by 
males and females in the different experimental conditions for
Harrison and Bryce respectively. Table 8.1 shows that males producedI
slightly more guilty verdicts on the charge of rape than females (19 
to 17 respectively) but females gave a much greater number of guilty 
verdicts on the charge of attempted rape than males (33 to 22 
respectively). Table 8.2 shows males to give a slightly greater 
number of guilty verdicts for Bryce on the charge of rape than 
females (6 to 4 respectively),. However, the number of guilty verdicts 
on the charge of attempted rape given by males and females was the 
same (10 each). Overall, though, most people found Bryce innocent
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of both charges.
To discover if there were any significant differences sex was
taken out as a factor for the three possible verdicts for Harrison and
2Bryce. Performing a x  (4x2) yielded no significant differences.
Pooling male and female responses across the order treatments yielded a
2 x 2  contingency table (guilty/not guilty and male/female).
For Harrison on the charge of rape no significant difference was 
2found (x = 0.16, df = 1, P > 0.05) , however, on the charge of
attempted rape women were found to make more guilty verdicts than
2men (x = 4.34, df = 1, P < 0.05). No significant differences in 
verdicts for Bryce were found on either of the charges.
8.4 DISCUSSION
This experiment was designed to explore the effects of different 
witness and testimony order upon jurors verdicts and their confidence 
in those verdicts. Neither hypothesis in respect to these judgements 
received any support. This was surprising in view of Thibaut and 
Walker’s (1975) findings and their claims of powerful recency effects 
in courtroom proceedings. In view of this some discussion and 
speculation over why this occurred is warranted.
Four issues need to be considered in this respect, they concern:
(a) the complexity and length of the trial case; (b) the simulation 
of courtroom proceedings; (c) the manipulation of witness and 
testimony order; and (d) sample size. The first two have indications 
for the relevance of previous research in this case; the last two 
are methodological/design views.
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In the introduction to this study it was indicated that the 
experiment reported here differed from previous ones investigating 
order effects because the stimulus material was of considerable 
length (over 3,000 words) relative to other studies (around 500 words 
at most). One obvious explanation for the failure to find empirical 
support for the hypotheses is simply that order effects disappear 
with longer and more complex material. Little previous research 
on order effects in psycho-legal studies specifically and order effects 
generally appears to have addressed this question.
In Bayesian type judgements a large number of trials has been 
found to encourage primary effects (Peterson and Duchorme 1967; Roby 
1967; Dale, 1968; Miller, 1968). However, because this can be 
regarded as a form of "conservatism" (see Chapter 4 for discussion of 
this) and because the stimulus material and task is so different to 
that used in this study the relevance of such studies to this issue 
is limited. In view of the lack of empirical enquiry into order 
effects and length of material the research reported here might well 
be taken as an indication that long and complex material vitiates 
such manipulations.
The problem then arises of generalising to trials which last for 
a number of days or even weeks, which is often the case. Might we 
expect order effects to reappear under such circumstances? It is 
not possible on the basis of this and previous research to provide 
any answer to this. The important point to be made here is that 
before we can accept the claims of Thibaut and Walker, and other 
researchers, some empirical work addressing itself to this issue
is of vital importance.
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A further explanation for the lack of order effects may be due 
to the way in which this experiment simulated courtroom proceedings. 
Again, as indicated in the introduction and Chapter 4, this feature 
is often absent in previous research, in particular cross-examination 
of the witness is usually omitted. Generally speaking, much previous 
research on order effects has varied prosecution/defence order. Whilst 
such an approach might shed light on important theoretical questions 
over which may be the most fair it has very little to offer in terms 
of how bias may enter actual practice. Manipulating witness and 
testimony order is one of the things that can be done within procedural 
constraints. Lack of any support for such variables affecting verdicts 
and confidence levels, but especially the former, may imply that they 
are not important ones to study in this context.
A distinction, however, needs to be made between "climax" and 
"anticlimax" ordering (McKelvy, 1952; Busch, 1961) and the testimony 
order manipulated here. Presentation of legal material from weak to 
strong (as in climax order) may not be the same as the TI order in 
this experiment. There may be, and probably is, an important difference 
between an objective and scientific approach, as used here, and one
i.where counsel for defence or prosecution intuitively decides what a 
"climax" (or "anticlimax") order would consist of. The method for 
ordering testimony ignores the "gestalt" of a prosecution or defence 
case. The objective procedure may not result in simulated jurors 
forming a clear picture of the case, or result in the case having the 
greatest impact on them. The former view was discussed in the 
previous chapter and will not be repeated here. The latter problem 
is one that might be resolved by using a scaling procedure designed
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to take account of the Internal relationship of testimony or the 
relation between witnesses.
In summary, the above discussion has argued two things: (1) 
that the order manipulations used here, within the constraints of 
traditional criminal proceedings, may not be important variables 
to study. (2) It may well be the case that "climax" or "anticlimax" 
ordering is an important variable to study, but the procedure used 
here and by Thibaut and Walker (1975) does not address it in the 
sense outlined above.
A number of methodological points with respect to whether a 
strong enough manipulation of order was achieved in this study, in 
addition to the discussion above, remain. These may also offer partial 
explanation for the lack of empirical support for the experimental 
hypotheses.(l)sOnly order of witness and testimony was varied, 
prosecutions' opening statement, summaries by prosecution, defence 
and the judge were left unchanged from the original transcript. It 
is possible that manipulation of these along "climax" or "anticlimax" 
principles may have influenced verdicts. However, the scaling pro­
cedure used in this experiment would not be able to achieve this for 
reasons discussed earlier. (2) The method for scaling witnesses may 
not have been adequate. A better approach, perhaps would have been 
to ask judges to scale each witness as well as their constituent 
statements.
The final consideation bearing on the failure to detect order 
effects is concerned with sample size. Thirty two subjects were
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included'in each order treatment, however because three different verdicts 
were possible with respect to each defendant this sometimes led to 
small numbers of guilty verdicts on charges of rape and attempted rape. 
Hence, failure to detect differences due to witness and testimony 
order may, in part, reflect the small number of subjects who gave such 
verdicts. A similar experiment using twice as many subjects, for 
example, would be necessary before we could have confidence in dis­
missing the idea that such order manipulation might influence verdicts.
The experiment did find differences between males and females 
in verdicts and confidence in those verdicts. Sex differences for 
verdicts were evidenced by the two interactions in confidence levels 
with respect to Harrison. Both interactions indicated that females 
were more confident of guilty verdicts than not guilty verdicts, whereas 
there was no difference for males. Both male and female jurors, however, 
expressed more confidehce in guilty verdicts than not guilty ones. As 
these findings are not of central importance to the experiment little 
further discussion will be given to them. It is probably worth noting 
that experiments using "rape trial" material often report a tendency 
for females to convict more often than males. As regards the general 
differences in confidence levels for guilty and not guilty verdicts 
it appears that once people have made up their mind that a person is 
guilty they are less likely to change their mind or be persuaded that 
the person is not guilty. This may be seen as being consistent with 
the "beyond reasonable doubt" instructions judges give to jurors.
In conclusion, this experiment does not provide evidence for 
order effects in criminal material using courtroom proceedings. In
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view of this the claims of Thibaut and Walker, outlined earlier, 
must be treated with extreme caution. Further research of this type 
is required to ascertain exactly what effects, if any, witness, 
testimony, etc. orders have on verdicts. In general, the results of 
this and the previous experiment indicate that order effects are 
much less pervasive than some of the literature would have us believe.
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CHAPTER 9.
EXPERIMENT 5; THE BRITISH FIREMAN"S STRIKE OF 1977/78: 1
AN INVESTIGATION OF JUDGEMENTS IN FORESIGHT AND HINDSIGHT'1'
9.1. INTRODUCTION
The next three experiments to be reported in this thesis all 
use contemporary socio-political or social events to investigate the 
effect of outcome knowledge on judgements under uncertainty. The 
rationale for the importance of an applied emphasis on this type of 
research was outlined in Chapter 3 and will not be repeated here. 
Experiment 5, reported in this chapter, investigates hindsight judgement 
with respect to the British Fireman's Strike of 1977/78. The second 
experiment, reported in Chapter lO, again investigates the effect of 
outcome knowledge upon judgements but this time with respect to the 
outcome of a pregnancy test. The third experiment in this series, 
reported in Chapter 11, investigates the same thing but with respect 
to the British General Election of May 1979.
BACKGROUND TO THE FIREMEN'S STRIKE
The Fire Brigade Union (F.B.U.) began a nationwide strike on 
Monday, 14th November 1977 which ended on Monday 16th January 1978.
The strike, which lasted for nine weeks, was over wages. The F.B.U. 
was asking for a 30% rise; the local authorities offered lO%, in
1. A version of this chapter is to appear as an experimental
report in the British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology.
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line with the Government (Labour) pay guidelines operating at that 
time. After much negotiation, with the F.B.U. turning down a number 
of offers, they eventually settled for lO% with a guarantee that 
parity with skilled industrial workers would be achieved by November, 
1979. The strike was used to investigate the circumstances under 
which outcome knowledge (hindsight) produces an inappropriate "knew it 
all along" attitude and to elucidate upon the cognitive processes 
that may be involved.
Hindsight Bias and the Firemen's Strike
The experiment to be reported here examined three issues with 
respect to hindsight bias. There were concerned with attempting to 
determine whether the bias is (1) present in judgements about 
socio-political events as Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) report;
(2) influenced by the way in which likelihood assessments are elicited, 
and (3) affected by the type of information the judge is given?
Most previous research by Fischhoff and his colleagues has 
asked judges to assign subjective likelihood assessments to outcomes 
specified by the experimenter (e.g. Fischhoff, 1975a; Fischhoff and 
Beyth, 1975). The present study incorporated both this standard 
technique as well as a new procedure where judges were asked to 
generate their own outcomes and then assess the likelihood of each.
The latter strategy may be seen as a way of aiding judges to recapture 
or reconstruct a foresight state of mind. Because they have actively 
thought about the issue and formulated their own outcomes recollection 
is likely to be more accurate and so hindsight bias is in turn likely
to be reduced or eliminated.
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The *experiment also looked at the effect upon perceptions and 
judgements of two types of information - a summary of how the strike
f
ended; and details about the first four weeks of the strike. The 
summary might be expected to encourage hindsight bias as judges are 
being provided with potential causal explanations of how the outcome 
that happened came about. If this is so, the outcome that happened 
should appear more probable: as Carroll (1978) has shown that imagining 
an event could turn out in a certain way encourages people to perceive 
that outcome as more probable. Pre-outcome details might be expected 
to reduce the bias as judges are being provided with ways in which 
other outcomes could have occurred.
The Effect of Attitudes on Judgement Under Uncertainty
Little research appears to have looked at how attitudes affect 
judgement under uncertainty, the question has not been addressed at 
all with respect to hindsight. McGregor (1938) , Cantril (1938) investi­
gated various determinants in the prediction of social events.
McGregor's interest was in how attitudes, wishes and beliefs together 
with information influence people when they make (foresight) predictions. 
In general he found that people who thought, believed or wanted a 
particular outcome would see it as more likely than those who thought,
t
believed or wanted it not to happen. Recent research has confirmed 
this with respect to thought (Carroll, 1978).
In view of this it might be expected that judge's attitudes to 
the Government Pay Policy operating at the time of the Fireman's 
Strike and attitudes to the Fire Brigade Union's 30% wage claim will 
affect likelihood assessments assigned to outcomes. We might predict 
that those who strongly support the Government Pay Policy and oppose
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the F.B.U.'s wage claim will perceive outcomes favouring the 
Government as more likely than those who support the F.B.U. and oppose 
the Government. Conversely, those for the F.B.U. and against the 
Government should see those outcomes favouring the F.B.U. as more 
likely than those for the Government and against the F.B.U.
In summary, using the Firemen's Strike of 1977/78 the effects 
of outcome knowledge, type of information, strategies of eliciting 
subjective likelihood assessments and attitudes upon people's 
perceptions and judgements were investigated.
9.2. METHOD
SUBJECTS
90 subjects, undergraduates at the University of Warwick took 
part in the experiment.
DESIGN
The design of the experiment can best be understood by examining 
Figure 1. The study included three conditions (labelled I, II and 
III) with two treatments in each. In one treatment, "specified", 
subjects were asked to assess the likelihood of a number of specified 
outcomes; in the other, "generate", subjects were asked to generate 
their own outcomes and assign probability estimates to each. In the 
latter condition subjects were asked to list a series of outcomes, 
drawing on the "pre-outcome details, which they had just read, and 
their own knowledge of the strike. They were asked to generate outcomes 
ranging from unlikely to likely. Subjects were not asked
to generate a number of outcomes, but were asked to produce as many 
as they could think of. Subjects in both treatments were asked to
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express their likelihood assessments in percentages.
The "specified" outcomes conerned four aspects of the strike:
(a) what decision the F.B.U. would reach; (b) how long from Week 4 
the strike would continue; (c) what action, if any, the Fart Time 
Fire Fighters would take; (d) what action, if any, the Fire Officers 
would take with respect to their own separate wage claim. Each of 
these questions had four or five possible outcomes listed, these are 
reproduced in Appendix 9A.
"Detail" information consisted of early events, developments, 
etc. that took place up to and including Week 4 of the strike. The 
information presented to subjects ran as follows:
Pre-strike Events - Monday 7th November - Saturday 12th November.
Firemen vote for nationwide strike from 9 p.m. on Monday 14th 
November by 25,000 to 13,000. This will be the first stoppage 
in the history of the union (70 years). Current pay for fire­
men ranges from E50-E65 per week. An offer of 1C% has been 
made by the local authorities in line with the government 
guidelines, but has been rejected. Troops are being trained 
to fight fires if the strikes comes off. Government offer 
of pay deal and reduced hours was rejected by firemen. Also 
productivity deal was rejected.
Week 1 of the Strike - Monday 14th November - Sunday 20th November
At 9 a.m. on Monday the firemen implemented their nationwide 
strike threat. Troops take responsibility for fighting fires. 
Fire Brigade Union (FBU) claims that response to strike has 
been solid, the firemen are not getting any strike pay. No 
early end to strike is foreseeable and negotiations have made 
no progress. The TUC has not become involved in the dispute 
so far. Fire officers vote not to go on strike in support 
of the firemen.
Week 2 of the Strike - Monday 21st November - Sunday 27th November
No official talks have gone on this week. Part-time firemen 
who are not on strike have asked for use of fire fighting 
equipment - the FBU say that to grant this would exacerbate
the situation. The Prime Minister made an appeal to all 
workers not to break government guidelines, arguing that 
the best interests of the people of this country are at 
heart. He further agreed that to give in to the Firemen 
would mean that everyone would want to break the 10% guide­
line. It seemed inevitable that the strike would go into 
third week as Government had made no move to break the 
deadlock.
Week 3 of the Strike - Monday 28th November - Sunday 4th December
The Government is faced by further challenges from Miners,
Civil Servants, and local government workers over 10% guide­
line . Executive of FBU spoke with the Prime Minister on 
Monday. Government offer a new pay formula that guarantees 
that firemen would be exempted from any future pay restrictions. 
This was rejected out of hand by the FBU, as they insisted 
on more money now not later. Union was angry, disappointed 
and determined to strengthen the strike.
FBU asked TUC to start campaign against 10% guidelines being 
imposed on unions. The TUC replied that they would not fight 
the government over its pay policy, and thus could not 
campaign with the Firemen. TUC recommended FBU to negotiate 
along lines of pay increase and reduction in hours.
FBU say there is no basis on which to negotiate, firemen even 
more solid than at beginning of strike.
Week 4 of the Strike - Monday 5th December to the present
An opinion poll shows public support for the firemen's strike 
is waning. Polls shows people believe firemen should settle 
for 10% rise and reduction in hours. Poll also shows much 
public support for keeping wage claims to within 10%.
Fire officers have rejected a strike call in pursuit of a 40% 
claim. FBU say the firemen are as determined as ever, if not 
more so, as a result of hearing TUC and Fire Officers will not 
lend support. Pressure exerted by FBU to take action against 
part-time firemen who are working normally.
The Government have offered a 10% wage rise now with a guarantee 
that in November '78 and *79 the wages will be reviewed. This 
is an improvement on the offer made about two weeks ago.
The FBU is to meet to discuss this proposal.
"Summary” information consisted of a 150 word summary of how 
the strike ended, outlining the meeting that took place, voting for 
accepting the offer, when the FBU returned to work etc. This ran as
follows:
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On January the 3rd at the request of the Fire Brigades Onion 
a meeting between the Government, local authority employers 
and the F.B.U. was held. This meeting lasted for three days 
after which the F.B.U. recalled the delegate conference to 
decide whether to end the eight-week old strike.
Local authority employers offered ^ l O  per cent immediately 
with a guarantee that parity with skilled industrial workers 
would be achieved by Nov, 1979. This means that the firemen's 
new basic wage will be £76 on average, and should average 
£100 by 1979.
On January the 12th the delegate conference voted by a 5 to 
2 majority to end the nine-week old strike and accept the 
lO per cent now with guarantee of wage rises in Nov. ’78 and 
Nov. '79, whatever pay policy is in force.
On Monday January 16th the firemen returned to work thus 
ending the first stoppage in the union's history.
Week 8 and 9 of the Strike - January 2nd to January 13th
Information for both the "summary" and "details" was taken from 
articles appearing in the "Guardian" and "Times" newspapers.
The attitudes of subjects to the Government Pay Policy and the 
Fire Brigade Union's 30% wage claim was measured on two seven-point 
scales. At one end of each scale was written "oppose" at the other 
end "support". Subjects were asked to circle the number which 
best reflected their feelings about each of these views. Appendix
i
9A reproduces these seven-point scales.
PROCEDURE
In Condition I, 30 subjects, 15 randomly allocated to each 
treatment, made foresight assessments during the fourth week of the 
strike after first reading the "details". The same subjects made 
two hindsight assessments, one six weeks and one three months after 
the strike had ended. These were made after first reading the "summary".
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Subjects in both treatments were asked to try to remember or recon­
struct the assessments they had given before the outcome was known. 
Those who had received "specified" outcomes in foresight were given 
the same outcomes with order and tense changed. In the "generate" 
treatment the subject was given the outcomes he/she himself/herself 
had produced in foresight, but without the original probabilities.
In Condition II, 30 subjects, 15 randomly allocated to each 
treatment, make only hindsight assessments six weeks after the strike 
had ended. Subjects were given instructions to think back to the 
middle of the strike (just before Christmas) and, in the "specified" 
treatment, to assign probabilities they thought they would have given 
then to the various possible outcomes. (These instructions are 
similar to those of Fischhoff and Beyth (1975)) . In the other 
treatment, the latter part of the above instructions was modified 
to include the "generate" procedure. (The actual instructions 
given to subjects in this condition and the other two are reproduced 
in Appendix 9B) . Subjects then read the "details" and "summary" 
and then make likelihood assessments as appropriate.
Condition III, again run six weeks after the strike had ended, 
differed from Condition II in-that subjects had to make two sets 
of assessments. The first was made after they had read the summary 
(Condition III(i) in Figure 1) the second after reading the details 
(Condition III(ii) in Figure 1). Again, as in Condition II, 15 
subjects were randomly allocated to each treatment.
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9.3, RESULTS
To discover how outcome knowledge, strategy of eliciting assess­
ments, type of information and attitudes affected people's judgements, 
comparisons were made using non-parametric tests (WilGoxon and Mann 
Whitney U as appropriate - Siegel, 1956). One-tailed tests were used 
except where specified.
(1) Data from Treatments when Outcomes Specified
(a) Judgements about the F.B.U. Decision
The analysis first examined judgements about what decision the 
F.B.U. would reach. In general, the "specified" outcome that 
actually occurred (F.B.U. get 10% rise and guarantee of increases 
in November 1978 and 1979) was perceived as more likely in hindsight 
than foresight. Table 9.1 summarises the median probability assess­
ments and shows that in four out of the five cases assessments in 
hindsight were greater than in foresight. One of these was significant 
at the .05 level (Condition II, U = 70), another a trend (Condition 
I, hindsight 6 weeks, T = 11.5, N = lO, P < 0.1.
From Table 9.1 it can also be seen that, for the four outcomes
I
which did not occur, hindsight assessments were less likely only in 
Conditions II and III, where seven out of the twelve comparisons 
with foresight in Condition I were in this direction.
Three of these, all in Condition III(ii), were reliable differences 
- Firemen get 10% and reduced hours, U = 53, P < 0.01; Firemen get 
10% and reduced hours and productivity deal, U = 59, P < 0.025; com­
promise somewhere between 10?s-20%, U = 70.5, P < 0.05. None of the
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remainirig five comparisons was in the opposite direction to that 
predicted.
For the outcomes which did not happen in Condition I (repeated 
measures) six were in the predicted direction (4 in hindsight, 6 weeks 
two in hindsight, 3 months) , and two in the opposite direction. None 
of these were reliable differences however.
(b) Judgements about the length of the strike
The analysis next examined judgements about how long the strike 
would continue. Table 9.2 summarises the median assessments and 
shows that for the outcome which occurred (more than 4 weeks from 
the fourth week) all five hindsight assessments were significantly 
more likely than foresight assessments. (Condition I: hindsight 6 
weeks, T = 13, N = 13, P <  0.01; hindsight 3 months, T = 10, N = 12,
P < 0.01; Condition II, U = 71, P < 0.05; Condition III:(i) U = 54.5,
P < 0.01; (ii) U = 54.5, P < 0.025.)
Table 9.2 also shows that for the outcomes which did not occur 
only the comparisons of Conditions II and III with I (foresight)
i
yielded consistent findings. Seven out of the nine were less 
likely in hindsight, four being significant. These were: Condition 
II, from 1-2 weeks longer, U = 67, P < 0.05; less than a week, U =
58, P < 0.025; Condition II, less than a week: (i) U = 71.5, P < 0.05; 
(ii) U = 70.5, P < 0.05. Repeated measures comparisons of hindsight/ 
foresight in Condition I for outcomes which did not occur yielded 
no significant effects.
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Table 9.1 Median Likelihoods for specified outcomes to the question
concerned with what decision tire' firemen would reach
CONDITION I CONDITION III
OUTCOME FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT 
6 WEEKS
HINDSIGHT 
3 MONTHS
CONDITION
II (i)SUMMARY
(Ü)
DETAILS
Firemen get 30% 
wage rise 10 5 IO O 2 5
Firemen get 10% 
+ reduced hours 30 25 40 30 30 IO***
Firemen get lO% 
+ reduced hours 
+ productivity 
deal
50 40 40 50 40 20**
Firemen get 10% 
+ guarantee of 
increases in 
Nov 1978 & 1979
40 50+ 40 50* 50 55
Compromise some­
where between 
10% - 20%
40 30 30 40 40 20*
This is the outcome which occurred.
Values with * denote that comparison with appropriate Foresight 
(Condition I) is significantly different
+ p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.025; ***p < 0.01.
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Table 9 .2 Median Likelihoods for specified outcomes to the question
concerned with how long the strike would go o n .
OUTCOME
CONDITION I CONDITION III
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT 
6 WEEKS
HINDSIGHT 
3 MONTHS
CONDITION II (i)
SUMMARY
(ii)
DETAILS
More than two 
weeks (but less 
than 4 weeks)
40 50 40 50 50 30
From 1 - 2  
weeks longer 30 25 20 IO* 25 20
More than 
4 weeks 15 50*** 50*** 60* 40** 40***
Less than a 
week IO IO IO O** 5* 5*
This is the outcome which occurred
Values with * denote the comparison with appropriate foresight 
condition is significantly different.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.025; * * * p  <  0 . 0 1 .
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(c) Judgements about the Part-time Fire fighters
The analysis next examined judgements about what the Part-time 
Firefighters would do. From Table 9.3, for the outcome which occurred 
(carry on as they had been doing), it can be seen than no hindsight 
assessments were greater than foresight ones. Five of the six were 
in the opposite direction, however, none of these was significant.
Table 9.3 also shows that for outcomes which did not occur, only three 
of the possible ten foresight/hindsight comparisons were in the 
predicted direction. Once again neither these or those in the opposite 
direction were significantly different.
(d) Judgements about the Fire Officers
Table 9.4 reveals that for the outcome which occurred (Fire 
Officers carry on working and assisting troops and pursue their own 
pay claim by negotiation) none of the five hindsight assessments 
were greater than the foresight one. Those in the opposite direction 
were not significantly different. Table 9.4 also shows that for 
the outcomes which did not occur, only one of the fifteen possible 
foresight/hindsight comparison was in the predicted direction.
Neither this or those in the opposite direction were found to be
f
significantly different.
(2) Data from Treatments when Outcomes were Generated by Subjects
The analysis next examined foresight and hindsight judgements 
in the "generate" treatment. The outcomes relating to the decision 
the F.B.U. would reach were collated from the "generate" treatment 
in Conditions I, II and III. The collating was done by the author
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Table 9.9 Median Likelihood assessments for snsoi fi pti outcomes to the
question concerned with the part-time Fire Fighters
OUTCOME
CONDITION I
CONDITION II
CONDITION III
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT 
6 WEEKS
HINDSIGHT 
3 MONTHS
(i)
SUMMARY
(ii)
DETAILS
Come out in sup­
port of the 
Firemen's claim
IO 20 20 20 20 20
Carry on as 
they had been 
doing
80 80 75 60 60 60
Stop helping 
troops because 
of F.B.U. 
pressure
30 20 20 35 20 30
This is the outcome which occurred.
Table 9.4 Median Likelihood assessments for speqjJEjgg^outcomes to the 
question concerned with the Fire Officers
OUTCOME
CONDITION I CONDITION III
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT 
6 WEEKS
HINDSIGHT 
3 MONTHS
CONDITION II (i)
SUMMARY
(ii)
DETAILS
Come out on 
strike for their 
own 40% wage 
claim
IO 20 15 IO IO
}
IO
Carry on working 
and assisting 
troops and pur­
sue their own 
claim by 
negotiation
70 60 65 65 60 70
Come out on strike 
in support of the 
Firemen's (FBU) 
pay claim
5 20 15 15 IO IO
Carry on as they 
are and wait and 
see what Firemen 
get before pur­
suing their own 
claim
50 50 55 60 60 40
This is the outcome which occurred
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assigning the outcomes generated to one of five categories (the four 
outcomes in Table 9.5 and a not applicable category). Two other 
judges independently collated the same outcomes. Correlation, using 
Kappa (Cohen, 1960) of 0.89 and b.88 with the author's classifications 
were obtained. Where there was disagreement the category 2 out of 
3 judges had given for the outcome was used. Appendix 9.C summarises 
outcomes generated by subjects and shows how the author and two 
judges classified them.
Table 9.5 summarises the median likelihood assessments together 
with the number of judges who generated each of the outcomes. The 
number of outcomes each judge generated varied, in Condition I the 
average was 5.2, in Condition II, 5.3 and in Condition III, 4.8. For 
the outcome that occurred, four out of the five assessments were 
greater in hindsight, but not significantly so. Table 9.5 also reveals 
that for the outcomes which did not occur two hindsight assessments 
in Conditions I and II were significantly lower in foresight (Compro­
mise somewhere between 10%-20%; Condition II, U = 19, P < 0.05; Condi­
tion III (ii) U = 5, P < 0.025). No significant differences were 
found in foresight/hindsight comparisons in Condition I .
(
(3) Type of Information - "summary"/"details"
Providing different types of information ("summary" and "details") 
yielded a consistent pattern of results in Condition III (i) and (ii) 
for both treatments. The medians for the various outcomes are given 
in Tables 9.1 and 9.5. The outcome that occurred was seen as more 
likely after judges had read the "details" than the "summary". The 
difference was significant for the generate treatment (P < 0.025;
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Table 9.5 Median Likelihood assessments assigned to generated outcomes 
concerned with the decision the F.B.U. would reach
OUTCOME
CONDITION I
CONDITION II
CONDITION III
FORESIGHT HINDSIGHT 
6 WEEKS
HINDSIGHT 
3 MONTHS
(i)
SUMMARY
(ii)
DETAILS
Fireman get 30% 
wage ri se
5
N = IO
IO
N = IO
IO
N = IO
IO
N = 5
20
N = 8
0.05 
N =* 8
Firemen get 10% 
+ reduced hours
17.5 
N = IO
20
N = IO
20
N = IO
30
N = 9
30
N = 6
40
N = 6
Firemen get 10% 
+ guarantee of 
increases in 
Nov 1978 & 1979
50
N = IO
60
N = IO
60
N = IO
60
N » 14
30
N = 9
60
N = 9
Compromise some­
where between 
10%-20%
50
N = 11
60
N = 11
65
N = 11
IO*
N = 7
37.5 
N = 4
20**
N = 4
This is the outcome which occurred.
Values with * denote that comparison with the appropriate before 
condition is significantly different.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.025
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T = 2.5, N = 1) (Table 9.5), but not for the specified treatment (Table 
9.1). For the outcomes which did not occur, five out of the seven 
medians were lower after "details" then "summary". Three of these 
comparisons being significant - "specified": Firemen get 10% and 
reduced hours, T = 9, N = 11, P < 0.05; Firemen get lO% and reduced 
hours and productivity deal, T = O, N = 9, P < 0.05 - and one a trend 
- "generate": compromise between 10%-20%, T = 0 ,  N =  7, P <  0.1. The 
results from the generate treatment here need to be treated with some 
caution because of the low power of the statistical tests due to 
small sample size.
(4) Attitudes and Judgements
From the "specified" treatment it was possible to categorise certain 
people in two ways to give the most extreme difference in attitudes 
(i) Those who indicated strong support for the Government Pay 
Policy (6 or greater on the appropriate seven-point scale) 
and strongly opposed the F.B.U.'s 30% wage claim (2 or less 
on the appropriate scale).
(ii) Those of strongly opposed the Government's Pay Policy (2 or
j
less) and strongly supported the F.B.U.'s 30% wage claim.
(6 or more).
Insufficient numbers of people fell into these categories in the Before 
conditions consequently they were dropped from the analysis. However, 
in the hindsight conditions (I, after 6 weeks; II and Ill(i)) there 
were sufficient numbers for statistical analysis to be performed.
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Table 9.6 Summary of median Likelihood assessments for specified 
outcomes for subjects indicating strong support for the 
Government Pay Policy and strong support for the F.B.U. 
wage claim
QUESTION AND OUTCOMES SUPPORTGOVT
SUPPORT
F.B.U.
DECISION F.B.U. WOULD REACH N=13 N=12
1. Firemen get 10% and guarantee of rises 
in November 1978 and 1979 60 50
2. Firemen get 30% wage rise O 3.5
3. Firemen get lO% and reduced hours 30 25
4. Firemen get 10% and reduced hours 
and productivity 40 32.5
5. Compromise somewhere between 10%-20% 17.5 35
HOW LONG STRIKE WOULD GO ON FOR
1. More than 4 weeks (from week 4) 40 50
2. More than 2 weeks (but less than 4) 45 50
3. From 1-2 weeks longer 40 20
4. Less than a week IO 2.5
PART-TIME FIRE FIGHTER
1. Carry on as they had been doing 40 69*
2. Come out on strike in support of 
the Firemen's claim 30 IO
3. Stop helping troops because of 
F.B.U. pressure 50 20
FIRE OFFICERS
1. Carry on working and assisting 
troops and pursue their own claim 
by negotiation
75 55*
2. Come out on strike for their own 
40% wage claim IO 15
3. Come out on strike in support of 
the F.B.U. wage claim
10 IO
4. Carry on, wait and see what F.B.U. 
get before pursuing own wage claim 50 62.5
For each question Outcome 1 is the one which happened.
*P < 0.05
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Table 9.6 summarises the median likelihood assessments for the 
four questions and their outcomes for subjects in the above two cate­
gories. The column labelled "support Govt" refers to category (i) 
above, that labelled "support F.B.U." to category (ii) above. For the 
question concerned with the decision the F.B.U. would reach the two 
most favourable outcomes for the F.B.U. (30% wage rise, and compromise 
between 10-20%) were perceived as more likely by those in category 
(i) than those in category (ii) . These differences were not signifi­
cant however. Those outcomes regarded as favouring the Government 
(10% and reduced hours, 10% and reduced hours and productivity deal) 
were seen as more likely by those in category (i) and (ii) . Again, 
there were not significant differences.
No significant differences were found for the outcomes concerned 
with the Question concerning how long the strike would continue from 
Week 4. The outcome which occurred for the questions concerned with 
the part-time Fire Fighters and Fire Officers was seen as more likely 
in category (ii) in the case of the former (U = 37, P < 0.05, two- 
tailed) and more likely in category (i) for the latter question (U = 43, 
P < 0.05, two-tailed) . For the outcomes which did not occur for 
these two questions no significant differences were found.
9.4. DISCUSSION
The flrstissue this experiment was designed to explore was whether 
the bias reported by Fischhoff and his colleagues is present in judge­
ments about contemporary socio-political events. Results offer only 
partial support for the claim that possession of outcome knowledge 
leads to an inappropriate "knew--it-all-along" attitude. The support
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comes fr'om the findings in the "specified" treatment for the questions, 
what decision the F.B.U. would reach and how long the strike would 
continue. The two outcomes which occurred were perceived as more 
likely in hindsight than foresight; the outcomes which did not occur 
were seen as less likely in hindsight. No hindsight bias was 
detected, however, with "specified" outcomes concerning the remaining 
two issues, namely the part-time Fire Fighters and the Fire Officers. 
Subjects who made both foresight and hindsight assessments showed 
much less of a "knew-it-all-along" attitude confirming the findings 
of Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) and Fischhoff (1977) . This is probably 
due, as they argue, to the logical role of memory, in that some 
subjects will explicitly remember their own probability assessments.
The experiment failed to replicate Fischhoff and Beyth's 
(1975) findings that hindsight bias became more pronounced the 
longer the period of time which elapsed between the outcome of the 
event being known and hindsight judgements being made. No significant 
differences were found between Hindsight, 6 weeks and 3 months in 
condition I. Furthermore, only two of the five possible comparisons 
was in the direction that would be predicted from Fischhoff and 
Beyth’s research (see Table 9.1).
The second issue was whether the bias would be influenced by 
the way in which probability assessments were elicited. People asked 
to "generate" their own outcomes showed little or no bias in any 
of the three conditions. In Condition I this may be partly attributable 
to the discrepancy in number of outcomes assigned probability assessments 
in foresight. In the "specified" treatment subjects gave assessments
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to outcomes concerned with four aspects of the strike, making seventeen 
in all. In the "generate" treatment the average number of outcomes 
produced was just over five. Thus, memory may account for the lack 
of foresight/hindsight differences in the latter treatment. However, 
this problem does not arise in Conditions II and III as subjects here 
made only hindsight judgements. These results then, provide some 
support for the hypothesis that the "generate" strategy may aid judges 
accurately reconstructing a foresight state. The results cannot be 
taken as providing strong support for this hypothesis because of 
the reduced power of the statistical tests due to small sample size.
The third issue was whether the bias would be influenced by the 
type of information. The impact of "details" (see p. 225 ) in Condition 
III(ii) was to make the outcomes which had occurred seem more likely 
than after reading the "summary" (Condition III(i)). Conversely, out­
comes which did not occur were perceived as less likely after "details" 
than "summary" information. Both effects were the opposite to that 
predicted.
An explanation for this comes from recent research on biases 
and errors in attribution (Ross, et al, 1975; Ross, 1977; Ross et al 
1977) which was discussed in detail, in Chapter 2. Briefly to repeat 
these findings Ross et al (1977) found that giving judges causal 
explanations as to why a social event turned out as it did increased 
perceptions of likelihood in that direction. They concluded that 
"identifying antecedents to explain an event increases the event’s 
subjective likelihood" (p. 826).
242.
In the context of the experiment reported here it can be seen 
that providing the "details" is equivalent to identifying antecedents.
The subject's cognitions of the Firemen's strike are biased because 
the "details" allow judges to construct causal explanations of why 
what happened did, and why what did not happen did not. Consequently, 
the outcomes which happened were perceived as more likely, and those 
which did not were perceived as less likely.
The fourth, and final, issue this experiment was designed to 
explore concerned the effects of subjects' attitudes upon subjective 
likelihood assessments. It was predicted that those who strongly 
supported the Government Pay Policy and strongly opposed the F.B.U. 
wage claim would perceive outcomes favouring the Government was more 
likely and those favouring the F.B.U. as less likely than judges 
who strongly held the opposite views. Conversely, those favouring 
the F.B.U. and opposing the Government would perceive the same outcomes 
in the opposite way. No substantial support was found for this 
hypothesis. Inspection of the medians in Table 9.6 did reveal the 
likelihood assessments for the outcomes associated with the decision 
the F.B.U. would reach to be in this direction. However, as no 
significant differences were found here little confidence can be 
placed in the reliability of them. This experiment was not designed 
with attitudes as a major theme and it may have been because strong supporters 
of both sides were not actively sought as subjects that the above non­
significant findings occurred.
Experiment 7, reported in Chapter 11 of this thesis, rectifies, 
such shortcomings by investigating judgements in foresight and hindsight
In summary, the experiment reported here has provided some support 
for hindsight bias and indications of the conditions under which it 
might not occur. The research to date, however, has not demonstrated 
that such a bias occurs when people are asked to make judgements 
about aspects of their own personal lives. The following experiment
made by Labour and Conservative Party members to various outcomes of
the British General Election of 1979.
was designed with this in mind.
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CHAPTER lO
EXPERIMENT 61 : ESTIMATING THE OUTCOME OF A PREGNANCY TEST:
WOMEN'S JUDGEMENTS IN FORESIGHT AND HINDSIGHT
10■1 INTRODUCTION
The study to be reported here investigates the extent to which 
hindsight bias will be found when people are asked to make subjective 
likelihood assessments which require them to look at certain "historical” 
aspects of their own lives. The area chosen for study was the 
uncertain event of pregnancy.
Most of the research conducted to date has required likelihood 
assessments to be made to outcomes concerning either (1) event 
descriptions "sufficiently familiar to permit intelligent responses 
and sufficiently unfamiliar to rule out the possibility of subjects 
knowing what really happened" (Fischhoff, 1975a, p. 290) or (2) 
contemporary socio-political events. The main drawback of these 
approaches is that the material may have little or no relevance for 
the judges; i.e. making judgements and predictions related to salient
i
‘
features of their personal lives. Experimental studies will almost 
certainly be required to explain the nature of hindsight bias, but if 
we are to be confident that there is a "real life" effect which 
requires explanation, it is important to demonstrate hindsight bias
1. The data for this experiment was collected by Kay McKenna for her 
third year project. Derek Rutter supervised the project with 
some assistance from the author. The author re-analysed the data 
and wrote the first draft of the paper which is to appear in the 
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology. The first draft 
was commented upon, and modified by, Derek Rutter and Ian Morley.
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in non-laboratory settings. To this end asking women to make foresight 
and hindsight assessments to the outcome of a pregnancy test will pro­
vide invaluable information about the extent of hindsight bias in 
everyday life.
Two procedures were used to investigate this (1) Women who sus­
pected they might be pregnant were asked to predict, on first contact 
with a branch of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, the likeli­
hood (foresight) that they were infact pregnant. A second (hindsight) 
assessment, asking women to remember or reconstruct their original 
assessment, was obtained once the women had been given the result of 
the pregnancy test. (2) Women who know the results of their tests 
were asked to remember or reconstruct assessments they would have 
made some time previously (hindsight).
It was predicted that those who knew the result of the pregnancy 
test (hindsight) would perceive that outcome as more likely. That is, 
those who received a positive result should see their chances of 
being pregnant as more likely in hindsight than foresight, conversely 
those receiving a negative result should, in hindsight, see their 
chance of being pregnant as less likely than in foresight.
IQ■2 METHOD
PROCEDURE
Women normally make an initial contact with pregnancy advisory 
services by telephone or in person. This study included two "telephone" 
conditions and one "in person" condition, and was conducted at the 
Coventry branch of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (B.P.A.S.).
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Conditions 1 and 2 included those subjects whose initial contact 
was a telephone call to the clinic to ask about the possibility of 
having a pregnancy test. Where this was possible an appointment 
was made for the test to be carried out at the clinic at a later 
date. Condition 3 consisted of women who made contact by calling at 
the bureau to request a test.
Condition 1. Half the telephone callers were randomly assigned 
to this condition. During the initial telephone conversation, the 
subject was asked a number of routine questions for the clinic's 
records. She was then asked to predict, using a scale from O to 100 
("where O means you are definitely not pregnant, 100 means you 
definitely are, and don't know is somewhere around the middle), how 
likely she thought she was to be pregnant. Approximately 4 to 5 days 
after this initial contact, the subject attended the clinic to have 
her test and she was told the outcome a few minutes later. After 
receiving the result, she was asked to remember or reconstruct the 
prediction she had made originally using the same scale.
Condition 2. Half the telephone callers were randomly assigned 
to this condition. During the initial telephone conversation, a 
pregnancy test appointment was made. Only information pertinent to 
the test was requested, and the subject was not asked how likely she 
thought she was to be pregnant. The second contact was made in person 
at the clinic, at which point the subject was given her pregnancy 
test and was then told the results a few minutes later. After she 
had heard the result, she was asked to remember or reconstruct how 
likely she thought she was to be pregnant at the time of the initial
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Condition 3. This condition consisted of those women who came 
to the clinic in person to request a pregnancy test. No prior 
appointment had been made, and the subject was simply given the test 
and told the outcome a few minutes later. After she had heard the 
result, she was asked to remember or reconstruct how likely she had 
thought she was to be pregnant when she first decided to have the 
test. 2
SUBJECTS
Altogether, 60 women were included, 20 in each condition. Ten 
in each condition proved to have a positive result to the pregnancy 
test and ten had a negative result. Certain criteria for inclusion 
had to be met, and these were intended to ensure that subjects 
seriously thought they might be pregnant.
(a) It was at least 41 days from a last period at the time 
of the test appointment. Those women who simply 
required information about pregnancy testing but did not 
wish to have a test were excluded.
(b) The woman was prepared to attend the clinic to have her 
urine sampled.
(c) She had not been sterilised.
(d) She had had no previous pregnancy test in the last 41 
days.
Note on the Pregnancy Test
The pregnancy test was performed by means of sun Immunological 
slide analysis of the urine sample (Kerber et al, 1970). It was
2 About half the women who contacted the agency without prior 
appointment were included as subjects in Condition 3. This was 
done to balance the 50% of women who failed to turn up to a 
nreviouslv made annointment (as in Conditions 1 and 2) .
contact 4 to 5 days earlier.
2 4 8 .
conducted after 41 days or more had elapsed since the last menstrual 
period because the technique is unreliable within 41 days (Tietz,
1965; Mayo and Thompson, 1965). For a more detailed discussion see 
Cabrera (1969).
Post-experimental follow up
Many subjects whose initial contact was made by telephone failed 
to keep their pregnancy test appointment. To test whether applicants 
might be dropping out because of the questionnaire - so leading to 
an unrepresentative sample - control condition was run in which the 
questionnaire was excluded. Of those who were asked the question, 
51.3% returned for the pregnancy test, against 46% of those who were 
not asked the questions. Indications are, therefore, that the experi­
mental questionnaire did not discourage women from returning, and 
that the experimental sample is unlikely to have been unrepresentative 
of the clinic's population.
Questionnaire and instructions
The routine questions asked of all women for the clinic's records 
were as follows: ,
J
Name
Age
Date of contact
Status: Married Single Other
L.M.P. Date
Approximate size in weeks
Number of previous pregnancies
Contraceptive used
Do you hope you are pregnant?
Are you trying to become pregnant?
Subjects allocated to Condition 1 before were asked to make sub­
jective likelihood assessments in accordance with the following
instructions :
Personal contact after
Name
Test result: Positive Negative
I would like you to remember back to when we spoke last. Can 
you remember what you thought the result of the test would be?
Imagine, say, you've got a scale from 0-100, where O means 
you definitely are not pregnant, lOO means you definitely are, 
and don't know is somewhere around the middle. What score 
would you have put on your chances of being pregnant?
Subjects in Condition II were provided with similar instructions. 
Women in Condition III, because they had not made prior contact with 
the clinic by telephone, were provided with slightly different 
instructions. These ran as follows :
I would like you to remember back to when you first decided 
to have a pregnancy test
(1) When did you decide?
(2) Can you remember what you thought the result of the test 
would be?
Imagine, say, you've got a scale from 0-100 where O means you 
definitely are not pregnant, lOO means you definitely are, and 
don't know is somewhere around the middle. What score would 
you have put on your chances of being pregnant?
10.3 RESULTS
To test the prediction, that those who knew the result of the 
pregnancy test (hindsight) would perceive that outcome as more likely 
than those asked to make subjective likelihood assessments before 
they knew the result (foresight), two sets of comparisons between 
conditions were made. First, for condition 1, in which each subject 
gave both a foresight and hindsight assessment, the two assessments
were compared by the Wilcoxon Matched pairs signed-ranks test.
Before and After assessments showed no significant differences both 
for women who had a positive result to the pregnancy test (Wilcoxon 
T = O, N = 3, n.s.) and for those who had a negative result (Wilcoxon 
t = 9, N = 4, n.s.).
In the second analysis, the reconstructed assessments in Condition 
2 and the reconstructed assessments in condition 3 were compared with 
the Before assessments in condition 1 using the Mann Whitney U test. 
Women who received a positive result to the pregnancy test in both 
Condition 2 and 3 perceived the outcome as more likely than women 
in foresight (Mann Whitney U = 27, P < 0.05; Mann Whitney U = 21,
P < 0.025, respectively). Women who received a negative result in 
conditions 2 and 3 showed no difference in likelihood assessments 
than women in foresight (Mann Whitney U = 44.5, n.s.; Mann Whitney 
U = 48, n.s., respectively).
The results summarised in Table 10.1 also indicated that, whether 
in foresight or hindsight, women whose test proved positive saw them­
selves as more likely to be pregnant than those whose result was nega­
tive. To test for this comparisons were made between assessments 
given by women who had a positive and negative result in each condition 
using the Mann Whitney U test. All four comparisons proved to be 
significant (1 Before (+) - 1 Before (-) : U = 24, P < 0.05; 1 After 
(+) - 1 After (-) : U = 19.5, P < 0.025; 2 After (+) - 2 After (-) :
C = 24.5, P < 0.05; 3 After (+) - 3 After (-) : U = 13, P < 0.01).
The median assessments for these conditions are depicted graphically
in Figure 10.1.
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Table 10.1: Summary of Median Likelihood Assessments and Biographical
Details
CONDITION RESULT OF PREGNANCY 
TEST
N MEDIANLIKELI­
HOOD
ASSESS­
MENT
DAYS
BETWEEN
CONTACT
AND
TEST
MEAN
AGE
PREVIOUS
PREGNANCY CONTRACEPTION
YES NO YES NO
1 BEFORE POSITIVE io 75
5.5 23.6 5 5 5 51 AFTER POSITIVE io 92.5
1 BEFORE NEGATIVE io 50
4.7 33.4 8 2 8 21 AFTER NEGATIVE io 50
2 AFTER POSITIVE io 95 4.1 25.1 6 4 5 5
2 AFTER NEGATIVE io 50 4.5 30.2 7 3 6 4
3 AFTER POSITIVE io loo 25.7 5 2 2 8
3 AFTER NEGATIVE io 55 28.4 5 5 5 5
In summary, then, there were two main findings. First, for women 
whose test proved positive, there was evidence that those who knew the 
result of the pregnancy test (hindsight) perceived that outcome as 
more likely than those asked to make the assessment before they knew 
the result (foresight), though this was only so when different women 
made hindsight and foresight judgements, and not when repeated measures 
were taken on the same women. Women whose result was negative showed 
no effect and were undecided about the outcome whenever they made 
the assessment. Second, consistently throughout the study, women 
whose test proved positive made higher assessments than those 
whose tests proved negative. Typically, those who were not pregnant 
were undecided (with a median assessment of 50%) while those who 
were pregnant made much higher assessments (with a median of 92.5). 
These findings suggest that who proved to be pregnant have some
insight.
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In order to understand how the pregnant group may have obtained 
this insight, a number of comparisons between the positive and negative 
groups were made using the personal information that had been collected 
about the women. This information is summarised in Table 10.1. The 
particular variables examined were (a) whether the woman had been 
pregnant before, (b) her age, (c) whether contraceptives were being 
used. Each variable was examined by chi-squared (Siegel, 1956, p.107), 
combining data for all three conditions.
2Neither previous pregnancy (x = 0.625) nor age proved significant.
However, for contraceptives/no contraceptives, a trend which approached
2significance was revealed (X = 2.4, df = 1,). That is, there was some 
indication that those who were not using contraceptives thought they 
were more likely to be pregnant than those who were.
A further analysis was then performed, comparing on the one hand
those who were using contraceptives with on the other those who were
not, combined with women who reported contraceptive failure. The
"contraceptive failure" group included those women who had specifically
reported that their method of contraception had failed; for example,
they had forgotten to take their pill or there had been some contra-
2ceptive failure. This revealed a trend at the 10% level (x = 3.5, 
df = 1) .
Taken together, these background data account perhaps for some 
of the difference between the positive and negative groups, although 
much of the variance remains unexplained.
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• 10.4 DISCUSSION
The purpose of this experiment was to explore, in a "real-life" 
setting, Fischhoff's suggestion that when outcomes of events are seen 
in hindsight, they are perceived as more likely than when those same 
events are seen in foresight. The uncertain event chosen for examina­
tion was the outcome of a pregnancy test, and only partial support was 
found for hindsight bias.
The present findings suggest that hindsight bias is a less perva­
sive phenomena outside the laboratory in "real life". This is so 
because the bias was present when a positive outcome to the pregnancy 
test was obtained but not when the test proved negative. Janis and 
Mann (1977) have argued that, when one is investigating decision­
making and judgement under uncertainty, it is essential to construct 
experiments which have relevance and consequence for subjects. Much 
previous research on judgement under uncertainty does not have this 
feature. The present study, although not having consequence, certainly 
does have obvious relevance. Subjects are being asked to give a 
formal assessment to their personal feelings and cognitions about 
something of the greatest importance - the likelihood of them being
I
pregnant.
The above considerations are important because they provide a 
clear framework by which the findings of this experiment can be 
explained. The fact that contact was made with a pregnancy advisory 
service implies a strong suspicion of pregnancy. Those women who 
received a positive result had their suspicions confirmed and were 
biased to seeing this outcome as more likely in hindsight. In
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contrast, for those who received a negative result, attendance at 
the agency served to counteract the effect of outcome knowledge, and 
so they showed no bias.
In conclusion, this experiment has demonstrated that before we 
can generalise findings from the laboratory, or where the stimulus 
material does not have personal relevance to subjects, to everyday 
life research is need in applied settings to determine what situational 
variables, for example, may mediate the effect. In this experiment, 
hindsight bias has been shown to occur only when a person's suspicions 
in foresight have been later confirmed. Where grounds for the 
suspicions have been removed hindsight bias did not occur. The 
experiment has shown this to be the case when people seek an answer 
from some objective source or authority, further research is 
required to discover whether this principle holds regardless of the 
objectivity of the "authority". Finally, the experiment indicates 
that an experiment designed to have relevance for subjects may yield 
important indications as to what conditions encourage or reduce hind­
sight bias, the next experiment to be reported in this thesis was 
designed with this in mind.
j
CHAPTER 11 .
EXPERIMENT 7; THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF MAY 1979: 
JUDGEMENTS IN FORESIGHT AND HINDSIGHT BY LABOUR AND 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY MEMBERS
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The British General Election of the 3rd May, 1979 came about as 
the result of a successful no confidence motion tabled by the 
Conservatives. The previous General Election in October 1974 gave 
Labour an overall majority of only three seats. This soon dwindled 
to a position where they had no overall majority. The no confidence 
motion in April, 1979 was successful because the minority parties 
voted with the Conservatives.
In the run up to the General Election of May, 1979 the opinion 
polls consistently predicted an overall majority to Conservative.
This proved to be the case: the result gave the Conservatives an overall 
majority of 42 seats. Labour lost nearly this many, and over the 
whole country the conservatives achieved a swing of over 5 per cent 
away from Labour. The Liberals lost three seats and the Scottish ! 
Nationalist Party, possibly providing the biggest surprise of the 
election, were decimated. They retained only two seats, losing nine.
The victory by the Conservative Party gave Britain its first ever 
woman prime minister.
Using Labour and Conservative party members as subjects, the 
experiment to be reported here made use of the General Election to 
investigate (1) hindsight bias, and (2) how attitudes and values
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affect èubjective likelihood assessments.
With respect to the first issue it was hypothesised that those 
who knew the result of the election would see the outcomes which 
occurred as more likely, and those which did not occur as less likely, 
than subjects in foresight. With respect to the second issue, it 
was hypothesised that outcomes favourable to a particular party would 
be seen as more likely, in both foresight and hindsight, by that party 
than the other one. This prediction in conjunction with the former 
one should also mean, as a consequence, that hindsight bias should 
be greater, for the outcomes which occurred, for party members where 
the result is in their favour. Conversely, the party who suffered 
defeat should exhibit less bias for the outcomes which occurred.
The use of active Labour and Conservative Party members as subjects 
in this experiment extends the theme of the experiment reported in 
the previous chapter. There it was found that designing experiments 
with material relevant to subjects provided important information 
concerning the conditions which may encourage or reduce hindsight 
bias. The present experiment investigates how attitudes, wishes, 
commitment or values (i.e. Party affiliations) may interact with 
outcome knowledge to affect subjective likelihood assessments.
McGregor (1938), Cantril (1938), as discussed in Chapter 9, both 
showed that people have a tendency to predict the events they would 
like or wish to see come about. More recently Slovic (1966) and 
Sevon (1975) have shown that the value a person attaches to an event 
affects likelihood assessments. Sevon (1975), for example, showed
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that people who highly valued certain polical outcomes perceived them 
as more likely than people who held no opinion or felt neutrally 
towards the same outcomes.
The aim of the present study was to extend these findings to 
look at how hindsight judgements may be affected by what people would 
have liked to have happened. The second hypothesis, then, was derived 
from the above findings.
11.2 METHOD
SUBJECTS
40 subjects, 20 active members of the Whitnash Conservative Party 
and 20 active members of the Coventry Labour Party, took part in the 
experiment.
Conservative subjects were obtained by approaching the chairman 
of the Whitnash Conservative Party. After briefly describing the 
project to him he subsequently asked his members if they would fill 
in a questionnaire. Those who agreed were given the questionnaire 
to complete at the appropriate time.
i
Labour subjects were obtained by approaching a committee member 
of the Coventry Branch of the Labour Party. Again a short outline of 
the project was related to him. He then asked other party members if 
they would take part in the study. The general view of those who 
agreed was that they would only do so if anonymity was ensured. With 
this restriction Labour subjects were given the questionnaire to 
complete at the appropriate time.
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PROCEDURE
20 subjects, ÎO Labour and ÎO Conservative were assigned to a 
foresight condition and 20 subjects, lo Labour and lO Conservative, 
to a hindsight condition. In both conditions subjects assessed the 
likelihood of outcomes to seven aspects of the General Election:
1. The result of the general election (a) likelihood assessments
(b) estimates of surprise
2. The turnout
3. The swing to Labour or Conservative
4. The number of seats majority to Labour or Conservative
5. The Liberals (a) % of votes polled
(b) swing from/to Liberal
(c) number of seats
6. The National Front
7. The Scottish Nationalist Party.
In the foresight condition both Labour and Conserative subjects 
filled out a lO-page questionnaire during the second week before the 
General Election (i.e. between 23rd - 30th April). Before assigning 
likelihood assessments to the outcomes related to the seven questions 
subjects read through an information sheet. This provided details 
about the result of the General Election of October, 1974 and information 
about the forthcoming General Election. This information was derived 
from Butler and Kavanagh (1975) and Mckie, Cook and Phillips (1978), 
it is reproduced in Appendix 11A. ;
In the hindsight condition subjects filled out a similar lO-page 
questionnaire during the 5th and 6th week after the day of the General 
Election (i.e. between 6th and 16th June). Before filling out the 
questionnaire subjects were provided with an information sheet 
summarising the results of the General Election. This was derived 
from the "Guardian" newspaper of 5th May, 1979 and is reproduced in
Appendix 11B.
INSTRUCTIONS
Labour and Conservative subjects in the foresight condition received
the following instructions on the cover sheet of the questionnaire:
In this questionnaire we are interested in your predictions 
concerning various aspects of the forthcoming General Election.
Would you please read through the information relating to the 
last General Election and information surrounding the forth­
coming one. Having done this would you then answer the 
questionnaire. Thank you.
Subjects in hindsight received the following instructions on the cover 
sheet of their questionnaire:
In this questionnaire we are interested in how you thought 
various aspects of the recent General Election would turn out. 
Although the results are known it is still of interest to 
know how people thought it would turn out. This being the 
case, I am asking you to cast your mind back to about a 
week before voting day (May 3rd) and try to assess how 
likely you thought each of the various outcomes listed in 
the questionnaire seemed to you before the results were 
known. That is, try to think back to before May 3rd and 
answer the questionnaire as you believed you would have done 
then.
You will find in what follows an information sheet stating the 
results of the General Election. Furthermore, with each 
question you will see an * before one of the possible outcomes, 
this indicates that it is the one which happened.
This information has been provided as people will vary in how 
much detail they know about the General Election result. This 
being so I have decided to provide all relevant information so 
that all people who answer this questionnaire know the same 
amount.
Would you please read through the information sheet then 
procédé with answering the questionnaire.
QUESTIONNAIRE
Subjects in both conditions were asked to make subjective likelihood 
assessments to seven aspects of the General Election, these were given 
earlier. The number of outcomes specified to each question ranged from 
four to nine. For example, one question (Number 3) asked subjects what 
they think/thought the swing at the General Election will/would be.
They had to indicate, on appropriate scales, how likely they thought 
the following outcomes were:
1. Swing to Labour of more than 10%
2. Swing to Labour of between 5-10%
3. Swing to Labour of between 2-5%
4. Swing to Labour of between 0.1-2%
5. No swing to Labour or Conservative
6. Swing to Conservative of between 0.1-2%
7. Swing to Conservative of between 2-5%
8. Swing to Conservative of between 5-10%
9. Swing to Conservative of more than 10%
Specifying so many outcomes to some questions was necessary 
for two reasons: (1) to ensure that the one that occurred would be 
present; (2) to provide a reasonable differentiation of the possi­
bilities . Having so many outcomes meant that it was unreasonable 
and unrealistic to ask subjects to provide subjective likelihood 
assessments in percentages and ensure that they totalled 100% for 
any one question. Consequently, subjects were asked to make assess­
ments in one of three ways, depending on the question. (1) in 
percentage form, the total adding to lOO per cent; this was only for 
Question 1 where only five outcomes were specified. (2) in terms 
of degree of surprise, expressed on a seven-point scale: this was for 
the same outcomes as in Question 1. (3) on a seven-point scale I
ranging from very likely (7) to not very likely (1); this was used 
for questions 2-7; subjects were asked to indicate these assessments 
by placing a vertical line on the scale in a position which best 
accorded with their subjective likelihood.
After each question and before the specified outcomes, a summary 
of relevant information, a short description of what the question 
was getting at, and an explanation of any technical terms was given.
2^1.
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This was provided to ensure that all subjects fully understood the 
question and associated outcomes. Appendix 11.C reproduces the 
questionnaire given to subjects in hindsight. The only differences 
between this and the one given in foresight was that the wording of 
the questions was changed from past to future tense.and, obviously, 
subjects were not informed of the result as it was not known at 
the time.
MEASUREMENT
A scale value for each outcome for each question had to be deter­
mined where subjects made likelihood assessments on seven-point 
scales. When designing the questionnaire the length of each scale 
was ensured to be the same (48 m.m.) . Conversion to a scale value was 
achieved by first measuring the distance of the subject's response 
from the "not very likely" end. Having already determined the length 
of each scale point the following formula was applied to determine 
the scale value (SV):
SV = 1 + —  where n = response by subject (mm)m
m = length of scale point (mm)(
11.3 RESULTS
In order to discover how outcome knowledge and party affiliations 
influenced subjective likelihood assessments two sets of analyses, 
using the Mann Whitney U test, were carried out. First comparisons 
between Labour subjects in foresight and hindsight, and Conservative 
subjects in foresight and hindsight. Second, comparisons between 
Labour and Conservative in foresight and Labour and Conservative in
263.
hindsight. One-tailed tests were used when differences were in the 
predicted direction, two-tailed when in the opposite direction.
(a) Foresight/Hindsight
Tables 11.1 to 11.10 summarise the median likelihood assessments 
given to the outcomes associated with each of the questions about the 
General Election. The Tables also show the Mann Whitney U statistic 
for foresight/hindsight comparisons and whether the differences are 
reliable or not. In what follows this section provides a short 
question by question description of the results, followed by an overall 
summary of them.
Q.l. The result of the General Election
(a) Likelihood assessments. Inspection of Table 11.1 reveals 
that, for the outcome which occurred (overall majority to Conservative), 
there was no significant difference between assessments for either 
Labour or Conservative subjects. None of the medians, for the outcomes 
which did not occur, were in the predicted direction. The one signi­
ficant result (majority to Conservative: Conservative subjects) was
in the opposite direction to that predicted by hindsight bias.
(b) Estimates of surprise: Table 11.2 shows that the foresight/
I
hindsight medians for the outcome which occurred are both in the 
opposite direction (i.e. more surprised in hindsight), but not signi­
ficantly so. For the outcomes which did not occur, 5 of the 8 hindsight 
medians were greater than foresight ones, two significantly so.
Q ■2. The turnout
Table 11.3 shows that for the outcome which occurred (between 
73-78%) there was no significant difference for Labour subjects.
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Table 11.1 Summary of Medians and statistical analysis for likelihood 
assessments (%) given to Q1 - The result of the General 
Election
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
OUTCOME MEDIAN
CONDITION FORE HIND U SIG CONDITION U SIG
Overall Maj. to Lab Lab 12.5 12.5 48 NS FORESIGHT 42.5 NS
Con 7.5 10.0 37 NS HINDSIGHT 29.0 NS
Overall Maj. to Con Lab 17.5 25.0 37 NS FORESIGHT 4.0 P<.OJ
Con 52.5 40.0 35 NS HINDSIGHT 34 NS
Majority to Lab Lab 32.5 37.5 42 NS FORESIGHT 17 p<.oi
Con 15.0 17.5 40.5 NS HINDSIGHT 25.5 P<. 05
Majority to Con Lab 30.0 30.0 42.5 NS FORESIGHT 31.5 NS
Con 20.0 34.5 19 P<.Ol HINDSIGHT 32.5 NS
Other Outcome Lab O O 50 NS FORESIGHT NS
Con O 0 50 NS HINDSIGHT NS
This is the outcome which occurred
Table 11.2 Summary of medians and statistical analysis for surprise 
estimates given to Q1.
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MED]FORE
.AN
HIND U SIG CONDITION U SIG
Overall Maj. to Lab Lab
Con
3.69
6.25
5.38
6.50
25
41
P<. 05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
20
23
pc.025 
pc.025
Overall Maj.to Con Lab
Con
3.82
1.75
4.88
2.06
43
28
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
11.5
19.5
PC.Ol 
P<.025
Maj. to Lab Lab
Con
2.20
5.82
3.25
5.00
42
49.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
17.0
26.5
Pc.Ol 
P< .05
Maj. to Con Lab
Con
2.20
2.81
2.75
2.75
39
49.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
36
46.5
NS
NS
Other outcome Lab
Con
6.88
6.94
7.00
6.75
26.5
44
PC .05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
47
21
N
pc.05
This is the outcome which occurred
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Table 11.1 Summary of Medians and statistical analysis for likelihood 
assessments (%) given to Q1 - The result of the General 
Election
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION
MEDIAN
U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
Overall Maj. to Lab Lab
Con
12.5
7.5
12.5
10.0
48
37
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
42.5
29.0
NS
NS
Overall Maj.to Con Lab
Con
17.5
52.5
25.0
40.0
37
35
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
4.0
34
PC.Ol
NS
Majority to Lab Lab
Con
32.5
15.0
37.5
17.5
42
40.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
17
25.5
PC.Ol 
P< .05
Majority to Con Lab
Con
30.0
20.0
30.0
34.5
42.5
19
NS
p<.oi
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
31.5
32.5
NS
NS
Other Outcome Lab
Con
O
O
O
O
50
50
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
NS
NS
This is the outcome which occurred
Table 11.2 Summary of medians and statistical analysis for surprise 
estimates given to Q1■
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MED 3 FORE
AN
HIND U SIG CONDITION U SIG
Overall Maj. to Lab Lab
Con
3.69
6.25
5.38
6.50
25
41
P<.05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
20
23
pc.025 
P<.025
Overall Maj.to Con Lab
Con
3.82
1.75
4.88
2.06
43
28
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
11.5
19.5
PC.Ol 
PC.025
Maj. to Lab Lab
Con
2.20
5.82
3.25
5.00
42
49.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
17.0
26.5
PC.Ol 
Pc .05
Maj. to Con Lab
Con
2.20
2.81
2.75
2.75
39
49.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
36
46.5
NS
NS
Other outcome Lab
Con
6.88
6.94
7.00
6.75
26.5
44
P<.05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
47
21
N
PC.05
This is the outcome which occurred
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Table 11.3 Summary of results for Q.2 - The turnout
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
MEDIAN
U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
Greater 78% Lab
Con
3.81
1.75
4.57
4.00
49
17.5
NSp<.oi FORESIGHTHINDSIGHT 2649 P< .05 NS
Between 73-78% Lab
Con
6.63
3.06
5.94
5.75
35.0
20.0
NS
P<.025
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
19
48.5
P<.025 
NS
Between 71-73% Lab
Con
4.44
4.38
4.62
5.00
47 .O 
36.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
49.5
38
NS
NS
Between 68-71% Lab
Con
3.50
3.13
3.50
3.00
46.0
35.0
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
41.5
48
NS
NS
Less 68% Lab
Con
1.63
1.56
2.31
1.81
28.5
35.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
45
44
NS
NS
Table 11.4 Summary of results for Q3 - The Swing
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
OUTCOME
CONDITION
MEDIAN
U SIG CONDITION 0 SIGFORE HIND
To Lab > 10% Lab 1.13 1.68 20 P<.025 FORESIGHT 31.5 NS
Con 1.25 1.63 34.5 NS HINDSIGHT 45 NS
To Lab 5-10% Lab 1.18 2.38 9 P< .01 FORESIGHT 28.5 NS
Con 1.63 1.63 49.5 NS HINDSIGHT 17 PC.OI
To Lab 2-5% Lab 2.14 4.06 21.5 P<.025 FORESIGHT 49.5 NS
Con 2.13 1.87 45 NS HINDSIGHT 4 PC.OI
To Lab 0.1-2% Lab 4.88 5.19 49.5 NS FORESIGHT 14 PC .01
Con 1.87 2.19 47.0 NS HINDSIGHT lO PC.OI
No Swing Lab 4.58 4.19 46.5 NS FORESIGHT 30 NS
Con 1.82 1.75 50 NS HINDSIGHT 28 NS
To Con 0.1-2% Lab 5.70 5.31 43 NS FORESIGHT 21 pc.025
Con 3.06 4.42 28 NS HINDSIGHT 40.5 NS
To Con 2-5% Lab 4.14 4.63 42 NS FORESIGHT 45.5 NS
Con 5.06 4.44 46 NS HINDSIGHT 41 NS
To Con 5-10% Lab 1.68 2.94 20 P<.025 FORESIGHT 4 PC.OI
Con 4.98 5.13 46 NS HINDSIGHT 17 PC.OI
To Con > 10% Lab 1.10 2.0 14.5 PC.01 FORESIGHT 15 PC.OI
Con 1.59 3.13 24 pc.05 HINDSIGHT 28.5 NS
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Table 11.5 Summary of results for Q4 - Number of seats
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MEDIAN U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
Lab Maj > 150 Lab
Con
1.23
1.29
1.65
1.49
12.0
36.5
Pc.Ol
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
42.5
31.5
NS
NS
Lab Maj 100-150 Lab
Con
1.23
1.35
1.82
1.50
27
41
P< .05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
42.5
24
NS
P< .05
Lab Maj 40-100 Lab
Con
2.12
1.59
3.23
1.67
35.5
45
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
38.5
4.5
NS
P< .Ol
Lab Maj 0-40 Lab
Con
5.71
2.12
5.30
2.43
36
34.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
12
26
P< .Ol 
P< .05
Con Maj 0-40 Lab
Con
5.31
4.62
4.53
4.82
42.5
47
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
41
49
NS
NS
Con Maj 40-90 Lab
Con
2.69
4.88
3.77
5.31
28
41
NS
NS
FORESIGHT’
HINDSIGHT
19
34.5
P< .Ol 
NS
Con Maj > 90 Lab
Con
1.08
2.42
2.03
3.26
15
38
p<.oi
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
17
34.5
p<.oi
NS
Table 11.6 Summary of Results for Q5(a) - The Liberals % of the votes polled
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MEDIAN U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
4ore 25% Lab 1.16 1.73 19 p<.oi FORESIGHT 35 NS
Con 1.71 1.50 41 NS HINDSIGHT 22 Pc.025
Between 19-25% Lab 1.12 2.56 25 P<.05 FORESIGHT 26 P< .05
Con 2.24 1.50 29.5 NS HINDSIGHT 14 Pc.Ol
3etween 17-19% Lab 1.59 4.18 25.5 P<.05 FORESIGHT 31 NS
Con 3.24 2.02 42.5 NS HINDSIGHT 35.3 NS
Between 12-17% Lab 4.12 4.83 45.5 MS FORESIGHT 25 P<.05
Con 2.20 3.31 34.5 NS HINDSIGHT 36 NS
jess 12% Lab 4.36 3.36 49 NS FORESIGHT 41.5 NS
Con 3.0 4.07 43 NS HINDSIGHT 50 NS
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Table 11.7 Summary of Results for Q5(b) - The Liberals Swing to/from 
Liberal
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MEDIAN U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
To Lib 5% Lab
Con
1.50
1.59
1.88
1.50
26
31
P< .05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
38.5
14
NS
Pc.Ol
To Lib 3-5% Lab
Con
1.70
2.22
2.50
1.73
21
27.5
P<.025 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
28
22
NS
P<.025
To Lib 0.1-3% Lab
Con
2.94
2.94
3.32
1.75
34
47.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
45.5
40.5
NS
NS
Ho Swing Lab
Con
2.82
2.35
3.94
2.94
32
48
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
40.5
45
NS
NS
Away Lib 0.1-3% Lab
Con
3.36
2.18
4.56
4.13
25
32
P< .05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
46.5
47
NS
NS
Away Lib 3-5% Lab
Con
3.73
2.12
3.60
5.00
44
30
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
34.5
49.5
NS
NS
Away Lib > 5% Lab
Con
3.59
1.59
2.56
3.09
40
20.5
NS
P<.025
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
19
47
P<.Ol
NS
Table 11.8 Summary of Results for Q.5c - The Liberals Number of Seats
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MEDIAN U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
More 30 Lab
Con
1.19
1.59
1.69
1.50
20
45
P<.025 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
32.5
33.5
NS
NS
23-30 Lab
Con
1.23
2.18
2 .OO 
1.56
22
20
P<.025 
P<.025
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
26
12
PC .05 
PC.01
14-23 Lab
Con
1.53
3.71
3.02
1.63
25.5
21.0
P<.05 
P<.025
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
24.5
20.5
P< .05 
PC.025
13 Lab
Con
2.70
4.20
4 .OO 
2.75
30.5
43
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
35
46
NS
NS
6-12 Lab
Con
4.29
3.35
4.31
3.50
48
39.5
NS
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
34.5
36.5
NS
NS
4-6 Lab
Con
2.94
2.37
3.74
4.86
48
25
NS
Pc.05
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
35.5
43
NS
NS
Less 4 Lab
Con
1.71
1.53
2.49
2.13
24
32
PC.05 
NS
FORESIGHT
HINDSIGHT
43.5
42
NS
NS
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Table 11.9 Summary of Results for Q6 - The National Front, % of poll
OUTCOME
FORES XGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MEDIAN U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
Poll > 1% Lab 1.35 1.88 28 NS FORESIGHT 43.5 NS
Con 1.78 1.88 37 NS HINDSIGHT 42 NS
Poll 0.4-1% Lab 4.13 3.61 47.5 NS FORESIGHT 39 NS
Con 4.83 5.25 46 NS HINDSIGHT 41 NS
Poll 0.4% Lab 4.47 4.56 40 NS FORESIGHT 48 NS
Con 5.12 5.19 48 NS HINDSIGHT 39 NS
Poll O .2-.4% Lab 3.82 3.81 44 NS FORESIGHT 30.5 NS
Con 2.20 3.07 34.5 NS HINDSIGHT 47 NS
Poll <0.2% Lab 2.47 2.13 40 NS FORESIGHT 41 NS
Con 1.76 2.50 25 P< .05 HINDSIGHT 44.5 NS
Table 11.10 Summary of Results for Q7 - The Scottish Nationalist Party
OUTCOME
FORESIGHT-HINDSIGHT LAB-CON
CONDITION MEDIAN U SIG CONDITION U SIGFORE HIND
tore 20 seats Lab 1.29 1.81 26 ?< .05 FORESIGHT 49.5 NS
Con 1.59 1.83 25 ?< .05 HINDSIGHT 39 NS
13-20 seats Lab 1.53 2.50 27 ?< .05 FORESIGHT 33 NS
Con 2.19 2.50 32.5 MS HINDSIGHT 43 NS
10-12 seats Lab 2.82 3.31 49 MS FORESIGHT 39.5 NS
Con 3.47 4.06 37 MS HINDSIGHT 35.5 NS
6-10 seats Lab 4.94 4.00 39 NS FORESIGHT 48.5 NS
Con 4.15 3.00 MS HINDSIGHT 39.5 NS
Less 6 seats Lab 4.71 4.63 42 NS FORESIGHT 20 P<.025Con 2.47 1.88 29 NS HINDSIGHT 23 P<.025
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However, Conservative subjects saw this outcome as significantly more 
likely in hindsight. For outcomes which did not occur, tbe only 
significant difference (greater 78%: Conservative subjects) was in 
the opposite direction to that expected, i.e. foresight subjects saw 
this as less likely than hindsight subjects.
Q ■3. The Swing
The outcome which occurred (swing to Conservative of between 5- 
10%) was seen as significantly more likely by Labour hindsight subjects 
than Conservative hindsight subjects, as Table 11.4 shows, but not 
by Conservative subjects in hindsight. For the outcomes which did not 
occur, the five significant differences shown in Table 11.4 are all 
in the opposite direction to that predicted by hindsight bias.
Q.4, Number of Seats
Table 11.5 shows that there were no significant differences between 
Labour and Conservative subjects in foresight and hindsight for the 
outcome which occurred (Conservative majority of 40-90 seats), 
although both hindsight medians are in the predicted direction. The 
three significant differences for outcomes which did not occur, shown 
in Table 11.5, are all in the opposite direction to that expected.
Q.5. The Liberals
(a) % of the votes polled. Table 11.6 shows foresight/hindsight
comparisons to be in the direction expected for the outcome which 
occurred (between 12-17%), but not significantly so. Once again the 
significant differences for the outcomes which did not occur were
all in the opposite direction.
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(b) ' Swing to/from Liberal. Table 11.7 shows for the outcome 
which occurred (swing away from Liberal of between 0.1-3%), the hypo­
thesis to be supported for Labour subjects but not for Conservative 
subjects. Once again all significant differences between foresight/ 
hindsight judgements for the outcomes which did not occur were in 
the opposite direction to that predicted by hindsight bias.
(c) Number of seats. Table 11.8 shows both hindsight medians
to be in the expected direction for the outcome which occurred (between 
6-12 seats), but not significantly so. The table also reveals seven 
hindsight assessments to be significantly differently for outcomes 
which did not occur. Two of these being in the expected direction 
(Conservative subjects: 23-30 seats; 14-23 seats), the other five in 
the opposite direction.
Q.6- The National Front
No significant differences were found for the outcome which 
occurred (poll between 0.4-1% votes), as Table 11.9 shows. The one 
significant difference for outcomes which did not occur was in the 
opposite direction to that expected.
Q.7. The Scottish Nationalist Party
For the outcome which occurred (less than 6 seats) there were no 
significant differences in foresight/hindsight, as Table 11.10 shows. 
The three significant differences for outcomes which did not occur 
were, once again, all in the opposite direction to that expected.
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Summary '
There are ten outcomes, reflecting different aspects of the 
General Election, which occurred. These afforded twenty individual 
comparisons, half between Labour and half between Conservative subjects 
in foresight and hindsight. Fifteen of the hindsight medians supported 
the hypothesis, four significantly so. Five of the comparisons were 
non-hypothesis supporting, none significantly so.
From the seven questions, fifty two specified outcomes to the 
General Election did not occur, thus offering 104 individual comparisons 
in foresight and hindsight. 30 hindsight medians were in the predicted 
direction (i.e. judgements less in hindsight than foresight), but only 
3 significantly so. 74 were in the opposite direction predicted by 
hindsight bias, 24 significantly so.
(b) Party Affiliations and judgements
Tables 11.1 to 11.10 summarise the medians given by Labour and 
Conservative party members. The tables also show the Mann Whitney U 
statistic for Labour/Conservative comparisons and whether the diffe­
rences are reliable or not.
j
Q.l. The Result of the General Election
(a) Likelihood assessments. Table 11.1 shows that an overall 
majority to the Conservatives (the outcome which occurred) was per­
ceived as significantly more likely by Labour subjects than Conserva­
tives, in foresight, but not in hindsight. A labour majority was also 
perceived as more likely by Labour than Conservative, both in fore­
sight and hindsight. No other significant differences for outcomes
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which did not occur were found.
(b) Estimates of surprise. Table 11.2 shows that Labour subjects, 
in both foresight and hindsight, expressed significantly more surprise 
for the outcome which occurred than Conservative subjects. For outcomes 
which did not occur Conservative subjects expressed significantly more 
surprise than Labour to the outcomes: Labour majority, and overall 
Labour majority, both in foresight and hindsight.
Q .2■ The turnout
In general high turnout is said to favour Labour. Labour subjects 
perceived a turnout of 73-78% (what happened) and greater than 78% as 
more likely in foresight, but not in hindsight, than Conservative 
subjects. There were no other significant differences.
Q . 3■ The Swing
The 5-10% swing to the Conservatives, which occurred, was seen 
as more likely by Conservative subjects in both foresight and hindsight. 
The various swings to Labour were, generally, seen as more likely by 
Labour subjects in hindsight but not foresight, as Table 11.4 shows.
A swing to Conservative of between 0.1-2% was seen as more likely in 
foresight by Labour (such a swing would have kept Labour in office).
A Conservative swing of greater than 10% was seen as more likely by 
Conservative subjects in foresight but not hindsight.
Q.4, The number of seats
Table 11.5 shows that a Conservative majority of between 40-90 
seats (what happened) was seen as significantly more likely in foresight
2,74.
by Conservative than Labour subjects. For other outcomes, those 
specifying a Labour majority of seats were seen as more likely by 
Labour. The outcome specifying a Conservative majority of greater 
than 90 seats was seen as more likely in foresight, but not in hind­
sight,by Conservative subjects.
Q.5. The Liberals
A Liberal gain in seats, per cent of votes oolled or swing in their 
favour is generally regarded as favouring Labour. This is because 
additional votes for the Liberals tend to come from people who voted 
Conservative on previous occasions.
(a) % votes polled. As Table 11.6 shows, three of the four signi­
ficant results - hindsight: more 25%, 19-25% and 12-17% - were seen
as more likely by Labour subjects than Conservative. These are con­
sistent with the above statement. One significant difference (foresight 
19-25%, more likely by Conservative subjects), however, is not con­
sistent with this.
(b) The Swing. Table 11.7 shows that the three significant results
)
- swing to Liberal of more than 5% seen as more likely in hindsight 
by Labour; swing to Liberal of 3-5% more likely in hindsight by Labour; 
and swing away from Liberal of greater than 5% seen as more likely 
in foresight by Conservative - are also consistent with the above 
statement.
(c) The number of seats. Table 11.8 shows two significant 
results - 23 to 30 seats and 14 to 23 seats seen as more likely by
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Labour - are consistent with the above claim. The other two - 
foresight: 23-30 seats and 14-23 seats, more likely by Conservative 
- are not.
Q.6. The National Front
The National Front poll such a small percentage of the vote that 
their fortunes are of little consequence to the two major parties. 
This is reflected in the results, shown in Table 11.9, where no 
significant differences were found between Labour and Conservative 
subjects, in either foresight or hindsight.
Q.7. The Scottish National Party
Table 11.10 shows that the only significant differences between 
Labour and Conservative subjects were for the outcome which occurred 
(less than 6 seats) . In both foresight and hindsight this outcome 
was seen as more likely by Labour members. This is consistent with 
the view that the Scottish Nationalist Party has, in the past, taken 
votes from Labour, so a poor result for the S.N.P. would favour 
Labour. This is further substantiated by the fact that Scotland was 
the only part of the British Isles to show a slight swing to Labour.
11.4 DISCUSSION
The first issue this experiment was designed to explore was 
whether hindsight bias would be exhibited by subjects who had strong 
commitments, desires and attitudes for certain outcomes to come about.
Active Labour and Conservative party members given questionnaires 
about the General Election before and âfter the result was known
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provided only partial and weak support for hindsight bias. This 
came exclusively from the outcomes which occurred to various aspects 
of the General Election. The twenty comparisons made for such outcomes 
showed 15 to support hindsight bias, with four of the differences 
being reliable ones. None of the five differences which were non­
hypothesis supporting were reliable.
No support at all for hindsight bias was found for the outcomes 
which did not occur. In fact the large number of significant 
differences in the opposite direction to that predicted as compared 
with those in the predicted direction (27 and 3 respectively) might 
be seen as evidence for an opposite effect. That is, subjects per­
ceived outcomes which did not happen as more likely in hindsight than 
foresight. This was found for only those questions where seven-point 
scales were used to measure uncertainty assessments.
These results, for the outcomes which did not occur, are difficult 
to explain: for one thing it is the first time such a pattern has 
been found in all the experiments reported so far in this thesis. 
Research by Fischhoff and his colleagues, as discussed in Chapter 3,
I
and the experiments reported here appear consistently to show hind­
sight bias to be less pronounced for outcomes which did not happen 
or are not reported as occurring. However, none of Fischhoff's research 
or that reported here provides any indication of an effect in the 
opposite direction.
One possible explanation of these results is that subjects in 
hindsight are using the seven-point likelihood scales differently.
That is,«those in hindsight are not using the "not very likely" pole 
of the scale in the same way as subjects in foresight. This can only 
remain a speculation as there is no other evidence for this and no 
reason, other than the pattern of results to regard this as the 
explanation.
The second issue this experiment was designed to explore concerned 
the effect of party affiliations and outcomes party members would have 
liked to have seen occur upon subjective likelihood
assessments. It was predicted that outcomes favourable to a party 
would be seen as more likely, in both foresight and hindsight, by that 
party than the other one. The results offered strong support for 
this hypothesis. Generally, outcomes favourable to the Labour party 
were seen as more likely by Labour party members than Conservative 
party members. Conversely, outcomes favourable to Conservative were 
seen as more likely by Conservative than Labour party members.
The third issue was that hindsight bias would be in greater 
evidence for outcomes which happened in the party for which those 
outcomes were favourable. This received no support. The result of 
the General Election was highly favourable to Conservative: in 
foresight these outcomes were seen as highly likely by Conservative 
subjects. Hence, the extent of party affiliation influence upon 
subjective likelihood assessments was tending towards some ceiling 
before the outcome was known. For Labour party members a different 
pattern of results emerged for these outcomes in foresight and 
hindsight. In foresight. Labour subjects perceived these events as 
much less likely than Conservative subjects. Outcome knowledge may
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have caused Labour subjects, but not Conservative, to realise that 
their assessments were unrealistically optimistic. In consequence, 
they adjusted them upwards to what they thought would have been more 
realistic at the time.
In general, these results show that subjective likelihood assess­
ments are strongly influenced by the value of an outcome to subjects 
and their desire for it to occur. This positive relationship appears 
to be only marginally affected by outcome knowledge. On the basis 
of these findings it might be concluded that hindsight bias is much 
less likely to occur when concomitant attitudes and wishes to see 
desirable outcomes occur is high.
The nature of the task and the subjects used raises the question 
of what the subjective likelihood assessments were assessments of. 
Ideally, subjects are beings asked to give some formal expression 
to their true expectations, x.e. to put aside what they would like 
to see happen and objectively judge what they think will happen. 
However, it is apparent that the judgements reflect subjects' wishes.
Hence in cases where a person has some kind of vested interest a bias*
as serious as that due to hindsight may occur. People who see 
undesirable outcomes as less likely, and desirable ones as more likely, 
than they are and fail to modify what they thought once they know 
how events turned out are going to learn even less from the past than 
if they were subject to hindsight bias.
In conclusion, this experiment has demonstrated that material 
relevant to subjects is necessary in order to discover hew widespread
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a phenomena hindsight bias is in "everyday life". The experiment 
has also extended the findings of the previous experiment by showing 
how subjects' desire and wish to see certain outcomes obtain and 
othersnot influence subjective likelihoods and interact with outcome 
knowledge.
j
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CHAPTER 12
EXPERIMENT 81: ROLES OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY: ESTIMATES IN 
FORESIGHT AND HINDSIGHT
12.1. INTRODUCTION
*The final experiment to be reported in this thesis investigates 
foresight/hindsight judgements using factual material. In Chapter 3, 
it will be recalled, two studies were reviewed, Fischhoff (1977) and 
Wood (1978) , which also used such stimulus material. In that chapter 
it was shown that those experiments provided the strongest evidence, 
relative to those which used "laboratory material" or contemporary 
social events, for hindsight bias. The experiment to be reported 
here seeks to replicate and extend these findings.
Previous research using factual stimulus material to investigate 
the effect of outcome knowledge upon judgements has asked people 
to assess the likelihood that a particular definition of a word is 
correct (or incorrect). In contrast to this technique the experiment
to be reported here used statistical information concerning the number
Ior percentage of women in certain careers or roles in society. In 
consequence, the use of such material allows us to ask subjects to 
estimate what they think or thought such numbers or percentages are 
or were.
1. Lorraine Sherr assisted in the collection of datal for this experi­
ment, she also provided the author with the experimental material.
281.
With an objective criteria by which to compare estimates made in 
foresight and hindsight it was predicted that those who were told 
what the actual figures were (hindsight) would produce estimates 
closer to those actual figures than those who were not told the 
figures (foresight).
12.2. METHOD
SUBJECTS
87 subjects, 25 male and 52 female, attending an Open Day at the 
Department of Psychology, University of Warvrick, took part in the 
experiment.
PROCEDURE
Subjects were run in small groups, and randomly assigned to either 
a foresight or hindsight condition. In both conditions subjects were 
required to estimate the number or percentage, as appropriate, of 
women in certain professions or roles in society. There were sixteen 
questions in all, ten relating to women in employment at the University 
of Warwick, and six concerned with the percentage of women occupying 
certain roles in England.
|
Subjects in the foresight condition were merely asked to estimate 
the number or percentage of women in those jobs or roles. Subjects 
in the hindsight condition were provided with the actual statistics 
in one column on the questionnaire and asked to estimate what they 
thought the figures might have been.
The entirely random procedure of assigning subjects to one of the 
two conditions led to 13 and 12 males in foresight and hindsight
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INSTRUCTIONS
Subjects in the foresight condition received the following 
instructions to the first lO questions:
At the University of Warwick there are the following numbers 
of people. How many do you think are women?
For the final six questions concerned with the percentage of women 
in certain roles in England no further instructions were given as it 
was thought that the questions themselves were self-explanatory.
Subjects in hindsight received the following instructions for 
all sixteen questions:
For the questionnaire below there are a series of questions 
followed by two columns (labelled 1 and 2) . Column 2 
refers to the actual figures. What you are asked to do is 
estimate what you thought the figures might have been. Do 
this in Column 1.
|
Subjects then received similar instructions as those in foresight to 
the first lO questions except that the second sentence was modified 
to read as follows :
respectively, and 26 and 36 females in foresight and hindsight res­
pectively. Subjects spent about 5-10 minutes answering the questionnaire.
Your response should estimate the number of women.
QUESTIONNAIRE
The sixteen questions used in this experiment were taken from
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"The Report of the Sex Equality Committee of Senate", University of 
Warwick, 1979. Subjects in both conditions received the same 16 
questions. Reproduced below is the questionnaire given to hindsight 
subjects, foresight subjects received the same questionnaire but 
without column 2 (outcome knowledge).
QUESTION COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2
1. 62 Professors -- 1 is a woman
2. 65 Readers and Senior Lecturers -- 4 are women
3. 261 Lecturers --- 29 are women
4. 16 Registry Senior Staff -- 3 are women
5. 7 Senior Library Staff --- O are women
6. 18^ Library Assistants (*s = part-time) -- 17*5 are women
7. Secretaries -- 100% are women
8. Domestic Cleaners, Cooking Assistants -- 100% are women
9. In the English Department last year 71% of the 
undergraduate degrees were obtained by women.
46 postgraduates were admitted, what percentage 
were women? -- 50% were women
IO. Warwick has (last year) 355 full-time post­
graduates, how many women? --
* * * * * *
H O  were women
11. What percentage of the labour force in
England are women? --
«
38%
12. How many of these are also Housewives? -- 75%
13. In the nursing profession, what percentage
are women -- 90%
14. Mothers of 0-2 year olds, how many are at home? -- 85%
15. Mothers of 5-15 year olds, how many are at home? -- 56%
16. What percentage of part-time workers are 
women? 88%
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To discover how outcome knowledge affected estimates two sets 
of analyses between conditions were made. First, in order to get a 
general picture of the results the means between foresight and hind­
sight, summarised in Table 12.1, were compared. If the mean in the 
hindsight condition for a particular question was closer to the actual 
figure (shown in column 2 of Table 12.1) it was regarded as hypothesis 
supporting. If, on the other hand, the mean in hindsight was less 
accurate than the one in foresight it was regarded as non-hypothesis 
supporting. This procedure was followed for both males and females.
For females the number of hypothesis - supporting hindsight means 
was 15, with one being non-hypothesis supporting. Similarly, for males 
the figures were 15 hypothesis-supporting and one nonhypothesis­
supporting .
This general description fails to take account of the magnitude 
of the difference between the two conditions for each question. In 
order to get at this the second set of analyses compared estimates 
given in foresight and hindsight to each question by analysis of 
variance. The factors foresight/hindsight and male/female were 
extracted, giving a 2 x 2 independent analysis with unequal cells 
(Winer, 1971, p. 445). Table 12.2 summarises the results of this 
analysis for each of the 16 questions.
The ten questions concerned with the number or percentage of 
women in certain types of employment at the University of Warwick 
yielded seven significant differences between foresight and hindsight
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Table 12.1 Summary of Mean Estimates and Standard Deviations given 
in Foresight and Hindsight by Males and Females
ACTUAL
FIGURE
ESTIMATED FIGURES
QUESTION FORESIGHT
MALES
FORESIGHT
FEMALES
3INDSIGHT
MALES
HINDSIGHT
FEMALES
X SD X SD X SD X SD
1. 62 Professors 1 17.31 9.10 19.56 6.28 10.66 5.35 15.67 9.45
2. 65 Readers and 
Senior Lecturers 4 23.0 8.20 22.96 8.15 15.17 7.28 17.41 9.85
3. 261 Lecturers 29 109.9 49.1 45.9 19.2 75.4 41.7 69.0 31.3
4. 16 Registry 
Staff 3 9.23 2.62 7.81 2.73 4.42 2.71 6.11 2.74
5. 7 Senior Lib­
rary Staff O 4.54 0.88 4.08 1.41 3.75 1.54 3.41 1.54
5. 18.5 Library 
Assistants 17.5 13.9 2.56 12.75 3.15 13.6 5.34 13.1 4.15
7. Secretaries
(%) loo 87.0 8.56 89.8 15.11 96.3 8.29 95.3 11.93
8. Domestic
Cleaner,
Cooking
Assistants loo 89.6 10.15 86.8 12.05 92.8 10.27 96.1 9.47
3. % Women Post­
graduates in 
the English 
Départment 50 60.0 16.2 49.1 17.23 52.6 13.85 51.3 15.83
IO Total (355) 
pos tg raduate 
women in 
whole 
University H O 134.0 23.68 152.6 41.3 133.7 40.8
j
132.0 32 .2
11 % Labour for 
women in 
England 38 33.4 7.0 39.0 11.0 36.1 6.36 36.0 7.64
12 % Also house­
wives 75 64.3 28.4 55.1 25.29 71.4 12.06 70.6 20.1
13 % Nurses in 
Nursing Pro­
fession 90 83.1 11.46 79.9 10.76 83.2 8.81 85.3 9.81
14 % mothers of 
0-2 yr old 
at home 85 85.5 12.40 81.1 13.03 84.6 9.41 83.3 10.21
15 % mothers of 
5-15 yr old 
at home 56 61.1 16.10 47.9 15.9 52.9 16.44 48.8 13 .08
16 % part-time
workers
female 88 68.5 22.3 74.5 15.33 78.3 16.0 77.9 10.84
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Table 12.2 Summary of 2 x 2 Analyses of Variance performed on each 
of the 16 Questions
SOURCE SS DF MS F P
2.1. THE PROFESSORS
A (Foresight/Hindsight) 486.7 1 486.7 7.29 P < 0.01
B (Male/Female) 230.7 1 230.7 3.47 NS
A x B 33.1 1 33.1 0.49 NS
ERROR 5471.6 82 66.7
Q.2. READERS AND SENIOR LECTURERS
A 785.1 1 785.1 9.95 P < 0.005
B 21.3 1 21.3 0.27 NS
A X  B 22.9 1 22.9 0.29 NS
ERROR 6394.9 82 78.95
Q.3. LECTURERS
A 78648.4 1 78648.4 9.83 P < 0.005
B 23468.8 1 23468.8 2.93 NS
A X  B 27996.1 1 27996.1 3.49 NS
ERROR 664656.9 83 8007.9
Q.4. REGISTRY SENIOR STAFF
A 187.15 1 187.15 25.35 P < 0.001
B 0.32 1 0.32 0.04 NS
A X  B 42.91 1 42.91 5.81 P < 0.025
ERROR 612.82 83 7.38
Q.5. SENIOR LIBRARY STAFF
A 9.06 1 9.06 4.53 P < 0.05
B 2.66 1 2.66 1.33 NS
A X  B 0.08 1 0.08 0.41 NS
ERROR 161.89 81 2 .OO
Q.6. LIBRARY ASSISTANTS i
A 928.7 1 928.7 0.87 NS
B 2670.8 1 2670.8 2.51 NS
A X B 15.89 1 15.89 0.02 NS
ERROR 87184.9 82 1063.2
Q.7. SECRETARIES
A 858.6 1 858.6 5.79 P < 0.025
B 12.31 1 12.31 0.08 NS
A X B 59.18 1 59.18 0.40 NS
ERROR 11427.2 77 148.51
Q.8. DOMESTIC CLEANERS, COOKING ASSISTANTS
A 617.9 1 617.9 5.63 P < 0.025
B 0.68 1 0.68 0.01 NS
A X B 143.9 1 143.9 1.31 NS
¡ERROR 3565.9 78 109.8
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Table 12.2 continued
SOURCE SS DF MS F P
Q.9. WOMEN POSTGRADUATES IN ENGLISH DEPARTMENT
A 119.9 1 119.9 0.46 NS
B 640.3 1 640.3 2.48 NS
A X  B 395.1 1 395.1 1.53 NS
ERROR 20676.7___ ___80__ __258-5__
Q.lO. POSTGRADUATE WOMEN IN THE UNIVERSITY
A 1838.6 1 1838.6 1.50 NS
B 1196.7 1 1196.7 0.97 NS
A X  B 1725.3 1 1725.3 1.40 NS
ERROR 93376.0 76__ 1228.6
Q.ll. LABOUR FORCE IN ENGLAND WOMEN
A 0.51 1 0.51 0.01 NS
B 137.0 1 137.0 1.86 NS
A X  B 145.3 1 145.3 2.00 NS
ERROR 6048.9 83 ___73.48
Q.12. ALSO HOUSEWIVES
A 2147.1 1 2147.1 4.28 P < 0.05
B 424.1 1 424.1 0.85 NS
A x B 298.0 1 298.0 0.59 NS
ERROR 40608.8 81 501.3
Q. 13. NURSES IN NURSING PROFESSION
A 108.9 1 108.9 1.21 NS
B 12.39 1 12.39 0.14 NS
A x B 101.2 1 101.2 1.12 NSERROR 7475.2___ __ 83__ ___90.1__
Q.14. % OF MOTHERS WITH 0-2 YEAR OLD CHILDREN AT HOME !
A 7.48 1 7.48 0.58 NS
B 144.03 1 144.03 1.12 NS
A X  B 45.54 1 45.54 0.35 NS
ERROR 10711.9 83 129.06
Q.15. % OF MOTHERS WITH 5-15 YEAR OLD CHILDREN AT HOME
A 233.2 1 233.2 1.05 NS
B 1326.2 1 1326.2 5.98 P < 0.025
A X  B 361.9 1 361.9 1.63 NS
ERROR 18396.7 83 221.7
Q.16. % PART-TIME WORKERS FEMALE
A 775.1 1 775.1 3.43 NS
B 141.5 1 141.5 0.63 NS
A X B 186.2 1 186.2 0.82 NS
ERROR 18783.1 83 226.3
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estimates. These were all in the predicted direction. The questions 
which yielded these differences were as follows: Q.l. Professors 
(F = 7.29; df = 1,82; P < 0.01); Q.2. Readers and senior lecturers 
(F = 9.95; df = 1,82; P < 0.005); Q.3. Lecturers (F = 9.83; df = 1,83; 
P < 0.005); Q.4. Registry senior staff (F = 25.35; df = 1,83; P < 0.001) 
Q.7. Secretaries (F = 5.79; df = 1,77; P < 0.025); Q.8. Domestic 
cleaners and cooking assistants (F = 5.63; df = 1,78; P < 0.025).
The six questions concerned with the percentage of women occupying 
certain roles in society in England yielded only one significant 
difference (Q.15 Percentage of mothers of 5-15 year olds at home:
F = 4.28; df = 1,81; P < 0.05). This was also in the predicted 
direction.
The analysis also allowed us to look for sex differences. Only 
one question, Q.15. percent of mothers of 5-15 year olds at home, 
yielded a significant difference (F = 5.98; df = 1,83; P < 0.025).
Here females underestimated the percentage of women at home to a 
greater extent than males. There was one significant interaction 
(Q.4. Senior Registry Staff: F = 5.81; df = 1,83; P < 0.025). Here
t
males showed little difference between foresight and hindsight esti­
mates, whereas females gave more accurate estimates in hindsight 
than foresight.
12.4 DISCUSSION
This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that those 
who were told the actual number or percentage of women in certain 
types of employment or roles in society would give estimates closer
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to the true figure than those who were not so informed. The experiment 
was an investigation of hindsight bias because subjects were asked, 
in hindsight, to give the estimates they thought they would have had 
they not been told.
In general, the results provide strong support for hindsight bias. 
Of the sixteen hindsight estimates, fifteen were in the predicted 
direction, eight of these being significantly different to foresight 
estimates.
The first ten questions subjects gave estimates for, concerned 
with women in employment at the University of Warwick, produced seven 
significant differences, all in the predicted direction. The six 
questions concerned with women's roles in England produced only one 
significant difference, this in the predicted direction.
The lack of strong support for hindsight bias for these six 
questions can be attributed to the accuracy with which subjects in the 
foresight condition made estimates. This experiment, in contrast 
to others using factual material (i.e. Fischhoff, 1977; Wood, 1978) 
had objective criteria with which to compare subjects' estimates.
One consequence of this is that if subjects in foresight make reasonably 
accurate estimates then there is hardly likely to be any effect due 
to giving outcome knowledge.
This is what has happened in Questions 11-16. Inspection of 
Table 12.1 reveals that, for these questions, the difference between 
the mean estimates in foresight and the actual figures is, generally
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speaking, quite small. For example, with Question 14 it is 0.5 and 
3.9 for males and females respectively. If we now turn to look at 
differences between hindsight estimates and the actual figures we again 
find them to be small. For Question 14, again, the differences are 
0.4 and 1.7 for males and females respectively.
By way of contrast, the differences between the actual figures 
and mean estimates in foresight for the first 10 questions is quite 
large. The difference between the actual figures and hindsight mean 
estimates is substantially smaller.
Hence, we can only expect hindsight bias to occur when there are 
objective criteria with which to compare estimates if subjects in 
foresight make relatively inaccurate estimates. That there was such 
a "ceiling effect" operating here is lent further support by subjects' 
comments. Those in foresight, on the whole, expressed considerable 
surprise at the actual figures for the first 10 questions when 
they were told them after completing the experiment. However, they 
did not express such surprise when they were informed of the actual 
percentages for the final 6 questions.
I
One advantage of using material v/ith an objective criteria, then, 
is that we can determine how accurately people make estimates in fore­
sight and hindsight. Asking people to make subjective likelihood 
assessments, on the other hand, does not allow this kind of analysis. 
However, if we are more interested in subjects' judgements and perceptions 
of social events it is not easy, if at all possible, to obtain any 
indication of accuracy. For example, somebody might say that there
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is a 70% chance of an all-out nuclear war between American and the 
U.S.S.R. in the next five years. It is not clear how one would deter­
mine the accuracy of this judgement. At most, we can only say that 
the person was wrong if they had said it was 100% likely and the 
halocaust did not occur, or if the person said it was 0% likely (i.e. 
no chance at all) and there was a nuclear war.
In conclusion, this experiment has replicated and extended the 
findings of Fischhoff (1977) and Wood (1978). The experiment has 
provided strong evidence for hindsight bias where factual stimulus 
material is used. The experiment has extended the findings as it 
has found the bias to occur when people make estimates of actual 
frequencies rather than subjective likelihood assessments of the 
chances of being right or wrong about some question of fact.
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PART III
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
293.
CHAPTER 13
HINDSIGHT BIAS AND ORDER EFFECTS
13.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers two main issues to arise out of the experiments 
reported in Part II of this thesis. Firstly, a discussion of hindsight 
bias. This is considered specifically from the point of view of the 
three types of experimental material - laboratory, contenporary 
social/political events, and factual - used to investigate the effect 
of outcome knowledge upon perceptions and subjective likelihoods.
It is followed by a general discussion of the results. Secondly, the 
effect of order of information upon judgements is discussed.
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13.2 HINDSIGHT BIAS
The experiments reported in PART II, and the previous research 
reviewed in Chapter 3, of this thesis investigated hindsight judgements 
using three types of experimental material. This section discusses 
these by following the same format and provides some indications of 
the conditions under which hindsight bias may be expected to occur 
and the conditions under which it may not occur.
13,2.1 Experiments using laboratory material
Experiments 1 to 3 (reported in Chapters 5 to 7 respectively) 
investigated hindsight/foresight judgements using "laboratory material", 
as characterised in Chapter 3. Experiments 1 and 3, it will be recalled, 
investigated hindsight bias, Experiment 2 creeping determinism.
Experiments 1 and 3 did not, in general, provide strong support 
for hindsight bias. Both failed to produce a systematic pattern of 
findings in this respect. What support there was for the claim that 
outcome knowledge leads to bias indicated that if it is going to occur 
at all it does so as an event description unfolds and is not present 
immediately people are in possession of such knowledge.
Furthermore, the bias may be influenced by order of information.
A consistent, but weak pattern of findings, in both experiments 
indicated that information bearing on the outcome reported to have 
occurred may encourage the bias when it appears at the end of the 
scenario, i.e. a recency effect. Conversely, information indicating 
outcomes other than the one reported may, when it appears at the end 
of the scenario, reduce the bias, again a recency effect. It must be 
stressed that the above findings were not particularly convincing, being
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less so in Experiment 3 than Experiment 1. Some reasons for this were 
discussed in Chapter 7 and will not be repeated here.
Experiments 1 and 2, investigating hindsight bias and creeping 
determinism respectively, both indicated, although again not particularly 
convincingly, that hindsight effects may not be so marked when outcome 
knowledge is given at the beginning, rather than the end, of the event 
description. Experiment 1 provided stronger support for this than 
Experiment 2.
All three experiments demonstrated, in keeping with previous 
work by Fischhoff and his colleagues, that hindsight effects are less 
frequent for outcomes believed not to have happened than ones reported 
as occurring. It is of interest to speculate why this is the case, 
but as it is a finding which occurs with experiments using different 
types of material it will be considered in the final part of this section.
Overall, the experimenLs using laboratory material do not provide 
strong support for Fischhoff's claim that people in possession of 
outcome knowledge exhibit hindsight bias or creeping determinism in 
judgements under uncertainty. The experiments indicate that when bias 
occurs it only does so as the event description unfolds; may be removed 
or reduced by varying the order of information and by reporting 
outcomes before rather than after (as Fischhoff, 1975a did) the scenario.
13.2,2 Experiments using contemporary Socio-Political Events
Experiments 5 to 7 (reported in Chapters 9 to 11 respectively) 
all investigated hindsight bias using contemporary social or socio­
political events. All experiments offered some support for the bias 
and also indicated conditions which encourage or reduce it.
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The two experiments (5 and 7) which investigated hindsight 
judgements with respect to socio-political events (the British Firemen's 
Strike of 1977/78 and the General Election of May, 1979), taken together, 
failed to provide consistent support for hindsight bias. Whilst 
Experiment 5 did provide some strong support, Experiment 7 showed that 
when the stimulus material is highly relevant to subjects and subjects 
have strong desires, commitments, etc. to see certain outcomes about 
hindsight bias is unlikely to occur.
Experiment 6, in contrast, showed that designing an experiment 
on the grounds of relevance alone is insufficient to reduce or eliminate 
hindsight bias. In this experiment, it will be recalled, female 
subjects made judgements about what they thought their chances of 
being pregnant were. Here hindsight bias was found when women had a 
positive pregnancy test result but not when they had a negative one.
Both Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that subjects who made 
both foresight and hindsight judgements showed less bias than subjects 
who made only hindsight assessments. This, as mentioned in Chapter 9, 
confirmed previous findings by Fischhoff and his colleagues.
Experiment 5 also showed two other things to affect the degree 
of influence of outcome knowledge upon judgements. First, bias is more 
likely where people are asked only to assess the likelihood of outcomes 
presented to them rather than if they are asked both to produce their 
own outcomes and assess the likelihood of each. Second, certain 
types of information were found to affect the bias. Antecedent 
events were more likely to result in bias than events surrounding the 
outcome which happened. This was an unexpected finding and some
theoretical discussion of it was given in Chapter 9.
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Using a general conception of attitude, Experiment 7, as 
indicated above, clearly showed how this affected judgements. Experiment 
5 also attempted to investigate this. However, as discussed in Chapter 
9, this experiment failed to show any effect of attitudes upon subjective 
likelihood assessments. This being mainly due, as argued there, to 
the lack of any explicit experimental manipulation of attitudes.
However, both experiments demonstrated a lack of interaction between 
attitudes, desires, etc. and outcome knowledge to make hindsight bias 
stronger under certain circumstances.
In general, the experiments using contemporary social or socio­
political material provided important insights into the extent of 
hindsight bias we might expect in the "real world" or everyday life.
They also provided indications of some of the conditions under which 
bias is likely and not likely to occur.
13.2,3 Experiments using factual material
The only experiment reported in this thesis to investigate 
hindsight bias using factual material was Experiment 8. This differed 
from Fischhoff (1977) and Wood (1978) because it asked people to 
estimate actual numbers or percentages rather than make subjective 
likelihood assessments.
The experiment provided strong support for hindsight bias.
The majority of estimates made to the questions demonstrated that 
subjects who knew what the actual figures were gave more accurate 
estimates, than those who were not in possession of such knowledge.
Whilst the experiment does give strong support for the bias a 
problem arises over whether the results would generalise to subjective
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likelihood assessments made with the same material. In view of the 
fact that the other experiments reported in this thesis did not produce 
such a systematic or convincing set of results as those claimed by 
Fischhoff such a generalisation might be problematic. Obviously, this is 
a line of enquiry which demands further empirical investigation.
13.2,4 Summary
The seven experiments investigating hindsight judgements, six 
looking at hindsight bias and one at creeping determinism, provide 
varying degrees, ranging from weak to strong, of support for previous 
research by Fischhoff and his colleagues.
The weakest support comes from that using laboratory material and 
the strongest from that using factual material. Those experiments 
investigating such judgements in an "applied" setting provided 
intermediate support relative to experiments using other types of 
stimulus material. These "applied” experiments also provided the best 
indications of conditions likely to encourage, reduce or eliminate 
hindsight bias. Most notable of these were the findings that asking 
people to produce their own outcomes reduced bias and providing 
antecedent details increased it. Also, people who wanted to see certain 
outcomes happen showed little bias. Here, though, attitudes, desires, 
etc., had such a strong influence on subjective likelihood assessments 
that a different bias to that of hindsight was shown to be present.
Generally, throughout the experiments it was found that hindsight 
bias/creeping determinism is more likely to be present, if at all, for 
the outcome which occurred rather than for the outcomes which did not 
occur. The question arises as to why this might be the case (an explanation
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of hindsight bias itself is treated in a later section of this chapter).
Fischhoff and Beyth (1975a), Fischhoff (1977) offer an explanation 
of this differential hindsight effect by considering the different 
information processing demands involved in each circumstance. Their 
arguments will not be repeated here, the reader is referred back to 
Chapter 3, except to add that they are lent further credence in light 
of the "confirmatory hypothesis - testing strategy" people use in 
predictive tasks discussed in Chapter 2. Besides such a plausible 
theoretical explanation an obvious methodological one needs to be considered.
In all the experiments which have used social scenarios or socio­
political events, subjects have been provided, typically, with four 
or more outcomes to some event. One of these is reported to subjects 
as having occurred or did in fact, occur. Hindsight bias for outcomes 
not reported to have occurred or which did not occur may not be detected 
simply because the reduced likelihood is spread over three or more such 
outcomes. This means that whilst the increase in likelihood given to 
the outcome which occurred often results in a significant difference 
the corresponding decrease is spread over the three or more outcomes 
which did not occur. This results in individual differences unlikely 
to be detected. One way to test this would be to provide a smaller 
number of outcomes to a scenario, for example three, and see if hindsight 
bias is found for the two outcomes not reported to have occurred.
On the face of it Experiment 6 might be thought to throw light 
on this issue also because only one of two outcomes were possible.
However, because subjects only gave one assessment on a scale which 
covered both eventualities (positive or negative result to the pregnancy
test) it cannot help here.
Further research, along the lines indicated above, is required 
to determine whether a theoretical explanation is needed or whether 
the result is an artifact of the design of the experiments.
13.3 ORDER EFFECTS
Five of the eight experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5)
reported in this thesis investigated the effects of different information 
orders upon judgement under uncertainty. Four of these experiments 
(Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5) looked at this with respect to foresight/ 
hindsight judges and one (Experiment 4) investigated just order effects. 
This section will briefly summarise the findings and draw some 
conclusions about how order of information may be expected to influence 
judgements generally.
The three experiments using laboratory material to investigate 
the effect of different orders of information upon hindsight judgements 
provided only partial evidence for recency effects. The strongest 
evidence came from Experiment 1 where greater hindsight bias was 
found when statements indicating the reported outcome appeared at the 
end of the event description rather than at the beginning. Some 
evidence for recency effects was found for outcomes reported not to 
have happened as well.
The next two experiments, however, produced little evidence for 
order effects in this context. Experiment 3, which was designed 
specifically with information order in mind, failed to produce any 
reliable results to indicate that hindsight bias might be affected by 
order of information. In this experiment, the medians were generally, 
in the predicted direction, but not significantly so. Some methodological/ 
design reasons explaining why this might have occurred were given in
301.
Chapter 7 and will not be repeated here.
One tentative conclusion that we might draw from these experiments 
is that hindsight bias may be influenced by information order when it 
is presented sequentially (as in Experiment 1) but not when it is 
presented all at once, as in the continuous prose passages in Experiments 
2 and 3. This might be taken as an indication that historians, policy­
makers, etc. who receive or search for information one item at a time 
may be more susceptible to hindsight bias if they come across that 
information in a certain order than if that information was received 
or searched for in a piecemeal fashion. However, further research is 
required before we could feel confident in accepting such a conclusion.
In a different vein, Experiment 5 demonstrated that ordering of 
different types of information produced a consistent and reliable 
influence on hindsight judgements. The experiment showed that 
antecedent details of an event, when presented after a summary of how 
the outcome to the event came about, encouraged hindsight bias.
It might be inferred, therefore, that possession of outcome 
knowledge leads people to perceive certain antecedent details 
(specifically, those indicating the outcome) as more salient than others. 
The results suggest that assimilation of this material is guided by 
possession of outcome knowledge also. This together with the research, 
discussed in Chapter 2, that people operate using a confirmatory 
hypothesis-testing strategy would suggest that information indicating 
the outcome which occurred is paid the most attention and hence more
readily assimilated into memory.
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Subsequent retrieval of information for the purposes of making 
judgements consists almost exclusively of information indicating the 
outcome, with the consequence that that outcome is seen as more likley 
in hindsight than foresight.
By contrast, people in foresight will not be subject to biased 
information assimilation and recall of that information simply because 
they do not know what has happened. Subsequent recall of information 
should be more representative of the degree of uncertainty at the time 
of the original discussion.
Results from Experiment 5 concerning the effect of different types 
of information have provided some inportant and interesting findings 
concerning the effect of order of information. The theoretical 
discussion offered above suggests a number of important lines of enquiry 
for future research. More general discussion will be given to these 
theoretical aspects when we come to consider all the experiments reported 
in this thesis in the next section.
Experiment 4 investigated witness and testimony order with respect 
to jurors' judgements of guilt or innocence in a rape trial case. '
As will be recalled, no order effects were found. An extended discussion 
attempting to account for these lack of findings was given in Chapter 8 
and will not be repeated here. On the basis of that discussion we might 
tentatively conclude that order of information is not a major variable 
in psycho-legal contexts where trials last, typically, hours or days 
and order is manipulated within the restraints of the traditional 
structure of a criminal trial.
To summarise, the various manipulations of information order in 
the experiments reported in PART II of this thesis have provided mixed 
evidence as to the importance of such a variable. Overall, only two of
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the five experiments demonstrate consistent order effects. One 
indicating recency and the other showing how different types of 
information affect judgements. With respect to hindsight bias order 
of information would seem to be an important variable when information
is presented sequentially and when different types of information are
under consideration.
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CHAPTER 14
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
14.1 INTRODUCTION
The final chapter of this thesis provides a theoretical discussion 
of the cognitive processes, centred around Tversky and Kahneman's 
(1974) heuristics of thinking, that may explain hindsight bias. The 
chapter and thesis concludes by making suggestions for future research 
on hindsight judgements specifically, and that premised on a model 
of man as an intuitive psychologist generally.
14.2 Hindsight Bias and Cognitive Processes
This section discusses some theoretical implications of the 
findings from the experiments concerned with foresight/hindsight 
judgements. Some explanation is offered as to how hindsight bias 
arises by recourse to the heuristics of thinking and cognitive strategies 
people use which were discussed in Chapter 2. At the same time some 
aspects of memory, such as assimilation and accessibility of information 
are also discussed.
In Chapter 2 it was indicated that hindsight bias may come about 
as a result of the inappropriate use of certain cognitive processes or
305
heuristics of thinking. The experiments reported in Part II of this 
thesis provide some answer to the question of under what experimental 
condition heuristics produce biased judgements.
Most previous research by Tversky and Kahneman, Fischhoff and 
others has been concerned with establishing the existence of heuristics 
and biases. The research reported in this thesis has gone beyond this 
and allows us to give more precise answers about when use of certain 
heuristics will lead to bias.
The three heuristics of thinking (availability, representativeness 
and anchoring and adjustment) proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
can all be seen to play a role in producing hindsight bias. Availability 
and representativeness, described in Chapter 2, are most appropriate 
to explain hindsight bias where it is demonstrated by subjects giving 
likelihood assessments. Anchoring and adjustment provides an explanation 
of hindsight bias when subjects make estimates, as in Experiment 8.
This will be discussed later.
The availability heuristic (the ease with which relevant 
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind when assessing the 
likelihood of an event) is, on the surface, the most likely candidate 
for explaining hindsight bias. However, some researchers (e.g.
Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Schneider, Hastorf and Ellsworth, 1979) appear 
to ignore the interdependence of availability and representativeness.
In what follows we shall (1) indicate how availability explains 
hindsight bias with reference to certain experimental findings reported 
in this thesis; (2) show how anchoring and adjustment explains hindsight 
bias in Experiment 8; (3) demonstrate how availability can also be used
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to explain why the bias might not appear in the first place under 
certain conditions; and (4) discuss the interdependence of availability 
and representativeness.
14.2.1 Availability and Hindsight Bias
The general reason for regarding the availability heuristic 
responsible for hindsight bias is that once an outcome to some social 
event is known it becomes more available in memory than other information 
surrounding the event. In effect it is a highly salient piece of 
information, which as will be shown later, highlights the role of 
representativeness. Outcomes which did not occur are not so available, 
at a later time. The net effect, then, is that the perceived likelihood 
of the outcome which occurred increases in hindsight.
Specific reasons for using availability to explain hindsight 
bias derive from consideration of some of the experimental conditions 
under which the bias was found to occur.
Consider, for example, the finding in Experiment 6 that women 
who received a positive result to a pregnancy test exhibited bias, 
whilst those who received a negative result did not.1" The reason for 
considering availability important here stems from the further finding 
that there was a trend showing positive/negative outcome to be related 
to whether contraception or no contraception (plus contraceptive 
failure) was used. One strategy women might have used in assessing how 
pregnancy could occur may depend on the construction of relevant 
scenarios or "scripts" (Abelson, 1976). The availability of such
* Incidentally, this pattern of results provides some evidence against 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic being responsible for hindsight 
bias here. Briefly, for such an heuristic to be operating we would 
expect to find a consistent effect of outcome knowledge on both 
positive and negative results. This heuristic can offer us no 
plausible explanation of why one group should show the bias and the 
other not, hence it may be regarded as not operating here.
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scenarios, the ease with which they can be brought to mind, will 
influence assessments. Hence women who did not use contraceptives or 
had contraceptive failure may realise that there is a higher chance of 
pregnancy than those who did use contraception simply because relevant 
scenarios indicating the outcome are relatively easy to imagine for 
this group.^
The negative group showed no bias because attendance at the 
clinic served to counteract the effect of outcome knowledge.
Availability also plays a role here, this is because it is reasonable 
to assume that this group constructed other scenarios which provided them 
with the suspicion of being pregnant.
Another example, this time from Experiment 5, further demonstrates 
the role of availability. In this experiment one of the findings was 
that antecedent details concerning the first four weeks of the 
Firemen's Strike were found to encourage hindsight bias. Outcome 
knowledge, as discussed earlier in this chapter, increases the salience 
of those antecedent events which indicate the outcome which happened 
would happen. Furthermore, as Fischhoff (1975a) has shown, such 
knowledge also determines which items of information in an event 
description are perceived as relevant to understanding why the outcome 
happened.
This, together with a "confirmatory bias" in information search 
and recall (Snyder, in Press), will have the net effect of making such 
information the most "available". This will result in a relative 
ease in constructing scenarios which indicate the outcome which 
happened, and a relative difficulty in imagining why and how other ' 
outcomes which did not happen could have happened.
In giving this explanation one would not want to ignore, of course, 
the plausible possibility that women whose test proved positive were 
aware of various psysiological cues that women whose test proved 
negative would have been unlikely to experience.
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Whilst this discussion rests upon differential "accessability" 
of information, it is reasonable to argue that outcome knowledge endows 
certain antecedent information with greater subjective accessibility 
because it is made more salient. The consequence being to make this 
information more "available" from memory.
Experiment 1 provides a final example of how availability accounts 
for hindsight bias. In this experiment it was found that the bias, if 
it was going to occur, occurred as the event description unfolded, 
it was not present immediately subjects had been given outcome 
knowledge before they read the event description.3 if we are saying 
that hindsight bias results from the ease with which scenarios indicating 
the outcome which occurred can be imagined or brought to mind, as we 
are with the availability heuristic, this pattern of findings is 
consistent with this view. This is because subjects can only construct 
such scenarios as relevant and appropriate information is revealed 
to them. This means that outcome knowledge causes people to seek 
explanations as to why that outcome happened and encourages them to 
imagine ways in which it came about. The availability of these types 
of scenarios will increase the subjective likelihood of that outcome 
with hindsight bias as the result. Again, the availability heuristic 
is intimately bound up with a confirmatory hypothesis testing bias.
If anchoring and adjustment were operating here we would expect 
people, on receipt of outcome knowledge before the event description, 
would be "anchored" to that outcome. This could mean that they 
see the outcome as 10O% likely and adjust this assessment downwards 
in the light of conflicting information which is subsequently revealed. 
With this strategy hindsight bias should be present immediately, as 
it was not it seems reasonable to assume that such a strategy is not 
used.
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The above discussion, by the same token, should also mean that 
hindsight bias should be present for outcomes which did not occur 
(i.e. those outcomes being seen as less likely in hindsight than 
foresight). As discussed in Section 2 of this Chapter, one of the 
most consistent findings of the experiments reported in this thesis was 
the absence of such an effect with such outcomes.
That there should be an effect here follows from the preceeding 
discussion because outcomes which did not occur should be more difficult 
to imagine happening as subjects should experience greater difficulty 
in constructing scenarios indicating their occurrence.4 The failure 
to find such bias here, and in Fischhoff's research, provides additional 
substance to the methodological/design account given in the previous 
section.
In summary, the availability heuristic provides a good account 
of hindsight bias when it is shown through subjective likelihood 
assessments. It accounts for both the impact of outcome knowledge 
on judgements and the way in which information is made accessible from 
memory when making those judgements. We now turn to look at how the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic explains hindsight bias when 
estimates are made.
In foresight the ease with which scenarios for each outcome can 
be imagined or constructed will only be influenced by the event 
description (plus any background knowledge the subject may have). 
In hindsight, by contrast, subjects will be influenced by outcome 
knowledge in addition to these factors.
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14,2.2 Anchoring and Adjustment and Hindsight Bias
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic - where people make 
estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to 
yield the final answer, is most appropriate to apply in situations 
where people make estimates rather than assessments.
Assessments are where people attempt to put some kind of formal 
figure on an internal state of knowledge about the world. This figure 
however, is not open to objective appraisal beyond consensus of 
opinion among a number of individuals. Estimates, by contrast, are 
where people put a formal figure on some property of the external 
world. This figure is open to objective appraisal.
Experiment 8 used factual material and, it will be recalled, 
provided the strongest evidence of all the experiments for hindsight 
bias. Providing hindsight subjects with knowledge of what the actual 
statistics were for the numbers of percentages of women in certain 
occupations/roles can be regarded as the anchor from which subjects 
adjust when making their own estimates. Indeed, with this task it 
is difficult to see what other kind of anchor, beyond the two limiting 
extremes, people could use. In foresight, of course, we would want 
to say, if anchoring and adjustment were operating, that one of these 
two extremes was used as the anchor from which adjustments were made 
to yield the final estimate.
Providing people with actual figures, which is difficult if not 
impossible to do with outcomes to social events, gives subjects such 
a natural starting point from which to base their estimates. The 
final estimates given by subjects, as shown by the results of Experiment 
8, indicates that people make insufficient adjustment when attempting 
to ignore the fact that they know what the actual figures are.
)
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Fischhoff (1975a), Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) both offered 
accounts of hindsight bias based on anchoring and adjustment. Neither 
of these experiments used material of a factual nature or asked subjects 
to make estimates. It is interesting to note that this early 
interpretation of the bias has been abandoned in subsequent research 
(e.g. Fischhoff, 1977) in favour of an interpretation using the 
availability heuristic.^ However, what is often ignored is the fact 
that this heuristic may be the appropriate one to use in certain 
conditions. It is to this that we now turn.
14.2.3 Availability and Hindsight = Foresight
The availability heuristic is appropriately used in some 
circumstances, as a consequence, does not lead to bias. Consider 
the results of Experiment 5, the British Firemen's Strike, where it 
was found that asking subjects to generate their own outcomes and 
assess the likelihood of each, rather than assess the likelihood 
of outcomes specified by the experimenter, led to little or no bias.
Such results indicate that the "generate" strategy allows subjects 
in hindsight to more accurately reconstruct a foresight state.
This implies that the availability of states of uncertainty e>q>erienced in 
foresight is greater when asked to express outcomes in their own words.
Fischhoff (1977) uses factual material to investigate hindsight bias, 
as described in Chapter 3. However, subjects in these experiments 
were asked to make likelihood assessments about their chances of 
being right or wrong about some question of fact. They were not 
asked to estimate what they thought some statistic was, had they 
not known it. Hence the interpretation of hindsight bias is more 
appropriately given by availability than anchoring and adjustment.
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This discussion, as with a previous one, relies upon their being 
a strong link between accessibility and availability. The assumption 
is plausible here for two reasons: (1) the generate strategy may entail 
subjects processing information, given to them at the time, more deeply 
than subjects in the "specify" treatment. As it has been shown that 
information processed in this way is remembered better on later 
occasions (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Craik and Tulving, 1975) it 
is reasonable to assume that judgements made upon more deeply processed 
information will be better remembered or reconstructed. In the context 
of the availability heuristic, we can see that because this information 
is more accessible the judgement or state of uncertainty that existed 
in foresight wi..l be more "available" because it is easier to reconstruct 
or imagine. (2) Tulving and Thompson (1973); Tulving and Watkins (1975) 
have shown that if an initial judgement is remembered it may serve as 
a cuing mechanism and facilitate the recall of information that had 
been instrumental in reaching the judgement. In terms of foresight/ 
hindsight judgements this means that the availability of related 
information which resulted in a particular state of uncertainty will 
be more accessible if the judgement is remembered without the particular 
reasons for reaching this position in the first place.
These two arguments are really two sides of the same coin, one 
is saying that states of uncertainty experienced in foresight are 
made more available by the "generate" strategy because such a strategy 
makes people process the information needed to make the judgement more 
deeply. On the other side of the coin, the states of uncertainty 
experienced in foresight are more accurately reconstructed if the 
original judgement is remembered because it makes the information upon 
which the judgement was made more available from memory.
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In summary, the use of a "generate" type strategy encourages 
the appropriate use of the availability heuristic and hence results 
in little or no hindsight bias. This is because the strategy allows 
hindsight subjects to more accurately reconstruct states of uncertainty 
experienced in foresight.
The above discussion is specific to cases where subjects give 
both foresight and hindsight judgements. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that the first argument could apply just as well to cases 
where subjects are asked, in hindsight, to assess what they thought 
the likelihood of the outcomes were had they not known what had 
happened. This, of course, provided they are asked to generate their 
own outcomes.
We would predict, then, that subjects provided with an event 
description, told how it turned out, and asked to produce a number 
of possible outcomes (in their own words), including the one that 
happened, would show much less or no hindsight bias when compared 
with subjects who were provided with outcomes.
14.2.4 Interdependence of Availability and Representativeness
Much of the preceeding discussion has been concerned to demonstrate 
how the availability heuristic may be used to explain how outcome 
knowledge biases perception or not depending on conditions. One 
important aspect ignored so far is how the representativeness heuristic 
(.the degree to which the outcome is similar to, or representative 
of, the features characteristic of the outcome) may play a role in 
determining the availability of instances or scenarios used when 
assessing likelihoods.
The ease with which instances or scenarios are available from
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memory may, as Nisbett and Wilson (1978) point out, result 
from them being viewed as the most representative aspects of the 
event. This may be especially true when we consider outcome knowledge 
itself. Outcome knowledge, apart from being an important piece of 
information about an event, may also be regarded as the most 
representative piece of information about than event, if for no 
other reason that it being the outcome which happened. If this is 
true, then it is not hard to see that when trying to assess likelihoods 
the most easily imagined (available) scenarios which can be brought 
to mind will be those indicating the outcome.
This, in conjunction with Carroll's (1978) finding that 
people asked to imagine an event turning out in a certain way see 
that outcome as more likely than those not engaged on such a task 
and the confirmatory hypothesis - testing strategy that people appear 
to use (Snyder, in Press) provide a further explanation of hindsight 
bias.
In summary, not only may outcome knowledge influence what 
antecedent information is regarded as most representative of the 
event, but the outcome which occurred may itself be seen as the most 
representative piece of information. Both factors, due to representa­
tiveness, have important influences over the availability heuristic.
The most available scenarios etc., being those which indicate the 
outcome which occurred, with the result that it is seen as more 
likely in hindsight than foresight.
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14.2.5 General Considerations
Before considering implications for future research and decision­
making, some general aspects of creeping determinism, hindsight bias, 
heuristics of thinking and the cognitive processes discussed in this 
thesis will be considered.
The creeping determinism/hindsight bias distinction, discussed 
and operationally defined in Chapter 2, is one which probably does not 
apply to historical or social events. In saying this, one is claiming 
that evidence of creeping determinism in such situations would, most 
of the time, be construed as hindsight bias. Justification for this 
comes from considering the cognitive task of someone provided with, or 
in possession of, outcome knowledge of an event and some information 
relating to the event before the outcome was known. Asking a person, 
with such knowledge, to assess the likelihood of that and alternative 
outcomes without specific instructions to ignore outcome knowledge 
may well cause the following sequence of thoughts: "what I am being 
asked to do is to judge the likelihood of the outcome which happened 
together with those that didn't. How can I best do this? I know 
what happened but it was not inevitable, or not 100% likely. However, 
knowing what happened may make it appear that way, so I shall ignore 
or try to ignore this, and try to make my likelihood assessments 
reflect only the information available before events turned out in 
such a way". Whilst this is highly stylised it does not seem to be 
^Unreasonable speculation. It is backed up to a certain extent from 
introspective reports of subjects who were questioned by the author in 
the various creeping determinism experiments reported in this thesis.
The credibility of this together with the authors beliefs that 
the distinction between creeping determinism and hindsight bias is
1
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no more than a technical one, except in special circumstances, means 
that any evidence of hindsight likelihood assessments for outcomes 
which occurred being greater than corresponding foresight assessments 
can be regarded as evidence of biased judgements. Such considerations 
presuppose the existence of such evidence, it is to this that we now 
turn.
The experiments reported in this thesis offer mixed support for 
hindsight judgements being biased. In view of this some discussion 
of the generality and strength of the bias is appropriate.
Generally, results from all the experiments investigating the effect 
of outcome knowledge on likelihood assessments are in the predicted 
direction (with only a few notable exceptions). Viewed from this 
perspective one might want to claim that hindsight bias is a general 
phenomenon. However, the effect does not appear to be a strong one.
This latter point is the crucial one.
Time and again the results from the seven experiments fall into 
this kind of pattern. That is, results in the predicted direction 
but not, on the whole, significantly so. One might want to claim 
that the experiments did not take a large enough sample to warrant 
such a conclusion. Two answers can be offered here, firstly, large 
sample sizes, as Ofced by Fischhoff and his colleagues, may produce 
significant results but only because smaller effects are found to be 
significant when sample size is increased (this point is dealt with 
at some length in Appendix 13). We are not only interested in 
significant results but also the size of the effect. Secondly, whilst 
smaller sample sizes reduce the power of a statistical test the consistency 
of the findings from the seven experiments reported in this thesis 
is enough to infer the effect to be a weak one.
I
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Generally, then, one would conclude that hindsight bias is something 
that people are susceptible to but not to a great extent. The 
question then arises as to how important an influence on judgements 
and decision-making it is. On the whole it could be said that decision­
making and prediction will not be overly influenced but knowledge of 
what went before in similar instances. However, it is reasonable 
to speculate that in special circumstances it may have an undesirably 
strong influence. In crisis decision-making in international politics 
for example.
In crisis decision-making the decision makers operate under a 
number of powerful constraints, perhaps the most important being time.
A short time in which to make a crucial decision, means that a large 
amount of information has to be processed and assimilated. One 
simplication strategy which, according to May (1973) is extensively 
cued is to fit some past event to the present situation. Use of 
such analogies, which tend to oversimplify past and result in over­
simplification of present events, may be where hindsight bias does 
play an important role. An undesirable outcome to the past event, 
which they generally are, may be seen as more inevitable than it 
was at the time. This results in the approach to the current crisis 
being perceived incorrectly with a strong possibility that the policy 
adopted here will be inappropriate.
Whilst hindsight bias may play an important role in such situations 
it is only because certain cognitive processes and/or heuristics of 
thinking are being misapplied also. Whilst, the interaction of 
hindsight bias and cognitive processes will not be considered further 
here, as some discussion is given in Chapter 2, this section will 
conclude by considering and speculating upon the generality and 
importance of the cognitive processes, particularly the heuristics of
Three issues deserve attention here: (1) how general is the 
application of a model of man as an intuitive scientist?; (2) how are 
the cognitive processes, heuristics of thinking to be regarded - are 
they conscious or unconscious processes?; (3) what relationship and 
interplay might we expect in the future between cognitive and social 
psychology? These issues will be treated in this order.
Firstly, the model of man as an intuitive scientist, using various 
heuristics, etc., to make judgements and decisions, to interpret and 
manage the information in the environment applies to everybody. One 
is not characterising the layman with operating with such processes 
and psychologists, scientists, etc., with other more rational or 
appropriate processes. Thus, for example, one can see evidence of 
the intuitive scientist in the professional scientist's activities.
The work of Kuhn (1962); Lakatos (1970) and Feyerabend (1975) can be 
viewed in this way. Feyerabend in particular with his emphasis upon 
the importance of historical reconstruction could be analysed from 
a cognitive social psychological perspective. In a different way many 
of the criticisms of Freud's research procedures and his case summary 
method could also be reconceptualised using research from social 
cognition. Lastly, psychologists themselves are not to be regarded 
as immune.
Secondly, the heuristics of thinking and other cognitive processes, 
as Nisbett and Ross (1980), Nisbett and Wilson (1977) point out, are 
something we are not aware of using, and ones which most people would 
not admit to using. What status do such processes have then - are they 
unconscious, pre-conscious, non-conscious or what? Such issues have 
not been addressed by researchers to date and it is difficult to see
thinking, detailed in Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter.
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what kind of light could be thrown upon these cognitive processes by 
such a discussion. The best that can be said at present is that 
empirical evidence leads us to infer that people operate with such 
strategies but only because of the weight and breadth of the evidence.
It is plausible that another model of man would be able to reconceptualise 
the findings. Such a development would be akin to a Kulvhi.an paradigm 
shift i.e. there would be no logical grounds for researchers in the old 
paradigm to accept the new one. Still this seems to be the way 
science progresses.
Thirdly, and lastly, the most exciting aspect of this work, as a 
psychologist, is the development of strong links between cognitive 
and social psychology. Such an interaction between the two areas is 
beneficial to both. For cognitive psychology an extended quote from 
Neisser (1976)^ demonstrates this clearly. He says:-
"The study of information processing has momentum and prestige, 
but it has not yet committed itself to any conception of 
human nature that could apply beyond the confines of the 
laboratory. And within that laboratory, its basic 
assumptions go further than the computer model to which 
it owes its existence. There is still no account of how 
people act in or interact with the ordinary world. Indeed, 
the assumptions that underlie most contemporary work on 
information processing are surprisingly like those of 
nineteenth-century introspective psychology, though without 
introspection itself.
1 U. Neisser (1976) Cognition and Reality, San Francisco:
Freeman and Co.
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If cognitive psychology commits itself too thoroughly 
to this model, there may be trouble ahead. Lacking in 
ecological validity, indifferent to culture, even missing 
some of the main features of perception and memory as 
they occur in ordinary life, such a psychology could 
become a narrow and uninteresting specialised field".
(pp. 6-7).
A strong partnership between cognitive and social psychology would 
prevent cognitive psychology ending up in obscurity. Social psychology 
can offer relevance and, perhaps more importantly, behavioural 
consequences of cognitive psychology. Social psychology can also 
provide ecological validity by being a regulatory force.
How does social psychology benefit from cognitive psychology? 
Primarily it offers a depth of analysis and understanding which, until 
recently has been lacking in social psychologists. Social psychologists 
are now in a position to offer cognitive explanations, as well as 
environmental, affective, etc., for social behaviour.
Finally, this relationship between cognitive and social psychology, 
because it is a new one, has much more to achieve them that stated 
above. Many traditional areas of social psychology could benefit 
from research by cognitive psychologists with their specialised 
techniques. For example, the notion of cognitive consistency is an 
important and persuasive one in social psychology, yet it seems strange 
that such a cognitive principle has not received substantial attention 
and investigation by cognitive psychologists.
In conclusion, a more productive psychology of social cognition 
can be produced by cognitive psychologists receiving inputs from social 
psychology and social psychology receiving inputs from cognitive 
psychology. A closer liaison between the two disciplines will, I 
believe, result in a more worthwhile and exciting discipline of psychology.
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14.2.6 Summary
It has been argued here that hindsight bias, when it occurs, 
may be best explained by the inappropriate use of the availability 
heuristic in conjunction with the representativeness heuristic.
This is so when subjects are asked to make likelihood assessments.
In cases where subjects show hindsight bias when estimating actual 
figures anchoring and adjustment provides the most plausible explanation.
The availability heuristic was also shown to be appropriately 
used under certain conditions with the result that little or no 
hindsight bias is detected.
The experiments reported in this thesis, then, have not only 
provided information concerning the conditions under which hindsight 
bias is or is not likely to appear, but have also provided some 
indication of under what experimental conditions heuristics of thinking 
produce biased judgements and the conditions under which it might be 
appropriate to use these heuristics.
14.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
One area which has not been empirically investigated in this 
thesis, but has been hinted at in several of the experimental reports, 
is to do with the way in which information search may be guided 
by outcome knowledge.
If, as has been shown, hindsight bias is affected by the type 
and order of information we would expect that a person who knows 
how an event turned out, but does not have sufficient knowledge about 
the event to assess how likely it was, would show distinct patterns
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of information search. We might hypothesise that information 
indicating the outcome which occurred, and not that indicating other 
outcomes, will be more actively searched for. Two reasons would argue 
for this; (1) Fischhoff's (1975a) findings that subjects perceive 
the most relevant information to be that confirming the outcome which 
occurred. (2) A confirmatory hypothesis-testing strategy which people 
use, already discussed in this chapter.
The way in which people search for information when making 
some judgement about the past or, perhaps more importantly, when 
attempting to predict future events based on one's knowledge of the 
past is of obvious practical importance for decision-making at all 
levels in society. Furthermore, in view of the overwhelming amount 
of information easily available to us (and potentially more easily 
available because of the microprocessor revolution) it will become 
essential to discover heuristic strategies used in search and the 
potential bias they may be subject to. With this knowledge, 
psychologists may be able to offer prescriptions as to ways in which 
information may be searched for which more correctly characterises 
and simplifies the world.
!
Not only may decisions, judgements and perceptions be influenced 
by outcome knowledge and the search for information but they may 
also be affected by the order in which information is searched for.
The experiments reported in this thesis offer only mixed support 
for order of information affecting judgements (both in relation to 
outcome knowledge and on their own) future research might build upon 
these findings. For example, the order in which different types of
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information, such as those in Experiment 5, are searched for may be 
an important factor. We might, speculatively, say that searching 
for information surrounding the outcome first and for early events 
second may bias judgements more than if the other way around.
Finally, further research is needed into the conditions under 
which hindsight bias appears and does not appear, especially in 
"applied" situations. For example, does the amount of information 
describing a scenario affect hindsight bias? The experiments reported 
here presented only short (about 150 word) summaries to subjects.
Whilst this may adequately simulate some judgements made in "real- 
life", there are obviously many important instances in which judgements 
are based on much larger amounts of information. Before we could 
generalise the findings reported here to such conditions further 
research into this is required.
14.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to offer prescriptions 
we might conclude by briefly considering some practical implications 
of the research reported here.
Decision makers who use historical knowledge in predicting 
the future or people who attempt to understand the past need, 
generally, to guard against hindsight bias. On the basis of the 
empirical findings reported here we might suggest that such people 
try to see and explain how events could have turned out in ways 
other than they did. Also, we would suggest that strategies which 
encourage a deeper level of information-processing should be encouraged.
?
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Furthermore, if people are in possession of information surrounding 
an event and outcome knowledge, but have not had occasion to read 
either, they should be encouraged to read the antecedent details 
first, formulate their own predictions and likelihood assessments, 
perhaps writing them down, before reading what the outcome was. By 
this argument, experimental reports in psychology, or elsewhere 
for that matter, should have the abstract last and not first.
On a different note, where commitment or desire to see certain 
outcomes happen is high people may be subject to a bias as severe 
to that of hindsight. In such situations people should make every 
effort to become aware of their own biases and reach beyond what 
they would personally like to see happen.
14.5 FINAL NOTE
Finally, and to conclude on a general note, much of the future 
research in cognitive social psychology, as characterised in Chapter 
2, will be devoting its attention, like this thesis, to establishing 
conditions under which biases and errors occur together with when it 
is appropriate to use certain heuristics of thinking and when it is 
not.
Such research, because of its potential value to decision makers, 
should not only be reported for consumption by psychologists but 
should be made relevant to people for whom it has practical significance.
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APPENDIX 5A - STATEMENTS FROM THIBAUT & WALKER (1975) USED IN JURY 
CASE (A) AND (B) IN EXPERIMENT 1
FACTS
-------- r
SCALE i 
VALUE
Adams (the defendant) and Zemp had been close 
friends for years. Recently, they 
began to gamble heavily, and, as 
matters became involved, met at a 
tavern to discuss their relationship.
NA1
i After a period of conversation Zemp knocked 
Adams to the floor and threw an object 
in his direction.
NA
Adams responded by stabbing Zemp in the 
stomach with a piece of glass.
NA
1 The law provides that it is unlawful to use 
more force in repelling an attack than 
a person believes necessary.
NA
At the start of the meeting Adams told Zemp 
they should end their relationship 
before serious trouble developed between 
them.
9.002
A waiter heard the defendant fall to the floor 
and scream "I ought to kill you for 
that".
3.75
j
The defendant ran out of the back door after 
the stabbing. 1.75 •
The defendant (Adams) is 6 foot tall and
weighs 15 stones; Zemp is 5 foot 8 inches 
tall and weighs 12 stones.
4.50
j
1t Adams was not injured when he was knocked to 
the floor.
3.50
i
Zemp liked to drink heavily and often became 
violent when drunk.
10 .5 0
Adams drank only one beer on the night of the 
stabbing.
L4.523
Before he met Zemp at the tavern the
defendant told a friend he hoped that 
he could settle his dispute with Zemp 
amiably.
1 1 .5 0
Statements with NA as scale value indicate those that formed part of 
the "test case summary", for which Thibaut & Walker di d not determine 
scale values.
2 Larger values indicate greater degrees of lawfulness, lower values 
greater degree unlawful.
Value obtained from different scaling procedure by Thibaut & Walker. 
Letter "L" indicates Lawful classification. Larger number greater 
degree of lawfulness.
3
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APPENDIX 5A (coni.)
FACTS SCALEVALUE
One of the waiters told the police he 4.50
wouldn't mind if Adams never came
to the tavern again because he
sometimes bullied other customers.
Zemp told one of the waiters at the tavern 11.00
he planned to settle his differences
with the defendant once and for all.
I
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APPENDIX 6A - FISCHHOFF * S (1975) INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS IN EXPERIMENT 1 
(which investigates creeping determinism)
The instructions were as follows:
"In this questionnaire we are interested in knowing 
how people judge the likelihood of possible outcomes 
of social events. A passage describing an unfamiliar 
historical event appears below. We will ask you to 
evaluate the probability of occurrence of each of 
the four possible outcomes of the event in the light 
of the information appearing in the passage." (p.289)
Following the passage subjects were asked:
"In the light of the information appearing in the 
passage, what was the probability of occurence of 
each of the four possible outcomes listed below?
(The probabilities should sum to 100%)" (p.2 8 9)
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APPENDIX 6B - SUMMARY OF MANN WHITNEY U VALUES AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
FOR FORESIGHT/HINDSIGHT COMPARISONS
SCENARIO AND
” 11
OUTCOME NUMBER COMPARISON U|
SIGNIFICANCE
MRS.DEWAR IN 1 F - H(B) 31.5 NSTHERAPY 1 F - H(A) 44.5 NS2 F - H(B) 47 NS
2 F - H(A) 42.5 NS
3 F - H(B) 30.5 NS
3 F - H(A) 32.5 NS
4 F - H(B) 50 NS4
l F - H(A) 39 NS
THE BRITISH - 1 F - H(B) 47 NSGURKHA STRUGGLE 1 F - H(A) 19.5 PL0.0252 F - H(B) 36.5 NS2 F - H(A) 28.5 PLO.l
3 F - H(B) 38 NS
3 F - H(A) 30.5 NS
1 4 F - H(B) 49.5 NS4 F - H(A) 40 NS
JURY CASE A 1 F - H(B) 48 NS
1 F - H(A) 40.5 NS2 F - H(B) 47.5 NS2 F - H(A) 32.5 NS
3 F - H(B) 36.5 NS
3 F - H(A) 32.5 NS
4 F - H(B) 27 PL0.05
4 F - H(A) 43.5 NS
JURY CASE B 1 F - H(B) 48.5 NS
1 F - H(A) 39 NS
2 F - H(B) 27 PLO.0 5
2 F - H(A) 37.5 NS
3 F - H(B) 29 PLO.l
3 F - H(A) 40.5 NS
4 F - H(B) 40.5 NS
4 F - H(A) 44.5
i
NS
F = foresight; H(A) = hindsight after; H(B) = hindsight before
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APPENDIX 7 A - QUESTIONNAIRE FOR "MRS.S" IN FORESIGHT ORDER 1
QUESTIONNAIRE
Sex ............
(l) In the light of what you have just read would you indicate how
probable you think each of the four following outcomes are within 
the 5 year period following Mrs. S.’s third suicide attempt.
Please give your probability estimates in percentages and ensure 
that the four scores add up to 100%.
Outcome Probability of Occurrence
1. Successful suicide attempt.
2. Further suicide attempt regarded 
as being highly dangerous to life 
and of serious intent on her part.
3. Further suicide attempt regarded 
as not being dangerous to life 
or of serious intent on her part.
4. No further suicide attempt.
- - - ---------->
(2) Again in the light of what you have read would you please indicate for 
each outcome how surprised you would be if it occurred. Would you do 
this on the 7~P°int scale provided.
1. Successful suicide attempt. 7 6
1 1
5
f
4
!
3
1
2 1 
1 1
Surprised
1
Not
Surprised
2. Further suicide attempt regarded as 
being highly dangerous to life and of
serious intent on her part. _ -7 6
1 1
5
1
4
1
3
1
2 1
1 1
Surpri sed Not
Surprised
3. Farther suicide attempt regarded as 
not being dangerous to life or of 
serious intent on her part. ^ ^
1 1
5
1
4
1
3
l
2 1 
1 1
Surprised Not
Surprised
4. No further suicide attempt. _7 6 
I I .
5
l
4
i
3
i
2 1 
1 I
Surprised Not
Surprised
APPENDIX 7A (cont.)
Questionnaire continued
(3) Would you please indicate how confident you 
feel about the judgements you have just made 
concerning Mrs.S.
Confident
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APPENDIX 7B - QUESTIONNAIRE FOR "MRS.S" IN HINDSIGHT ORDER 1
QUESTIONNAIRE
Sex
(1) In the light of what you have just read would you 
think each of the four outcomes listed below were 
following Mrs.S.’s third suicide attempt. Please 
estimates in terms of percentages and ensure that 
up to 100%.
indicate how likely you 
in the 5 year period
give your probability 
the four scores add
Outcome Probability of Occurrence
1. Successful suicide attempt*
2. Further suicide attempt which was regarded 
as being highly dangerous to life and of 
serious intent on her part.
3. Further suicide attempt which was regarded 
as not being dangerous to life or of 
serious intent on her part.
4. No further suicide attempt.
♦This is the outcome which actually happened.
(2) Again in the light of what you have just read would you please indicate 
for each outcome how surprised you would have been had it occurred. 
Would you do this on the 7-point scale provided.
1.
2.
3.
Successful suicide attempt. 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
J____ 1____ 1____ I I I_____L
Surprised Not
, Surprised
Further suicide attempt which was regarded as 
being highly dangerous to life and of serious
intent on her part. 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
1---- 1____ I____ t____ I____ I____ L
Surprised
Further suicide attempt which was regarded as 
not being dangerous to life or of serious 
intent on her part.
L
Not
Surprised
6
Surprised
5
L
Not
Surprised
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APPENDIX 7D (cont.)
Questionnaire continued
4. No further suicide attempt. 7 6
j____L
Surprised
5 4 3 2 1
J____I____ I_____1____ L
Not
Surprised
(3) Would you please indicate how confident you feel about the judgements 
you have made concerning Mrs.S.
7 6 5 4 3 2  1J--------- 1-----------1_________ I_________ I_________ 1_________ L
Confident Not
Confident
j
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APPENDIX 7C - FORESIGHT ORDER 1 FOR MRS.S SCENARIO
MRS. S.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
Mrs. S. loved her three children and appeared to get a sense of 
fulfillment from them. A short while after her husband's death 
Mrs. S. returned to work as a secretary and seemed to enjoy going back to 
work. Mrs. S. was a likeable person who always appeared to be cheerful 
and had a free and easy attitude to life. She had left home at the age 
of 21 and took a job as a secretary at which she was quite competent and 
which she seemed to find enjoyable. At 29 Mrs. S. was married, she gave 
up her secretarial work to have a family. In a period of 7 years, from 
30 to 37» Mrs. S. had three children - two girls and a boy. Mrs. S. had 
had a fairly happy childhood and did not want for any material things. 
Insurances had left her well provided for materially and financially 
after her husband's death. Mrs. S. had no previous psychiatric history 
of mental illness apart from that associated with her second suicide 
attempt. Mrs. S. was not altogether happy with her life as a housewife, 
it often made her tense and depressed. At the age of 20 she had made her 
first suicide attempt by trying to poison herself with her mother's 
sedatives - this was classified as a dangerous threat to life but not of 
serious intent on her part. Mrs. S. was born in 1930 and came from a 
family in which her father had committed suicide and her mother often 
threatened it. After her first suicide attempt Mrs. S. was restless 
and discontented perhaps because she did not have a steady boyfriend.
When she was 40 her husband died of a heart attack which made her 
depressed and discontented. A year after her husband's death she made 
a third suicide attempt by taking a small overdose of aspirins - this 
was seen as relatively harmless to life and not of serious intent on her 
part. At 27 Mrs. S. had made a second suicide attempt by poisoning - 
this was seen as dangerous to life and of serious intent on her part - 
she was admitted to a mental hospital for two months.
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APPENDIX 7P - JUDGES« SCALES FOR MRS,S. AND ADAMS AND ZEMP SCENARIOS
SCALES
(i) MRS„S.
1 2 3 4 5 6
weakly 
indicate 
no further 
suicide 
attempt
1 2
weakly 
indicate a 
further 
suicide 
attempt
3 4 5 6
(ii) ADAMS AND ZEMP
1 2 3 4 5 6
lowest 
degree of 
guilt
1 2 3 4 5 6
lowest 
degree of 
innocence
7 8 9
strongly 
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APPENDIX 8a - QUESTIONNAIRE GIVEN TO "JURORS"
QUESTIONNAIRE
Now that you have read the case, I would like you to reach a verdict on 
each of the four charges. Would you please fill in the following 
questionnaire indicating your verdicts and the degree of confidence you 
feel in each one.
(l) Would you find Harrison guilty or not guilty on the charge of 
rape? Please indicate by putting either G (guilty) or 
NG (not guilty) in the box below. ------
Harrison on the charge of rape
Having done this would you please indicate how confident you are 
about your verdict. Please indicate on the following seven 
point scale
Not
confident Very
at all confident!----1___ I____I____I____I I I
O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(2) Would you find Harrison guilty or not guilty on the charge of 
attempted rape? Please indicate by putting either G (guilty) 
or NG (not guilty) in the box below. _____
Harrison on the charge of attempted rape
Having done this would you please indicate how confident you are 
about your verdict. Please indicate on the following seven 
point scale
Not
confident Very
at all confident j
J----1____I____L___I____I____I____L
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(3) Would you find Bryce guilty or not guilty on the charge of rape? 
Please indicate by putting either G (guilty) or NG (not guilty) 
in the box below s- ______
Bryce on the charge of rape
Having done this would you please indicate how confident you are 
about your verdict. Please indicate on the following seven 
point scale
Not
confident Very
at all confident
J____ I____I____ I____ I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Questionnaire continued
(4) Would you find Bryce guilty or not guilty on the charge of 
attempted rape? Would you please indicate by putting
either G (guilty) or NG (not guilty) in the box below
Bryce on the charge of attempted rape
Having done this would you please indicate how confident you are 
about your verdict. Please indicate on the following seven 
point scale :
Not
confident Very
at all confident
J____ I____ I_____I_____I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5  6 7
i
APPENDIX 8B - TRIAL CASE AS READ BY SCALING JUDGES
( 1 )
RAPE TRIAL
PROSECUTION * S CASE
James William Harrison and John Michael Bryce are charged with the rape 
of Mary Watkins on November 5th at Boothville, Liverpool. Each pleads not 
guilty.
Prosecution says that Harrison and Bryce are charged with raping l6 
year old Mary Watkins of Boothville. He tells them that she and her friend 
Joyce Blunden attended the bonfire on allotments near Mary Watkins' home 
and after talking to a group of friends they set off for home. Harrison 
approached them as they were talking down Vale Street, he frightened them 
and they ran back to their friends. Fifteen minutes later they set off 
again and this time they were chased by Harrison through inlets between 
the houses where Mary Watkins was grabbed by Harrison and taken into an 
entry behind the houses. It is the Crown's case that Harrison held Mary 
Watkins against her will and forced her to have intercourse against her 
will, and that Bryce came up and also forced her to have intercourse with 
him. You will hear (a) what the girl went through (b) Mr. George Smith, 
a householder, who overheard what was taking place, that they would not 
let Mary Watkins go when she wanted to (c) Mrs. Godfrey, who met Mary 
Watkins on her way home afterwards (d) Joyce Blunden who was with her atI
the bonfire (e) Mary Watkins mother. Prosecution asserts that all this 
evidence suggests that Mary Watkins did not consent to these men inter­
fering with her sexually and that she was thoroughly upset, flushed and 
crying. After hearing the evidence you will come to hold the view that 
both defendents did (or at least attempted to) have sexual intercourse 
without her consent.
MARY WATKINS' EVIDENCE
Prosecutor obtains statements of the events from Mary Watkins to the 
effect that on Tuesday November 5th at about 10 PM she and Joyce Blunden 
were talking with some boys at the Vale Street bonfires when Harrison and 
Bryce passed them. Mary Watkins states eventually she and Joyce Blunden 
left the bonfire, intending to go home, and that, when they had walked a
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little way down Vale St., before reaching Victoria Rd., Harrison ran 
towards them and they ran back to the boys, but Harrison had grabbed 
and held Mary Watkins for a while. After 10 minutes she and Joyce 
Blunden set off for home again, in the same direction. Mary Watkins 
says that when Harrison chased them they ran down a passage between 
houses and that half way down she ran into Bryce who got hold of her 
by the arm and that Harrison then got hold of her left wrist. She 
next states that Harrison dragged her over waste ground into an entry 
where he pushed her up against a wall, undid the zip of her slacks, 
pulled them down, pulled down her knickers and put his hand round her 
waist. She says that she was not willing for Harrison to do this and 
that she tried to stop him but that he hit her, banging her head against 
the wall and punching her on the arm. She states that he tried to have 
intercourse with her and that he succeeded. She said "when he dragged 
me into the entry, he pulled down my pants, brought out his person, 
forced my legs open, he put his person in between my legs and I managed 
to break away from him."
Further questioning elicits statements from Mary Watkins to the 
effect that Bryce twice came into the entry to ask Harrison if he had 
finished. The first time Harrison is alleged to have said no, and tried 
again to have sexual intercourse, the second time Bryce returned and this 
time Harrison said he had finished.
1
Mary Watkins states that the two whispered, leaving her still unclothed 
and Bryce then thrust her against the wall and brought out his person, 
moving it around and asking her to touch it, which she refused. Next 
she alleges that Bryce tried to put one finga-then two inside her, 
causing her to scream and that he threatened to do what his mate had to 
her if she screamed. He then put his person in between her legs which 
hurt her. She says that Bryce said "It will hurt" and that he kept on 
telling her to press and then pulled his person out of her. The prose­
cution establishes that Mary Watkins is saying that Bryce actually got 
inside her. Mary Watkins then states that Bryce said "you can go now, 
but don’t tell anyone or I'll get you again". She then pulled up her 
clothing and then ran out into Victoria Rd.
APPENDIX 8B (cont.)
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The prosecutor then requires Mary Watkins to state that being in 
the entry with the two men and what went on was without her consent.
On further questioning Mary Watkins states that she met Mrs. 
Godfrey in Vale St. and that she was crying, her nose was bleeding, 
her wrist bruised and her arm red. She says that Mrs. Godfrey took 
her to Mrs. Blunden’s house. Joyce Blunden then asked Mary Watkins 
what had happened to her and was told that she had been stripped by 
the two lads. In reply to Joyce Blunden's question "did they do any­
thing to you" Mary Watkins said "Yes".
1. Defence establishes that Harrison was kissing Mary Watkins before 
the alleged intercourse attempt.
2. Mary Watkins tells the defence lawyer that she knew the meaning of 
intercourse before November 5th.
3« On further cross questioning Mary Watkins states that Harrison was 
kissing her for at least three minutes, and that this occurred 
before Harrison unfastened her trousers.
}
4. Defence establishes that at the magistrates court Mary Watkins had 
said that her trousers had fallen down and that now she asserts that 
they were pulled down. She said she had got mixed up earlier and had 
meant to say that they were pulled down.
5. She also failed to tell the magistrates court that Harrison had been 
kissing her.
6. She didn't reply when asked why she had not told the court that she 
had been kissed by Harrison.
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7» Also, when giving evidence in the magistrates court she had told 
Joyce Blunden that two men had stripped her and that she was in­
dicating that both men had removed her clothes. Today she said 
that Harrison only had stripped her. She said that she had got 
mixed up earlier.
8 . Mary Watkins had said that Harrison had made her nose bleed, 
however when talking to Det.Con. Foster at the police station she 
had said that Bryce had done it. She was sure now that it was 
Harrison.
9. She admitted that she wasn’t savagely attacked, but had been hit 
on the face and banged against the wall.
10. When giving evidence at the magistrates court she had said "when 
the bolt rattled Bryce was present". However, today she said that 
only Harrison was present when the bolt rattled.
11. Defence suggests that she went willingly into the entry with 
Harrison, that there was affection between them and that she let 
him undo her trousers. Mary Watkins denies it.
12. Defence then suggests that Bryce allowed her to go as soon as he 
arrived. She denies this also.
JOYCE BLUNDEN»S EVIDENCE
13. In reply to prosecution's questions Joyce Blunden states that at 
about 10 pm on November 5th she and Mary Watkins were talking to
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some boys at the comer of Victoria Rd. and Vale St. when the 
accused men passed by. She further states that they left the 
group to go home and were chased by Harrison who caught Mary 
Watkins and let her go. Both of them returned to the boys.
14. She then states that after a quarter of an hour they started for 
home again. The two men approached them and Bryce chased her, 
she ran home without seeing what happened to Mary Watkins.
15. The prosecutor questions Joyce Blunden about later that night and 
she says Mary Watkins arrived at her home with Mrs. Godfrey, that 
Mary Watkins was crying and her nose was bleeding.
16. In trying to elicit what was said between the two girls the prose­
cutor was told that Mary Watkins said she had been raped. The 
judge establishes the word wasn't used and that Mary Watkins had 
said "they stripped me".
CROSS EXAMINATION OF JOYCE BLUNDEN
I17. Defence establishes that Joyce Blunden had said at the earlier
hearing that she had been chased only once that night but that now 
she is alleging that it was twice.
GEORGE SMITH'S EVIDENCE
18. George Smith states that on the night in question while going to 
the outside toilet he heard a couple outside his back gate. The 
girl said hysterically "You've had what you wanted, can I go now?". 
Then he and his wife heard the girl say "I'm tired, will you let me
go, I have to go to work in the morning".
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19. He states that his wife went indoors and that he rattled the bolt 
to move the couple.
20. He went in but \\rhen he came out later he heard footsteps and a 
man's voice saying "I've got her mate round the corner".
21. George Smith says he heard footsteps across the waste ground again, 
and that he went indoors again.
22. On coming out again he heard the girl say "Please let me go, I will 
give you anything you want". He heard the man decide to let her go
and say "Don't go that way. Go that way.".
APPENDIX 8B (cont.)
23. Then he heard a girl's footsteps going down the entry towards Lyle 
Rd.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF GEORGE SMITH
24. Defence establishes that both could hear the bolt rattled and that 
he didn't hear sounds of violence, screaming or anyone in pain.
MRS. GODFREY'S EVIDENCE
25. In reply to questioning Mrs. Godfrey states that she lives three 
doors from Mary Watkini • home and that on November 5th at about 
11 pm, returning home from a visit to her sister's, she heard Mary 
Watkins call out to her in Vale St.. She states that Mary Watkins 
was very distressed and crying and that later at Joyce Blunden's 
home she saw that Mary Watkins' nose was bleeding. She then took 
Mary Watkins home.
APPENDIX 8B (cont.)
DOROTHY WATKINS * EVIDENCE
26. Dorothy Watkins, the mother of Mary Watkins, states that atebout 
11 pm on November 5th Mrs. Godfrey brought her daughter home with 
a red, swollen face, red upper arms, a blackened left wrist, nose 
bleed and crying terribly.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF DOROTHY WATKINS
27. Defence establishes that the swollen face may have been caused by 
crying.
28. Defence also establishes that Dorothy Watkins did not know of any 
boyfriends of Mary Watkins.
29. Dorothy Watkins was sure that Mary was quite innocent of what 
sexual relations were.
PROSECUTION READS EVIDENCE OF DR. GROSVENOR ,
30. Mary Watkins was examined on 6th November at 11.30 am. The doctor 
states that he found the condition of the hymen and vagina consis­
tent with partial penetration by the male organ, a condition that 
could have been caused otherwise.
31. There was no sign of recent tearing of the orifice, but it was 
possible that a woman whose vagina was already in such a condition 
could have sexual intercourse and there be little physical evidence 
afterwards.
32. A vaginal swab did not reveal the presence of spermatozoa nor was 
any foreign hair present on the patient's body.
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PET. CON. FOSTER*S EVIDENCE
33. Harrison was interviewed by me in the presence of P.C. Hemingway. 
Initially he denied (a) that he carried darts (one of the men 
alleged to have raped Mary Watkins was seen to recover darts),
(b) that he was connected with the affair at all (alleging he was 
in the Iron Lung public house). P.C. Hemingway went to investigate 
these claims and failed to substantiate them. On P.C. Hemingway's 
return Harrison produced darts from his pocket and admitted "It 
was me, I may as well tell you all about it".
34. After cautioning Harrison made the following statement
(i) "On Tuesday, I think it was after 10 o ’clock, I was in Victoria 
Rd. with two of my mates. We were standing outside a public 
house. I saw two girls standing on the opposite corner of 
Victoria Rd. I went over to them and they were talking to 
some lads. I got hold of one of the girls and took her down 
the entry.
(ii) "She never said much so I undid her trousers, they fell down. 
She had a pair of knickers on and I didn’t try to pull them 
down. I took my knob out and tried to put it between her 
legs but she wouldn’t. I got fed up with her so I let her go,
1 put my knob back in my trousers and walked out of the entry.
(iii) "I don’t know if anybody else went into the entry after me."
35» Bryce was seen by Det. Con. Foster on 11th November and invited to 
make a statement about the alleged rape. After cautioning he made 
the following statement
(i) "On bonfire night I was with a group of lads outside the public 
house on the corner of Victoria Rd. and Vale St. I saw Harrison 
go with a girl into the hollow in Victoria Rd."
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PET. CON. FOSTER'S EVIDENCE
33. Harrison was interviewed by me in the presence of P.C. Hemingway. 
Initially he denied (a) that he carried darts (one of the men 
alleged to have raped Mary Watkins was seen to recover darts),
(b) that he was connected with the affair at all (alleging he was 
in the Iron Lung public house). P.C. Hemingway went to investigate 
these claims and failed to substantiate them. On P.C. Hemingway's 
return Harrison produced darts from his pocket and admitted "It 
was me, I may as well tell you all about it".
34. After cautioning Harrison made the following statement
(i) "On Tuesday, I think it was after 10 o'clock, I was in Victoria 
Rd. with two of my mates. We were standing outside a public 
house. I saw two girls standing on the opposite comer of 
Victoria Rd. I went over to them and they were talking to 
some lads. I got hold of one of the girls and took her down 
the entry.
(ii) "She never said much so I undid her trousers, they fell down. 
She had a pair of knickers on and I didn't try to pull them 
down. I took my knob out and tried to put it between her 
legs but she wouldn't. I got fed up with her so I let her go,
I put my knob back in my trousers and walked out of the entry.
(iii) "I don't know if anybody else went into the entry after me."
35. Bryce was seen by Det. Con. Foster on 11th November and invited to 
mak.e a statement about the alleged rape. After cautioning he made 
the following statement
(i) "On bonfire night 1 was with a group of lads outside the public 
house on the corner of Victoria Rd. and Vale St. I saw Harrison 
go with a girl into the hollow in Victoria Rd."
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PET. CON. FOSTER * S EVIDENCE
33- Harrison was interviewed by me in the presence of P.C. Hemingway. 
Initially he denied (a) that he carried darts (one of the men 
alleged to have raped Mary Watkins was seen to recover darts),
(b) that he was connected with the affair at all (alleging he was 
in the Iron Lung public house). P.C. Hemingway went to investigate 
these claims and failed to substantiate them. On P.C. Hemingway's 
return Harrison produced darts from his pocket and admitted "It 
was me, I may as well tell you all about it".
34. After cautioning Harrison made the following statement
(i) "On Tuesday, I think it was after 10 o'clock, I was in Victoria 
Rd. with two of my mates. We were standing outside a public 
house. I saw two girls standing on the opposite corner of 
Victoria Rd. I went over to them and they were talking to 
some lads. I got hold of one of the girls and took her down 
the entry.
(ii) "She never said much so I undid her trousers, they fell down. 
She had a pair of knickers on and I didn't try to pull them 
down. I took my knob out and tried to put it between her 
legs but she wouldn't. I got fed up with her so I let her go,
I put my knob back in my trousers and walked out of the entry.
(iii) "I don't know if anybody else went into the entry after me."
35- Bryce was seen by Det. Con. Foster on 11th November and invited to 
make a statement about the alleged rape. After cautioning he made 
the following statement
(i) "On bonfire night I was with a group of lads outside the public 
house on the corner of Victoria Rd. and Vale St. I saw Harrison 
go with a girl into the hollow in Victoria Rd."
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(ii) "Sometime later I went to the hollow to make water. As I
got there Harrison was just leaving the girl."
(iii) "X spoke to the girl and asked her what was wrong, but she 
never said nothing, but appeared upset. I said something 
like *you had better go home' to her and she ran down the 
entry. That was the last I saw of her."
CROSS EXAMINATION OF PET. CON. FOSTER
3 6. Defence established that Mary Watkins never accused Harrison of 
making her nose bleed.
37« Defence also established that Bryce had always denied having 
anything to do with the girl.
DEFENCE*S CASE
EVIDENCE OF HARRISON
38. In reply to defence questions Harrison states that on November 5th 
he met Mary Watkins when he and others were coming down the street, 
and that he spoke to her and there were a lot of lads on the comer. 
He says that he did not chase her but that there was a lot of milling 
about.
39. Later he says he went with her to the entry and they were kissing 
for three or four minutes during which time she hadn't pushed him 
away or said no.
40. Asked whether anyone else was there, he states that Mary Watkins had 
said "as long as Bryce doesn't come". He also states that he asked 
her where she lived and other such questions.
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41. Harrison states that Bryce and some others were on the bomb 
debris.
42. He states that he then went home and that Mary Watkins had not 
objected to what he did to her. He also says that he didn’t 
see Bryce again.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF HARRISON
43. In answer to prosecution's questions Harrison states that he 
approached Mary Watkins (not with Bryce) when she was with a 
crowd of boys and put his arm on her shoulder and was speaking 
to her.
44. She was a stranger to him.
45« Harrison says that she soon came with him when he asked. He denies 
ever holding her by the wrist.
t
46. Prosecution reminds that in his statement he said "I got hold of 
one of the girls and took her down the entry."
47« He asserts that everything that took place was with her consent but 
that he never "got right in her" or even partly in because some 
lads came along.
48. Harrison asks what "penetration" means and says that when he told 
the judge previously "I had sexual intercourse with her" he had 
meant: "got it between her legs". Later he says that he does not
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41. Harrison states that Bryce and some others were on the bomb 
debris.
42. He states that he then went home and that Mary Watkins had not 
objected to what he did to her. He also says that he didn’t 
see Bryce again.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF HARRISON *1
43. In answer to prosecution’s questions Harrison states that he 
approached Mary Watkins (not with Bryce) when she was with a 
crowd of boys and put his arm on her shoulder and was speaking 
to her.
44. She was a stranger to him.
45. Harrison says that she soon came with him when he asked. He denies 
ever holding her by the wrist.
1
46. Prosecution reminds that in his statement he said "I got hold of 
one of the girls and took her down the entry."
47. He asserts that everything that took place was with her consent but 
that he never "got right in her" or even partly in because some 
lads came along.
48. Harrison asks what "penetration" means and says that when he told 
the judge previously "I had sexual intercourse with her" he had 
meant "got it between her legs". Later he says that he does not
APPENDIX 8b (cont.)
think that sexual intercourse is just putting your person between 
a girl's legs, but that it is "you have sexual intercourse with 
someone, and somebody has a. baby, I know that much".
49« To further prosecution questioning he says that the reason he'd 
said he'd had sexual intercourse with her when he'd only had it 
between her legs was that he thought it was the same thing.
50. Prosecution repeats his question about Mary Watkins resisting. 
Harrison asserts that she didn't except when the crowd came.
51« He is offered his police statement but says he can't read. He
asserts that he tried on two separate occasions to get it between 
her legs and succeeded once.
52. Prosecution persists with questions about Mary Watkin's alleged 
consent and Harrison says that he asked her to open her legs. 
Although she said no she did in fact open them.
53« Harrison agrees that he has not been telling the truth about this. 
He agrees with prosecution that he tried to force her legs open 
and that it was not with her consent.
54. He denies that he tried to rape the girl, but gives no answer when 
asked what he calls what he, in fact, said he did.
EVIDENCE OF BRYCE
55« In reply to defence questions Bryce says that on the night he went 
across the waste ground in Victoria St. "to make water". He saw
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some girl there. He asked her what was up and told her she ought 
to go home that way so as to avoid the lads on the corner.
56. He says that she ran down the entry and that he went back on the 
corner with the lads. He says that he did not have sexual inter­
course with her.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF BRYCE
57* In reply to prosecution questioning he says that he had seen Mary 
Watkins earlier in the evening but that she hadn’t been running 
away.
58. He admits chasing and catching Joyce Blunden, saying it was part of 
the general "skylarking about" of bonfire night.
59. He says he let Joyce Blunden go when she said she wanted to go 
home and asserts he never had hold of Mary Watkins.
|
60. He denies saying to Harrison "have you finished yet".
61. After persistent questioning Bryce still asserts that he went into 
the entry only once, that he found Harrison and the girl leaving, 
that the girl was fully clothed but distressed, that the only 
thing he said to her was about which way to go out of the entry.
62. He denies successively each statement of the girl's about what she
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some girl there. He asked her what was up and told her she ought 
to go home that way so as to avoid the lads on the corner.
56. He says that she ran down the entry and that he went back on the 
corner with the lads. He says that he did not have sexual inter­
course with her.
CROSS EXAMINATION OF BRYCE
57« In reply to prosecution questioning he says that he had seen Mary 
Watkins earlier in the evening but that she hadn't been running 
away.
58. He admits chasing and catching Joyce Blunden, saying it was part of 
the general "skylarking about" of bonfire night.
59* He says he let Joyce Blunden go when she said she wanted to go 
home and asserts he never had hold of Mary Watkins.
i
60. He denies saying to Harrison "have you finished yet".
61. After persistent questioning Bryce still asserts that he went into 
the entry only once, that he found Harrison and the girl leaving, 
that the girl was fully clothed but distressed, that the only 
thing he said to her was about which way to go out of the entry.
62. He denies successively each statement of the girl's about what she
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alleges he said or did to her and asserts that that part of the 
evidence given by the girl is a complete fabrication.
6 3. Bryce says at one point "No, I told her I would have nothing to
do with her in that respect" but immediately asserts it is a slip 
of the tongue and he had meant to say "I told you, sir, I had 
nothing to do with her in that respect".
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PROSECUTION1S SUMMING UP
Prosecution asserts that both accused are guilty and that in 
Harrison's case there is no thought of Mary Watkins' suffering 
during or after the act. He points out that Harrison admitted to 
sexual intercourse or at least putting his penis between her legs. 
Prosecution says Mr. Smith's statement is evidence that two men 
were involved in holding a girl in the entry against her will and 
that Mrs. Godfrey, Joyce Blunden and Mrs. Watkins' statements are 
evidence that physical assault had taken place.
In Bryce's case the prosecutor asserts that the decision about his 
concern about which way she went home was "fatherly" or otherwise 
and whether his story of uninvolvement with Mary Watkins is true 
or whether her version of his part is true.
The decision is whether to believe a young girl's story, substan­
tiated by three other witnesses or the story of two young men who 
admitted to chasing, sexual intercourse on various occasions.
APPENDIX 8B (cont.)
DEFENCE'S SUMMING UP
Only evidence presented in court should be considered and the defen­
dants should be acquitted if guilt is not certain. He says that the 
substantiated evidence about the girl's condition and behaviour is 
consistent with regret after the event rather than unwillingness 
for the act. He points out that Mary Watkins agreed to walk with 
Harrison and that three or four minutes of kissing took place. 
Harrison says this was followed by putting his penis between her 
legs and that such willingly indulged in behaviour might well have 
been tried immediately after. J.W.H.'s morals may well be reprehen­
sible but that doesn't constitute rape or attempted rape which are 
serious crimes.
As for Bryce the decision is a straight forward one of whose story, 
the girl's or his, is to be believed according to Defence. He points
APPENDIX SB (cont.)
out inconsistencies between her evidence here and in the Magistrate's 
court - who was with her when the bolt rattled, where, how and by 
whom she was hit. He suggested that if the girl's evidence seems 
fabricated or embellished the jury should not convict the men.
JUDGE'S SUMMING-UP
Rape means sexual intercourse with a girl or woman without her 
consent and by the use of force and fear. It is for you to decide 
whether Harrison and/or Bryce raped or attempted to rape Mary 
Watkins. Sexual intercourse means that there was at least partial 
penetration, full and complete intercourse is not necessary for this 
purpose. An attempt is something which falls short of the full 
offence. It is steps on the way to the commission of a crime which 
would be a crime if the act were completed. You have to be satisfied 
that there was the intention to commit rape before you can convict of 
an attempt.
The burden of proof lies on the crown from beginning to end, you 
must be satisfied that either of the accused is guilty before you 
can convict. The crown have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that 
the girl did not consent.
|When the woman makes a complaint of a sexual attack it is dangerous 
to convict on the word of the woman, you must look for corroboration 
of her evidence from a source other than herself. Corroboration 
means some evidence independent of the woman's evidence. Neverthe­
less if you feel justified you can convict on her evidence even 
though it is not corroborated. You can take evidence of the accused 
as corroboration if it agrees with the story of the complainer. The 
vital matter on which you should seek corroboration is the question 
of consent.
I would now like you to reach a verdict on each of the four charges.
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out inconsistencies between her evidence here and in the Magistrate's 
court - who was with her when the bolt rattled, where, how and by 
whom she was hit. He suggested that if the girl's evidence seems 
fabricated or embellished the jury should not convict the men.
JUDGE'S SUMMING-UP *I
Rape means sexual intercourse with a girl or woman without her 
consent and by the use of force and fear. It is for you to decide 
whether Harrison and/or Bryce raped or attempted to rape Mary 
Watkins. Sexual intercourse means that there was at least partial 
penetration, full and complete intercourse is not necessary for this 
purpose. An attempt is something which falls short of the full 
offence. It is steps on the way to the commission of a crime which 
would be a crime if the act were completed. You have to be satisfied 
that there was the intention to commit rape before you can convict of 
an attempt.
The burden of proof lies on the crown from beginning to end, you 
must be satisfied that either of the accused is guilty before you 
can convict. The crown have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that 
the girl did not consent.
I
When the woman makes a complaint of a sexual attack it is dangerous 
to convict on the word of the woman, you must look for corroboration 
of her evidence from a source other than herself. Corroboration 
means some evidence independent of the woman's evidence. Neverthe­
less if you feel justified you can convict on her evidence even 
though it is not corroborated. You can take evidence of the accused 
as corroboration if it agrees with the story of the complainer. The 
vital matter on which you should seek corroboration is the question 
of consent.
I would now like you to reach a verdict on each of the four charges.
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HARRISON - SUMMARY OF SORTING OF STATEMENTS BY 20 PERSONS
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r
r
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HARRISON -  SUMMARY OF SORTING OF STATEMENTS BY 2 0  PERSONS
*
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APPENDIX 9A - QUESTIONS AND OUTCOMES GIVEN TO SUBJECTS IN THE "SPECIFIED" 
TREATMENT
A. What decision do/did you think the firemen will/would reach?
OUTCOME PROBABILITY
(l) Firemen return to work & settle for 10% 
+ reduced hours + productivity deal i
1. . 1
(2) Firemen get 30% wage rise !i
(3 ) Firemen return to work & settle for 10% 
8c reduced hours
j
i
!
!
(4) Firemen get 10% wage rise now & guarantee 
of substantial increases in Nov *78 & '79
ji
1
i
(5 ) Compromise somewhere between IO & 20% 
+ reduced hours
1i
1
B. What do/did you think the part-time firefighters will/would do?
(l) Carry on as they had been doing
(2) Come out on strike in support of the 
Firemen's claim
.... .. .....................................
ii
i
(3) Stop helping the troops because of F.B.U* 
pressure !. 1
C. How long from Week 4 do/did you think the strike will/would go on?
(l) More than 4 weeks (from week 4) !
(2) More than 2 weeks (but less than 4)
|(3) From 1-2 weeks longer 1
(4) Less than a week
I
> .... . . _i
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D. What do/did you think the fire officers will/would do?
(l) Come out on strike for their own 40% 
wage claim
(2) Carry on working and assisting troops & 
pursue their own claim by negotiation
(3 ) Come out on strike in support of firemen's 
(F.B.U.) pay claim
(4) Carry on as they are and wait and see what 
firemen get before pursuing their own 
pay claim
E. How do/did you feel about
(l) The government pay policy
oppose support
t i l l  I I I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The firemen's 30p/o claim( 2 )
APPENDIX 9B - INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO SUBJECTS IN THE "SPECIFIED11
AND "GENERATE" TREATMENTS FOR EACH OF THE THREE CONDITIONS
(a) "SPECIFIED" - Condition I
The instructions given to subjects in foresight (Condition I) 
in this treatment ran as follows:-
This questionnaire is concerned with the current Firemen's 
dispute. You will find a brief summary of the events and 
related issues that have occurred over the past month.
Once you have read this would you please follow the instruc­
tions outlined in the questionnaire sheet.
Having read the description and drawing on your own know­
ledge of the situation would you please estimate the proba­
bilities of the possible outcomes of this dispute. I would 
like you to give each outcome a probability value from 
O - 100%
0% - there is no chance of the outcome happening 
100% - the outcome is certain
In the two hindsight conditions (6 weeks and 3 months after the 
strike had ended) the same subjects were given the following instruc­
tions
As you remember, some time ago, while the firemen's strike 
was still on, you completed a questionnaire by providing 
probabilities for the occurrence of a number of possible 
outcomes to the dispute. The present interest is in the 
relation between the quality of your predictions and your 
ability to remember these predictions. For this reason,I 
would like you to fill out once again the same questionnaire, 
which you completed then, giving the same probabilities which 
you gave then. If you cannot remember the probability yrhich 
you then assigned, give the probability which you would have 
given to each of the outcomes to the dispute.
Condition II. Subjects in this condition made only hindsight 
assessments to specified outcomes, their instructions ran as follows:-
This questionnaire is concerned with the firemen's strike 
which has just ended. You will find a summary of the first 
four weeks of the strike and a summary of how it ended.
Having read these would you please turn to the questionnaire 
sheet. On this I would like you to produce reconstructed 
probabilities - giving probabilities to the outcomes that you 
would have given during the strike. That is, try to think 
back to the middle of the strike, just before Christmas, and 
assign probabilities to the outcomes that you would have 
given then.
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In Condition III the above instructions were modified to exclude 
the reference to the "details" (i.e. summary of the first four weeks 
of the strike. After subjects had assigned likelihood assessments 
to the "specified" outcomes they were given the following instruc-
tions:-
Having completed the first part of the questionnaire I 
would now like you to read a brief summary of the events 
of the first four weeks of the strike (7th Nov. to 5th Dec.). 
Having done this I would like you again to produce recon­
structed probabilities for the various outcomes but in the 
light of the information given.
(b) "GENERATE" - Condition I
The instructions given to subjects in the foresight condition 
in this treatment were the same for the first paragraph in the 
"specified" treatment. After subjects had read the "details" they 
were given the following instructions:-
Having read the description and drawing on your own know­
ledge of the situation would you please list a series of 
outcomes (either likely, unlikely or in-between). Against 
the outcome 1 would like you to estimate the likelihood of 
its occurrence. I would like you to give each outcome a 
probability value from 0 - 100%
0% - there is no chance of it happening
10096 - it is certain to happen
!i
In the two hindsight conditions (6 weeks and 3 months) subjects 
received similar instructions as those given to hindsight subjects 
in the "specified" treatment of Condition I. The instructions were 
modified to indicate that subjects had themselves generated the 
outcomes.
In Condition II subjects received the following instructions 
on the cover sheet of the questionnaire:-
This questionnaire is concerned with the firemen's strike 
which has just ended. You will find a summary of the 
first four weeks and a summary of how it ended. What I 
would like you to do is to read this, then on the ques­
tionnaire sheet reconstruct a series of outcomes (either
APPENDIX 9B (cont.)
likely, unlikely or in between) that you think may have 
occurred while the strike was still on. I would then 
like you to produce reconstructed probabilities - giving 
the probabilities that you would have given during the 
middle of the strike, that is, try to think back to the 
middle of the strike, just before Christmas, and assign 
probabilities you would have given then to the various 
outcomes.
Instructions given to subjects in Condition III on the cover 
sheet of the questionnaire were similar to those given immediately 
above. The instructions were modified to exclude reference to the 
"details". After generating outcomes and assigning likelihood 
assessments subjects were then instructed to read the "details" 
and, in the light of the new information reconstruct foresightful 
assessments to the outcomes generated in the first part of the 
questionnaire.
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APPENDIX 9C - OUTCOMES PRODUCED BY SUBJECTS IN THE "GENERATE" TREATMENT 
AND THE CLASSIFICATION GIVEN TO THEM BY THE AUTHOR AND 
TWO JUDGES
Key: Numbers in last three right hand columns refer to the following
classifications of outcomes
1. Settle for 10% + guarantee of rises in November 1978 and 1979»
2. Firemen get 30% wage rise.
3. Settle for 10% + reduced hours.
4. Compromise somewhere between 10% - 20%.
5. Not applicable.
ISUB­
JECT OUTCOMES GENERATED
JUDGE
1
JUDGE
2
JUDGE 
3 *
CONDITION I - FORESIGHT !j
|
1 1. Victory to the firemen 2 2
------- +
2 !
2. Victory to the government 3 3 3
j 3« Victory to the government with a face saving formula for the firemen
1 4 4
i 4. Strike peters out as individual firemen 5 5 51 return to work
j 5. Strike continues indefinitely 5 5 5
2 1. Firemen settle for 10% only 3 3 3
2. Firemen settle for 10% + reduced hours + 
parity
1 1 1
i 3. Firemen are offered more than 10% but less than maximum demand
4 4 4
1 4. Firemen are offered and accept their 2 2 2maximum demands j 11
3 1. Strike continues indefinitely 15 : 5 1 5
2. Firemen accept new proposal l i i 1
3. Pay offer greater than 10% 4 4 ! 4
4. Further concessions leading to acceptance 1 4 4 | 5
4 1. Firemen accept less than 30% 4 1
—  
4 i 4ji
i
2. Government offer more than 10% + 
guarantee of parity
4 4 :
I
4
1
; 3. Both parties will settle at a point midway between 10% and 20%
4 4 4
|
* Judge 3 was the author
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! ISUB-1 
I JECT j OUTCOMES GENERATED
JUDGE
1
JUDGE
2
JUDGE
3i l
! 5 1i 1. Settle on terms of government offer 3 1 3 iI i 2. Settlement on terms of F.B.U. i.e. 
full claim
2 2
•
2
|
I 3. Compromise settlement of terms negotiated 
through C.A.B.
4 4 4
•
6 1. Government meets firemen's demands in full 2 2 2
2. Collapse of strike in next few days 3 1 3
3. Face-saving formula involving small over­
run of 10% limit
4 4 ! 4  ij
7 1. Firemen refuse latest offer and hold out 
for face-saving formula
_
4 !
—
4 ii
4
2. Firemen accept latest proposals and 
strike ends 1 1
1 i
' i
1
3- Firemen refuse latest government offer 
and government capitulates
2 2 12
4. Government meets all firemen's demands and 
strike ends within week
2 2 2
8 1. Accept 10% review 1 1 1
9 1. Firemen will agree to latest government 
offer
1 1 1
2. Strike continues for few weeks more but 
eventually firemen give in
1 1 3
3. Government will give in 2 2 2
io 1. Firemen's claim met in full 2 2 2
2. Firemen awarded 10-15% + guaranteed 
pay increments
4 4 4
3. Firemen awarded 10% + review + reduction 
in hours
4 1 1 |
4. Strike fails, firemen receive only 10% 3 3 3
11 1. Firemen accept present offer i.e. 10% 
+ review 1 1 1
2. Firemen accept present offer + reduction 
in hours
4 3 3
|3<> Offered 10% rise and accepted 4 4 4
12 1. Firemen get more than 10% 4 4 4
2. Firemen settling for only 10% 3 j 3 3 ,
3» 10%  now + review later 1 l 1
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SUB-! 
JECT' OUTCOMES GENERATED
t | JUDGE ;
! i
—
JUDGE
2
lJUDGE |13
13 i
i
1. F.B.U. demand met in full without 
further developments
2
i
2 2
2. Firemen settle on government offer of 
only 10% 3 3 3
iji
3. Government’s offer of productivity deal 
will be accepted without further develop­
ments
1 1 1
j_____ 4. Firemen get increase offer beyond 10% 4 4 4
! 14 1. Firemen get what originally went on 
strike for
2 2 2
i
1 2. Government make firemen special case 2 4 4
!
1
3» Final wage settlement will not be what 
it should be i.e. average industrial wage 
+ 10%
2 3 3
1 15 1. Firemen will settle for 10% 3 3 3
2. Firemen will settle for 10% now + a 
later award
1 1 1
3» Firemen will accept a national .average 
linked wage in exchange for giving up 
right to strike
4 1 4
CONDITION II
1
j
1. Settle in government guide lines 3 3 3
2. Settle within government guide lines + 
further guaranteed rises
1 1 1
i 3« Settle at a higher rate than 10% 4 4 4
2 1. Accept 10% now + parity later 1 1
—
1
2. Accept just 10% 3 3 3
3» Reject offer continue to press for 
original claim
2 5 5
* 3 1. Some men left their jobs as receiving no money while strike was on 5 5
! 2. Fire Officers alienated by firemen 5 5 5
4 ....1. F.B.U» accept government 10% offer + 1 i i
2. Government make firemen special case 
and give them rise they demand
2 ! 2
2
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SUB­
JECT OUTCOMES GENERATED
1 1 
1 JUDGE ;
1
JUDGE
2
1 1 JUDGE i
3
1. F.B.U. demand met in full without 
further developments
2
:
2 2
| 2. Firemen settle on government offer of 
only 10% 3 3 3
3. Government's offer of productivity deal 
will be accepted without further develop­
ments
1 1 1
j 4. Firemen get increase offer beyond 10% 4 4 4
14 1« Firemen get what originally went on 
strike for
2 2 2
}
lI 2. Government make firemen special case 2 4 4i
1
i
3. Final wage settlement will not be what 
it should be i.e. average industrial wage 
+ 10%
2 3 3
1 15 1. Firemen will settle for 10% 3 3 3
: 2. Firemen will settle for 10% now + a 
later award
1 1 1
i
3» Firemen will accept a national average 
linked wage in exchange for giving up 
right to strike
4 1 4
CONDITION II
1 1. Settle in government guide lines 3 3 3
2. Settle within government guide lines + 
further guaranteed rises
1 1 1 1
<
i 3. Settle at a higher rate than 10% 4 4 4
2 1. Accept 10% now + parity later 1 1 1
2. Accept just 10% 3 3 3
.1
3» Reject offer continue to press for 
original claim
2 5 5
1
! 3
i
1. Some men left their jobs as receiving 
no money while strike was on 5 5 ! 5j
I 2. Fire Officers alienated by firemen 5 5
I
5
4 1. F.B.U. accept government 10% offer + 1 1
................
i 1
2. Government make firemen special case 
and give them rise they demand
2 2 I 2
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SUB­
JECT OUTCOMES GENERATED
JUDGE
1
JUDGE
2
I
JUDGE
3
5 1. Accept 10% rise
------
3 3 3
2. 10% + guarantee of parity 1 1 1
3. Between 10 - 15% 4 4 4
4. Over 15% 4 4 4
5« 10% + promise that firemen not subject 
to future pay restraint
1 1 1
6 1. Accept improved offer 1 1 1
2. Public opposition against firemen - 
accept only 10%
3 3 3
1 3. T.U.C. offer support to firemen, govern­
ment give in
2 2 2
7 1. F.B.U* accept offer of week 9 1 1 1
2. F.B.U. backing down without immediate rise
i 3 3 5
8 1. 10% + reduction in hours + review 1 1 1
2. Government give in and allow 30% 2 2 2
3» Concession by government 20% wage increase 
+ review
4 4 4
4. T.U.C./government confrontation 5 5 5
9 1. Union go back without substantial 
increases
1 1 1
2. Firemen would gain more 2 5 4
3. Strike go on for longer than 9 weeks 5 5 5
io 1. Take first offer 3 3 3
2. Refuse all offers except one asking for 2 5 2
3. Take 10% + review *78 and »79 1 1 1
4. Take offer of January 1 1 1
11 1. Total defeat of firemen, i.e. only 10% 3 3
■-------1'
3
|1j 2. 12i%  + reduced hours 4 4 4
! 3. Parity with skilled workers by 1979 + 10% now
1 1 l
4. 30% rise 2 2 2
5« 10% + reduction in hours 3 1 3
6. Award in excess of 20% 4 2 4
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SUB­
JECT OUTCOMES GENERATED
JUDGE
1
JUDGE
2
JUDGE
3
12 1. 10% rise in litie with government guide- 3
»
3
-  -j
3
lines
2. 10% + guarantee of review in ’78 & '79 i 1
3. 30% to F.B.U. 2 2 2
: 4. 10% + free accommodation 3 5 5”1
13 1. Settle for 10% only 3 3 3
2. Intermediate settlement 4 4 4
3. Shorter hours + 10% 4 3 3
4. 10% now + promise of more later l l l
5. Push for higher claim 5 5 2 —  !
14 1. Government offer more 10% 4 4 4 !
2. 10% + reduced hours 4 1 3 !
3» 10% only + review 1 1 1
j 4. Union holds out for more 10% 4 5 4
1. Firemen accept offer by week 9 1 l 1 i
CONDITION III
1 1. Strike would be successful and government 2 2 2
would give in |
I 2. Compromise - 10% + reduced hours 4 3 I1
3» Strike unsuccessful and firemen go back •1 3 3
1 to work ! i
! 2 1. F.B.U. get 15-20% wage rise 4 4 4
2. Firemen help in emergencies 5 5 5
3 1. Offer 15% accepted 4 4 4
1
j 2. Accept original government offer • 3 3 3
| 3. Accept original government offer + parity 1 1 1
! 4. Offer 25% j 4 ! 2 2
! 4 1. Rejection of proposal 5 | 5 5
2. Accept proposal 1 1 1
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SUB­
JECT OUTCOMES GENERATED
JUDGE
1
5 1. Get what asking for 2
| 2. Reduction in hours + 10% 1!| 3. Strike lasting 2-3 weeks longer than it did
5 !i
6 1- End of strike on firemenfs terms i2 !
2. End of strike on employers' terms i :1
' 7i 1« Settle in 10% guideline but no guarantee future wage rises
T
3 ;
1111
2. Settle for 10% + guarantee better pay 
prospects
i
1
I1
3» 10% + fiddles, e.g. different grading 
structure, increased responsibility 
allowance
4
1i 4. Above 10% 4
i 5. Settle at firemen's original demand 2 i
8 1. Accept 10% instead of 30% 1 !! 2. Government gives 30% 2
i!L
3« 10% settlement accepted by firemen before
week 5
5
i 9 1. Offer over 10% 4j 2. Accept 10% offer 1 !
| 3. T.U.C. would call general strike causing government to call general election 5 !i!
1 10 1. Claim would be met in full 2
11 1. Strike continue until original demands 
met
2
• 2. Accept 10% and go back to work 1
JUDGE ; JUDGE
2 3______ i_________ ;
2 2
1 1
5 5
2
3
3 i
1 i
3
2
1
3 
1 
5
4
2
1
2
5
4
1
5
2
2
1
APPENDIX 11A - INFORMATION SHEET GIVEN TO SUBJECTS IN FORESIGHT CONDITION
The General Election of October 1974
This was the last General Election to be held. It was predicted that 
Labour would win with a fairly massive majority, but in the end the 
result proved to be close.
The outcome was as follows:-
Party Number of Percent share ofseats total votes cast
Labour 319 39.2%
Conservative 277 35-8%
Liberal 13 18.3%
Scottish Nationalist Party 11 2 .9%
National Front nil 0.4%
Others 15 3.4%
Total 365 Total 100%
This result gave Labour an overall majority of 3 seats.
Over the whole country Labour achieved a swing of 2.2% from Conservative
The overall turnout was 7 2.8% (this is the percentage of voters who
actually voted).
The forthcoming General Election
The state of the parties at going to the polls is as follows:- 1
Party Number ofseats
Labour 306
Conservative 281
Liberal 13
Scottish Nationalist Party 11
National Front 0
Others 20
Speaker and Deputies 4
Total 365
V-'  : î  V
I
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Bye-elections held since the last General Election have resulted in 
swings to Conservative. Those held in 1975, '7 6  and *77 resulted in 
an average swing to the Conservatives of 11.8%, those held in 1978 
have resulted in an average swing of 7.1% to Conservative from Labour.
The Result of the General Election of 3rd May 1979
In the run up to the General Election the Opinion Polls consistently 
predicted a Conservative majority. This proved to be the case. The 
final outcome was as follows
Party Number of Percent share ofseats total votes cast
Labour 268 36.9%
Conservative 339 43.9%
Liberal 11 13-8%
Scottish Nationalist Party 2 1.6%
National Front nil 0.6%
Others 15 3.2%
Total 635 Total 100%
This result gave the Conservatives an of ^  seats.
Over the whole country Conservative achieved a swing of 5.2% away from 
Labour.
The Liberals lost three seats, there being a 2.5% swing against them.
The National Front slightly increased their share of the vote; in 1974 
they polled 0.4% of the votes cast, they polled 0.6% of the votes cast 
in May 1979*
The Scottish Nationalist Party lost 9 seats, holding on to only 2.
The overall turnout at the General Election was 76% (this is the 
percentage of voters who actually voted).
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APPENDIX 11C - QUESTIONNAIRE GIVEN TO LABOUR & CONSERVATIVE SUBJECTS 
IN THE HINDSIGHT CONDITION
l(a) What did you think the result of the May 1979 General Election 
would be?
Would you please indicate this by estimating how likely you thought 
each of the following outcomes were, i.e. for each of the five possible 
outcomes would you indicate how likely you thought each was. Make 
your likelihood estimates in terms of percentages and ensure that 
the sum of your estimates total 100%.
OUTCOME LIKELIHOOD
1. Overall majority+ to Labour - i.e. a 
Labour Government.
* 2. Overall majority to Conservative - 
i.e. a Conservative Government.
3. Majority++ to Labour (but not an 
overall one) - leading to Labour 
Government by forming some kind of 
pact with a minor party.
4. Majority to Conservative (but not 
an overall one) - leading to a 
Conservative Government by forming 
some kind of pact with a minor party.
5. Other outcome, e.g. Liberal govern­
ment, National Front Government.
i___
An overall majority is where one party has more seats than 
all the other parties put together.
A majority is when one party has more seats than any other 
party but does not have an overall one.
In the rest of this questionnaire you will find that you are asked 
to estimate the likelihood of possible outcomes on a 7-point scale. 
To indicate what you think put a vertical line along the scale such 
that it corresponds to your estimate. Please do this for each scale 
provided. For example:-
7 1
your
estimate
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l(b) Would you indicate below for the same outcomes how surprised you
would have been if it had occurred. Do this on the 7-point scales
associated with each outcome.
1. Overall majority to Labour i.e. a 
Labour Government.
7
1
1
1
SURPRISED NOT
SURPRISED
* 2. Overall majority to Conservative 
- i.e. a Conservative Government.
(
1
1
1SURPRISED NOT
SURPRISED
3- Majority to Labour (but not an 
overall one) - Leading to Labour 
Government by forming some kind 
of pact with a minor party.
7
1
1
JSURPRISED NOT
SURPRISED
4. Majority to Conservative (but not 
an overall one) - Leading to a 
Conservative Government by 
forming some kind of pact with a 
minor party.
7
1
1
. 1
SURPRISED NOT
SURPRISED
5. Other outcome e.g. Liberal Govern- f
ment National Front Government SURPRISED------------- NOT
SURPRISED
2 At the October 1974 General Election the turnout was 7 2 .8%. How large
did you think the turnout would be at the May 1979 General Election?
Would you indicate this by assessing the likelihood of the following
possibilities :
1 . Greater than 78% 7 1 1
VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
* 2. Between 73 - 78% 7 1 j
VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
7 13. About the same as before, i.e. 1 |
between 71 - 73% VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
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4. Between 68 - 71%
VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
5. Less than 68% 7i
1
I
VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
What did you think the swing at the May 1979 General Election would be?
For either one of the major parties to have won the General Election
there would have had to have been a swing in votes to that party.
Would you please indicate on the 7-point scales how likely you thought
each of the swings listed below were:
1. Swing to Labour of more than 10% 71
1
1VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
2. Swing to Labour of between 5 - 10% 7i
1
VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
3. Swing to Labour of between 2 - 5% 71
1
1VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
4. Swing to Labour of between 0.1-2% 7
|
1
1VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
5. No swing to either Labour or 7l
1
! 1
VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
6. Swing to Conservative of between 7 1
0.1 - 2% 1 1VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
7. Swing to Conservative of between
2 - 5%
7
i
1
VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
8. Swing to Conservative of between 
5 - 1 0 %
7
l
1
. r |VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
9. Swing to Conservative of more 7 1
than 10% i fVERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
V»' ' J; <*■
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4 Swings to Labour or Conservative have, of course, consequences for 
the number of seats each party ends up with. However, there can be 
a disparity between the size of the national swing and what happens 
locally. Thus the number of seats predicted from a certain swing 
may not be the same as that actually achieved. For this question would 
you estimate how likely you thought the lead in seats (if any) was 
likely to be. As a rough guide the swing needed to achieve this is 
given in brackets.
Estimate how likely you thought the following majorities (not overall 
majorities) were on the 7-point scales provided for the possible 
outcomes listed below.
APPENDIX 11C (cont.)
1. Labour majority of greater than 
150 seats (about 3% swing to Lab) VERY
LIKELY
JNOT VERY 
LIKELY
2. Labour majority of between 
lOO - 150 seats (about 2-3% 
swing to Labour) VERYLIKELY
NOT VERY 
LIKELY
Labour majority of between 
40 - 100 seats (about 0 - 1 %  
swing to Labour) VERYLIKELY
NOT VERY 
LIKELY
4. Labour majority of between 
0 - 40 seats (about 0 - 1 %  
swing to Conservative) VERYLIKELY
NOT VERY 
LIKELY
5. Conservative majority of between 
0 - 40 seats (about 1 - 3 %  swing 
to Conservative) VERYLIKELY
NOT VERY 
LIKELY
* 6. Conservative majority of between 
40 - 90 seats (about 3 - 5 %  swing 
to Conservative) VERYLIKELY
NOT VERY 
LIKELY
7. Conservative majority of greater 
than 90 seats (about 5% swing or 
more to Conservative) VERYLIKELY
NOT VERY 
LIKELY
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5 Three questions concerned with how you thought the LIBERALS would 
fare at the May 1979 General Election.
(a) At the General Election in October 1974 the Liberals polled 18.3%
of the votes (about 5.5 million votes). What percentage did you think 
they would poll in the May 1979 General Election? Indicate this by 
estimating how likely you thought each of the following outcomes were:
1. Poll more than 25% of the votes
2. Poll between 19 - 25% of the 
votes
3. Poll about the same (17 - 19%)
* 4. Poll between 12 - 17% of the 
votes
5. Poll less than 12% of the votes
7 1
I__VERY
LIKELY
7
i__VERY
LIKELY
7
i__VERY
LIKELY
7
1__VERY
LIKELY
7
I__VERY
LIKELY
JNOT VERY 
LIKELY
JNOT VERY 
LIKELY
JNOT VERY 
LIKELY
JNOT VERY 
LIKELY
JNOT VERY 
LIKELY
(b) How likely did you think the following swings for Liberal were?
1. More than 5% to Liberal
2. Between 3 - 5% to Liberal
APPENDIX 11C (cont.)
(c) National swings might not accurately reflect seats lost or gained. 
This being the case would you estimate how likely you thought the 
following number of seats for Liberal were. (At the time of going 
to the polls Liberal had l4 seats). As a rough guide the swing
needed to achieve these seat numbers is given.
More than 30 seats (swing of 
more than 5% to Liberal)
7
i
1
JVERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
Between 23 - 30 seats (swing 
of 3 - 5% to Liberal)
7
t
1
JVERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
Between l4 - 23 seats (swing 
of 1 - 3% to Liberal)
7
1
1
JVERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
The same number of seats 
(no swing either way)
7
i
1
JVERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
Between 6 - 1 2  seats (swing of 
1 - 3 %  away from Liberal)
7
1
i
JVERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
Between 4 - 6  seats (swing of 
3 - 5 %  away from Liberal)
7
i
1
iVERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
Less than 4 seats (swing of 
more than 5% away from Liberal)
7
i
1
1VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
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6 THE NATIONAL FRONT At the General Election of October 1974 the National
Front polled 0.4% of the votes cast (this represents about 140,000 votes). 
How well did you think they would fare in the May 1979 General Election? 
Would you indicate this by estimating how likely you thought each of the
following outcomes were.
1. Poll more than 1% of the votes cast
* 2. Poll between 0.4 - 1% of votes cast
3. Poll about the same (0.4%)
4. Poll between 0.2 - 0.4% of votes 
cast
5. Poll less than 0.2% of votes cast
7 1
I__VERY
LIKELY
7
— INOT VERY 
LIKELY
1
I__VERY
LIKELY
7
_1NOT VERY 
LIKELY
1
I________________________________ 1VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
7 1
|__
VERY
LIKELY
7
_tNOT VERY 
LIKELY
1
I_______________________ 1VERY NOT VERY
LIKELY LIKELY
7 THE SCOTTISH NATIONALIST PARTY At the General Election of October
1974 the Scottish Nationalist Party had 11 seats. How many did you think
they would get in May 1979?
Would you indicate this by estimating how likely you thought each of the
following outcomes were.
1. More than 20 seats (swing of more 
than 4% to the SNP)
2. Between 13-20 seats (swing of 
about 3% to SNP)
3. Between 10-12 seats, i.e. about 
the same
4. Between 6-10 seats (swing of 
about 2% away from SNP)
* 5. Less than 6 seats (swing of about 
3% away from SNP)
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8 Which party did YOU want to see in office (i.e. form a Government) 
following the General Election? Please tick one of the following
APPENDIX H C  (cont.)
appropriate ++
(a) Conservative
(b) Labour
(c) Liberal
(d) Other (please specify)
9 Who did you vote for in the General Election? Please tick one of the 
following as appropriate: ++
(a) Conservative
(b) Labour
(c) Liberal
(d) Other (please specify)
THIS INFORMATION WILL BE TREATED AS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND ONLY 
USED FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION IN FILLING IN THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE - IT IS VERY MUCH APPRECIATED. THANK YOU.
<i «•
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APPENDIX 12 - DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS
Experiments investigating hindsight bias/creeping determinism 
reported in this thesis have all, with the exception of Experiment 8, 
used non-parametric statistics. There were two sets of reasons for 
this: those concerned with (l) assumptions underlying the use of
parametric tests; (2) the distribution of responses subjects gave in 
the various experimental treatments.
Parametric statistics, such as the t test and analysis of variance, 
whilst estimating population parameters also make three major assumptions 
about the population from which the data was drawn, and the data itself. 
These assumptions are that (l) the samples were drawn randomly from the 
population; (2) the data should be normally distributed; and (3) the 
data should be at least on a true interval scale. Some comment on each 
will show why non-parametric statistics have been used in this thesis.
The first assumption could be met by the experiments in question.
In all these experiments samples were randomly drawn, within particular 
specified constraints, and subjects were randomly allocated to experi­
mental treatments.
The second assumption, that scores should be normally distributed 
could not, in general, be met. This was for two reasons, (l) the 
number of subjects in each experimental treatment was between 10 and 15. 
With such numbers one would hardly expect the responses to be normally 
distributed. On its own this problem would not be too severe but does 
become so in light of the second reason. (2) The subjective likelihood 
assessments given by different people to the same scenario and outcome 
in the same experimental treatment showed great variation. On some 
occasions the range of assessments given by subjects asked to express 
their likelihoods in percentages was O to 100. This merely demonstrates 
that opinions differed as to the likelihood of outcomes. Hence with 
such a range of responses from a small sample the data could not be con­
sidered as being normally distributed, but as skewed.
The third and final assumption, that the data should be on a true 
interval scale, could not be met either. In the experiments where
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subjects were asked to make assessments in terms of percentages 
(Experiments 1, 2, 3i 5 and part of 6) it might appear that the data 
was on an interval scale. However, it became apparent, from asking 
subjects and looking at patterns of responses, that this was not so.
Two reasons can be cited: (l) if one subject gave a response of 
30% and another a response of 6C>%, it did not imply, as is required, 
that the latter saw the outcome as twice as likely as the former. We 
need to have some indication that such a relationship would hold for 
it to be classified as interval scale data. (2) In one experiment 
(Experiment 5) subjects were not instructed to ensure that the per­
centages for each of the outcomes to a question totalled 100%. Adding 
assessments to a number of outcomes to a question showed some to be 
in excess of this figure. Given this we can hardly assume that an 
assessment of 30% by a subject whose percentages totalled 100% meant 
that outcome was half as likely when a subject gave an assessment of 
60% but the total was in excess of 100%. For these two reasons, then, 
the data cannot be considered as being on a true interval scale and 
must be regarded as ordinal.
The second set of reasons for using non-paramet.ric statistics 
concerns, as indicated earlier, the distribution of likelihood assess­
ments given by subjects. As indicated above there was often quite a 
range of responses. To compute means and use parametric statistics would 
have given undue weight to the extreme values. This is especially true 
if subjects gave responses within a relatively narrow range and one or 
two gave extreme responses. The mean would be unrepresentative in such 
cases, particularly where N is small. (I am grateful to McCauley & 
Jaques, 1979 for this argument).
The above two sets of reasons meant that medians and non-parametric 
statistics were appropriate in the experiments being discussed here.
To summarise, the assumptions of a normal distribution and the data 
being on a true interval scale could not be met. Furthermore, the dis­
tribution of responses indicated that parametric statistics were appro­
priate as they are less sensitive to the presence of a few extreme scores 
than parametric statistics.
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Two of the experiments (Experiment 5 and 6) reported in this 
thesis have been accepted for publication in the British Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology. In the course of the review process 
and from personal communications with Fischhoff one comment has 
appeared consistently. This has centred round the suggestion that 
the studies have low power due to relatively small sample size. Simply 
stated the problem is, according to Fischhoff (personal communication), 
"the chances of detecting significant hindsight effects diminishes with 
small sample sizes." Fischhoff's research, typically, used between 20 
and 30 subjects per treatment, that reported in this thesis used 
between IO and 15 per treatment.
The above problem raised by the reviewers and Fischhoff is not a 
simple one, however. We not only want to know how reliable an effect 
is (here hindsight bias/creeping determinism), but also, and just as 
importantly, how strong the effect is. The two issues are related 
because we are only interested in reliable effects if they are also 
reasonably strong ones.
To appreciate the issues more fully a general discussion of sample 
size, significant differences and the strength of an effect will first 
be given. This will be followed by a consideration of how these issues 
relate to the experiments reported in this thesis.
j
In estimating the number of subjects needed in an experiment two 
major factors need to be considered: (l) how big a difference between 
experimental treatments is considered important; (2) whether the 
research is concerned with replication or extension of previous 
findings.
APPENDIX 13 - SAMPLE SIZE
The first factor refers to what is technically known as "strength 
of association" (Keppel, 1973» Linto & Gallo, 1975; Hays, 1973). The 
significance level obtained from the application of a statistical test 
tells us no more than a relationship between variables exists at a 
specified level of probability. It follows that although the relation­
ship is a real one it might also be a weak one. The strength of associa­
tion between the experimental treatments and resultant behaviour tells us 
how strong or weak this relationship is.
If «*• V / &
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Two of the experiments (Experiment 5 and 6) reported in this 
thesis have been accepted for publication in the British Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology. In the course of the review process 
and from personal communications with Fischhoff one comment has 
appeared consistently. This has centred round the suggestion that 
the studies have low power due to relatively small sample size. Simply 
stated the problem is, according to Fischhoff (personal communication), 
"the chances of detecting significant hindsight effects diminishes with 
small sample sizes." Fischhoff's research, typically, used between 20 
and 30 subjects per treatment, that reported in this thesis used 
between 10 and 15 per treatment.
The above problem raised by the reviewers and Fischhoff is not a 
simple one, however. We not only want to know how reliable an effect 
is (here hindsight bias/creeping determinism), but also, and just as 
importantly, how strong the effect is. The two issues are related 
because we are only interested in reliable effects if they are also 
reasonably strong ones.
To appreciate the issues more fully a general discussion of sample 
size, significant differences and the strength of an effect will first 
be given. This will be followed by a consideration of how these issues 
relate to the experiments reported in this thesis.
J
In estimating the number of subjects needed in an experiment two 
major factors need to be considered: (l) how big a difference between 
experimental treatments is considered important; (2) whether the 
research is concerned with replication or extension of previous 
findings.
APPENDIX 13 - SAMPLE SIZE
The first factor refers to what is technically known as "strength 
of association" (Keppel, 1973; Linto & Gallo, 1975; Hays, 1973). The 
significance level obtained from the application of a statistical test 
tells us no more than a relationship between variables exists at a 
specified level of probability. It follows that although the relation­
ship is a real one it might also he a weak one. The strength of associa­
tion between the experimental treatments and resultant behaviour tells us 
how strong or weak this relationship is.
397.
The strength of association measure is in terms of the amount of 
variance accounted for, and is sometimes estimated by the use of the 
following general formula (Linton & Gallo, 1975, p.332):
APPENDIX 13 (cont.)
Where analysis of variance is used strength of association is calculated
The point about this index, whichever formula is used to calculate 
it, is that sample size exerts a great influence upon it. As Rosenthal 
& Gaito (1 9 6 3) show, if two experiments are run, one with an N of 5 and 
one with an N of 20 and both yield a significant result at P = 0.05 
it is the one with the smaller sample size that yields greater strength 
of association. With sample size constant the smaller the value of 
the greater the strength of association.
Ideally, psychological research should aim at obtaining reliable 
differences which also account for a reasonable proportion of the 
variance (10% or more is the figure usually accepted). However, under 
certain circumstances we may find these two criteria to be in conflict. 
This happens because there is a trade off between the power of a test 
(Cohen, 1962, 1 9 6 9) and strength of association between variables.
The power of a statistical test refers to the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. It is calculated 
using B , which gives the probability of committing a Type II error. 
Generally, the probability of committing a Type II error decreases as 
sample size increases, hence increase in sample size increases the power 
of a statistical test.
Q2 + N
where rm estimate of the strength of association 
numerical value of the inferential statisticQ
N the sample size
2using omega squared (w ) (Hays, 19 6 3).
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We are now in a position to consider the above discussion in terms 
of hindsight bias/creeping determinism. As mentioned earlier, one 
potential problem with the studies reported in this thesis is their low 
power. By using small sample sizes relative to those in Fischhoff's 
original studies one may reduce the chances of detecting significant 
hindsight effects if they exist. Tversky & Kahneman's (l97l) "Law of 
Small Numbers" deals in detail with this problem.
This is only a problem, however, if we are dealing with an effect 
which is relatively weak (i.e. accounts for only a small proportion of 
the variance) in the first place. It is not possible to determine the 
size of the hindsight effect from published research. It will be 
recalled from Chapter 3 that the work of Fischhoff and his colleagues 
was criticised on the grounds that, among other things, their presen­
tation of data and statistical analysis provided little or no insight 
into how strong an effect hindsight bias/creeping determinism is. The 
main argument for this (see p. ) came from the criticism that they 
failed, on the whole, to provide inferential statistical treatment to 
individual experimental conditions.
In designing and analysing the experiments reported in this thesis 
it was originally assumed that the hindsight effect was a reasonably 
strong one. Hence sample size, within certain limits, was not con­
sidered to be a methodological problem. It soon became apparent, as. 
the results in the early experiments (which were actually designed 
and run before the ones appearing later in this thesis) indicated, was 
not as strong as researchers seem to have assumed.
APPENDIX 15 (cont.)
The assumption was, then, that using 10 to 15 subjects in each 
experimental treatment, as most of the experiments reported here do, 
would provide adequate statistical power and, more importantly, give 
a better indication of the strength of the effect. Using such numbers 
it was further assumed that effects due to outcome knowledge, if found, 
would be interesting ones and ones which might apply outside of the 
laboratory.
399.
In summary, the issue of sample size is an important consideration 
in the context of the experiments reported in this thesis. If the 
concern was solely replication of Fischhoff's results then the number 
of subjects in each treatment would have had to have been considerably 
incieased. However, as the interest, overall, was with the magnitude 
of the effect smaller sample sizes are justified.
The statistical tests used to investigate foresight/hindsight 
differences have, throughout this thesis, been non-parametric. Unfor­
tunately, as Linton & Gallo (1975) Jioint out: "little attention has been 
paid to developing strength of association measures for ordered data" 
(p«333). Such formulae exist for the Kruskal-Wallis test, Friedman test 
and the Rank-sums test, but not for the non-parametric tests used in 
this thesis.
APPENDIX 13 (coni.)
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A t t e n t i o n  i s  d r a w n  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
c o p y r i g h t  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  r e s t s  w i t h  i t s  a u t h o r .
T h i s  c o p y  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  h a s  b e e n  s u p p l i e d  
o n  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  a n y o n e  w h o  c o n s u l t s  i t  i s  
u n d e r s t o o d  t o  r e c o g n i s e  t h a t  i t s  c o p y r i g h t  r e s t s  
w i t h  i t s  a u t h o r  a n d  t h a t  n o  q u o t a t i o n  f r o m  
t h e  t h e s i s  a n d  n o  i n f o r m a t i o n  d e r i v e d  f r o m  i t
i
m a y  b e  p u b l i s h e d  w i t h o u t  t h e  a u t h o r ’ s  p r i o r  
w r i t t e n  c o n s e n t .
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